The final issue to be considered in this chapter is whether we have exaggerated the importance of categorization as the basis for different kinds of prejudice. Perhaps, after all, despite the theory and evidence which I have discussed above, the perception of someone as belonging to a different group from our own matters less than some other factor in paving the way for negative intergroup attitudes and discrimination.
Such was the claim made by Rokeach (1960), who argued that the crucial ‘other factor’ was the degree of similarity or ‘congruence’ between our belief system and that of the other person. Following Festinger (1954), Rokeach believed that similarity of opinion between two people leads to mutual attraction, because of the validation that such agreement provides. On the other hand, disagreement leads to dislike, because of the threat to our belief system that is posed by that discord (see Brown, 2000a).
Rokeach then extrapolated from this well-founded hypothesis and proposed that
various group prejudices do not have much to do with people’s memberships of those groups and their associated norms, stereotypes and intergroup relations, but are prin-cipally the result of belief incongruence, a perception that the people concerned hold belief systems incompatible with our own. To quote him directly, ‘belief is more important than ethnic or racial membership as a determinant of social discrimination’
(Rokeach, 1960, p. 135).
To test this idea, Rokeach and colleagues (1960) devised an experimental paradigm in which group membership and belief congruence were independently varied. Thus participants typically had to express their liking for various people who allegedly belonged either to the same or to a different group from their own and who were also seen to hold similar or different beliefs. In a number of studies using this basic tech-nique, the ‘belief’ factor usually emerges as a more powerful determinant of attitude than the categorial variable. Thus white people will often claim that they prefer a black person with similar beliefs to a white person with dissimilar beliefs (Byrne and Wong, 1962; Hendrick et al., 1971; Rokeach and Mezei, 1966; Rokeach et al., 1960). The exceptions to this tendency appear to be accounted for by rather stronger measures of attraction (for example by the desire to have a close friendship) – a situation where several studies have found that the category difference assumes greater importance than belief dissimilarity (Insko et al., 1983; Stein et al., 1965; Triandis and Davis, 1965).
Despite the empirical support for Rokeach’s theory, there are several grounds for doubting whether it offers an adequate account of prejudice, at least in the strong form in which he originally formulated it. To begin with, we should note that the theory involves some sleight of hand in explaining the occurrence of any kind of inter-group prejudice. If it is the case, as Rokeach argued, that we dislike people (that is, we are prejudiced against them) because we perceive them to hold different beliefs from ours, why should we assume that members of outgroups hold those different beliefs?
Surely, if social categories are unimportant, then our liking for a person should be on a case-by-case basis, decided by that person’s similarity to us. There should be no a priori reason why a whole group of people (for example blacks, if we happen to be white) should share the same beliefs. And yet, prejudice is manifestly patterned along categorial lines, as the dozens of examples we have already encountered in this book testify so clearly. Thus, for Rokeach’s theory to hold water, we need to add the extra and category-based assumption that members of another group are likely to believe in different things from the ones we believe in. In fact, there is some evidence that this is exactly what people do perceive; but, note, such a perception is first predicated on the psychological reality of the ingroup–outgroup category difference (Allen and Wilder, 1979; Wilder, 1984a).
A second difficulty with Rokeach’s theory is that it is limited by an important quali-fication. From the beginning he wished to exempt from the belief-congruence expla-nation those situations in which the prejudice has become institutionalized by law or social custom, or where there exists significant social support for its expression. There, he conceded, people’s respective group memberships would override belief congru-ence as the basis for prejudice (Rokeach, 1960, p. 164). Thus, for many of the most widespread and virulent manifestations of prejudice – against Muslims in many parts of Europe and of the USA; between different religious sects in parts if the Middle East; between members of different castes in India, and so on – it seems that Rokeach’s theory is simply inapplicable.
9781405113069_4_003.indd 64
9781405113069_4_003.indd 64 5/29/2010 3:27:17 PM5/29/2010 3:27:17 PM
Social Categorization and Prejudice 65
A third criticism of the belief-congruence approach hinges on the typical experi-mental methodology used to substantiate it. I have presented this critique in more detail elsewhere (Brown and Turner, 1981), so here I will do no more than briefly reiterate the main argument. The central point of this critique is that the race-belief paradigm (as it has come to be known) does not usually present a proper intergroup situation to the experimental participants. Typically, participants are confronted with a series of individuals (real or hypothetical) who just happen to endorse this or that set of beliefs and who, almost incidentally, share (or not) a category membership with the participant. In such circumstances, I have argued, it is little wonder that one of the major determinants of interpersonal attraction (that is, attitudinal or belief similarity) comes to the fore as the principal casual factor. On the other hand, where the group-like nature of the situation is given equal weight to considerations of interpersonal similarity, the evidence for Rokeach’s theory is much less strong.
Perhaps the direct example of this comes from an experiment by Billig and Tajfel (1973), which employed variants of the minimal group paradigm I described earlier in the chapter. Their objective was to examine the effects of different methods of group formation on intergroup discrimination. In one condition, participants were informed only that some recipients were more similar to them than others because they had preferred the same kind of painting in the pre-test. There was no mention made of groups. This, therefore, constituted a ‘pure’ similarity condition. In a second condition, by contrast, there was no mention of any similarity; participants were sim-ply told that they had been assigned to two groups by the toss of a coin. This was a
‘pure’ categorization condition. In a third variant, the first and second conditions were combined so that similarity of picture preferences formed the basis for categori-zation. Finally, in the control condition there was neither similarity nor categoriza-tion. The first two conditions are the critical ones. If Rokeach is correct, one would expect discrimination in the first, but not the second. If, however, categorization does have an independent influence, then one would expect more discrimination in the second than in the first. Table 3.6 summarizes the main results, and it is clear that the latter interpretation received more support: in the two conditions where a categoriza-tion was present, ingroup favouritism in the reward allocacategoriza-tions was visible. The main effect of the similarity variable, although statistically significant, was much weaker than the categorization effect. Other experiments using the minimal-group paradigm have also generated findings which are difficult to reconcile with belief-congruence theory (Allen and Wilder, 1975; Diehl, 1988).
Table 3.6 Categorization vs similarity as causes of intergroup discriminationa
No categorization Categorization
No similarity −0.2 +2.0*
Similarity +1.0 +3.9*
Notes: aDiscrimination could range from –12 to +12, positive score indicating ingroup favouritism. Asterisk indicates that score was significantly greater than zero.
Source: Adapted from Figure 1 in Billig and Tajfel, 1973
It seems clear, therefore, that the original form of Rokeach’s (1960) hypothesis is not tenable as an explanation for prejudice. In situations in which group memberships are psychologically salient – which, as I argued in Chapter 1, are exactly the ones that are of most interest to students of prejudice – the idea that dissimilarity of beliefs is a more potent force than categorial differences simply cannot be sustained. Nevertheless, there is a weaker version of Rokeach’s theory which may be more consistent with the evidence. In this form, some division into ingroup and outgroup is taken as read, and what is then at issue is the effect of different degrees of intergroup similarity (Brown, 1984b). Do people typically display less prejudice against outgroups which are seen as endorsing similar attitudes to those which prevail in the ingroup than against outgroups which seem to believe in quite different things? The answer to this question is a quali-fied ‘yes’. However, to understand how I arrive at this conclusion requires some consideration of the consequences of group membership for a person’s social identity.
Since this is not treated until Chapter 6, I shall postpone further discussion of the alternative form of Rokeach’s theory until then.
Summary
1 A fundamental aspect of human cognition is people’s need and ability to cate-gorize the world. This need arises because of the enormous amount and complexity of information we have deal with. This is as true of the social world as it is of the physi-cal world. Associated with the simplificatory function of categorization are a number of biases which have important implications for understanding prejudice and how it can be reduced.
2 One direct outcome of categorization is a cognitive accentuation of differences between categories and a diminution of the difference within categories. These processes of differentiation and assimilation have been shown to affect intergroup perceptions, attitudes, and behavioural discrimination. Some of these processes may operate outside of our awareness.
3 When two or more systems of categorization operate simultaneously, the effect can be to reduce the biases associated with any single one of them, taken in isolation.
This is most evident in laboratory settings. In naturalistic contexts one categorization will often dominate over the other(s).
4 Once a given categorization comes into play, differences within groups are attenuated. This is usually not a symmetrical process – outgroups may be seen as being more homogenous – although in certain intergroup contexts, particularly in those involving minorities or values central to a group’s identity, the reverse is observed.
5 The adoption of a particular categorization in a given situation depends upon the ease of its cognitive accessibility to the person concerned and upon the degree of fit between that category system and the actual differences and similarities between people in that situation. Factors affecting accessibility and fit include the person’s needs, goals and habitual dispositions, or features of the stimuli such as visibility, proximity and interdependence.
6 Some have claimed that categorial differences are a less important basis for prejudice than perceived differences in beliefs. This claim is only tenable in those
9781405113069_4_003.indd 66
9781405113069_4_003.indd 66 5/29/2010 3:27:17 PM5/29/2010 3:27:17 PM
Social Categorization and Prejudice 67 situations where group memberships are not psychologically salient. Otherwise the evidence shows that categorization factors are more important than interpersonal difference in belief.
Notes
1 This is but one in a variety of different procedures which have been used for allocating peo-ple to groups. Others include: musical preferences (Brown and Deschamps, 1981), dot estimation tasks (Tajfel et al., 1971), and even, most minimally of all, the simple toss of a coin (Billig and Tajfel, 1973).
2 The techniques for scoring these matrices and the various measures which can be derived from them are described by Bourhis and colleagues (1994).
3 The terms ‘anglophone’ and ‘francophone’ refer to people whose preferred language is English and French respectively.
4 Of course, if I am giving the lecture in Northern Ireland, the same dichotomy might be much more functional!
5 The difference was eliminated in one experiment by making the passers-by aware that they were being observed. Apparently, then, the ‘attention grabbing’ properties of novelty can be easily counteracted by social desirability factors.
6 ‘Parafoveally’ means outside of the central part of a person’s visual field. Subliminality is achieved because it takes some milleseconds for the eye to move from the central fixation point to the stimulus, by which time the stimulus has disappeared behind the mask. When people are shown primes like this one, they are usually unable to report what they have seen, apart from the nonsensical string itself.
Further Reading
Crisp, R. J, Ensari, N., Hewstone, M., and Miller, N. (2002) A dual-route model of crossed categorization effects. European Review of Social Psychology 13: 35–74.
Diehl, M. (1990) The minimal group paradigm: Theoretical explanations and empirical find-ings. European Review of Social Psychology 1: 263–92.
Oakes, P. (2001) The root of all evil in intergroup relations? Unearthing the categorisation process. In R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), The Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology:
Intergroup Processes, 3–21. Oxford: Blackwell.
Tajfel, H. (1981a) Human Groups and Social Categories, chs 4–6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Voci, A. (2000) Perceived group variability and the salience of personal and social identity.
European Review of Social Psychology 11: 177–221.
Wilder, D. (1986) Social categorization: Implications for creation and reduction of intergroup bias. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 19: 291–355. New York: Academic Press.
Stereotyping and Prejudice
The observation in the last chapter that perceived differences amongst members of the same category often become blurred leads naturally to a phenomenon at the heart of the study of prejudice: that of stereotyping. To stereotype someone is to attribute to that person some characteristics which are seen to be shared by all or most of his or her fellow group members. A stereotype is, in other words, an inference drawn from the assignment of a person to a particular category. Despite its popularity in everyday and in scientific usage, the word ‘stereotype’ has a curious origin. It actually derives from an aspect of the printing process in which a mould is made so as to duplicate patterns or pictures on to the page. It was Lippman, a political journalist, who first saw the aptness of the term to describe the way people use cognitive moulds to repro-duce in their own minds images of other people or of events – the ‘pictures in our heads’, as he called them (Lippman, 1922, p. 4).
In any discussion of stereotypes, three questions invariably arise: Where do they come from? How do they operate and with what effects? How can they be changed?
Accordingly, I have organized this chapter around these same three themes. Because we are interested in the implications of stereotyping processes for prejudice, I shall naturally concentrate on unfavourable group stereotypes. But being unfavourable is by no means a universal feature of group stereotypes. Just as the categories on which they are based are not, in themselves, positive or negative, so it is perfectly possible for stereotypes, too, to have positive, negative, or even neutral overtones.