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After presenting and analyzing the data of utterances produced by Kofi Annan’s interview, it is found that speech act, especially Illocutionary act which is used by Kofi Annan have illocutionary verb of representatives, directives,

commissives, declarative, and expressive.

Representatives happen when the speaker committed to the truth of proposition. This aspect includes in Politeness (except boasting) and categorized by collaborative, the illocutionary aim ignores the social intention, such as;

asserting, instructing, announcing, and another. Representatives or assertives dominates the data. It means that the content of this interview tells us about something truth from the speaker to the listener (public). There are several forms of directives which is called as Illocutionary verbs also can be found in this thesis, they are suggesting, advising, affirming, and explaining (see in the table 4.1).

Illocutionary verb which is often to be used in this thesis is affirming. It means that in this interview, the speaker state firmly or publicity that something is true or that the speaker supports something strongly.

Another types of illocutionary act is directives, the speaker tries to get the hearer to do something. It means that Kofi tries to influence a public to do

something. There are several forms of directives which is called as illocutionary verb, they are: requesting, advising, recommending related with his position as Secretary General and also related with his political policy. Several forms of illocutionary verb which is dominated in this interview is advising. It is means that the researcher in this interview wants the listener (public) wants to do something or the speaker influence to somebody that what the speaker’s utter should do in particular situation. Commissives is used quiet often than other types in this interview. It means that the speaker (Kofi Annan) is committed to some future action.

INTERVIEW 1

R Dr C E Dc Verb

1 BBC Was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, without a Security Council resolution,

the most difficult point for you in your term?

Kofi It was extremely difficult, because I really believed that we could have stopped the war and that if we had worked a bit harder - given the inspectors a bit more time - we could have. It is healing but we are not there yet. It hasn't healed yet and we feel the tension still in this organisation as a result of that.

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Suggesting

[1.a]

2 BBC Is it civil war?

Kofi It is an extremely dangerous situation and I think we all are interested in getting Iraq right and we would want to get it right, but the Iraqis will have to come together and make it happen.

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Suggesting

[1.b]

3 BBC Is it civil war?

Kofi I think, given the level of violence, the level of killing and bitterness and the way that forces are arranged against each other. A few years ago, when we had the strife in Lebanon and other places, we called that a civil war. This is much worse.

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4 BBC You must in some way feel sadly vindicated - in 2003, in March, you said that: "A war can lead to unintended consequences, producing new threats and new dangers."

Concluding [1.c]

Kofi It is sad - it is sad in the sense that it had to come to this.

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5 BBC Was it a mistake? Some Iraqis say that life is worse than it was under a dictator.

Affirming [2.a]

Kofi I think they are right in the sense of the average Iraqi's life. The society needs security and a secure environment for it to get on - without security not much can be done - not recovery or

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reconstruction.

6 BBC Do you believe that the Iraq Study Group led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton which is about to publish its report is a recognition that the US and others have to change course urgently?

Suggesting [2.b]

Kofi Yeah, I think it's a recognition that things are not working the way they had hoped and that it is essential to take a critical review - take a critical look at what is going on and, if necessary, change course.

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Explaining

[3.a]

7 BBC Because there's no denying the risks at stake here - you met Middle East leaders this summer, they said to you that the whole region had been radicalised and destabilised. In fact, they said it was a disaster.

Kofi This is the feeling of the leaders in the region and in the streets as well. The people are worried - So we have a very worrisome situation in the broader Middle East and we also need to look at them as a whole, not as individual conflicts. There are linkages between these crises.

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Advising

[3.b]

8 BBC But when you see this unfolding, in the dark of night, do you ever think: "I, as the secretary general, could have done more to stop it, personally"?

Kofi You mean the war or the situation?

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Requesting

[4.a]

9 BBC The war.

Kofi I think as secretary general I did everything I could. I worked with the member states, and you've read some of the comments I made before the war.

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Affirming

[4.b]

10 BBC Why didn't you stand up in the UN Security Council and say in 2003:

"This war is illegal without a Security Council resolution"?

Kofi I think, if you go back to the records, you will discover that before the war I said that for the US and its allies to go to war without Security Council approval would not be in conformity with the Charter.

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Suggesting

[4.c]

11 BBC Which is a very sort of UN bureaucratic thing, rather than saying "it's

illegal" which would have much more impact. And your aides say to me: "This was Kofi Annan, the cautious man, not wanting to

confront."

Kofi It's easy to - what do the Americans call it? - "Saturday morning quarter-backing", or "armchair critic". I mean, it was one of those situations where even before a shot had been fired, you had millions in the street and it didn't make a difference.

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Affirming

[4.d]

12 BBC But for you, in that position, a very difficult, devastating time. Your aides say that you lost your voice.

Kofi Yeah, it was very difficult, very painful, because I really, really felt we should have tried harder to avoid it and I was very worried about the consequences and the results.

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Affirming

[4.e]

13 BBC Another big challenge for you: the situation in Darfur. Many say that Darfur has proven that the United Nations cannot stop genocide.

Kofi Who and what is the United Nations? The United Nations are the

member states.

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Suggesting

[5.a]

14 BBC The Security Council.

Kofi Your government and mine.

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15 BBC It's been going on for three years, more than 200,000 people have died, two to three million have been displaced.

Kofi I'm not disputing the gravity of the situation. We've been pushing very

hard to get peacekeepers in.

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Suggesting

[5.a]

16 BBC One of the big successes of UN reform was this Responsibility to Protect. But you're not protecting - it's been three years.

Kofi I myself have made that point, that member states made a solemn

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Complaining

pledge to protect. Sudan has made it quite clear to the whole world that it will not accept UN peacekeepers. The resolution says we should deploy the troops with the cooperation and consent of the Sudanese. If the Sudanese do not give their consent, no government, not yours or mine, is going to give troops for a peacekeeping operation in Darfur.

[5.b]

17 BBC So, people said after Rwanda, after Srebrenica, "never again". But it's happening again.

Kofi It is deeply, deeply disappointing and it's tragic but we do not have the resources or the will to confront the situation - as in, If you did it, would you maker the situation worse, or would it be better?

I mean, I have gone out and indicated to the Sudanese that if they cannot protect their people, and they are refusing to let the international community come in and assist, they will be held individually and collectively responsible for what is happening and what happens.

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Condoling

[5.c]

Explaining [5.d]

18 BBC We're told that you're going to make this one of your priorities to the day that you leave, on 31 December.

Kofi ……..I hope all of us feel that way. I'm going to work on it - Darfur and one or two other issues which I'm working on - up until the last day.

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Affirming

[5.e]

19 BBC Another policy approach identified with you was zero tolerance when it came to sexual abuses carried out by blue helmets - UN

peacekeepers. In 2004 there was a scandal involving peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and yet again, in the last few days, there have been reports of abuse. What happened to zero tolerance?

Kofi We take zero tolerance very seriously and we have tightened up and

we have groups that work in these peacekeeping operations………….

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Explaining [6.a]

20 BBC But your assistant secretary general for peacekeeping operations told the BBC that: "My operating presumption is that this is either a

problem or a potential problem in every single one of our missions."

Kofi I think by that she means that we recruit these people from the wider

world - we don't have troops, we borrow them from governments

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Explaining

[6.b]

21 BBC But it has happened - again and again.

Kofi I don't think she was defending it.

22 BBC But it has happened again and again, since it first broke as a scandal in 2004. So zero tolerance doesn't seem to be having an impact.

Kofi I beg to differ. I think you have an absolute position on everything, the moment you declare zero tolerance, everything vanishes. And as I said...

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Complaining

[6.c]

23 BBC But what would help [so you can] expect it to get better?

Kofi We have been very active and we've been challenging some of these governments about their troops, the civilians have been disciplined and some of them have been fired, and we are going to remain vigilant.

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Affirming

[6.d]

24 BBC As you get ready to leave, is there something that particularly worries you? For example, you went to Iran recently and the Iranians made it clear to you they're not going to back down on their nuclear

programme, they're prepared for the worst. Is that something you think could happen again, a military confrontation?

Kofi I hope not. As I indicated, I have a great concern for the whole Middle Eastern region and I don't think the Middle East can take another crisis. It's in a very precarious and delicate state at this moment and I have indicated quite clearly that on the Iranian issue we need to do whatever we can to get a negotiated solution and that, in my mind, is the only one.

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Recommending

[7.a]

25 BBC Do you think that there are others, though, perhaps other countries who may be thinking about a military solution since the diplomacy's not working?

Kofi It would be extremely unwise for that country and for the world and

everything should be done to stop it.

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Advising

[7.b]

26 BBC Your biggest regret?

Kofi My biggest regret - well, it's also linked to Iraq. It was 23 wonderful colleagues and friends I sent to Iraq who got blown away. They went to Iraq to try and help clean up in the aftermath of a war……?

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Apologizing

[7.c]

27 BBC Any advice for your successor?

Kofi He should do it his way. I did it my way, my predecessors did it their

way and he should do it his way.

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Advising

[7.d]

28 BBC And the Kofi Annan way - a man who said he doesn't like

confrontation, who's cautious by nature - that was the best way, in retrospect?

Kofi I said he should do it his way.

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Advising

[7.e]

INTERVIEW 2 1 Jim Mr. Secretary-general, welcome.

Kofi Thank you.

2 Jim Does it appear now there is going to be a deal on Darfur?

Kofi They are close, but they are not there yet, and lots of effort is going into it in Abuja. You have the mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, who is working very hard with the support of President Obasanjo of Nigeria and the head of the African Union, President Sasson Nguesso of Congo, and they are bringing about five or six African leaders to pile on the pressure. And, of course, President Bush also has sent Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick to the place, and I have my own representative from Sudan on the ground, in addition to the British minister of economic development, Hilary Benn, so you have quite a lot of high-powered people really trying to nurture and steer this into a closure, and I hope we do get a solution.

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Explaining

[1.a]

3 Jim Do you have the feeling that both sides, meaning the Sudan government and the rebels of Darfur, want this thing resolved now?

Kofi That is what they say, but we have to test it. We have to really press them to do it.

The lead negotiator for Sudan has gone back to Khartoum, because they indicated they were ready to sign the agreement as put forward by the mediator; the rebels were not ready to sign. And people have been working with the rebels, and I hope, when the Sudanese mediator, Ali Taha goes back, with the help of all of these presidents and all of this on the ground, that they will be able to steer them in the right direction and get them to sign, because that's the only viable solution.

But it has to be a serious agreement, an agreement that will stand the test of time and make a difference on the ground, not something patched up that doesn't hold...

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Suggesting

[1.b]

4 Jim Is your understanding of the agreement that, if it in fact is signed, and if it in fact is real, it will stop the killing, stop the displacements?

Kofi Not immediately. It will help, but it will take some time. You know, with these things, by the time you get the order down to the men on the ground fighting and get it down all the way to the lowest level, it does take a bit of time. And so it will help, but we have to be prepared for some dislocation. And not only that, we need to strengthen the African Union forces on the ground to help with the

implementation and to help provide better security for the displaced persons and the refugees.

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Forecasting

[1.c]

5 Jim Is that the number-one priority? Is safety number one?

Kofi Yes, I think we have four key priorities: The first is the Abuja agreement, if we can get it in the next 24 hours. Then, we have to focus on providing security for the refugees on the ground. And here, since the African Union troops are on the ones on the ground, they are the ones we need to strengthen immediately...

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Informing

[2.a]

6 Jim Because there's not enough of them, right? They can't do the job?

Kofi They can't do the job. They've made a difference in some areas where they are effective, but we need to strengthen them; we need to give them logistical support; we need to give them financial support to continue the operation, until such time that we are able to transition to a U.N. force, and that does take a while.

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Suggesting

[2.b]

7 Jim But you're on board, as far as the need for a U.N. force to replace the African Union force?

Kofi Absolutely, the Security Council is on board. The African Union itself took a decision in principle, but we've had difficulty with the Sudanese authorities who have not been cooperative on this issue. Actually, they have maintained that they will be prepared to engage after the peace agreement, just as we did with the north-south agreement. We sat with them and...

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Explaining

[2.c]

8 Jim The north-south agreement, another part of the Sudan.

Kofi Another part of Sudan.

9 Jim Right.

Kofi And so, if the agreement were to come through, I would expect them to live up to

that obligation and begin to talk seriously about the international force coming in.

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Recommendin g [2.d]

10 Jim And the international force has been organized and is ready to go in?

Kofi Well, planning is done, which is so quite different from ready to go.

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Advising

[2.e]

11 Jim Sure. Sure.

Kofi We need now to tend to, one, the Security Council takes a firm decision and gives us a clear mandate. We then have to approach the governments to offer troops, and that is where...

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Explaining

[2.f]

12 Jim You mean the government of Sudan?

Kofi No, the U.N. member states.

13 Jim Oh, the U.N. member states. I see, the people who would actually supply the troops, right.

Kofi Supply the troops.

14 Jim All right.

Kofi Since we don't have a standing army, we are in the hands of our member states,

yours, and mine, and the others...

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Explaining

[2.g]

15 Jim Sure.

Kofi ... as to how much they are prepared to help and how quickly they are prepared to move. And depending on their responses, it can take anywhere between three to four months or longer to put the UN troops on the ground.

Explaining [2.h]

16 Jim But Sudan has agreed to allow a U.N. force in there?

Kofi Not yet.

17 Jim That's part of this deal, right?

Kofi ... not yet, I think.

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18 Jim Mr. Secretary General, a lot of people are asking -- this has been going on for three years. Over 200,000 people have died; 2 million have been displaced. And it's right all in public view. This has been well-known and reported all over the world. Why has it taken so long to stop this?

Kofi That is a very good question; that's a painful part. I mean, you can imagine my

anguish as a human being and as an African, an African secretary general, to see

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Affirming

[2.i]

us going through this after what we went through in Rwanda. It's very painful and difficult to take. But the question is: Why hasn't anything been done? Let me say that, first of all, it is a complex issue, but it's also a question of will, the will of the member states to move. It's a complication that the Sudanese have introduced by resisting help. If the Sudanese had been able to protect their own people and prevent what is going on in Darfur, we would not even be talking about

deployment of U.N. troops. Having failed to do so, I think they have an obligation to accept help from the international community to help with their protection. And the international community has an obligation. You may recall that, at the last summit in September, the member states pledged solemnly, individually and collectively, to take responsibility for the protection of people in such situations, arguing that it is a responsibility of each member state to protect this population. But where they fail, or are unable to do so, or they themselves are the perpetrators, the international community, through the Council, has to take action, and, if need be, by force. And now we have to redeem that pledge, that solemn pledge of September.

18 Jim Would it be correct to say that this whole episode, as you just described it, is an indication of where the weaknesses of the United Nations are, their inability to move quickly and stop something like this?

Kofi Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that we are an organization of 191 member states.

You need to get the decisions taken. And since we don't have an army, we need to run around getting support and help from governments. I have often described the way we operate and run this peacekeeping operation -- it would be a bit like telling the fire department in Washington, D.C., that, "We know you need a fire department, but we'll get you one and build you one when the fire breaks,"

because it's when the fire breaks that we start putting together the army, we start collecting the money to create an army that will go in. And so there is the built-in delay in the way we operate. And this is why where member states deem that it is extremely urgent to move quickly, they've tended to put together a coalition of

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Affirming

[3.a]

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