The MEC pleaded that the applicant's claim was time-barred under the Prescription Act. 32 In Frieslaar NO v Ackerman [2018] ZASCA 3 par 27 it was held that the defendants' obligation to pay transfer costs and other related costs in the sales agreements constitutes a debt as contemplated by section 10(1) of the Prescription. Prescription generally comes into effect when the creditor has acquired the right to claim the debt as stipulated in section 12, subsection of the Act. And a claim for reinstatement or compensation under the LRA must also be contemplated within the meaning of "debt" in the Limitation Act.
In Sondorp, however, the question was whether the claim for reinstatement prescribed in terms of the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. Three issues were common in all three cases, namely: (a) whether the Limitation Act applied to arbitration awards made in terms of the LRA; (b) what limitation period applied to such arbitration awards; and (c) whether an application brought to review and set aside an arbitration award interrupts the running of prescription, or otherwise constitutes an impediment to the running of prescription as contemplated in section 13(1) of the Limitation Act. A review to set aside an award was not a "process by which the creditor demands payment of the debt", which in terms of section 15 of the Limitation Act would interrupt the running of limitation.
4 3 The Mogaila judgment
On any approach taken in Myathaza v Metrobus, she was entitled to proceed with the certification of the award made pursuant to s 143 of the LRA.104 Ultimately, the court held that the reinstatement order made in favor of Ms Mogaile the arbitrator did not prescribe in terms of the Limitation Act.105.
4 4 The FAWU v Pieman’s Pantry decision
In other words, although the LRA requires expediency in legal proceedings, "it is not intolerant of delay. These differences between the two statutes are, in my view, sufficiently significant to constitute inconsistency as contemplated by section 16(1) of the Prescription Act. If indeed the drafters of the LRA had intended to incorporate the Prescription Act, they would have expressly done so.
If the claim is referred to after the expiry of the three-year period provided for by the Limitation Act, the employer can invoke the Limitation Act "sledgehammer" and take the point that the claim prescribed and, with or without good reason, the claim is 'dead'.”125. The LRA is concerned with periods which do not necessarily lead to the extinction of the claim in the event of non-compliance, whereas the purpose of the Limitation Act is to achieve extinction in the event of non-compliance. To the extent that the Limitation Act will apply to actions for the collection of debts, the question arises whether, given the admittedly unique and context-sensitive nature of the LRA, there is a principled incompatibility in trying to interpret the Limitation . Act in a manner that makes it applicable to the LRA dispute resolution process.
However, this is not the case with the inclusion of labor rights in the Law of Rights, which signaled an important and seismic development in the recognition of workers' rights. 134. ii) Is the request a "debt" according to the statute of limitations? 135. The decision referred to the court's approach in Mdeyide, which considered whether the Limitation Act was consistent with the Road Accident Fund Act and held that it was "a search bound to fail". If we were to consider, in the present case, the wording of section 210 of the LRA (which provides that the provisions of the LRA shall apply in the event of a conflict between it and the provisions of any other law), the meaning of the word.
When asked whether the deadlines set in Article 210 of the ZRA were inconsistent with the provisions of the Act on Limitation, it was pointed out that although both Acts deal with deadlines, they do so for different reasons and to achieve different goals. Therefore, in terms of section 210 of the LRA, the provisions of the LRA do not conflict with the provisions of the Prescription Act.
Thus, when the dispute was referred to the Labor Court for adjudication on 16 March 2005, it clearly did not prescribe.148. While limitation has been broadly identified as limiting the right of access to courts,150 the operation of the provisions of section 12 has been described as the necessary balance between certainty and fairness by introducing the necessary flexibility when a debt becomes enforceable and when prescribed such debt.151 However, it must be borne in mind that flexibility in the LRA is not of the open kind. Failure by a party to comply with time frames requires an application of condonation which will be granted if good reasons are given for the delay.
The principle of fairness to both sides contained in the "good cause" exercise is similar to the approach taken by the court in Links v MEC152 in interpreting the Limitation Act: "I would say no more than that the consciousness that is created to bear on these two different but compatible pieces of legislation proves the same golden thread - fairness to both sides and certainty in the process".153. Finally, Kollapen AJ found that both the Limitation Act and the LRA seek to achieve goals that are compatible with each other, namely the efficient and timely resolution of disputes within a specific time frame within their respective spheres. They do not promote different and inconsistent litigation imperatives – rather they can and have coexisted in an integrated manner.154.
Consequently, Cele J dismissed the annulment application in court.158 Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court delivered its decision in Myathaza v Metrobus, which unfortunately provided a stalemate rather than a clear way forward; the court was evenly split on either side of the divide, one half holding that the Limitation Act applied to the LRA, while the other half held that it did not. Only in the subsequent case of FAWU v Pieman's Pantry did a clear majority emerge, holding that the Limitation Act applied to LRA litigation.159 Without necessarily repeating the discussion of Froneman J's decisions in Myathaza v Metrobus and that of the majority in FAWU v Pieman's Pantry, which the LAC advised should be read together,160 suffice it to say that Sutherland JA relied on several passages in both cases,161 and held that once it was accepted that the Limitation Act applied to all litigation under the auspices of the LRA, there is no rational basis for concluding that any aspect or stage of such litigation, including a judgment, is not subject to prescription. In light of Pieman's Pantry, the view of half of the Constitutional Court in Metrobus to this effect must now be accepted as a definitive statement of the law.
Having found that at the date Cele J heard the case, a total of 19 months could be counted as periods during which the statute of limitations ran in relation to Masana's rights; Thus, the case was returned to the Labor Court to deal with the foundation of the request for leave. 163.
The reinstatement was intended to take place in terms of an order made on 16 April 2007 by Cele AJ of the Labor Court. Rather, the employer was engaged in efforts to overturn the order of the Labor Court through the appeal processes. In other words, the employees' claim was a "judgment debt" in terms of section 11(d) of the Limitation Act.
The employer conceded that the claims for arrears of wages from 23 April 2007 to 28 September 2009 were new claims in contract and not a continuation of the unfair dismissal dispute that existed between the parties.166. That dismissal must include repayment due in respect of the period 1 January to 22 April 2007. However, according to the Labor Appeal Court, the limitation period in respect of the claims for back wages for the period 23 April 2007 to 28 September 2009 was three years.
The workers took the employer's refusal to pay their back wages from 1 January 2007 to 29 September 2009 to the Constitutional Court in NUMSA obo Fohlisa v Hendor Mining Supplies (A Division of Marschalk Beleggings) (Pty) Ltd, 172 the employer claiming that the suit had anticipated. For the workers, NUMSA argued in support of the Labor Court's determination that back pay arising from reinstatement constituted a judgment debt and would only prescribe after 30 years in terms of section 11(a)(ii) of the Limitation Act. The significance of this date is simply that it is the order date.
As the first part of the claim was a judgment debt, the limitation period was 30 years. Therefore, the prescription could not have started to run before the date of restoration of their contracts.
6 CONCLUSION
Although the second part of the claim concerned a contractual claim, it was not time-barred either. The reasons given for this are very different from those in the first judgment.185 As far as the second period is concerned, the applicants have done so. Reinstatement involves reinstatement of the employment contract.186 Because the applicants involved were reinstated on September 29, 2009, that was the day on which their contracts were reinstated.
Accordingly, they could not have initiated legal proceedings for the payment of their wages before the date on which their contracts were reinstated. In other words, they could not have taken legal action to enforce contracts that were not in force, while the order for their reinstatement had been stayed because the employer appealed.187 The labor court therefore wrongly dealt with the case on on the grounds that the labor court The debts relating to the period from April 23, 2007 to September 15, 2009 became due on September 15, 2009 and were therefore time-barred no later than September 19, 2012 when the applicants initiated the relevant procedure.188.
