Notes

1 See Hindriks and Guala (2015) and Hodgson (2006, 2015b) on the nature and definition of institutions.

2 This is especially clear in the writings of Veblen (1909, pp. 629–636).

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Recommended readings

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2012), Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosper-ity, and Poverty, New York: Random House and London: Profile.

Furubotn, E. G. and Richter, R. (1997), Institutions in Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Hodgson, G. M. (2004), The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Dar-winism in American Institutionalism, London and New York: Routledge.

Hodgson, G. M. (2015), Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, Future, Chi-cago: University of Chicago Press.

Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rutherford, M. H. (2011), The Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918–

1947: Science and Social Control, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

This chapter will present what I see as the key features of feminist economics, arguing that these all follow from its fundamental premise: that economics needs to take account of gender relations because the differences in men’s and women’s roles are integral to how any economy runs. Changes in the economy can affect gender relations and vice versa. Feminist economics is therefore not economics for women, but simply better eco-nomics, and all economists should become feminist economists.