WEST AFRICAN UNITY
PHILIPPE DECRAENE
Author and African Correspondent of (Le Monde1
M O N R O V I A ,
capital of the Republic of Liberia, served as the setting during July of last year for the first meeting of Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and William Tubman, the governmental heads of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia. The meeting was a sign of the great acceleration in the steady change of Africa; for, since the accession of the Gold Coast to independence in May
1957 under the name of Ghana, the historic evolution of the Continent has altered its rhythm. On the morrow of the Second World War, the only independent States in Africa were Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia and the Union of South Africa. Today there are six m o r e : Libya, the formerly Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana and Guinea. In i960, Togoland, Cameroun, Sierra-Leone, the formerly Italian Somaliland, and Nigeria—the largest and most populous of the territories still under British rule—will achieve their independence. The Constitution of the £th French Republic makes—in Article 86—
provision for the right to independence.
Pan-Africanism is clearly on the march. The formation of
G
*Zr
A«%
?0 Sl SJ ^^?
* &
the F r e n c h C o m m u n i t y , t h e t w o Accra Conferences, t h e Leopoldville riots, t h e creation of t h e Mali Federation and the Ghana-Guinea U n i o n are each a step on the road towards t h e materialisation of t h e Pan-African ideal. W h e t h e r o r n o t it is likely to b e c o n s u m m a t e d in o u r t i m e , Pan-Africanism is never- theless o n e of t h e m o s t powerful forces at w o r k in t h e second half of o u r c e n t u r y . And the m e e t i n g of the t h r e e African statesmen, u n t h i n k a b l e less than t h r e e years ago, proves clearly that African unity has b e c o m e a positive reality. Yet the diffi- culties e n c o u n t e r e d at t h e m e e t i n g s h o w t o o that, in spite of t h e will to transcend national b a r r i e r s , t h e r e r e m a i n significant obstacles in t h e way of t h e ideal.
It was o n S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 ^ 8 , that M. Sekou T o u r e and D r . K w a m e N k r u m a h decided to u n i t e Guinea and Ghana and in this way form t h e nucleus of a U n i t e d States of Africa.
Reciprocal technical and administrative aid was p r o m i s e d ; and Ghana made £ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 available to Guinea for essential d e v e l o p m e n t . C o m i n g as it did at t h e t i m e of discussions on t h e European C o m m o n M a r k e t and t h e Free Exchange Z o n e , t h e u n i o n was seen in France as a manipulation of t h e British Foreign and Colonial Offices; it is believed that no such u n i o n w o u l d have taken place had t h e tension t h e n existing b e t w e e n Guinea and France n o t forced M . T o u r e to t u r n eastwards.
Be that as it may, t h e Ghana-Guinea U n i o n exists so far only in t h e o r y . No legal d o c u m e n t has as yet given it c o n c r e t e f o r m ; and t h e r e exist many factors w h i c h may yet p r e v e n t t h e realisation of a real and c o m p l e t e fusion of t h e t w o States.
T h e j o u r n e y of D r . N k r u m a h to Guinea in May, 194:9, has achieved no positive results b e y o n d a c o m m u n i q u e inviting t h e leaders of o t h e r African States to join t h e i r efforts to those of Accra and Conakry. T h e very fact that Ghana and Guinea remain in their respective m o n e t a r y zones m u s t c o m p r o m i s e the efficacy and efficiency of t h e U n i o n . Perhaps t h e real explanation of t h e U n i o n ' s inadequacy lies in the lack of u n d e r - standing b e t w e e n French- and English-speaking Africans. T h e considerable differences b e t w e e n t h e British and French colonial systems seem to have resulted in t h e creation of t w o W e s t Africas w h i c h r e m a i n fundamentally foreign to o n e a n o t h e r ; though h o w fundamentally, history m u s t decide.
Four months after t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n of t h e Ghana-Guinea U n i o n , 4 4 representatives of Senegal, D a h o m e y , Sudan and Haute-Volta m e t at Dakar and d e c i d e d — o n 17th January, 1959
—to regroup these four republics into a Mali Federation. The presidency of the Federal Assembly was entrusted to M. Mobido Keita. The 62 articles of the constitution—voted unanimously and by acclamation—stipulated Dakar as the capital, French as the official language, and Dahomey, Senegal, the Sudanese and Voltaic Republics as the four member States. The Federal institutions were to be three in number: the Executive was placed in the hands of the Federal President, who chooses his Ministers, two from each member State. The legislative power was vested in a Federal Legislative Assembly, elected for five years and made up of 12 delegates from each of the member States nominated by their respective legislative assemblies.
Any West African State was made able to join the Federation at any time, provided it was a republic and respected the separation of powers.
The Mali Federation, as it was then conceived, was an im- portant African entity. But, both economically and demo- graphically, the dominance of the Senegal-Sudan axis was crushing. Moreover, Dahomey and Haute-Volta were not only
" p o o r " partners, but reluctant ones. For Haute-Volta is greatly dependent economically on the Ivory Coast, while Dahomey is traditionally more closely linked with Lagos or Niamey. This explains why ratification of the new constitution met with great difficulties at Ouagadougou and Porto-Novo.
The referendum organized in March, 19^9, in the Haute-Volta Republic was a defeat for the federalists; and the Dahomey leaders, since the decision of the French government to build a harbour at Cotonou, have grown more antagonistic to the Mali Federation. Both republics have passed from the camp of M. Senghor to that of M. Houphouet-Boigny; they are no longer looking towards Dakar, but towards the Ivory Coast.
After the conference at Dakar on March 2^, 19^9, at which
the Parti de la Federation Africaine was born, a new Mali Union
was formed, uniting Senegal and Sudan into a Federal State
within the French Community. The Presidency of the Govern-
ment has been entrusted to M. Mobido Keita, and the Presidency
of the Assembly to M. Leopold Sedar Senghor. By limiting, for
the moment, its territorial ambitions to Senegal and Sudan,
this new Mali Federation has gained both in economic balance
and in cohesion; though differences of opinion exist between
the various leaders of the P.F.A., Dakar being less intransigent
in its attitude to France than Bamako.
Since t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n of t h e Mali Federation, a further t e r r i t o r i a l r e g r o u p i n g — t h a t of Senegambia—-has b e c o m e likely.
T h e 270,000 inhabitants of Gambia belong to t h e same e t h n i c grouping as t h e Senegalese, and historically t h e countries have close links. In D e c e m b e r , 1 9 ^ 8 , M . Mamadou Dia, head of t h e Senegalese g o v e r n m e n t , w e n t to Bathurst to p r o p o s e t h e creation of a customs u n i o n , t h e use of t h e Gambia river for the transit of Senegalese goods, technical and financial c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework of a c o m m o n organization, t h e fixing of t h e g r o u n d n u t p r i c e for b o t h c o u n t r i e s , and cultural exchanges.
It cannot be long before t h e British possession and t h e formerly F r e n c h o n e are linked t o g e t h e r .
In April, 19^9, Paris learnt that t h e governments of t h e Ivory Coast and t h e Voltaic Republic had signed an a g r e e m e n t in reply to t h e n e w Mali Federation. D o m i n a t e d by M. H o u p h o u e t - Boigny's allegiance to t h e F r e n c h C o m m u n i t y , t h e a g r e e m e n t was politically m o r e flexible and m u c h less basic. T h e h a r b o u r of Abidjan in the Ivory Coast b e c a m e a c o m m o n establishment, administered by a b o a r d on w h i c h b o t h republics are r e p r e s e n t e d . T h e Abidjan-Niger railway was to be used communally by b o t h c o u n t r i e s , and road t r a n s p o r t a t i o n was to be c o - o r d i n a t e d . T h e c o m m u n a l exploitation of postal services was to be studied, and a c o m p l e t e customs u n i o n was instituted, w i t h provision for an equitable distribution of t h e duties and taxes received.
A Comeil de VEntente was to regulate all affairs concerning b o t h g o v e r n m e n t s , and an inter-State C o n v e n t i o n w o u l d create the
" F o n d s de S o l i d a r i t e " p r o v i d e d for in t h e constitution of t h e Ivory Coast. Finally, a c o m m o n C o u r t of Appeal would sit in Abidjan until the Haute-Volta could acquire its o w n .
Although t h e Niamey-Abidjan e c o n o m i c axis seems less solid than t h e Ouagadougou-Abidjan one—mainly because it is longer
— a formal a g r e e m e n t was signed soon afterwards by Niger, t h e Ivory Coast and t h e Haute-Volta. D a h o m e y in its t u r n , after t h e fall of t h e Apithy g o v e r n m e n t , gave its c o n s e n t ; and the Sahel-Benin U n i o n o r t h e U n i t e d States of t h e Conseil de VEntente was b o r n .
Finally o n e m u s t m e n t i o n t h e Etats Associes Africains launched last February by P r e s i d e n t T u b m a n , a "friendly C o n v e n t i o n "
regulating navigation and c o m m e r c e among African States already—or soon to b e — i n d e p e n d e n t . Sufficiently flexible to allow each of t h e signatories to retain its national sovereignty and identity, t h e C o n v e n t i o n rejects any idea of political u n i -
fixation and is regarded w i t h grave doubts by t h e o r t h o d o x Pan-Africanists, w h o see in it an American m a n o e u v r e to sub- stitute for a U n i t e d States of Africa a flexible association m o r e acceptable to t h e European p o w e r s .
Yet, despite t h e e n o r m o u s advances in Pan-Africanism in so s h o r t a t i m e , serious obstacles r e m a i n in t h e p a t h of t h e ideal.
T h e n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t African States are jealous of their hard- w o n national sovereignty and r e l u c t a n t to s u r r e n d e r any part of it. It is for this reason that the leaders of Mauritania k e e p t h e i r distance from o t h e r black African States; and that Nigeria, soon to b e i n d e p e n d e n t , shows n o signs of wanting to delegate s o m e of its p o w e r s to Ghana in any i m m e d i a t e W e s t African Federation.
W i t h i n the States themselves, u n i t y m u s t first be accom- plished. Togo and D a h o m e y are sharply divided into a N o r t h and a S o u t h ; and in Guinea, t h e Christianised Soussous of t h e coastal zone keep strictly apart from t h e Islamised peoples of Fouta-Djallon. In Ghana, t h e b e t t e r - d e v e l o p e d coastal strip lives in uneasy p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h t h e n e i g h b o u r i n g Ashantis and Togoland, and m o r e uneasily still w i t h t h e u n d e r d e v e l o p e d and politically r e t a r d e d " N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r i e s " . In Nigeria, t h e Hausas of t h e N o r t h , w i t h t h e i r Moslem Emirs, fear t h e hege- m o n y of t h e i ' M e n of t h e S o u t h ' ' ; while t h e Baileke of Southern C a m e r o u n revealed their particularism in t h e elections of January, 19 5" 8.
M u c h of t h e disunity results, of c o u r s e , from t h e collision of e n t r e n c h e d chiefly privileges w i t h t h e establishment of universal suffrage. D r . N k r u m a h ' s principal difficulties have been w i t h t h e Chief of the A s h a n t i ; in Haute-Volta, those elements m o s t hostile to t h e Mali Federation are found mainly in t h e entourage of M o r o - N a b a , w h o reigns over 1,700,000 subjects living around O u a g a d o u g o u ; while t h e Ivory Coast authorities face a d e m a n d by t h e king of Assinia, H . M . Anion Ndoffu III, to rule i n d e p e n - dently over his tiny k i n g d o m of 8,000 k m s . and 4 ^ , 0 0 0 subjects.
T h e king and his councillors are n o w in Abidjan prison awaiting j u d g m e n t o n t h e charge of having " t h r e a t e n e d t h e security of t h e S t a t e " . In Guinea t o o , t h e very first m o v e of M . Sekou T o u r e has b e e n to suppress t h e chieftainships and strip all political p o w e r from t h e chiefs of Fouta-Djallon. M . Ahidjo, h o w e v e r , p r o m u l g a t i n g on January 1, 19^9, t h e n e w Statute of C a m e r o u n , inserted a clause e n t r e n c h i n g t h e rights of t h e chiefs; and t h e Nigerian authorities have created a C h a m b e r of Traditional Chiefs.
T h e clash of political personalities also plays a p a r t . T h e division of French Africa into t w o political clans is s o m e t h i n g m o r e than a quarrel b e t w e e n " f e d e r a l i s t s " and 'canti-federal- is t s " ; it is t h e result of t h e rivalry b e t w e e n Dakar and Abidjan, o r m o r e exactly b e t w e e n M. Senghor and M. H o u p h o u e t - Boigny, for t h e political leadership of F r e n c h W e s t Africa.
In British Africa, this struggle for leadership is focussed in t h e conflict b e t w e e n D r . N k r u m a h and M r . Azikiwe, and, w i t h i n Nigeria itself, in t h e rivalry for leadership of t h e State by M r . Azikiwe, M r . A w o l o w o and t h e Sadurna of Sokoto. Those w h o w o u l d over-emphasize t h e significance of such collisions, h o w e v e r , m u s t have been amazed by the visit of D r . N k r u m a h to Nigeria in February last year. Pan-Africanism is a living force t h r o u g h o u t W e s t Africa; t h o u g h personal rivalry m u s t t e n d to weaken it, and n o b o d y can p r e d i c t h o w the principal actors in any W e s t African C o n f e d e r a t i o n — D r . N k r u m a h , M. T o u r e , M r . T u b m a n , M r . A w o l o w o , M. Senghor, M . Dia, M . H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y and M . M o b i d o Keita—will submit to making o n e of t h e i r n u m b e r t h e star.
Linguistic obstacles cannot b e ignored. Knowledge of both F r e n c h and English is e x t r e m e l y rare in W e s t Africa; and, for the i m m e d i a t e future, t h e unity of French- and English-speaking c o m m u n i t i e s , as in t h e p r o p o s e d m e r g e r of the British and F r e n c h C a m e r o u n s , is likely to e n c o u n t e r severe practical difficulties in administration.
Economic obstacles are m o s t significant; and a U n i t e d States of Africa will doubtless create a n u m b e r of p r o b l e m s of e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n , b o t h in t h e fields of p r o d u c t i o n and i n v e s t m e n t . T h e difference in e c o n o m i c p r o s p e r i t y b e t w e e n Ghana and Guinea, for e x a m p l e , is likely to p u t Guinea u n d e r t h e e c o n o m i c tutelage of Accra. For Ghana is today t h e w o r l d ' s first p r o d u c e r of cocoa, t h e t h i r d of industrial diamonds, and t h e fifth of manganese. It has, m o r e o v e r , a population t w i c e that of G u i n e a ' s , a reserve fund of £ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , i m p o r t a n t bauxite deposits and an e x p o r t trade t e n times that of its p a r t n e r . In t h e field of African investments, difficult b u t inevitable choices will have t o b e m a d e ; and it will n o t b e easy to decide w h i c h p r o j e c t should be given p r i o r i t y over a n o t h e r . In t h e field of t h e e l e c t r o - m e t a l l u r g y of a l u m i n i u m alone, four projects are in c o m p e t i t i o n : t h e 'Volta River A u t h o r i t y ' in Ghana, t h e ' K o n k o u r e ' in Guinea, t h e ' K o u i l o u ' in t h e F r e n c h Congo, and t h e Tnga' in t h e Belgian C o n g o .
4
T h e young African States, weighted d o w n by heavy u n d e r - d e v e l o p m e n t , are reluctant to add to t h e i r b u r d e n s . Some of t h e m request financial aid from France w h i l e rather shamelessly refusing to link their fete w i t h that of their less p r o s p e r o u s n e i g h b o u r s . T h e Ivory Coast, thanks to its coffee and tobacco e x p o r t s , has an annual foreign c u r r e n c y surplus of 16 milliard francs; yet t h e m i d d l e classes, mainly African small-holders, w h o govern at Abidjan refuse to share these profits w i t h t h e m e m b e r s of a federation t h e very functioning of w h i c h may yet strike t h e m as too o n e r o u s . N e i t h e r Lagos n o r Ibadan wishes a c o m p r o m i s e of its existing p r o s p e r i t y by t h e integration of its local economy into a larger u n i t ; and this doubtless accounts for t h e l u k e w a r m a t t i t u d e of Nigerians towards W e s t African unity.
O v e r and above t h e purely African obstacles to be o v e r c o m e , t h e r e is t h e influence of t h e great p o w e r s and m o r e particularly that of France and Britain, each of w h i c h c o u n t r i e s a t t e m p t s , in its o w n interests, to r e g r o u p t h e African units a r o u n d itself.
G r e a t Britain, faithful to its fifteen year old policy of Teaving in o r d e r to stay', tries to establish African federations; w h i l e France, w h i c h has always r e j e c t e d i n d i r e c t r u l e and still possesses a vague nostalgia for assimilation, dreams of a federal republic 'from t h e R h i n e to t h e C o n g o ' .
T h e British colonial system has o f t e n — n o t unreasonably—
b e e n c o m p a r e d w i t h that of Carthage, t h e F r e n c h w i t h that of R o m e . T h e British always placed t h e i r c o m m e r c i a l interests above any humanitarian responsibilities, discouraging the e c o n o m i c and social d e v e l o p m e n t of their colonized peoples w h e r e such was n o t to their clear e c o n o m i c benefit. If the) practised i n d i r e c t r u l e , it was mainly to avoid t h e high cost o administration and c o n c e n t r a t e o n high i n v e s t m e n t r e t u r n s Yet n o t only was t h e British g o v e r n m e n t t h e first to grant in d e p e n d e n c e to a colonial t e r r i t o r y ; b u t , having o n c e agreec to i n d e p e n d e n c e for t h e Gold Coast, it released D r . N k r u m a l from jail to offer h i m t h e p r e m i e r s h i p . And by subordinating Nigerian i n d e p e n d e n c e to t h e r e t e n t i o n of those federal link w h i c h Britain herself had created, it successfully p r e v e n t e d th<
balkanisation of t h e huge t e r r i t o r y . By playing off local rivalries t h e British g o v e r n m e n t could have split t h e c o u n t r y u p i n t o thre<
o r four separate and c o m p e t i n g u n i t s ; b u t by having full con fidence in its African e l i t e , it w o r k e d for its o w n interests leaving intact o n e of t h e greatest e c o n o m i c and political unit of Africa and assuring Britain's o w n e c o n o m i c future. Recog
nizing t h e intensity and potential of Pan-Africanism, t h e British have j o i n e d — a n d so s t r e n g t h e n e d — t h e c u r r e n t . T h e policy is already paying dividends. Since Ghana achieved indepen- d e n c e , its w h i t e p o p u l a t i o n has d o u b l e d ; and t h e G o v e r n o r - General at Accra has m o r e effective a u t h o r i t y than t h e High C o m m i s s i o n e r of t h e F r e n c h Republic at L o m e , w h i l e at t h e same t i m e being less severely criticised by t h e p e o p l e he administers.
T h e legalistic t u r n of t h e F r e n c h m i n d , accentuated by t h e brains' t r u s t of lawyers w h o govern t h e £th Republic in ignorance of African realities, has formulated t h e c o n c e p t of t h e Com- munaute. Faithful to t h e assimilationist idea, France wants Paris—and n o t Dakar o r Abidjan o r Tananarive—to b e t h e c e n t r e of t h e C o m m u n i t y . To t h e Pan-African ideal she replies w i t h t h e ideal of Eurafrica, a p r o j e c t w h i c h has already b e e n strongly c o n d e m n e d by t h e majority of responsible African leaders. T h e g r e a t e r d e g r e e of a u t o n o m y that t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t has r e c e n t l y given to t h e t e r r i t o r i e s u n d e r its c o n t r o l , t h e existence of an i m p o r t a n t French-speaking elite, t h e increasing e c o n o m i c i n v e s t m e n t by France and t h e encourage- m e n t she is giving to social d e v e l o p m e n t — a l l this will greatly help t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e Presence Francaise in Africa. But o n e factor has roused suspicion against h e r — t h a t France refused to give de facto i n d e p e n d e n c e to h e r f o r m e r colonial possessions, forcing t h e m to choose b e t w e e n i n d e p e n d e n c e and c o n t i n u e d m e m b e r s h i p of t h e C o m m u n i t y . T h e authors of t h e £th Republic have chosen a federal system around France and look askance at any inter-African r e g r o u p i n g ; in t h e minds of many of France's p r e s e n t leaders, t h e desire for unity in Africa masks t e r r i t o r i a l o r personal ambitions at variance w i t h t h e interests of France. It is this defensive reflex w h i c h explains, at least in p a r t , w h y t h e appeal by Mali for an effective r e g r o u p i n g of French W e s t Africa awakened no response in Paris.
It is easy to conclude from this that France favours the balkan- isation of Africa, and Britain t h e unity. But t h e p r e s e n t French c o n s t i t u t i o n p e r m i t s any n u m b e r of political a r r a n g e m e n t s , from t h e m o s t rigid federal system to a loose confederacy. T h e inevitable head-on collision b e t w e e n M . Senghor and M . Houphouet-Boigny has n o t yet taken p l a c e ; and t h e r e is no reason w h y F r e n c h c o m m o n - s e n s e should n o t c o m e to t e r m s w i t h Pan-Africanism, and t h e partisans of a French C o m m o n w e a l t h prevail over t h e defenders of a strict federal o r t h o d o x y .