Conclusion - The Epistemology of Augmented Reality

Part 3: The Epistemology of Augmented Reality

6. Conclusion

In order to solve the problem of the traditional account of knowledge, according to which justification is the ability to provide reflectively accessible positive rea-sons in support of one’s beliefs, a number of epistemologists have suggested that knowledge is true belief that is the product of a cognitive ability. According to this alternative, a belief-forming process may count as a knowledge-conducive cognitive ability if and only if it has been cognitively integrated on the basis of processes of mutual interactions with other aspects of the agents’ cognitive

 For further considerations on how the hypothesis of extended cognition might invite a rec-onceptualisation of current legal theorising and practices, and especially of how we should per-ceive the right against personal assault, see Carter/Palermos (forthcoming).

system. One of the advantages of this approach is that it allows knowledge and justification to be extended to such artifacts as telescopes, microscopes, smart-phones and Augmented Reality systems. Augmented Reality systems, however, rely on deceptive reality augmentations that could significantly deteriorate the epistemic efficiency of users’ cognitively integrated natures. This could lead to a form of ‘augmented skepticism’, whereby it will be impossible to tell augment-ed from physical reality apart. In order to solve this problem, epistemology should play an active role in the design of future Augmented Reality systems and practices. To this end, this chapter has put forward some initial suggestions, concerning the training of Augmented Reality users and the design of certain re-ality augmentation features. This is but a first step to ensuring that our everyday epistemic practices won’t be easily disrupted by the advent of Augmented Reality technologies. To avoid such threats it is important to not undermine the impact that philosophical engineering (Halpin 2013, Hendler/Berners-Lee 2010, Halpin et al. 2010, Palermos forthcoming), in general, and epistemological design, in particular, can make on the development of emerging technologies.

Acknowledgements

I am very thankful to Duncan Pritchard and Panagiotis Kourtesis for their thoughtful comments on a previous draft of this chapter.

References

Abraham, F. S./Abraham, R. H./Shaw, C. (1990): A Visual Introduction to Dynamical Systems Theory for Psychology, Santa Cruz, Ca: Aerial Press.

Bach-y-Rita, P./Kercel, S. W. (2003): “Sensory Substitution and the Human- Machine Interface”. In: Trends in Cognitive Science 7(12), 541–546.

BonJour, L. (1985): The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.

BonJour, L. (2002): “Internalism and Externalism”. In P. Moser (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 234–264.

Carter, J. A./Kallestrup, J./Palermos, S. O./Pritchard, D. (2014): “Varieties of Externalism”.

In: Philosophical Issues 24(1), 63–109.

Carter, J. A./Palermos, S. O. (forthcoming): “The Ethics of Extended Cognition: Is Having Your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault?”. In: The Journal of American Philosophical Association.

Chisholm, R. M. (1977): Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Clark, A. (2007): “Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defence of the Extended Mind”. In: The Journal of Philosophy 104, 163–192.

Augmented Skepticism: The Epistemological Design of Augmented Reality 147

Clark, A./Chalmers, D. (1998): “The Extended Mind”. In: Ananlysis 58(1), 7–19.

Goldman, A. / Beddor, B. (2015): “Reliabilist Epistemology”. In: E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/

entries/reliabilism/

Greco, J. (1999): “Agent Reliabilism”. In: Philosophical Perspectives 13, 273–296.

Greco, J. (2004): “Knowledge As Credit For True Belief”. In: M. DePaul/L. Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 111–134.

Greco, J. (2007): “The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge”. In: Philosophical Issues 17, 57–69.

Greco, J. (2010): Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halpin, H./Clark, A./Wheeler, M. (2010): “Towards a Philosophy of the Web: Representation, Enaction, Collective Intelligence”. In: Proceedings of the WebSci10: Extending the Frontiers of Society On-Line. Retrieved from http://journal.webscience.org/324/

Halpin, H. (2013). “Does the Web Extend the Mind?”. In: Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM Web Science Conference. Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2479972.

Hendler, J./Berners-Lee, T. (2010): “From the Semantic Web to Social Machines: A Research Challenge for AI on the World Wide Web”. In: Artificial Intelligence 174(2), 156–161.

Menary, R. (2007): Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbound, Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan.

Noë, A. (2004): Action in Perception, Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.

Palermos, O. (2011): “Belief-Forming Processes, Extended”. In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2, 741–765.

Palermos, S. O. (2014a): “Loops, Constitution, and Cognitive Extension”. In: Cognitive Systems Research 27, 25–41.

Palermos, S. O. (2014b): “Knowledge and Cognitive Integration”. In: Synthese 191(8), 1931–1951.

Palermos, S. O. (2015): “Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge”.

In: Synthese 192(9), 2955–2986.

Palermos, S. O. (2016): “Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic Anti-Individualism”. In: Erkenntnis 81(2), 305–334.

Palermos. S. O. (forthcoming): “Social Machines: A Philosophical Engineering”.

In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Palermos, S. O./Pritchard, D. (2013): “Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology”.

In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2(8), 105–120.

Pappas, G. (2005): “Internalist versus Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification”.

In: E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stan-ford.edu/entries/justep-intext/

Poston, T. (2008): “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology”. In: B. Dowden & J. Fieser (eds.), Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from www.iep.utm.edu/int-ext/

Pritchard, D. (forthcoming): “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology”. In: Journal of Philosophy.

Pritchard, D. (2009): Knowledge, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pritchard, D. (2010a): “Knowledge and Understanding”. In: A. Haddock / A. Millar / D. H. Pritchard (eds.), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Pritchard, D. (2010b): “Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis”. In: Synthese 175 (1), 133–151.

Pritchard, D. (2013): What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, London and New York: Routledge.

Pryor, J. (2001): “Highlights of Recent Epistemology”. In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52, 95–124.

Roberts, J./Yaya, L./Manolis, C. (2014): “The Invisible Addiction: Cell-phone Activities and Addiction Among Male and Female College students”. In: Journal of Behavioral Addictions 3(4), 254–265.

Rowlands, M. (2009): “Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive”. In: Philosophical Psychology 22(1), 1–19.

Steup, M. (1999): “A Defense of Internalism”. In: L. Pojman (ed.), The Theory of Knowledge:

Classical and Contemporary Readings Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 310–321.

Wilson, R. A. (2000): “The Mind Beyond Itself”. In: D. Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations:

A Multidisciplinary Perspective, New York: Oxford University Press, 31–52.

Wilson, R. (2004): Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Augmented Skepticism: The Epistemological Design of Augmented Reality 149

Bolesław Czarnecki and Tadeusz Czarnecki

Is Augmented Reality a Source of New Types of Knowledge?

Abstract: Some everyday cases of cognition show how computers functioning within Plain Reality give us a new type of knowledge. In contrast, the project of Augmented Reality is epistemologically challenging because it proposes hy-brid scenarios which are friendly for cognitive agencies but infuse them with Virtual Reality (VR) overlay that is alienated from reality. Working with the as-sumption that Augmented Reality is ontologically heterogeneous, as it mixes ex-periences of individual objects with exex-periences of models, we examine its cog-nitive usefulness. We argue that insofar as our cogcog-nitive contact with Augmented Reality-based simulations may be even better than the celebrated contact with reality, there is room for extending the notion of knowledge.

Keywords: knowledge-that, knowledge-how, skill, Augmented Reality, model, simulation, registration, instrumental value.

1. Introduction

Pieces of knowledge-that may be interpreted as products of cognitive agents who, for example, transform their veridical experiences into true beliefs. Skepti-cal “Brain in a Vat” (BIV) scenario suggests that a brain totally immersed into Virtual Reality (VR) stands no chance of coming to know because its agency and experiences become illusory. We question whether BIV scenario is consistent if it does not explain how the agency of a brain can be reconstructed on the basis of VR experiences. Granting that agency and “contact with reality” are standard conditions for knowledge-that to emerge, we ask what is required to create an environment for a new type of experience which could result in a new type of knowledge. Such an environment should not violate cognitive agency and offer a new type of non-deceptive experience. There are everyday cases of cogni-tion which show how computers funccogni-tioning within Plain Reality provide us with information which is a new type of knowledge. These cases are easily acceptable because the information respects the requirement that we remain in touch with reality. In contrast, the project of Augmented Reality is epistemologically chal-lenging because it proposes hybrid scenarios which are friendly for cognitive agencies but infuse them with VR overlay that is alienated from reality. Augment-ed Reality scenarios do not tamper with our senses and essentially extend of our

DOI 10.1515/9783110497656-009

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.

experiences. They provoke, however, the question in what sense VR overlay could be veridical, as it somehow must be in order to support instances of new types of knowledge. We propose that it is helpful to assume that Augmented Reality is ontologically heterogeneous and mixes experiences of individual ob-jects with experiences of models. Models become cognitively useful when they are models of future individuals, and are adequately anchored in reality. If this last condition is satisfied, cognitively advantageous situations may be gen-erated whereby we experience 3D models in the environment of individuals, rather than 2D models in the environment of other 2D models. In this paper, we mainly consider the usefulness of 3D presentations in quite a different con-text of possible extensions of knowledge-how. That is, we analyze the possibility that 3D artificial experiences of an agent are sufficiently multilayered to generate their new manual skills. Though skeptical about it, we try to formulate condi-tions which augmented experiences should fulfil to generate reliable simulacondi-tions of new manual skills. We claim that in both areas of knowledge simulation is the crucial component to take into account. We believe that our cognitive contact with simulations may be even better than the celebrated contact with reality. Es-pecially, if simulations are able to diminish the risk of failure when we strive for useful information or useful manual skill in order to obtain practical goals. If we adhere to the idea that problems should precede pieces of knowledge necessary to solve them, then reliable simulations may by indisputably more valuable in solving problems than fully veridical experience. Thus, we finally come to a con-clusion that Augmented Reality project gives us perhaps a strategic impulse to extend the basic notion of knowledge and ask on what conditions new types of knowledge can be found in the sphere of computer simulations.

Dalam dokumen BERLIN STUDIES IN (Halaman 155-161)