Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:M:Mathematical Social Sciences:Vol37.Issue1.Jan1999:
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Suh (Suh, S., 1997. Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash. Social Choice and Welfare 14, 439 2 447.) considered a decision making problem where there are a set of
We derive additive and multiplicative criteria for individual decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria to obtain new justifications of known social choice rules with
I show that if there is sufficient uncertainty, the game has an equilibrium (essentially a subgame perfect equilibrium) in which two players enter at distinct positions simul-
In Qin (1996) it is shown that there is a unique allocation rule that is component efficient and results in a link formation game with a potential in the restricted case where
It generalizes the well-known Referendum Paradox to the non-dichotomous choice case, and shows that all Condorcet choice rules are sensitive to the design of the apportionment of
We note that in the limit, when the size of the market tends to infinity, we obtain the continuous model of Sattinger and retrieve his characterization of the core of the game in
Keywords: Social choice; Social decision rules; Normative constraints; Rationality conditions; Aggregation operator; Arrow theorem; Ordinal relation..
With this model I verify the congru- ence hypothesis in the absence of side-payments and transaction costs: the proportional and equal-division rules always mobilize at least
