ACTIONS - THE PUBLIC ACTS QUEENSLAND

See ADMIRALTY; JUSTICES; PRACTICE-

•

Acts. [Vol. I.

The rules of interpretation contained in the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post, are applicable to the Rules of the Supreme Court of 1900, by virtue of Ord. 1, r. 1, thereof, title PRACTICE. It is declared by s. 10 of the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post, that the rule-making powers of judges of the Supreme Court are, unless a contrary intention appears, exercisable by a majority of such judges of whom the Chief Justice, or if that office be vacant, the senio-r Puisne Judge, shall be one.

The Local Government Act of 1936, by s. 31 ( 26) thereof (title JjocAL AuTHORITIES), directly applies the Acts Shortening Act of 1867 to by-laws under that Act and provides that terms in such by-laws shall, unless the contrary appears, have the same meaning as in the Local Government Act itself.

Sections 28 and 29 of the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post, apply certain rules to pleadings and legal proceedings.

Where there are incorporated in the same document provisions bearing a statutory construction and other provisions, the inference may arise that the latter also are to bear the statutory construction so far as applicable. See Broadwater Tin Mining Co. v. Oliver (1874), 4 S.C.R. 91; Fell v. Derby Leather Co. Ltd._, [1931] 2 Ch. 252.

Acts of the New South Wales Parliament prior to Crea.tion of this State.-Provision with respect to references in these Acts to New South Wales, Sydney, the harbour of Port Jackson, the Supreme Court of New South Wales, or offices or employments or or in New South \Vales, is made by ss. 34-37 of the Supreme Court Act of 1867, title SuPREME

COURT.

STATUTE LAW REVISION.

Pormerly many Acts were passed without provision therein for citation by a short title. Section 8 (1) of 'l'he Acts Shortening Act Amendment Act of 1903, post, provides short titles for a large number of such Acts as set out in the Pirst Schedule.

In addition to short titles to particular Acts, a system of short collective titles for the citation of bodies of Acts upon particular subjects, inclusive of principal Acts as amended and independent provisions contained in amending Acts, has been established. This was done to a large extent by s. 8 (2) and the Second Schedule to The Acts Shortening Act Amendment Act of 1903, post. In addition provision is frequently made by particular amending Acts for citation by collective titles.

Section 10 and the Third Schedule of The Acts Shortening Act Amendment Act of 1903, post, corrected a large number of verbal erro,rs in Acts passed before that date. Sections 2 and 5 and the Pirst and Third Schedules of The Statute Law Revision Act of 1908, post, also carried out a large number of minor amendments, including the repeal of numerous preambles and enacting words occurring before particular sections o,£ Acts.

REPRINTS OF THE STATUTE J.JA W.

Section 29A of the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post, provides that the Government Printer shall reprint Acts with textual amendments incorporated and making all necessary consequential amendments of marginal notes, headings and divisions. Section 3 of The Statute Law

P l'eliminary Note.

Revision Act of 1908, post, renders is unnecessary in any edition of the Statutes to reprint Acts the only effect of which was to make textual ameHC1ments to prior Acts.

The Statutes Rt>print Act of 1936, post) requires the Attorney- General, on being satisfied after receipt o,f a report from the Editorial Board appointed for purpose:-; of the reprint, to sign a cc·rtificate with nspect to each volume of the present reprint, that it correctly sets forth the law. Such certificate has a certain probative effect with respect to the contents of the reprint. A copy of such certificate is to be printed in each volume.

MISCEI;LANEOUS STA'l'UTORY PROVISIONS.

Imperial and New South Wales Acts in Force.-It appears that upon the settlement of New South Wales the common and statute law of l<JnglmH1, as existing at that date, became applicable throughout the colony. ~eP Halsbury's I.1aws of England (2nd t>d.), Vol. 11, p. 243.

It was further tlireetcd hy s. 24 of the Australian Courts Act, 1828 (Imperial) (titlt~ CoNS'l'ITO'riON). that all laws and statutes in force in England at the time of the passing of that Act should be applied in the administration of justice in New Sonth Wales, so far as they could he applied. rrhe effect of this section has been confirme1l with respect to Queensland Ly ~- 20 of the Supreme Court Act of 1867, title SUPREMFl

CollHT: these provisions made applicable a large body of statute law.

All laws in force within the territory comprised in the State o:f Queens~

land at the time of its separation from New South Wales on December 29, 1859 were continued in force. See Letters Patent of June 6, 1859,

<Jonstituting this State, and Constitution Act of 1867, s. 33, title CoN STITUTJON.

Legislative Power of the Queensland Parliament.-The Acts relating to this matter are printed tmder the title CONSTITUTION.

Classification of Acts.-Acts of Parliament may be classified as public general Acts, local and personal Acts, and private Acts. Local and personal Acts are public Acts, as are all Acts unless the contrary be expressly provided (Acts Shortening Act o:f 1867, s. 8, post).

AR to the operation of private Acts, see ibid., s. 9. Local, personal and private Acts have not all been printed in this reprint. Such as have been printed will be found collected in the Volume contain:ing L<>cal, Pe1-somtl and Private Acts.

Citation.-With respect to citation of Acts, see Acts Shortening Act of 1867,

ss.

5, 24, post. For the meaning of the word enactment, see H azel1voocl v. Webbe1· (1934), 52 C.L.R. 268.

Commencement.-Acts of the Imperial Parliament were formerly

<leemed to commence from the first day of the session in which they were passed, unless some specific date for commencemt>nt were mentioned.

SeeR. v. Smith, [1910] 1 K.B. 17, at p. 24. Commencement of Queens- land Acts is governed by ss. 6 and 7 of the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post.

Judicial Notice and Proof.-All public Acts are judicially noticed as such (Acts Shortening Act of 1867, s. 8, post). rrhis 'reprint of the statutes is judicially noticed (The Statutes Reprint Act of 1936, s. 3 (3), post). Statutory proclamations and Orders in Council published in

the Gazette are judicially noticed (Evidence and Discovery Act of 1867~

s. 1, title EvmE~CE). The courts of this State are required to take judicial notice of Commonwealth Acts (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, s. 5, title CoMMONWEAL'l'H AND STATES) and of the Acts of all States and the ordinances of all territories of the Commonwealth (State and Territorial I ... aws and Records Recognition Act, 1901, s. 3 ( Conm1o1nvealth) ; The Evidrnce Act, 1898, s. 3, title EVIDENCE).

As to proof of Acts other than public Acts, see the Evidence and Discovery Act of ] 867, s. 2, title EviDENCE.

Further provision relating to proof of statutei'>, proclamations, l'egulations and Orders in Council is made by The Evidence Act, 1898, title EviDENCE; Evidence Act, 1905, ss. 5, 8-10 (Commonwealth) ; State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Acts, 1901 and 1928 (Commonwealth); Evidence (Colonial Statutes) Act, 1907 (Imperial), title EVIDENCE.

Statutes to be Recorded.-All statutes are required to be enrolled by the Hegistrar of Titles within ten clays after they become law. See The Registration of Deeds Act of 1843, s. !1; The Registrar of Titles Act of 1884, title RK\T; PROPERTY; Supreme Court Act of 1867, s. 36, title SuPREME CouRT.

Statutory Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures.-Important provision is made with respect to who may sue for :fines, penalties an<l forfeitures, and the application of the same when recovered, by ss. 25 and 26 of the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post, and by ss. 177 and 178 of rrhe Justices Act of 1886, title J IJSTICES.

Time.-In addition to the provision made in s. 1:3 of the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post, with respect to times prescribed or allowed for the doing of particular things; provision is made adopting the mean time of the one hundred and :fiftieth meridian of longitude east of Greenwich in England as the standard time throughout Queensland and the time to be deemed, unless it is otherwise specifically stated, to be referred to in any Act, Order in Council, rule, regulation, by-law, deed or other instrument. See The Standard Time Act of 1894, title TIME. It is noteworthy that provision to the same effect has been made by the Standard Time Act, 1902 of New South Wales, by s. 91 of the Supreme Court Act, 1928 of Victoria, and by the Standard Time Act, 1895 of Tasmania.

Interpretation of English and Commonwealth Acts.-The Imperial Interpretation Act, 1889, which contains numerous provisions similar to those of The Acts Shortening Acts, post, will be found in Hals- bury's Statutes of England, Vol. 18', pp. 992 et seq. That Act applies to such Imperial statutes as are printed in this reprint and fall within its terms (see s. 40 thereof), including the Commonwealth Constitution, title COMMOKWEAL'rH AND STATES.

The construction of Commonwealth Acts is affected by the Acts Interpretation Acts, 1901, 190±, 1916, 1918, 1930, and 1932.

JeDICI.AL PRINCIPLES FOR INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES.

Tht> law relating to the interpretation of Rtatutes is to be found partly in The Acts Shortening Acts, post, and other Rtatnt<>s, and partly

Preliminary Note.

in decided cases. The latter are very numerous, and it would be imprac- ticable to deal fully in this Reprint with that source of the law on this subject. For a detailed treatment of the subject, see the title Statutes in Halsbury 's Laws of England, Maxwell on the Interpreta- tion of Statutes, and Craies on Statute Lmv; and for eases, see the l<Jnglish and Empire Digest, Vol. 42, pp. 595 et seq. RE'ference ma.y also be made to the Imperial enactments in the title Statutes in Halsbury 's Statutes of England, Vol. 18, pp. 929 et seq., and to the Preliminary Note thereto.

The interpretation of statutes generally is a question of law (Mason v. Bibby ( 1864), 2 H. & C. 881), and the duty of Judges is not to legislate, but to declare the express intention of the Legislature, even if that intention appears to the Court to be injudicious (Wear Rive1·

Commissioners v. Adatnson (1877), 2 App. Cas. 743, per Lord Blackburn, at p. 764).

Where Language is Clear.-If the language of a statute is clear.

then all that is necessary is to expound the words in theil' natural and ordinary sense (St. John, HQ/mpstead, Vestry v. Cotton (1886), J2 App. Cas. 1, per Lord Halsbury, at p. 6; R. v. Beeston, [1915] St. R.

Qd. 101, at p. 108; 9 Q.J.P.R. 91), or, as is sometimeR Raid, in their popular sense (Phar·1naceutical Society v. London and Pr·ot•incial Supply Association, Ltd. (188.0), 5 App. Cas. 857, per IJord Selbonrnc, at p.

~'62) . The words should be construed as they 'vould have been construed the day after the statute was passed, unless some. subsequent statute has declared that some other construction is to be adopted or has altered the previous statute (Shar·pe v. 1Va.k.efield (1888), 22 Q.B.D.

239, per Lord Esher M.R., at p. 242). In order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute the Courts may assist themselves by any literary help which they can :find, including the consultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries (R. v. Peters (1886), 16 Q.B.D. 636, per Lord Coleridge C.J., at p. 641); but it has been held that evidence as to the meaning of ordinary English words in a modern Act of general application is not admissible (Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1914] 1 K.B. 641, per Swinfen Eady L.J.~

at p. 650).

Where Language is obscure.-If the language of a statute is not clear, then the intention of the Legislature may be obtained from (1) the whole statute, (2) other statutes, (3) contemporaneous circumstances; and (4) the four matters laid down in Heydon's case (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7A, namt>ly, (a.) what was the common law before the making of the Act, (b) ·what vvas the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, (c) what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease, and (d) the true reason of the remedy. The rule laid down in Heydon's case, has been followed in many cases. (See, inter alia, Salkeld v. Johnson ( 1848), 2 Exch. 256~

at p. 273; Wear River Commissioners v . .Adan~son (1877), 2 App. Cas.

743, at p. 764; and Attorney-General v. Br.ovwn, [1920] 1 K.B. 733, at p. 791.)

Whole Statute to be Considered.-As to the consideration of the whole statute, see Brett v. Brett (1826), 3 Add. 210, and Edwards v.

Attorney-General for Canada,, [1930] A.C. 124, at pp. 127, 185. Where

Acts. [Vol. I.

the same word occurs in different parts of a statute, it is, as a general l'Ule, to be considered as used throughout the Act in the same sense

(Courtauld v. Legh (1869), hR. 4 Exch. 126).

As to what parts of a statute may be considered, the following rules of law have been established:-

Title.-The title of an Act (that is, the long 'l'itle as distinguished from the short Title used for purposes of citation) may be used to interpret the Act as a whole and to ascertain its scope ( 17 ache.r and Sons, Ltd. v. London Society of Compo•sitors, [1913] A.C. 107, per J,ord Moulton, at p. 128). See also Coomber v. Berks JJ. (1882), 9 Q.B.D. 17, per Huddleston B., at p. 33.

Preamble.-The preamble is part of a statute, and may be used to explain it, and is, as I.Jord Coke says ( 4 Co. Inst. 330), ''a key to open the meaning of the makers of the Act, and the mischief it was intended to remedy" (Salkeld v. Johnson (1848), 2 Exch. 256, per Pollock C.B., at p. 283) ; but, on the other hand; although the preamble may explain (Salkeld v. Johnson, s11pra) what is ambiguous in the enactment and may either restrain or extend it as best suits the intention (Fle:tcher v.

Birkenhead Corpn., [1907] 1 K.B. 205, per Farwell L.J., at p. 218;

Bowtell v. Goldsborough Mo1"t and Co. Ltd. (1905), 3 C.L.R. 444, at p. 451), it cannot control the enacting part, which may, and often does, go beyond the preamble (Salkeld v. Johnson, s1Jpra), if the enactment is itself clear and unambiguous (Powell v. Kernpton Park Racec01u'¥!e Co. Ltd., [1899] A.C. 143, per Lord Halsbury C., at p. 157; Drake v.

Thon~ton (1883), 1 Q.L.J. 159, at p. 161).

Interpreta.tion Section.-Although the purpose of the interpretation section in an Act is prima fa.cie to give the meaning of the words inter- · preted therein for the purposes of the Act, it is not to be taken as strictly defining what the meaning of a word must be in all circumstances (R. v. Cambridgeshire JJ. (1938), 7 Ad. and El. 480, per Lord Denman C.J., at p. 491), but should be understood to· define the meaning of the word interpreted in cases where there is nothing else in the Act opposed to or inconsistent with that interpretation (Midland Railway Co. v.

A1nbergate, Nottingham., and Boston and Eastern Jttnction Railway Co. (1853L 10 Hare, 359). See also R .. v. Pearce (1880), 5 Q.B.D.

386, per Lush J., at p. 389, and the second paragraph of this Preliminary Note, ante. Interpretation section~ are usually prefaced by the words

"unless the context otherwise indicates". or a similar phrase.

Headings of Parts.-The headings of different portions of an Act constitute an important part of the Act itself (Eastern Counties and London and Blacktoall Ry. Cos. v. 1!1ctrriage (1860), 9 H.L. Cas. 32, per Channell B., at p. 41), and a heading may be referred to for the purpose of determining the sense of any doubtful expression in a section under that heading (Hatnmerstn·ith and City Ry. Co. v. Brand (1869), L.R. 4 H.L. 171; R. v. Local Government Board (1882), 10 Q.B.D. 309, per Brett L.J., at p. 321). But although headings may be referred to where the meaning is doubtful, a heading cannot be used for the purpose of limiting the effect of plain words in a section under the heading in question (Fletcher v. Bi1"kenhead Corpn., [1907] 1 K.B. 205, per Farwell L.J., at p. 218; R. v. Fulham Gu.ardians, [1909] 2 K.B. 504, per Lord Alverstone C.J., at p. 509). Subheadings of single sections are to be regarded in the same way as headings to a group of sections (Hanson v. Barwise, [1930] St. R. Qd. 285, at p. 293; 24 Q.J.P.R. 91).

Preliminary Nate.

Marginal N otes.-Marginal notes in the early English Acts formed no part of the statutes as they did not appear on the rolls of Parlia- ment. See Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (7th ed.), p. 37.

Although they are now placed on the rolls, they are not regarded as forming part of the statntes, and the general rule is that they are not to be referred to for purposes of interpretation (Re Penrhyn's (Lord) Se:ttlent,ent Tntsts, [1923] 1 Ch. 143, at p. 147). It seems however that the rule has been relaxed 80mewhat in England. See Nicholson v.

Fields (1862), 31 L.J. Ex. 233 and B1tsheU v. Hamnwnd (1904), 73 L.J.K.B. 1005, where Collins M.R. remarked that "the side-note, although it forms no part of the section, is of some assistance, inasmuch as it showH the drift of the section.''

In Re Woking Urba•n Oo'l~ncil (Basingstoke Canal) Act, 1911, [1914

J

1 Ch. 300, at p. 322, Phillimore L.J·. said: "I am aware of the general rule of law as to marginal notes, at any rate in public Acts of Parliament; but that rule is founded, as will be seen on reference to the cases, upon the principle that those notes are inserted not by Parliament nor under the authority of Parliament, but by irresponsible persons. Where, ho1vever, as in sect. 10 of this Act and in some other recent local and personal Acts 1vhich have come under my cog·nisance, the marginal notes are mentioned as already existing and established, it may well be that they do form part of the Act of Parliament.'' In determining whether the marginal notes are part of the statute, the question appears then, to be whether they were part of the document which was dealt with by the Legislature. As part of such a document they might be regarded as part of the means whereby the Legislature has expressed its intention. See Comrnittee of Direction of Fruit 1Vlarketing v. Collins (1925), 36 C.L.R. 410, at p. 421, where Isaacs J.

applied a similar course of reasoning with respect to punctuation.

So far as modern Queensland statutes, at all events, are concerned the bills before the Legislature and the Acts published in the Gazette upon assent being given, contain the marginal notes. Furthermore, there is some legislative recognition that marginal notes are unalterable except by statute or under statutory authority. Section 10 and the 'fhird Schedule of The Acts Shortening Act Amendment Act of 1903, post, which correct a number of verbal errors in the statutes, frequently make such corrections in marginal notes. This was referred to by I.JUkin J. in Liddell v. Moss, [1920] St. R. Qd. 104, at p. 106; [1920]

Q.W.N. 17, where he mentions such a correction to a marginal note as supporting his decision in the case. It is notable that the last-mentioned Act repealed a marginal note, and substituted therefor a new marginal note in an Act even so old as the Act 18 Viet. No. 25. Amendments to marginal notes are also made by 'J'he Statute I.Jaw Revision Act of 1908, post. Section 29A of the Acts Shortening Act of 1867, post, inserted by The Acts Shortening Act Amendment Act of 1903, post, authorises the Government Printer, when reprinting statutes 1vith amendments incorporated, to make consequential amendments to marginal notes. See also per I_.~illey C.J". in R. v. Barton (1879), 1 Q.L.J. Supp. 16, at p. 17.

On the other hand., in Drake v. Thondon, 1 Q.I..J.J. 159, decided in 1883, Harding A.C .• T. regarded the position with respect to marginal notes as being the same as in England.

Dalam dokumen THE PUBLIC ACTS QUEENSLAND (Halaman 72-88)