for mercy from what is believed to be a punishing God. In support of the above the historical relationship between childhood abuse and abandonment (which were rampant during the time the Judeo-Christian scriptures and other sacred narratives were being written27) and the thematic content of various sacred narratives will be presented in Chapter 6.
population) over succeeding generations similar to how a Type I Behavior could? The answer is ‘‘Yes, through cultural selection,’’ but only in the particular society in which such behavior currently is occurring. The specific Type II Behavior would not appear in suc-ceeding generations if the person were adopted at birth into a different society that had a different religion.29This is not just a theoretical or hypothetical question. There is evidence that in modern pluralistic societies those individuals who are religious have better survival in their particular society.30 Here is the important question. What changes (from a biological evolutionary perspective) when such indi-viduals—who are engaging in Type II religious behaviors and where engaging in Type II behaviors leads to increased survival—increase in the population in a particular society over succeeding generations?
To understand what changes, one has to appreciate that the con-tributing causes of behavior can be divided into those causes that are intraindividual and those causes that are extraindividual. Of the intra-individual causes of behavior, there are those that actually are associ-ated with movement, such as muscles in the arm contracting. There are also the nonmovement contributing causes of behavior that are associated with its motivation. As explained in the beginning of the chapter, religious beliefs, values, moods, and feelings can be consid-ered intraindividual, contributing causes of religious behavior. Beliefs and values are ‘‘structural’’ meaning that the information (that which is necessary to make decisions) of which they are composed is a struc-ture rather than a function. Information itself is thermodynamic/
structural.31Living matter changes when it acquires information, such as a belief. What changes is structural. How can this knowledge be used to understand how religious beliefs and values, which are con-tributing causes of Type II religious behaviors, can be affected by natural selection?
In addition to being conceptualized as that which is held to be true, a belief can also be conceptualized as a unit of information that biases behavior (movement) in a predictable way. A value is then the rank order given to a belief and the entire rank-order hierarchy of beliefs is called a value system. The content of beliefs can be acquired through one’s ancestors via DNA (e.g., heights are dangerous) or by social learning (e.g., Jesus is the Son of God).
If having the capacity to hold symbolically coded beliefs that were acquired through social learning led to an increase in survival, then the effectiveness, efficiency, and even the size of the structures in the brain that acquire and hold symbolically coded beliefs in general
would have increased in subsequent generations.32 In this respect, religious beliefs and the values that derive from their hierarchical organization would also have contributed to the capacity for humans to hold symbolically coded beliefs and values in general.
In contrast to the above, moods and feelings, which also are contributing causes of religious behavior, are functions rather than structures. As functions they do not have form. One cannot hold a mood or a feeling in one’s hand. Nevertheless, the brain tissues whose functions are (or which produce) moods and feelings are structures that do have form and can evolve biologically by natural selection. As a result, if having certain religious moods and feelings led to an increase in survival, the brain tissues that generate moods and feelings in general and religious-related moods and feelings in particular would have increased in effectiveness, efficiency, and size in sub-sequent generations.
For example, there are a number of moods and feelings associated with spirituality that include such things as an increased capacity for commitment33 as well as feelings of awe, love (attachment), trust (faith), compassion, gratitude, forgiveness, joy, and hope.34Most reli-gions have such a spiritual component. Therefore, when individuals experienced these moods and feelings and as a result engaged in Type II Behaviors that increased their survival or the survival of their kin and co-ethnics (in tribal societies), the brain tissues that generated these moods and feelings would have increased in effectiveness, effi-ciency, and size in subsequent generations. The implication of this process is that, contrary to the more intuitive (and more secular) proposition that religious psychology evolved as a by-product of the mind,35believing in God may have been what contributed to the cre-ation of many parts of the human mind. Some would call that a ‘‘gift.’’
This perspective is in contrast to other perspectives that may have pre-maturely dismissed religion’s value.36
CONCLUSION
This chapter began by giving a brief overview of religion as well as some ways to understand and classify behavior. The main question was whether religious behavior has a traceable, biological evolutionary history. It was shown that the Type I religious behavior that is seen in the nonvocal aspect of petitioning prayer does. Type II religious behaviors were also addressed, especially since they make up the
majority of religious behaviors. When these Type II religious behav-iors are executed, if by executing them there was an increased survival of individuals or the individuals’ families or co-ethnics (in tribal soci-eties), it was shown how this could have led to the increase in the effectiveness, efficiency, and even size of the brain structures respon-sible for the motivations of these behaviors in succeeding generations.
Some of these brain structures would have been involved in the moods and feelings that underlie much of what is known as religious spiritu-ality. Other brain structures that would have been selected if Type II religious behaviors conferred increased survival would have been those that were involved with some of the higher cognitive capacities of humans such as those that are responsible for symbolically coded beliefs and values.
In addition, much Type II religious behavior itself is symbolic as are many of the items that accompany the behavior. The meanings attrib-uted to these symbols often divide the material world into the sacred, which has religious significance, and the profane.37Appreciate that the symbolically coded language with which sacred narratives were first spoken and eventually written were executed through Type II behavior. As a result, when the earliest humans engaged in Type II religious behavior, including speaking, writing, and transcribing sacred narratives, this could have had important consequences for human evolution if engaging in such behaviors led to an increase in survival. One such consequence could have been the emergence38of or improvement in human higher cognitive and intellectual capacities.
To date there have been two major biobehavioral scientific theories of how human higher cognitive and intellectual capacities could have emerged. The first theory was zoologist Richard Alexander’s theory of social competition.39 The second was evolutionary psy-chologist Geoffrey Miller’s theory of sexual selection.40 To these two theories one can now add a third. It can be called religious. This religious theory proposes that at least some human higher cognitive and intellectual capacities could have emerged and improved as humans began not only to pray but to search for some type of meaning in their lives.41These three theories on how human higher cognitive and intellectual capacities could have emerged and improved are not mutually exclusive. It would also be very difficult but perhaps not impossible to design a modern experiment that could choose among them. Note also that ‘‘religious’’ in this context does not mean intelligent design, as the proposed mechanism is Darwinian natural selection.
All of the above, some of which is admittedly speculative, begs the more provocative question of why people believe in God. To many true believers the answer is self-evident. To others it is yet to be dis-covered. Nevertheless, the evolutionary history of religious behavior probably began with the Type I make-oneself-lower-or-smaller-or-more-vulnerable behavior associated with the nonvocal aspect of peti-tioning prayer. It can therefore be predicted that with few exceptions, when individuals relate directly to a higher power, deity, or God, such behavior will still be executed. In fact, if one ever observes this type of behavior being exhibited anywhere in the world and it is not directed to someone else in close proximity, and if fear is absent on the face, one can be almost certain that one is witnessing the nonvocal aspect of petitioning prayer. It is in this simple behavior where religion—
with all its current splendor, glory, and complexity—most likely had its humble evolutionary origin.
NOTES
1. Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection.
London: John Murray.
2. Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
3. Lorenz, K. (1981). The foundations of ethology. New York:
Springer-Verlag.
4. Feierman, J. (2009). How some major components of religion could have evolved by natural selection. In E. Voland & W. Schiefenho¨vel (Eds.), The biological evolution of religious mind and behavior. New York:
Springer-Verlag.
5. Tinbergen, N. (1963). Zeitschrift fu¨r Tierpsychologie, 20, 410–433.
(Reprinted 2005 in Animal Biology, 55, 297–321.)
6. Hinde, R. (1999). Why gods persist: A scientific approach to religion. Lon-don: Routledge.
7. Technically, moods and feelings are functions. They do not have mass and cannot cause behavior (the movement of individuals) unless one believes in nonmaterial causation. The brain tissues whose functions are moods and feelings would be the actual contributing cause of the behavior.
See Feierman, How some major components of religion could have evolved by natural selection. This issue also is addressed later in the chapter in refer-ence to religious behavior.
8. Feierman, J. (2006). The ethology of psychiatric populations II: Dar-winian neuropsychiatry. Clinical Neuropsychiatry, 3(2), 87–109.
9. Immelmann, K., & Beer, C. (1989). A dictionary of ethology (p. 27).
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
10. Amundson, R., & Lauder, G. V. (1994). Function without purpose:
The uses of causal role function in evolutionary biology. Biology and Philoso-phy, 9, 443–469. For a discussion of use function, see Love, A. C. (2007).
Functional homology and homology of function: Biological concepts and philosophical consequences. Biology and Philosophy 22(5), 691–708. A selected effect function would be a distal (ultimate) use function.
11. Lorenz, The foundations of ethology.
12. Ibid.
13. Tinbergen, N. (1951). The study of instinct. New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press.
14. Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1975). Unmasking the face: A guide to recognizing emotions from facial clues. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
15. Moore, M. M. (1985). Nonverbal courtship patterns in women:
Contexts and consequences. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6, 237–248.
16. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1989). Human ethology. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. See also Morris, D. (1977). Manwatching: A field guide to human behavior. New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers.
17. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Human ethology.
18. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1971). Love and hate: The natural history of behav-ior patterns. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
19. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Human ethology.
20. First, note the conjunction is or rather than and, which means that someone can exhibit LSV behavior by being either lower or smaller or more vulnerable. Also, LSV behavior is reportedly absent in the behaviors of shamans in the Enga people of New Guinea, as per Polly Wiessner, personal communication, 2008. However, see a discussion of this in Chapter 15 in terms of LSV behavior in the recipients of the services of a Malaysian shaman.
21. Immelmann & Beer, A dictionary of ethology.
22. Feierman, J. R. (1994). Ethology and sexology. In V. L. Bullough &
B. Bullough (Eds.), Human sexuality: An encyclopedia (pp. 190–193). New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. Also, Feierman, J. R. (2000). Gender ethol-ogy: Feminine mannerism as signals of sexual reciprocity. The Second International Behavioral Development Symposium. University of North Dakota, Minot.
23. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1990). Dominance, submission, and love: Sexual pathologies from the perspective of ethology. In J. R. Feierman (Ed.), Pedo-philia: Biosocial dimensions (pp. 150–175). New York: Springer-Verlag. See also Medicus, G., & Hopf, S. (1990). The phylogeny of male/female differ-ences in sexual behavior. In Feierman (Ed.), Pedophilia: Biosocial dimensions (pp. 122–149).
24. This behavior is in contrast to the victory leap in which one puts both hands above the head and jumps high, making oneself taller. This is seen in winning sports teams.
25. It has been shown that people invoke vertical perceptions (i.e.,
‘‘Glory to God in the highest’’) when God-related cognitions are accessed.
They also encode God-related concepts faster if presented in a vertical high position. They rate strangers whose pictures are presented in a high versus low position as more likely to believe in God. See Beier, B. P., Hauser, D. J., Robinson, M. D., Friesen, C. K., & Schjeldahl, K. (2007). What’s ‘‘up’’
with God: Vertical space as a representation of the divine. Journal of Personal-ity and Social Psychology, 93(5), 699–710. These findings may contribute to our understanding why people engage in the ‘‘lower’’ aspect of LSV behavior when they pray, as lower makes one more congruent with God being higher.
Of course, being lower is also being more submissive to whomever or what-ever is more dominant.
26. See Immelmann & Beer, A dictionary of ethology. According to classical ethological theory formulated more than half a century ago, the con-summatory end act ‘‘consumes’’ the ‘‘energy’’ propelling the appetitive acts.
This is a theoretical formulation that now has only historical interest. See Lorenz, The foundations of ethology.
27. Abelow, B. (2007). What a history of childhood reveals about New Testament origins and the psychology of Christian belief. The Quarterly Review of the Committee for the Scientific Examination of Religion, 2(1), 1– 6.
28. de Waal, F. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
29. The issue is actually more complex, as components of religion may be subject to natural selection at the group level as well as at the individual level. See Wilson, D. S. (2002). Darwin’s cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
30. Reynolds, V., & Tanner, R. (1983). The biology of religion. London:
Longman. See also Koenig, H. G., McCullough, M. E., & Larson, D. B.
(2001). Handbook of religion and health. New York: Oxford University Press.
31. Lowenstein, W. R. (1988). The touchstone of life: Molecular informa-tion, cell communicainforma-tion, and the foundations of life. New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press.
32. Brown, W. M. (2001). Natural selection of mammalian brain com-ponents. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 16(9), 471–473.
33. Nesse, R. M. (Ed.). (2001). Evolution and the capacity for commitment.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
34. Vaillant, G. (2008). Spiritual evolution: A scientific defense of faith. New York: Broadway Books.
35. Pinker, S. (2006). The evolutionary psychology of religion. In P. McNamara (Ed.), Where God and science meet: How brain and evolutionary
studies alter our understanding of religion. Volume I: Evolution, genes and the reli-gious brain (pp. 1–9). Westport, CT: Praeger.
36. Dawkins, R. (2006). The god delusion. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
37. Eliade, M. (1958). Patterns in comparative religion. New York: Merid-ian, New American Library.
38. The term ‘‘emergence’’ is used rather than ‘‘evolved’’ because higher cognitive and intellectual capacities are functions rather than structures. The functions emerge as a by-product of the evolution of the structures whose functions they are.
39. Alexander, R. (1979). Darwinism and human affairs. Seattle: Univer-sity of Washington Press.
40. Miller, G. F. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. New York: Doubleday.
41. Frankl, V. E. (1963 [1946]). Ein Psycholog erlebt Konzentrationslager [Man’s Search for Meaning]. New York: Washington Square Press, Simon and Schuster.