NOTES
1.3 JOHN SEARLE’S SPEECH ACT THEORY
1.3.4 Searle’s classification of illocutionary acts
Searle (1976: 2) claims that there are at least 12 dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts differ from each other. Among the most important of these dimensions of differences between speech acts are:
x the illocutionary point, x the direction of fit, and
x the expressed psychological states.
Before the description of these, for Searle, most important dimensions of variation in which speech acts differ from each other, the other nine dimensions he lists in his
24 Understanding pragmatics
paper ‘A classification of illocutionary acts’ will be mentioned. With these dimensions Searle (1976: 5ff.) points at differences:
x ‘in the force or strength with which the illocutionary point is presented’ (Searle provides the examples ‘I suggest we go to the movies’ and ‘I insist that we go to the movies’ which both have the same illocutionary point but are presented with different strengths);
x ‘in the status of position of the speaker and hearer as these bear on the illocutionary force of an utterance’ (Searle refers to a general asking a private to clean up his room – which is a command, and a private asking a general to do the same – which is most probably a suggestion or a proposal, if not an act of insubordination);
x ‘in the way the utterance relates to the interest of the speaker and the hearer’ (compare the differences between boasts and laments, congratulations and condolences);
x ‘in relations to the rest of the discourse’ (performative expressions like ‘I conclude’
or adverbs and conjunctions like ‘moreover’, ‘therefore’ and ‘however’ relate an utterance to the rest of the discourse);
x ‘in propositional content ... determined by illocutionary-force-indicating devices’ (a report can be about the past or present, a prediction must be about the future);
x ‘between those acts that must always be speech acts and those that can be, but need not be performed as speech acts’;
x ‘between those acts that require extra-linguistic institutions for their performance and those that do not’ (in order to bless, christen, pronounce guilty, etc. the speaker must have a position within an extra-linguistic institution; making a statement like ‘it is raining’ does not require extra-linguistic institutions);
x ‘between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where it does not’ (most illocutionary verbs like ‘state’, ‘promise’,
‘order’ have performative uses, but one cannot perform acts of boasting, for example, by saying ‘I hereby boast’); and
x ‘in the style of performance of the illocutionary act’ (e.g. the difference between announcing and confiding need not involve a difference in illocutionary point or propositional content, but only in the style of how the illocutionary act is performed).
But back to Searle’s most important dimensions of variation in which speech acts differ from each other.
First, ‘[d]ifferences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act ... affect the attempts to get the hearer to do something’. Searle points out that the
point or purpose of a description is that it is a representation (true or false, accurate or inaccurate) of how something is. The point or purpose of a promise is that it is an undertaking of an obligation by the speaker to do something ...
Pragmatics and philosophy 25 The point or purpose of a type of illocution I shall call its illocutionary point.
Illocutionary point is part of but not the same as illocutionary force. Thus, e.g., the illocutionary point of request is the same as that of commands: both are attempts to get the hearer to do something. But the illocutionary forces are clearly different.
(Searle 1976: 2f.) The second most important dimensions of variation in which speech acts differ from each other are ‘[d]ifferences in the direction of fit between words and the world’. Searle (1976: 3) points out that some ‘illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words ... to match the world, others to get the world to match the words.
Assertions are in the former category, promises and requests are in the latter’. He illustrates these differences with an example taken from G. E. M. Anscombe (1957).
Imagine a man gets a shopping list from his wife with the words ‘beans, butter, bacon, and bread’ on it and goes to a supermarket. He is followed by a detective who notes down what he takes. When both leave the shop they have two identical lists; however, these lists have different functions. The man who did the shopping is supposed to make his actions fit the list, i.e. to get the world to match the words. The purpose of the detective’s list is to make the words match the world, the list has to note the actions of the shopper. If the detective goes home and realizes that the man bought pork chops instead of bacon he can erase the word ‘bacon’ on his list and write ‘pork chops’. The shopper who comes home and is told by his wife that he bought pork chops instead of bacon cannot correct his mistake by erasing ‘bacon’ from the list and writing ‘pork chops’ (see Searle 1976: 3).
The third most important dimension of variation in which speech acts differ from each other affects ‘[d]ifferences in expressed psychological states’. Searle illustrates this dimension as follows:
A man who states, explains, asserts or claims that p expresses the belief that p; a man who promises, vows, threatens or pledges to do expresses an intention to do A ... In general, in the performance of any illocutionary act with a propositional content, the speaker expresses some attitude, state, etc., to that propositional content.... The psychological state expressed in the performance of the illocutionary act is the sincerity condition of the act... If one tries to do a classification of illocutionary acts based entirely on differently expressed psychological states ... one can get quite a long way...
(Searle 1976: 4) Searle, however, does not attempt to base his classification of illocutionary acts only on the way psychological states are expressed in performing illocutionary acts. His typology of speech acts is based on the three dimensions ‘illocutionary point’,
‘direction of fit’, and ‘expressed psychological state’. After a critical survey of Austin’s taxonomy for illocutionary verbs presented in his last William James Lecture, Searle presents his own taxonomy, a list of what he regards ‘as the basic categories of illocutionary acts’ (Searle 1976: 10). This list consists of the following five types:
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1. Representatives. Like Austin’s constatives, representatives have a truth value:
They ‘commit the speaker to something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition ... The direction of fit is words to the world; the psychological state expressed is Belief (that p)’ (Searle 1976: 10f.)11. Thus, acts of
‘asserting’, ‘reporting’, ‘stating’, ‘concluding’, ‘deducing’, and ‘describing’ are paradigmatic cases of representatives. Sentence (18) illustrates this type:
(18) Barack H. Obama is the forty-fourth President of the United States.
2. Directives. The illocutionary point of directives is that they ‘are attempts ... by the speaker to get the hearer to do something ... The direction of fit is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is want (or wish or desire). The propositional content is always that the hearer ... does some future action’ (Searle 1976: 11). Acts of ‘requesting’,
‘asking’, ‘ordering’, ‘commanding’, ‘begging’, ‘pleading’, ‘praying’, ‘defying’ and
‘challenging’ are paradigmatic cases of directives. Sentence (19) illustrates this type:
(19) Go home.
3. Commissives. They are ‘illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker ... to some future course of action ... The direction of fit is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is Intention. The propositional content is always that the speaker ... does some future action ...’ (Searle 1976: 11). Acts of ‘promising’,
‘threatening’, ‘offering’ and ‘pledging’ are paradigmatic cases of commissives.
Sentence (20) illustrates this type:
(20) I will have written this paper by Friday next week.
4. Expressives. ‘The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional contents ... in expressives there is no direction of fit’ (Searle 1976:
12). The gist of expressives is that they express the speaker’s psychological attitude or state, like joy, grief, sorrow, etc. Acts of ‘thanking’, ‘congratulating’,
‘apologizing’, ‘condoling’, ‘deploring’ and ‘welcoming’ are paradigmatic cases of expressives. Sentence (21) illustrates this type:
(21) What a wonderful paper, Mark!
5. Declarations. Searle points out that they ‘are a very special category of speech acts’. Declaratives ‘bring about some alternation to the status or condition of the referred-to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed’. However, the successful performance of declarations requires the existence of an extra-linguistic institution in which the speaker and the hearer occupy special places. ‘The direction of fit is both words-to-world and world-to-words ... there is no sincerity condition’ (Searle 1976: 14f.). Paradigmatic cases of declarations are successful acts of ‘appointing’,
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‘nominating’, ‘marrying’, ‘christening’, ‘excommunicating’, ‘declaring war’,
‘resigning’, and ‘firing (from employment)’. Example (22) illustrates this type:
(22) I now pronounce you Man and Wife.12