any such petition shall not be satisfied that the alleged adultery has been committed or shall find that the petitioner has during the marriage been accessory to or conniving at the adultery of the other party to the marriage or has condoned the adultery complained of or that the petition is presented or prosecuted in collusion with either of the respondents then and in any of the said cases the court shall dismiss the said petition.
Judgment absolute may be refused on the ground of collusion or that material facts have not been brought before the Court (The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1875, s. 7, post).
Judgment for dissolution of marriage cannot be given by consent of the parties. See 0 'Kane v. 0 'Kane, [1908] St. R. Qd. 202.
The Court is bound to accept the findings of the jury on tho bars to divorce established by this section (Sharpe v. Sharpe, [1936] St. R. Qd. 93; reversed on other grounds, 10 A.L.J. 335).
Collusion is established if there be an agreement or understanding or concerted action between the parties with an improper intention (Doutrebande v. Doutrebande (1929), 29 N.S.W.S.R. 456; Anthony v. Anthony (1932), 49 N.S.W.W.N. 103; Brine v. Brine, [1924) S.A.S.R. 433). There must be some concerted action by the parties for the purpose of carrying on or conducting the suit. It is sufficient if the parties assist each other to work up a true case; it is not necessary that the acts done in concert should be with the intention of deceiving the Court (French v. French, [1910] St. R. Qd. 190; [1910] Q.W.N.
29).
The fact that a respondent is not adverse is not enough in itself to show collusion (Treacy v. Treacy (1866), 3 W.W. & a'B. (I.E. & M.) B?)·
Where there is collusion after the petition is :filed all proceedings taken or had during such collusion or in pursuance of any order made during such collu·
sion will be set aside (Bond v. Bond, [1910] St. R. Qd 30; [1910] Q.W.N. 4).
The Court is entitled in an undefended divorce suit to cross-examine the petitioner and to call witnesses to prove collusion (Kirk v. Kirlc (1889), 15 V.L.R. 118).
A suit may be dismissed for collusion without prejudice to the petitioner's right to present a fresh suit founded on the same facts (Leabeater v. Leabeater
(1912), 29 N.S.W.W.N. 121).
See further, with respect to collusion, Halsbury's Laws of England (2nrt ed.), Vol. 10, pp. 677, 678; Joske: Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Australia (2nd ed.), pp. 234 et seq.; Preston v. Preston, [1935] Q.W.N. 21; Hanson v.
Hanson (1937), 58 C.L.R. 259.
26. Case proved. Decree of dissolution. Excepted cases.-In case the court shall be satisfied on the evidence that the case of the petitioner has been proved and shall not find that the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to or conniving at the adultery of the other party to the marriage or has condoned the adultery complained of or that the petition is presented or prosecuted in collusion with either of the respondents then the court shall pronounce a decree declaring such marriage to be dissolved.
J.l:latrimonial Gau.ses
J~wisd1:ctionAct of
1864. s. 26.Provide~ ~lways that the court shall not be bound to pronounce such de~ree 1f 1t shall find that the petitioner has during the marriage been gmlty of adultery or if the petitioner shall in the opinion of the -court ha:r~ been guilty of unreasonable delay in presenting or prosecuting such petitiOn or of cruelty towards the other party to the marriage or .of having deserted or wilfully separated himself or herself from the other party before the adultery complained of and without reasonable -excuse or of such wilful neglect or misconduct as has conduced to the adultery.
[Dismissal or granting of petition founded on desertion.-If the eourt, on the hearing of any petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion, finds that the petitioner has condoned the desertion complained of, or that the petition is presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent, then the court shall dismiss the petition, but otherwise the court shall, if satisfied of the truth of all material allegations in the said petition, pronounce a judgment declaring the marriage to be dissolved.
Domicile of deserted wife.-Where a deserted wife who was domiciled in Queensland at the time of desertion petitions for a dissolu- tion of marriage on the ground of desertion, she shall be deemed to have retained her Queensland domicile notwithstanding that her husband may have since the desertion acquired any foreign domicile.]
The third and fourth pnragraphs were added by The Matrimonial Causes Acts Amendment Act of 1923, s. 3, post.
Judgment is judgment nisi in the first instance. See The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1875, s. 7, post.
It is the duty of the petitioner to make a full disclosure of all material facts relating to the matrimonial life, including any act of misconduct on the petitioner's own part (MoRae v. McRae, [1906] V.hR. 778; Nash v. Nash
(1918), 36 N.S.W.W.N. 93).
The :finding of the existence in fact of any of the grounds upon which divorce may be refused under this section must be that of the judge himself and he is not bound by the finding of the jury (Bales v. Bales, [1927] St. R. Qd.
246; [1927] Q.W.N. 42; 21 QJ.P.R. 78; Ross v. Ross (1901), 11 Q.L.J. 28;
Plumb v. Plumb, [1916] St. R. Qd. 128, at p. 131), but the :finding of the jury should, as a general rule, be adopted by the judge (Ross v. Ross, supra; Plumb v. Plumb, supra).
The discretion under the section is for the trial judge (Bales v. Bales, supra). It is a regulated discretion to be exercised according to :fixed and ascertained rules (Wallis v. Wallis (1891), 12 N.S.W.L.R. (D.) 1; Plumb v.
Plumb, supra). See also, as to the nature of the discretion, Adams v. Adams, [1938] V.L.R. 90. For the principles on which an appellate court will review an exercise of the discretion, see Keys v. Keys (1925), 25 N.S.W.S.R. 582.
In exercising its discretionary powers the Court must have regard not only to the rights and liabilities of the parties to the suit inter se, but also to the interests of society and public morality (McRae v. McRae, [1906] V.L.R.
778; Mulder v. ¥ulder, [1906]. V.L.R. 388) .. The probability t.hat refu~l to grant a decree w1ll conduce t? uregular r~lat10~s may be takeJ?- mto con~1~e1·a·
tion as a reason for not settmg up the d1scret1onary bar agamst a pet1t10ner who has committed adultery (Harvey v. Harvey, [1911] V.L.R. 345). 'l'he Court is more lenient in exercising its discretion in favour of a wife than of a husband
(Watson v. Watson (1913), 30 N.S.W.W.N. 139).
Adultery.-As to whether adultery of tha petitioner is a bar to divorce on any ground other than that of adultery, see Dans"kanen v. Dans"kanen, [1924]
St. R. Qd. 237; (1924] Q.W.N. 48; Gray v. Gray, [1925] St. R. Qd. 166;
[1925] Q.W.N. 16.
s. 26. jlf
ar'tiage and Divorce. [Vol. VI.
There is no discretion to refuse divorce on the ground of adultery during a prior marriage (Wockne1· v. Wockner, [1927] St. R. Qd. 357; [1927] Q.W.N.
54). Adultery occurring between decree nisi and decree absolute is adultery during the marriage for purpose of this section (Hulse v. H~Llse (1871), L.R, 2 P. & D. 259; Ellis v. Ellis (1883), 8 P.D. 188; Brown v. Walters (1931), 46 C.L.R. 290).
The governing consideration in determining whether to grant divorce notwithstanding petitioner's adultery is the interest of the community at large in maintaining the sanctions of honest matrimony (Brown v. Brown, [1932]
St. R. Qd. 246). Among the matters which the Court is entitled to consider in determining· whether to grant a divorce to a petitioner guilty of adultery are whether the grant of a divorce is likely to encourage immorality, whether the petitioner's misconduct caused or conduced to that of the defendant or vice versa, condonation of the petitioner's misconduct, the interests of the children, the interests of an adulterer or 'adulteress that he or she may be in a position to marry, the fact that husband and wife have been long separated, that they are not likely to be reconciled if divorce is refused, and the desire of the guilty petitioner to re-marry. See Brown v. Brown, supra.
Where the petiti:oner has committed adultery a divorce will be grunted only in extraordinary circumstances (Osborne v. Osborne (1922), 18 Tas. L.R. 42;
Weeding v. Weeding (1887), 13 V.L.R. 215; Ross v. Ross (1901), 11 Q.L.J.
28). But see Adams v. Adams, [1928] V.L.R. 90; Toogood v. Toogood (1925), 42 N.S.W.W.N. 76.
A petitioner guilty of adultery should disclose such adultery in the petition.
Concealment 'Of the fact from the Court will mitigate against the exercise of discretion in favour of the petitioner (Deane v. Deane, [1929] St. R. Qd. 124;
McRae v. McRae, [1906] V.L.R. 778). See also Adams v. Adams, supm.
Where adultery by tl1e petitioner has been completely condoned by the other party the Court will not ordinarily refuse divorce (Plttmb v. Plurnb, [1916] St. R. Qd. 128; [1916] Q.W.N. 31).
Only in rare eases will a decree be refused on the ground of petitioner's adultery where desertion by defendant has conduced to such adultery (Hovelrond v. Hovelrond, [1938] Q.W.N. 17).
For circumstances in which the Court refused to exercise its discretion in favour of a petitioner who had been guilty of adultery, see Maher v. Maher (1901), 27 V.L.R.147; Aldred v. Aldred, [1908] V.L.R. 58; Litster v. LitsteT (1921), 23 W.A.L.R. 18; Deane v. Deane, supra; Land v. Land, [1931] Q.W.N. 32.
As to when divorce will be granted notwithstanding petitioner's adultery, see also Gray v. Gray, supra; Wockner v. Woc'kner, supra; Danslcanen v.
Dans'kanen, [1924] St. R. Qd. 237; [1924] Q.W.N. 48; Hanley v. Hanley
(189~), 18 V.L.R. 646; Myers v. Myers, [1913] S.A.L.R. 180; Dunning v.
Dunntng, [1921] S.A.S.R. 296; Murray v. Murray, [1928] S.A.S.R. 136;
Fenton v. Fenton, [1931] S.A.S.R. 406; Bowley v. Bowley, [1934] S.A.S.R. 441.
See also Donaldson v. Donaldson, [1923] V.L.R. 371; Ellis v. Ellis, [1929]
S.A.S.R. 317; Heath v. Heath, [1929] S.A.S.R. 5; La Falaise v. La Falai.se (1903), 20 N.S.W.W.N. 127; Bray v. Bray (1923), 40 N.S.W.W.N. 138.
As to what constitutes adultery and evidence of adultery, see notes to s. 21,
ante. .
Unreasonable Delay.-The delay contemplated by this section is that sort of delay which shows the petitioner to have been insensible to the loss of the spouse (Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, [1907] V.L.R. 211; Litster v. Litster
(1921), 23 W.A.L.R. 18).
As to what constitutes undue delay, see also Wragge v. Wragge, [1902]
St. R. Qd. 243 (delay due to want of means, good faith; petition granted) ; Crosby v. Crosby, [1912] St. R. Qd. 66 (delay of thirteen years due to lack of means; petition granted); Hovelrond v. Hovelrond, [1938] Q.W.N. 17 (delay by reason of ignorance of right to sue in forma pauperis); Bayner v.
Rayner, [1919] V.L.R. 617 (delay due to ignorance of the law; petition refused); O'Connor v. O'Connor (1886), 12 V.L.R. 324 (delay due to religious considerations); Dodd v. Dodd, [1930] S.A.S.R. 281 (a similar case).
In the following cases the delay was held to be not unreasonable : Daniel v. Daniel (1873), 3 A.J.R. 132 (twelve years); Pinchin v. Pinchin (1898), 20 A.L.T. 54 (delay of ten years); Hill v. Hill (1901), 3 W.A.L.R. 108 (delay of several years); Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, [1907] V.L.R. 211 (delay of
thirt~en years~; Jens v. Jens, [1921] S.A.S.R. 95 (delay of fifteen years);
Wall~s v. Wallts, [1930] A.L.R. 240 (delay of twenty years); Skinner v. Skinner, [1932) S.A.S.R. 332 (delay of twenty-eight years).
Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction .Act of
1864. s. 26.See also Keys v. Keys (1925), 25 N.S.W.S.R. 582; Burns v. Burns (1929), 46 N.S.W.W.N. 68; Kinnear v. Kinnear (1904), 4 N.S.W.S.R. 512; Osborne v.
Osborne (1931), 31 N.S.W.S.R. 71; Bourke v. Bourke (1906), 23 N.S.W.W.N.
121; Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd ed.), Vol. 10, p. 682; Joske: Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Australia (2nd ed.), p. 294.
Crnelty.-For what amounts to cruelty, see notes to s. 9, ante.
The Court's discretion was exercised in favour of a petitioner guilty of cruelty and of neglect and misconduct conducing to the defendant's adultery
in Short v. Short, [1934] Q.W.N. 49. '
As to whether the cruelty must be cruelty conducing to the offence, see Kenny v. Kenny (1896), 22 V.L.R. 267; Bythell v. Bythell (1872), 3 A.J.R. 68;
Horwitz v. Horwitz (1883), 4 N.S.W.L.R. (D.) 1.
Desertion or Wilful Separation.-For what constitutes desel"tion, see notes to s. 21, ante.
There was held to be no wilful separation without reasonable excuse where the parties had married because the wife was then pregnant and had immediately sepnrnted by agreement (Ebenston v. Ebenston, [1916] St. R. Qd. 79; [1916]
Q.W.N. 19).
A husband's petition was refused where he had deserted his wife before her adultery, in Carena v. Oarena, [1938] St. R. Qd. 81.
See also Watson v. Watson (1919), 36 N.S.W.W.N. 50; Bell v. Bell (1900), 21 N.S.W.L.R. (D.) 9; Ring v. Ring (1903), 3 N.S.W.S.R. 453; Mackay v.
Mackay (1903), 20 N.S.W.W.N. 130; Hawkins v. Hawkins (1912), 29 N.S.W.W.N. 158; Joske: Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Australia (2nd ed.), p. 291.
WJlful Neglect or MJscondnct.-Conducing means causing or contributing to in a material degree (Carena v. Carena, [1938] St. R. Qd. 81, at p. 85;
Haeveclcer v. Haevecker (1936), 57 C.L.R. 639, at p. 655; Adams v. Lidams, [1926] N.Z.L.R. 308). Conduct which has only remotely contributed to the adultery is not sufficient (Tr·inder v. Trinder (1914), 34 N.Z.L.R. 78).
Wilful neglect involves something equivalent to misconduct (Ellison v.
Ellison (1901), 18 N.S.W.W.N. 206). There may be wilful neglect or misconduct conducing to adultery even where the plaintiff had no intention that his conduct should contribute to adultery (Sharpe v. Sharpe (1936), 10 A.L.J. 335; reversing [1936] St. R. Qd. 93, 227). See also Neich v. Neich (1901), 1 N.S.W.S.R. (D.) 67; Burke v. Burke (1896), 13 N.S.W.W.N. 28.
A husband's permitting his wife to tour with a theatrical troupe was held not to constitute wilful neglect (Richardson v. Richardson (1896), 22 V L.R.
342).
In deciding whether there has been conduct conducing to adultery, the whole conduct of the petitioner in reference to his marital duties from the contract of marriage to the commencement of the suit should be considered (Terry v.
Terry (1864), 1 W.W. & a'B. (I.E. & M.) 78; O'Connor f. O'Connor (1886), 12 V.L.R. 324). Misconduct of the husband calculated to lower the wife's sense of the obligation to :fidelity, or which might provoke her to retaliatory infidelity, may be conducive to adultery with which it has no connection whatever. The injurious operation of his conduct on his wife's mind seems to be enough ( J ac'kson v. J aclcson ( 1896), 22 V.L.R. 263). Where a husband's conduct had conduced to his wife's adultery eight years previously, but matrimonial relations had been resumed thereafter between them, the husband should not by reason of such conduct and without any further misconduct on his part be barred from relief in respect of the wife's subsequent adultery with another person (Richardson v. Richardson, supra).
Where the :first act of adultery is not the consequence of the petitioner's conduct, his subsequent conduct is no bar although further acts of adultery may be attributed to it (Haevecker v. Haevecker (1936), 57 C.L.R. 639, at p. 655).
A complete repudiation of the relationship of husband and wife by the petitioner may amount to wilful misconduct conducing to adultery (Bales v.
Bales, [1927] St. R. Qd. 246, at p. 253; [1927] Q.W.N. 42; 21 Q.J.P.R. 78).
Mere acquiescence in a wife's d,t3sire to live apart and affording her sufficient support which enabled her to do so does not constitute misconduct conducing to adultery (Paradine v. Paradine, [1930] Q.W.N. 27).
A collusive arrangement with respect to a wife's action was held to be relevant to the question, in an action by the husband, whether he had by wilful neglect and misconduct conduced to his wife's adultery (Bales v. Bales, supra).
ss. 26, 27.
Marriage and Divorce. [Vol. VI.
Watching for evidence is not necessarily conduct conducing (Sharpe v.
Sharpe, (1917] N.Z.L.R. 220).
Refusal to allow marital intercourse may be conduct conducing (Lance v.
Lance (1902), 19 N.S.W.W.N. 125).
For circumstances in which petitioner's conduct was held to conduce to adultery of respondent, see Schae[e1· v. Schaefer (1872), 3 A.J.R. 132 (desertion of a newly married woman without anyone to take care of her, without keeping up a col'l'espondence and without making any inquiries as to her whereabouts or welfare) ; 0 'Connor v. 0 'Connor (1886), 12 V.L.R. 324 (husband left wife for several years and neglected to provide for her, even though wife had a father with whom she could have made her home, but her husband knew that she would not do so) ; Jackson v. Jackson (1896), 22 V.L.R. 263 (visits to houses of ill fame by petitioner); Connor v. Connor (1924), 26 W.A.L.R. 88 (petitioner married respondent in order to give a child of whom he was the father a name, the respondent agreeing that he should not live with her if he did so. He left the respondent immediately after the ceremony and did not contribute to her support or (until compelled to do so twelve months after the child's birth) the support of the child). See also Bathgate v. Bathgate (1862}, 2 W. & W. (I.E.
& M.) 129; Jackson v. Jackson (1917), 13 Tas. L. R. 11.
For circumstances in which petitioner's conduct was held not to conduce to adultery of respondent, see Ebenston v. Ebenston, [1916] St. R. Qd. 79;
[1916] Q.W.N. 19; Hodge v. Hodge (1911), 7 Tas. L.R. 28; Osborne v. Osborne (1878), 5 V.L.R. (I.P. & M.) 112 (husband left immediately after the marriage but kept wife supplied with money and maintained a correspondence) ; White v. White. (1887), 13 V.L.R. 239 (petitioner's allowing wife suffering from habitual drunkenness to leave him for four years); Rosrnan v. Rosman (1926), 28 W.A.L.R. 69 (wife suspicious of infidelity went away for six months);
Weidenbach v. Weidenbach, [1930] S.A.S.R. 399 (petitioner had left respondent some months before adultery for which she instituted proceedings); Maxwell v. Maxwell (1880), 6 V.L.R. (I.P. & M.) 117; Bevern v. Bevern, (1920] V.L.R.
26; McPhail v. McPhail (1893), 14 N.S.W.L.R. (D.) 9.
As to when divorce will be granted notwithstanding wilful neglect and misconduct conducing to adultery, see Lo~tis v. Louis, (1929] St. R. Qd. 184;
Sackley v. Sackley, [1935] Q.W.N. 47; Short v. Short, [1934] Q.W.N. 49.
See further Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd ed.), Vol. 10, p. 684;
Joske: Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Australia (2nd ed.), p. 274.
Bars to Petition for Desert.ion.-Adultery of the petitioner is no bar to divorce on the ground of desertion (Danskanen v. Danskanen, [1924] St. R. Qd.
237; (1924] Q.W.N. 48; Gray v. Gray, (1925] St. R. Qd. 166; (1925] Q.W.N.
16; A dey v. Adey, (1928] St. R. Qd. 303, at p. 307; Duckworth v. Duckworth, (1929] Q.W.N. 35; Stoker v. Stoker, (1930] Q.W.N. 16).
A wife does not unconditionally condone desertion by a casual resumption of cohabitation., with her husband owing to her necessity and in the hope that he might be i:Ii"duced to change his intention of abandoning her (Andrews v.
Andrews, (1938] St. R. Qd. 72). As to what constitutes condonation, see also the notes to s. 24, ante. The affidavit verifying the petition should negative condonation (Robertson v. Robertson, [1929] Q.W.N. 14).
For what constitutes collusion, see notes to s. 25, ante.
Domicil of Deserted Wife.-As to the necessity for domicil of the spouses within Queensland to :found jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage, see notes to s. 1, ante. The effect of the last paragraph of this section is to give the Court jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage in the case there dealt with (Scott v. Scott, (1924] Q.W.N. 7). As to service of petition, see R.S.C. (1900), Ord. 11, rr. 1 (5), 4, title PRACTICE.
27. Court may order gross sum or annuity to be paid to wife.- The court may if it shall think fit on any such decree [or on a decree for nullity of marriage] order that the husband shall to the satisfaction of the court secure to the wife such gross sum of money or such annual sum of money for any term not exceeding her own life as having regard to her fortune (if any) to the ability of the husband and to the conduct of the parties it shall deem reasonable and for that purpose may refer it to counsel to settle and approve of a proper deed or instrument to be executed by all necessary parties
Matrimonial Causes Jut·isdiction Act of
1864. s. 27.and the said court may in such case if it shall see fit suspend the pronouncing of its decree until such deed shall have been duly executed and upon any petition for dissolution of marriage the court shall have the same powers to make interim orders for payment of money by way of alimony or otherwise to the wife as it would have in a suit instituted for judicial separation.
The words in square brackets were inserted by The Matrimonial Causes Acts Amendment Act of 1931, s. 2, post.
''Any such decree'' in the :first line refers to decrees for divorce.
Applications under this section are regulated by R.S.C. (1900), Ord. 69, rr. 27-33, title PRACTICE.
As to discharge, modification, increase and suspension of orders under this section, see ss. 27B, 27D, post.
This section provides merely for an order to give security and not for imposition of personal liability (as to which see s. 27 .A., post) (Brown v.
Brown (1932), 27 Tas. L.R. 104).
Failure to enter an appearance is not a sufficient reason for refusing t() hear a husband on an application under this section (Utick v. Utick (1907), 5 C.L.R. 400).
As to the distinction between alimony in judicial separation and alimony (maintenance) on divorce, see Gardiner v. Gardiner (No. 3) (1933), 33 N.S.W.S.R. 407. As to alimony Q!ll judicial separation, see ss. 10, 14, ante.
After death of the husband, no order can be made under this section (Norton v. Norton (1916), 16 N.S.W.S.R. 461).
Jurisdiction to make an order under this section does not arise until the order for dissolution is pronounced. The order for alimony may be embodied in the same judgment or application may be made for it after judgment absolute (Sidne11 v. Sidney (1867), 36 L.J.P. & M. 73; Bradley v. Bradley (1878), 3 P.D. 47), but not after the lapse of a reasooable time from judgment absolute (Moss v. Moss (1936), 55 C.L.R. 166; Scott v. Scott, [1921] P. 107).
· As to what constitutes a reasonable time, see Moss v. Moss, supra (sixteen months held not too long); Loss v. Loss (1925), 41 N.S.W.W.N. 170 (fifteen months held not too long in the circumstances); Montgomery v. Montgomery (1915), 32 N.S.W.W.N. 131 (three years held too long); Ross v. !loss (1930), 47 N.S.W.W.N. 139 (year and nine months held too long). As to an application for maintenance after decree absolute where the husband has acquired a new domicil, see note to s. 1, ante.
The Court has an absolute discretion on dissolution 'Of marriage, even in the case of a guilty wife, to add a condition as to maintenance of wife (Jones v. Jones (1911), 28 N.S.W.W.N. 56). But ordinarily an order will not be made in favour of a wife found guilty of adultery. See Carnaby v.
Carnaby (1862), 1 W. & W. (I.E. & M.) 86; Terry v. Terry (1864), 1 W.W. &
a'B. (I.E. & M.) 78; Maxwell v. Maxwell (1880), 6 V.L.R. (I.P. & M.) 117;
Wyatt v. Wyatt, [1935] V.L.R. 127. For eases in which successful petitioners for divorce were ordered to give security for maintenance, see Paradir~oe v.
Paradine, [1930] Q.W.N. 27; Short v. Short, [1934] Q.W.N. 49; Sackley v.
Sac7cley, [1935] Q.W.N. 47. Orders were refused to respondent wives in Rooks v. Rooks, [1934] Q.W.N. 37; Mig hall v. Mig hall, [19291 V.L.R. 105. A petitioning wife was refused an order in Maher v. Maher, [1919] V.L.R. 632.
In estimating the income of a husband, all his means of subsistence should be taken into account, including a pension made inalienable by statute (Buckley v. Buckley, [1932] St. R. Qd. 239). But the Court cannot make an order which would have the effect of reducing his income below the amount of such pension (ibid.).
As to amount of aJimony, see B1wkley v. Buckley, supra; Henry v. Henry (1895), 16 N.S.W.L.R. (D.) 1; Gardiner v. Gardiner (1925), 25 N.S.W.S.R. 274;
Molesw.orth v. Molesworth (1862), 1 W. & W. (I.E. & M.) 57; Pardey v.
Pardey (1865), 2 W.W. & a'B. (I.E. & M.) 58; Smith v. Smith (1872), 3 A.J.R. 62.
The Court cannot order permanent alimony from a time prior to judgment absolute (Rubie v. Rubie (1910), 27 N.S.W.W.N. 119).
Where a husband is ordered to secure an annual sum f·or his wife she is not entitled to have the sum secured paid into Court (Bl1tnden v. Blunden (1910), 10 N.S.W.S.R. 793).