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CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Gelyke Kanse and Others v Chairperson of the Senate, Chairperson of the Council and the University of Stellenbosch

CCT 311/17 Date of hearing: 8 August 2019 ________________________________________________________________________

MEDIA SUMMARY

________________________________________________________________________

The following explanatory note is provided to assist the media in reporting this case and is not binding on the Constitutional Court or any member of the Court.

On Thursday, 8 August 2019 at 10h00, the Constitutional Court will hear an application for leave to appeal directly to it against the judgment and order of the High Court of South Africa, Western Cape Division, Cape Town (the High Court). This case concerns the decisions of the Senate and Council of Stellenbosch University (the University) to adopt a new language policy for the University (2016 Policy). The 2016 Policy was adopted under the Higher Education Act and the National Language Policy for Higher Education (LPHE).

The 2016 Policy creates three language specifications: parallel medium, dual medium and single medium. Its effect is to adopt a preference for English in certain circumstances so as to advance the University’s goals of equal access, multilingualism and integration while also maintaining and preserving Afrikaans, subject to demand and within the University’s available resources. The University contends that the 2016 Policy, in contrast to the preceding policy, the 2014 Policy, does not exclude black and English- speaking students from full and equitable access to the University.

Gelyke Kanse is a voluntary association originally formed to oppose the 2016 Policy but which now has broader goals in seeking to promote Afrikaans mother-tongue education and the acceptance of mother-tongue education as indispensable to community development. Further applicants include black and white students of the University affected by the 2016 Policy. They approached the High Court seeking an order reviewing and setting aside the 2016 Policy and reinstating its predecessor, the 2014 Policy.

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The High Court dismissed the application. First, the Court held that white Afrikaans and white English speakers are the beneficiaries of apartheid and are an economically and educationally advantaged group. This is of particular importance as the Constitution and the LPHE are mandated to address past discrimination. In determining whether the provision of education in an official language of choice is “reasonably practicable” in terms of section 29(2) of the Constitution, the State must take into account what is fair, feasible and satisfies the need to remedy the results of past discriminatory laws and practices.

Second, the High Court held that the assessment of what is reasonably practicable requires consideration both of resource constraints and logistics (the factual criterion), and of equity, redress and non-racialism (the constitutional criterion). Therefore, what is logically possible, but constitutionally offensive, is not reasonably practicable. The High Court found that the 2014 Policy was not equitable as it denied black students access to the University.

Third, the High Court found that the University’s obligations under section 29(2) of the Constitution are limited to providing Afrikaans education where reasonably practicable and through reasonable educational alternatives. In addition, the High Court held that Afrikaans is not an “indigenous language” as contemplated in section 6(2) of the Constitution, since the provision refers to “the historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages”. This clearly excludes Afrikaans, which received massive support during apartheid in contrast to indigenous African languages.

The High Court found further that the LPHE was important as a guiding document but it was not binding on the University. Rather, it is a policy guideline from which universities are free to depart, when justified. In this case, the University had adequately justified its departure from the LPHE. In any event, the Court found that the 2016 Policy is consistent with the LPHE, which focuses on ensuring equitable access.

In the Constitutional Court, the applicants contend that although section 6 of the Constitution may not impose a self-standing obligation on individual universities, it is relevant to the assessment of language policies and the interpretation of section 29. In addition, section 6(4) places an obligation on the State to regulate and monitor the use of all official languages to ensure parity of esteem and equitable treatment. The applicants argue that the ongoing phasing-out of Afrikaans does not accord with the positive obligation imposed on the State by section 6(4) of the Constitution as well as the LPHE.

Further, the applicants contend that universities have to adopt language policies which are subject to the LPHE. The LPHE aims to promote multilingualism along with equity and access to higher education. According to the applicants, the 2016 Policy amounts to a retrogressive measure for first language Afrikaans-speaking students which the University has failed to justify. Finally, the applicants assert that the University’s decision-making was unduly influenced by the demands of the Open Stellenbosch collective.

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The University and its office-bearers contend that the test of what is reasonably practicable comes directly from section 29(2) of the Constitution. Hence the right to tuition in one’s own language exists only when it is reasonably practicable for this to be provided. The obligation under section 6(2) of the Constitution rests on the State and not on individual universities. The Constitutional Court’s decision in Afriforum v University of Free State disposes of this matter.

Further, the University contends that the 2014 Policy was not reasonably practicable as it was inconsistent with the demand in section 29(2) of the Constitution for equity and redress. They point out that the 2014 Policy may even constitute unfair discrimination as it violates section 9 of the Constitution and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act. Afrikaans-speaking students have no right under section 29(2) of the Constitution to demand Afrikaans tuition beyond what the University is reasonably able to provide without excluding black students.

In addition, the University argues that it is best placed to make the determination of what blend of different language specifications best serves its students, staff and goals. The Court should intervene only to the extent that the University has acted irrationally or unconstitutionally. In this regard, the University denies that the decision to adopt the 2016 Policy was influenced by the Open Stellenbosch collective. The adoption of the 2016 Policy followed a fair and thorough process, in which the University considered representations from stakeholders, including responses to online surveys, public comment on the draft policy, submissions and detailed feedback from Council, Senate, faculties and external counsel.

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