Georg Lukács as a Communications Scholar: Cultural and Digital Labour
2.1. Introduction
CHAPTER 2
Georg Lukács as a Communications
2.1.1. History and Class Consciousness
Georg Lukács was one of the twentieth century’s most well known Marxist phi-losophers. His book History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dia-lectics (Lukács 1923/1971) is among the most influential studies of the prole-tariat and reified consciousness. History and Class Consciousness focuses on the analysis of class-consciousness, ideology, and reification. Labour is a strongly subordinated and rather neglected topic in the book. Language and commu-nication play no role at all in it. In a preface written for the new 1967 edition, Lukács (1923/1971, xvii) acknowledges the neglect of labour in the book: ‘It is true that the attempt is made to explain all ideological phenomena by reference to their basis in economics but, despite this, the purview of economics is nar-rowed down because its basic Marxist category, labour as the mediator of the metabolic interaction between society and nature, is missing’.
Lukács had an ambivalent position towards his own book. In the 1967 preface, he characterised History and Class Consciousness as ‘ethical idealism’
(1923/1971, x), ‘revolutionary messianism’ (xiv). He writes that it did not begin
‘its analysis of economic phenomena […] with a consideration of work’ (xx) and that it ‘equates alienation with objectification’ (xxiv). One should, how-ever, see that these comments do not refute the importance of ideology cri-tique and the understanding of ideology as reified thought in class-based socie-ties. Rather, Lukács expresses the need that ideology critique is part of a larger critical theory of society that he did not elaborate in the 1920s. The project of establishing such a theory was undertaken in his last book, in the Ontology of Social Being. It is a theory of production in society, including the production of use-value and value, physical and cultural commodities as well as the produc-tion of ideologies. One could say that the Ontology is a broader framework that encompasses History and Class Consciousness.
Lukács died in 1971. Shortly before his death in 1971, some of his students conducted interviews with him that together with a New Left Review inter-view from 1971 was published as his autobiography (Lukács 1983). In it, Lukács (1983, 77) repeats his criticism of History and Class Consciousness, but also says that it ‘is even today better and more intelligent than many of the things that bourgeois writers scrawl about Marx’ (77). He also says that in the Ontology, the ‘concept of labour is the hinge of my analysis’ (173) and stresses the impor-tance of ontology in Marxist philosophy.
2.1.2. Adorno, Lukács and Ontological Philosophy
The Ontology of Social Being was as entire book first published in German in the year 1986. Excerpts from it were published in English in 1978 (Lukács 1978a, 1978b, 1978c). Adorno died in 1969 and Horkheimer in 1973. They therefore had no opportunity to read and comment on Lukács’ final book. One can,
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however, certainly say that Lukács’ approach formulated in this book encom-passes ideology critique in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. In 1960/1961, Adorno gave lectures on the overall topic of Ontology and Dialectics (Ontolo-gie und Dialektik) at the University of Frankfurt. These lectures have posthu-mously been published in German (Adorno 1960/1961).
Adorno in these lectures undertakes a profound critique of Heidegger’s phi-losophy. He argues that Heidegger is the main representative of an ontological philosophy. Adorno in these lectures opposes dialectical philosophy to ontol-ogy (114) and when he speaks of ontolontol-ogy he means Heidegger’s philoso-phy. Adorno criticises that for Heidegger, being dominates the subject. As a consequence, this ‘extreme objectivism that more or less neutralises the sub-ject’ (200) results in an archaic (239) and mythological (246) philosophy that has ‘sympathy with barbarism’ (240). Heidegger’s philosophy is for Adorno undialectical. He argues that being ‘becomes for Heidegger an undialecti-cal essence’ (315). Adorno says that dialectiundialecti-cal philosophy that stresses non-identity is not an alternative ontology, but the latter’s anti-pole (325). But he also stresses that there is not a strict choice between ontology or dialectical philosophy (10) and that dialectical philosophy is the ‘critical self-reflection of ontology’ (12–13) and the ‘dialectic is in itself mediated through ontology’
(13). In Negative Dialectics, Adorno (2004) formulates the same critique of Heidegger’s ontology. He argues that ‘dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things’ (Adorno 2004, 11).
Given that ontology is a theory of being, Adorno’s concern is that formulat-ing an ontology automatically posits beformulat-ing as static and is prone to justifyformulat-ing the bad reality that exists today. So his concern is that ontology neglects reality’s dynamic and historical character. In a dialectical ontology, any being is how-ever always tied to its negative other that contradicts it, by which the founda-tions of change are automatically given. The One is always related to the Other, Being to Nothingness, and the unity of both constitutes becoming. So there can be no being without becoming. Being is only because it becomes. Becoming is being in dialectical motion. Adorno hints at this relation of ontology and dialectic, but unlike Lukács does not speak of a dialectical ontology. Adorno was interested in a dialectical critical theory of society. Lukács called such a theory in his final work a ‘dialectical ontology of social being’. We do not know if Adorno would have agreed on such a title, but Lukács and Adorno certainly both share the interest in how to combine the critical theory of society and dialectical philosophy.
2.1.3. Lukács Scholarship: The Unfortunate Neglect of the Ontology of Social Being
The Ontology of Social Being is in contrast to History and Class Consciousness a critical theory of society and capitalism and is therefore much more concerned
with the relationship between work and culture, as well as that between labour and ideology. It also gives attention to communication and language, which makes it particularly interesting for reflections from a media and communi-cations perspective. In the reception of Lukács’ works, there has been a very strong focus on History and Class Consciousness, overlooking that he also wrote other important works, such as the Ontology of Social Being. This also becomes evident in more recent publications on Lukács.
Andrew Feenberg (2014, viii) argues in his book The Philosophy of Praxis:
Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School that History and Class Consciousness is the ‘pivotal text of [the] philosophy of praxis’. He therefore focuses the entire book on this work and its relevance and does not mention the Ontology once.
The book Georg Lukács: The Fundamental Dissonance of Existence (Bewes and Hall 2011) is a collection of 13 essays. They contain just one reference to the Ontology and 127 to History and Class Consciousness. The collected volume Georg Lukács Reconsidered (Thompson 2011) consists of 13 essays. They in total make 13 references to the Ontology and contain hundreds of references to and quotes from History and Class Consciousness. Chris Nineham’s (2010) Capital-ism and Class Consciousness: The Ideas of Georg Lukács focuses on History and Class Consciousness and does not mention the Ontology.
In the first volume of Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas (1984) devotes chapter IV to the topic ‘From Lukács to Adorno: Rationaliza-tion as ReificaRationaliza-tion.’ He shows the influence that Lukács had on the Frankfurt School and focuses his analysis on Lukács’ concept of reification in History and Class Consciousness. Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘critique of instrumental reason understands itself as a critique of reification that takes up Lukács’ reception of Weber without accepting the implications of his objec-tivistic philosophy of history’ (Habermas 1984, 366). Habermas’ criticism of Horkheimer and Adorno is that they lack a theory of communicative rational-ity that negates instrumental rationalrational-ity. In formulating this critique however, because of his pure focus on History and Class Consciousness and his neglect of the Ontology of Social Being, Habermas does not realise that the importance of communication in society can be grounded in Lukács’ works itself, which may be a better way for a critical theory than using concepts of communication that stem from bourgeois approaches such as John L. Austin and John Sear-le’s speech act theories and George Herbert Mead’s symbolic interactionism.
Habermas (1984, 365) concludes that Lukács’ theory is a return to objective idealism. He, however, ignores in this context that in the Ontology Lukács was very much concerned with the relationship of culture and the economy. Haber-mas’ judgement is based solely on a reading of History and Class Consciousness and the complete neglect of the Ontology.
Ricardo Antunes (2013) compares Habermas’ theory of communicative action and Lukács’ Ontology. He concludes that Habermas ‘isolates the life-world as a thing-in-itself, conferring upon it a non-existent separation from the systemic sphere’, whereas for Lukács there is an ‘unshakable interrelationship
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between the sphere of the subject and the activity of work’ (Antunes 2014, 138).
Antunes goes one step too far in his reading of the Ontology and completely leaves out the analysis of ideology and ideological labour, i.e. labour that pro-duces ideology (see Fuchs 2015, chapter 3). Lukács however discusses, as I will show, this form of production as well as others in the Ontology, and thereby integrates History and Class Consciousness’ stress on ideology.
One should not misinterpret my stress on Lukács’ Ontology. I do not want to say that History and Class Consciousness is unimportant, problematic and outdated and should not be read. To the contrary: in chapter 5 of this book, I show the contemporary relevance of Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness by engaging with how his concept of reification inspired Axel Honneth’s critical theory of recognition. We can use both approaches for a critical theory of rei-fied/alienated media in the digital age. So my point is that one should not only read History and Class Consciousness, but also Lukács’ other works. His philoso-phy is immensely rich and a thorough engagement with it is very rewarding.
2.1.4. The Ontology of Social Being’s Context
The Ontology was written in the years 1964–1970 and was Lukács’ final work (Fehér, Heller, Markus and Vajda, 1976). In his study of the Ontology, Nicolas Tertulian argues that Lukács’ aim in this work was ‘to reconstruct ontology as the fundamental discipline of philosophical reflexion’ (Tertulian, 1988, 247) and to work out ‘a really universal theory of the categories of existence’ (249). It is an extensive book comprising of 1,460 pages in total, separated into two vol-umes in the German edition. Some chapters of the Ontology have been trans-lated into English and published in three parts on a total of 436 pages, which shows that large parts have remained thus far untranslated. The first part of the English edition focuses on Hegel (Lukács, 1978a), the second on Marx (Lukács, 1978b), and the third on labour (Lukács, 1978c). The second German volume (Lukács, 1986b) contains a part called Das Ideelle und die Ideologie (The Realm of Ideas and Ideology) that consists of three parts: Das Ideelle in der Ökono-mie (The Role of the Ideal in the Economy), Zur Ontologie des ideellen Moments (Toward an Ontology of the Ideal Moment), and Das Problem der Ideologie (The Problem of Ideology). It also contains a section on work that has been trans-lated (Lukács, 1978c). Given that there is both a focus on work and ideas and on labour and ideology in one volume, it is clear that the Ontology promises insights into the relationship of the economy and culture.
Lukács’ doctoral students Ferenc Fehér, Ágnes Heller, György Markus, and Mihály Vajda (1986) published their notes on the Ontology, in which they for-mulated dissatisfaction with the work concerning concepts such as nature, objectification, reflection, value, freedom, and progress. They also note that it remained an unfinished work because Lukács, who only partly agreed with his students’ criticisms, died before he could carry out any planned revisions. But
overall, he was not convinced by his students’ criticisms. Rather ‘at the end of his life, Lukács was persuaded that it was in his Ontology that he had furnished the essential and definitive form of his thought’ (Tertulian, 1988, 248).
The analysis shows that the Ontology is largely ignored and has not been read and discussed a lot, both in the German-speaking world and internationally.
The reasons for this cannot be ascertained and can only be left to speculation.
Lukács left the book unfinished, but it is nonetheless extremely voluminous. It is certainly a book that is difficult to read. The popularity of History and Class Consciousness may also play a role in the lack of its reception. And the fact that only parts of the book have been translated into English certainly strongly limits its international presence. It is difficult to be recognised when one stands in the shadow of giants. My point is that the Ontology should be seen as having equal importance as History and Class Consciousness.
For a cultural-materialist perspective on society, Lukács’ final book promises insights into the relationship of work on the one hand and communication and language on the other hand, as becomes evident when for example Titus Stahl (2013) in an encyclopaedia entry about Lukács writes about the Ontology:
From these ontological commitments, it follows that the existence of the social totality depends on the intentionality which guides individual acts of labor and vice versa […] Lukács therefore describes social phenomena – as language and institutions – as modifications and ‘mediations’ of the rela-tions of the labor process. That is, they are media of “indirect” teleological positing because they enable forms of action which do not directly modify nature, but which indirectly aspire to bring other persons to do so.
Language and communication in the Ontology are explained as part of the dia-lectics of society, in which work undergoes dialectical mediations.
The principal aim of the ontological-genetical method developed by Lukács in his last work is to show how, in beginning from the elemen-tary act of work, social life constitutes itself as a tissue of objectifications of greater and greater complexity, as interhuman relations better and better articulated, thanks precisely to the relation of dialectical tension between the teleological activity of individual subjects and the network of objective causal determinations (Tertulian 1988, 258).
2.2. Work and Communication