Having outlined an approach for understanding entities in terms of single and multiple levels of analysis, it is now possible to consider variables and constructs and their relationships in conjunction with the entities to specify four simple, yet comprehensive theories for a new kind of OB. As noted earlier, each theory consists of two variables, an association between them, and a specification of the levels of analysis at which they are expected to operate (i.e., entities for which they are asserted to hold). These ‘‘little ideas that can be well tested’’ are simple ‘‘rules’’ [inWolfram’s (2002)terms] that can account for or explain a variety of behaviors and actions in OB.
A THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND
more important it becomes to maintain a relationship with that organization;
as the number of side bets increases, so does the commitment.Staw (1976) describes this escalation of commitment to a chosen course of action. The psychological mechanism seems to be powerful enough that individuals continue to commit to various entities or courses of action even when facing continual negative consequences (Staw, 1976). ForMeyer and Allen (1984, 1991), continuance commitment occurs when the cost of leaving (an organization) is perceived as prohibitively high, causing the employee to remain at the organization.
In brief, individuals, when faced with various alternative courses of action – options or behaviors – appear to become more committed to certain entities as options decrease (i.e., continuance commitment;Meyer & Allen, 1984), as side bets increase (i.e., other options are cut off or viewed as not feasible; Becker, 1960), and as their calculations regarding such costs, investments over time, and lack of alternatives become more salient (‘‘calculative commitment’’; Hrebiniak & Alutto, 1972; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). As such, for individuals, things persist over time and involve a rejection of feasible alternatives that, presumably, are less desirable. We refer to this process simply as option cutting (also seeNaughton, 1982).
An interesting issue here is (1) whether these individual differences are a reflection of relatively stable individual traits or characteristics such that we can observe interindividual differences where commitment and option cutting vary from person to person or (2) whether these individual differences shift or develop over time such that we can observe intraindividual differences where commitment and option cutting change within persons.
The former view is a whole-person perspective; the latter is a person-parts perspective. Both are plausible levels of analysis alternatives for defining and explaining the option cutting–commitment connection (seeNaughton, 1982).
Given these points, it seems useful to elaborate some notions about commitment (especially to organization, roles, and superiors), option cutting (and its various forms or types), and person level of analysis issues to develop a testable theory of these ideas.
Specific Formulation
In terms of commitment, psychological attachments to organizations, roles (or jobs), and one’s superior/supervisor have all been the subject of prior work (e.g.,Mathieu & Zajac, 1990;Meyer et al., 2002, 2004). Organizations in general, and work roles (or occupations) and supervisors in particular, are
an important part of our lives. Oftentimes, beyond spending a large portion of their working hours in organizations and in work roles as well as interacting with superiors, individuals identify with their organizations and jobs and endorse or adopt the values espoused by their superiors. As such, our interest in commitment per se is more specifically focused on an individual’s psychological attachment to his or her (1) organization, (2) role, and (3) superior. In terms of option cutting, several different mechanisms or types may be involved (seeNaughton, 1982).
First, individuals can display an option-cutting orientation. In other words, perhaps owing to personality traits or characteristics, some individuals may have a greater propensity to seek out and evaluate information on options relative to one another. They might then be more inclined to cut off options as compared to other individuals.
Second, this process may be behavioral based and evidenced in terms of option-cutting actions. Some individuals may cut options by engaging in behaviors or actions that preclude or prevent them from engaging in other forms of behavior. Physical activities, emotional energy, and psychological efforts are all limited in some way, so engaging in some activities means not partaking in other ones.
Finally, environmental option-cutting is setting- or context-based. In this case, because of various situational constraints or contingencies, individuals may find themselves in environments or contexts where they do not know about options or alternatives or cannot gather information to evaluate them. Their location in such situations may result either from their own choices or from factors beyond their control.
When considered together, it seems plausible that option-cutting orientation, option-cutting actions, and environmental option cutting are associated with commitment to an organization, a work role, and a superior based on individual differences (i.e., the person level of analysis). A variety of OB and related literatures appear to support this assertion at the person level of analysis as well as in terms of both stable trait differences (between-persons view; i.e., wholes) and changes in individuals over time (within-persons view; i.e., parts).
At what is often recognized as the beginning of OB, March and Simon (1958) extended the classical economics view and discussed the notions of
‘‘bounded rationality’’ and ‘‘satisficing.’’ Individuals are not able to pursue multiple courses of action simultaneously because of physical (space–time) and biological restrictions. Moreover, they often do not know or cannot even conceive of the consequences of their actions because information is not 100% complete or accurate, nor is unlimited information processing
time available to assess costs and benefits of alternatives. As such, individuals make rational decisions within limits (bounded rationality) that are satisfactory rather than optimal in nature (satisficing). Individuals are, therefore, viewed as restricting their alternative courses of action or cutting off options that are unknown, viewed as not feasible, perceived as not available, and so on. The more options that are cut or eliminated, the more individuals become committed to the options that remain.
Choices or investments that individuals make in various courses of action can explain their attitudes such as commitment to an organization, job, or superior.Becker’s (1960)discussion of side bets aligns with this view. As a function of time, the cost of leaving a system (e.g., organization) increases because an individual has made more and more bets or developed extraneous interests in the system, and as such remains committed to staying. This ‘‘consistent behavior’’ – that is, consistent lines of activity – implies a rejection by the individual of feasible alternatives, resulting in a
‘‘commitment by default’’ (see Becker, 1960). An underlying issue for side bets is that by placing these bets, an individual gives up other alternative courses of actions or options.
In a related development,Staw (1976)noted that even in light of negative consequences, individuals tend to hold to a decision and continue investing in a failing course of action, rather than reversing the decision. Individuals appear to continue to commit to these decisions because their behavioral actions prevent them from entertaining or engaging in other options.
Individuals cannot optimize their decision, so they use satisficing criteria to justify remaining with the current option and cut off other options (also see March & Simon, 1958). This strategy then yields an escalation of commit-ment to the current course of action (seeStaw, 1976).
The preceding discussion suggests two different possibilities to account for how individuals cut options and become committed (also see Naughton, 1982). First, at the person level of analysis, the option cutting–commitment relationship may be based on stable traits or enduring characteristics of individuals. In this case of interindividual differences, option cutting and commitment are properties of individuals and vary from person to person (between-person differences or a wholes perspective). For example, worka-holics, by their very nature, may be more committed and cut off more options than non-workaholics. Even so, if option cutting and commitment are viewed as individuals’ stable traits, then organizations might make selection decisions based on these constructs and their specific dimensions.
Second, and also at the person level of analysis, the option cutting–
commitment relationship may evolve over time as shifts or changes occur
concomitantly for the two main constructs and their specific dimensions. In this case of intraindividual differences, option cutting and commitment constitute an internal process that varies within each person (within-person differences or a parts perspective). For example, a state of cognitive dissonance or tension might motivate a person to change his or her option cutting, and therefore commitment, so as to restore harmony or balance in the individual’s life. If option cutting and commitment are viewed as changeable internal processes of individuals, then organizations might make training and development decisions based on them.
A third possibility is that a shift in levels of analysis – rather than a shift in variables – occurs over time [see Dansereau et al. (1999) for a detailed explanation of this phenomenon] for the option cutting and commitment relationship. In this case, a parts (or wholes) view of option cutting and commitment at a focal time period might ‘‘transform’’ up (or down) to a wholes (or parts) view at a subsequent time period. While this process is plausible, as are the other two previously mentioned views at the person level of analysis, in the spirit of simplicity endorsed here, as well as based on the more traditional view in the literature (seeBecker, 1960;Mathieu & Zajac, 1990;Meyer et al., 2002, 2004), we offer below what we believe is the more likely alternative as an initial assertion for empirical testing in future work.
In summary, these notions result in the following specific testable formulation:
Option-cutting orientation, option-cutting actions, and environmental option cutting are positively related to commitment to an organization, commitment to a role, and commit-ment to a superior based on between-employee differences (interindividual differences or whole employees).
Etiology of the Effect
Why do we expect this person-level hypothesized effect to hold? Or, stated differently, from an evolutionary theory perspective (Gould, 2002), does the effect make a difference in terms of the human condition and survival? We believe that this effect may matter because without it, or something like this effect, it would likely be impossible for individuals to make decisions and stay with or attach to them. The hypothesis means that an individual can commit to a course of action and pursue it. Without this capability, or something similar to it, when faced with a threat, there would be too many (virtually unlimited) options to pursue, and the individual would likely experience analysis paralysis. In such a situation, if a predator was starting
to attack, this paralysis would have resulted in extinction. Thus this effect, or something like it, may be quite important for the survival of humans.
Those individuals with capabilities to cut options and become committed may have been likely to pass that characteristic on in an evolutionary sense.
As an additional issue, if a person is committed, how can that commit-ment change? For a change to occur requires that a new set of behaviors or choices arise, such that then the commitment changes. But these behaviors and choices will be resistant to change until the person perceives that the current behavior or option does not satisfy him or her any longer, and that it no longer warrants commitment. In other words, the person would become dissatisfied with the current choice and no longer remain committed to it.
Barring such a situation, the original option remains the viable one that the person follows.