What then, if anything, does Socrates see? How literally are we to take his self-description as barren, as lacking intellectual
52 One could, alternatively, connect this metaphor with the psychic pregnancy described by Diotima in the Symposium : cf. Sheffield (2001) for the enlightening proposal that psychic pregnancy in the Symposium isdesigned to do the same job asthe theory of recollection, but without prenatal learning. However, asBurnyeat (1977b : 7–9) has shown, the Theaetetus account isnot designed to recall the Symposium one: for example, in Smp. 205c1–3 all human beingsare pregnant, whereasin the Theaetetus only some are, and even fewer with authentic offspring. It is easier to connect the latter with the rarity of successful recollection, pointed out at Phd. 76a9–c3.
brainchildren of his own? In some sense this barrenness must be read as Plato's current way of viewing Socrates' celebrated disavowal of knowledge (a disavowal which later, at 179b2–3, Socrateswill reaffirm). But that disavowal is itself open to many interpretations. Socrates has frequently been thought, while claiming not to know anything, to permit himself any number of strongly held beliefs;53or alternatively to disavow ‘knowledge’ only in a very strong sense of the word, while happily admitting that he ‘knows’ things in some secondary sense.54Othershave taken the disavowal of knowledge to be mere irony. But there remains a long-standing suspicion—already embraced by the Academic sceptics in antiquity—that he not only admitsto knowing nothing in any sense of ‘know’, but also doeshisbest not to hold opinionsthat fall short of knowledge—any opinionsat all, that is.
It isnot my intention to enter thisdebate about the Platonic Socrates. Asa matter of fact I doubt that any one interpretation will work for all the Socratic dialogues, if only because Plato himself may have had considerable trouble deciding just what spin to put on Socrates' disavowal. He probably suspected at times that Socrates knew more than he let on, and histendency—which increased dramatically in his middle period—to put solid doctrines in Socrates' mouth could well be a measure of that suspicion. But this can be a matter for little more than speculation. What we might more usefully do is ask what spin Plato was putting on his master's disavowal of knowledge at the time of writing the Theaetetus. And that will require closer scrutiny of the midwife image than I have so far attempted.
How wise does Socrates admit to being? He explains that he is ‘unable to give birth to wisdom’ (150c4), and that he
‘hasnothing wise’ (150c6); but also, more moderately, that he is ‘not entirely wise’ (150d1).55These mixed signals seem to mean that he has no piece of wisdom to which, under questioning, he might give birth, but that he nevertheless does in some other way possess rudiments of wisdom. There is good reason to interpret these rudiments as consisting in the insights that enable him to practise midwifery itself. So at any rate I will argue now, as I turn to the metaphor of his barrenness.
53 e.g. Irwin (1995, ch. 2).
54 Vlastos (1994: 39–66).
55 That οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός means ‘not entirely wise’, not, as usually translated, ‘not at all wise’, wasrecognized by the anonymouscommentator on the Theaetetus, 55.42–5, whose interpretation I defend as linguistically correct in Sedley (1996a : 98).
DoesSocrates' failure to produce offspring mean merely that he hasno knowledge, or that he hasno beliefseither? On the one hand, he says that he has given birth to no wise discoveriesfrom hissoul (150d1–2), leaving open the possibility that he hasgiven birth to beliefsthat then proved untenable—just as, by the end of the dialogue, Theaetetus will have done. On the other hand, he also tells Theaetetus that, whereas he questions others, he makes no assertions of hisown about anything (150c4–7). It seems to follow from this latter that Socrates' recognition of his own inability to give birth to wisdom—the consciousness of his own lack of wisdom already famously declared in the Apology (21b4–5)—hasled him to avoid asserting philosophical truth-claims at all. To that extent, a relatively strong reading of his disavowal of knowledge ishere receiving Plato'sendorsement.
However, Socrates' denial that he makes assertions cannot on any reading be taken as comprehensive, because he is right now making a whole series of assertions about his midwifery. And since—unusually for Socrates—he explicitly claimsthislatter asan expertise (technē) that he possesses and practises (149a4, 7, 150b6, c1, 184b1, 210c4–5),56 we may well get the impression that the ‘barren midwife’ metaphor doesnot include midwifery itself among the subjectsabout which he is intellectually barren. For clearly whatever items of knowledge one has to possess in order to practise the expertise of midwifery are possessed by Socrates.57 Indeed, later in the dialogue Socratesmakesit virtually explicit that the expertise of midwifery constitutes the sole exception to his disavowal of knowledge. At 161b1–5 he tells Theodorus:
You don't realize what ishappening. None of the argumentsoriginatesfrom me, but alwaysfrom my interlocutor. I myself have no knowledge to add,
56 There isa partial parallel at Euthyphro 11b9–e1, where Socrates professes to possess, here too by family inheritance rather than choice, a version of the expertise of his ancestor Daedalus. Again it is a dialectical skill: that of destabilizing a logos.
57 There is a possible further advantage in supposing this. When speaking about literal midwives at 149b4–c4, Socratesremarksthat although now unable to give birth they must have past experience of doing so, ‘because human nature is too weak to acquire expertise in things of which one has no experience’ (149c1–2). It may appear to follow from thisthat Socratestoo hassome past experience of producing intellectual offspring of his own, and here too we may suspect that these offspring are the principles of midwifery itself. However, I would not insist on this, because Socrates' midwifery does not rely purely on ‘human nature’, having been imposed on him by god (150c7–8, d8–e1).
with one small exception: how to extract and receive an argument in a reasonable way, from someone else who is wise.
And at the close of the dialogue (210c4–6), with regard to hisclaim to have, if nothing else, rid Theaetetusof the false conceit that he knowswhat he in fact doesnot, he remarks:
For that alone, and nothing more, isthe extent of my expertise'spowers, and I know none of the thingswhich othersdo—great and wonderful men both present and past.
Jointly, these passagesmake it clear that Socratesdoescount hismaieutic expertise asknowledge. On the other hand, beyond this single exception, his barrenness has turned out to manifest itself, not merely in the avoidance of knowledge claims, but in his not making assertions at all. And that corresponds to a relatively strong interpretation of the disavowal of knowledge.
At the same time the concession that the principles of midwifery are an exception to Socrates' avowed ignorance is of vital importance. For all of the skills and insights that Socrates will contribute in the course of the dialogue can, it seems to me, be classed among these principles. To anticipate (their actual justification will in the main have to wait), they can be summarized under ten headings:
1. Religion. The god-given nature of his maieutic expertise gives Socrates insight into god's essential goodness, and an overwhelming commitment to divine service (Chapter 3 §§5–6).
2. Cognitive psychology. The requirement that an intellectual midwife should be able to distinguish which objects of investigation can and which cannot be studied by his art—an art which examinesthe soul'sinner resources, without reliance on the senses—enables Socrates to discern the distinction between two modes of thought, roughly the empirical and the a priori (Chapter 4 §4, Chapter 5 §6).
3. Universality. By the same token, Socrates understands the importance of the universal, and is correspondingly uninterested in asking questions about the local and particular (Chapter 3 §4).
4. Definition. Socratesunderstandsthe primacy, in a dialectical inquiry about anything, of seeking itsdefinition; in keeping with this, he is an arbiter of well and badly formed definitions, and understands how they should be sought (Chapter 1 §8).
5. Aporia. The requirement that a midwife should be able to bring an interlocutor's ideas into the world makes Socratesan expert at inducing mental labour, that is, puzzlement (aporia; 148e1–8, 151a5–b1).
6. Refutation. The requirement that a midwife should be able to recognize a false or unviable offspring (150b9–c3) makes Socrates an expert at exposing falsehood in argument, thus (210b11–c5) disabusing people of the belief that they know what in fact they do not know. Thisisactually the most important of hismaieutic skills (150b9–c3).
7. Dialectic. The intellectual midwife'sdependence on question and answer asthe proper mode of investigating ideashasled Socratesto the insight, first made explicit in the Theaetetus itself (189e4–190a8), that thought itself has, and can be exhibited in terms of, that same question-and-answer structure (Chapter 5 §4).
8. Expertise. The fact that midwifery isan expertise (technē) which Socrateshasmastered giveshim an understanding of what expertise itself is and how it functions (Chapter 3 §7).
9. Virtue. Although Socratesdoesnot claim to know what virtue is, hisunderstanding of expertise giveshim the insight that being virtuous, like being good at anything, entails wisdom, consisting in intellectual understanding of the relevant principles(Chapter 3 §§5–6).
10. The soul. Socrates' almost exclusive interest in the souls of those he engages in conversation arises from his appreciation that the soul is the true self, and the sole agent of all acts, cognitive or otherwise (Ch. 4 §6).
While all ten facets of Socrates' midwifery arise from his quest for moral understanding, they endow him with knowledge which extendsconsiderably wider than that. Virtually all of them will inform hisinterrogation of Theaetetus, Theodorus, and the absent Protagoras, and they might also be argued to amount, jointly, to a fairly accurate retrospect on the kindsof insight that the Socratesof the early dialogues, despite hisavowed ignorance, appearsto manifest.58 If
58 Even the main convictionsthat Socratesexpressesin Apology, that it is wrong to disobey your superior and that no harm can befall a good man, and in Crito, where the former of these does much of the work, might be accommodated under item 1. I confess that I have not yet worked out a fully satisfactory way to get from item 9 to Socrates' confident condemnation of harming othersin Crito, Gorgias, and Rep. I .
thisisright, Plato'sdecision in the Theaetetus to allow Socrates one genuine expertise, that of midwifery, is a strategy for rationalizing the deeply enigmatic figure displayed in his early dialogues. I am not suggesting that this makes it the right way to read the early dialogues, but if it is Plato's retrospective interpretation of his own portrayal of Socrates, it deserves to be considered with the utmost respect.
Notice, too, what is not included in the ten principles:
(a) Transcendence. Asalready observed, Socrateshasno inkling of the transcendent Forms.
(b) Psychic complexity. For all that he says about the soul, Socrates never hints that it may be complex, comprising irrational aswell asrational components.
(c) Immortality. Although Socrates is open to the idea of the soul's surviving death, nothing that he says about eschatology depends on it (pp. 79–81 below).
(d) Recollection. Aswe have seen (§10), Socratesdoesnot suppose knowledge to be, thanksto the soul's pre-incarnate experiences, innate.
(e) Physics. Socrateshasno theoriesof hisown about the structure and nature of the physical world.
When Plato shows us Socrates calling himself barren, it is surely above all the absence of doctrines like these—none of them integral to the maieutic principleswith which he operates—that he hasin mind. Of the five themes, (a)–(d) are widely held to mark Plato'smajor departuresin hismiddle period, while (e), developed in the Timaeus, isthought to belong primarily to hislate period. Socrates' innocence of all five confirmsonce again that the figure before usreally is a re-creation of the early Socrates.