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IN DEFEHCE OF BEHAVIOUHISM:
A Skinnerian reinterpretation of Stenhouse' s etholoej.cal theory of intelligence, supported by a Galilean philosophy of science.
A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Viaster of Arts in Education at 1-:assey Uni versity.
Lav1rence David Southon 1977
Abstract Preface
CONTENTS
1. The Aristotelian View of Science 1.1 Varieties of the Aristotelian view 1.2 The Aristotelian fallacy
2. A Galilean Ideal of Science 2.1 Claims and disclaimers
2.2 Methods in philosophy of science 2.3 Introduction to Galilean scie~ce 2.4 Derivation of the formulation
2.5
~xemplars of Galilean scientific knowledge 2.6 Revolutionary science2.7 Normal science 2.S Technoloey
2.9 Justification of theories
3. Behaviourism
3.1 Behaviourism as Galilean science 3.2 Replies to criticisms
3.3 Justification
An Ethol ogical Theory of Intelligence 4.1 Stenhouse on intelligence
4.2 Intelligence defined . 4.3 The four factors
4.4 Instinct and inhibition 4.5 Evolutionary continuity
5.
A Behaviourist Theory of IntelliP,ence 5.1 Skinner on intelligence5.2 Stenhouse's factors reinterpreted 5.3 Evolutionary continuity
Bibliography and Author Index
iii
V
1 4
9 10 12 13
18
23 32 37 47
55 65 80
81 82
83 92 100
102 106 117
119
iii ABSTRACT
This thesis att empts to justify a Skinneric.n interpretation of intel l ieence . The justific~tion has three major t hemes. Firstly it is arQled th~t
Skinnerian beh&viourism has the status of scientific knouledge corn.parable to 1.Je,,,tonian r,1echanics. Secondl y it i ~ argued that Gtenhouoe 's etholocicnl theory of intelligence has a number of defects, so t}1at a
behaviouri st theory which retains the strengths of the etholocic2.l theory while avoidine t hose defect s i s to be preferred. Thirdly it i s argued that cert2.in \·:i<iely received accounts of scientific knowl edge are mistaken; o.n altern2.tive [.,Ccount is presented. 'rhis venture into philosophy of science underl ies the other two theoes
~nd is presented first .
The supposition that sci ence may be represented in t er r:::1s of gener al l aus of tl:e foro 'i,11 swans nre white ' i s critically exanined, followinG Toulmin' s analysi s i:.1hich is i llustrated with three exeopl ars of scienti f ic knoul edge.
£ Galilean ideal of science is then el aborated . The idec.l is formulated in terns of scientific knoi·rledge following Toulmin, and illustrated with three exemplars of scientific knoi;.1ledge. The processes of revolutionary science, normal science, t echnology, and justification of theories, are interpreted in terms of the ideal alluded to 2.bove with further illustn.;.tions. Converg- ences with de Bono's ' lateral thinking' are suggested. Criticisms of st atistical ' social science' are noted. The conventional contrast between physical and social science is critically exc.rnined.
A formulation of Skinnerian behaviourism is presented, to demonstrate that behaviourism conforms to the Galilean ideal of science. Various criticisms
iv of behaviourism are responded to. The proposed criteria for justificction of theories are applied to behaviourism.
Stenhouse ' s ethological theory of the nature and evolution of intelligence i s criticially examined. The divergent development of et hology ru1d behaviourism from
reflexoloe;y is outlined.. Skinner 's critique of P2.vlov' s concept 'inhibition' is appl ied to Stenhouse's 'P-factor'.
The use of metaphors in science i s discussed. De
Bono ' s 'special mel.:lory sur·fL:.ce ' is noted as 8l1 alternative to the usual r:iechanical or electronic storage systems as a metaphor for memory.
Skinner' s anal ysis of the ns.ture and evolution of intelligence is elabor~ted. Stenhouse' s f2ctors and
especially the F- factor ~re reinterpreted in behaviourist teros . It i s 2,rgued that a behaviourist theory of
intelligence is preferable to Stenhouse 's ethological theory in terms of the Galilean ideal of science.
Educational and political implicat i ons of vo..rious philosophical and theoretical positions are also noted.
PREFACE
\lhile this thesis is organised around and concludes with a behaviouri st reinterpreta.tion of
Stenhouse's theory of intelligence, that reinterpretation is confined to one final chapter. The preceding four chapters discuss various i ssues as listed in the
Abstract (principally in the phil osophy of science both generally and as applied to beh2.viourism and ethol ogy), which may be of wider interest apart from the support they give to the final chapter.
The existing treatments of these issues vary: sone are merely infornal and fraeraent ary, some while substo..ntial h2.ve been neGlected by r:i.ore recent writers, and some express what I wil l argue are seriousl y
r.1islea6.ing vieHs o.s to the n~ture of science. In view of this situation it seemed necessary to discuss some of those i ssues at leneth in order to clarify and defend the presuppositions of the final chapter; other related i ssues are di scussed briefly by way of digressi ons. At best those first four chapters may contain some
substantial contribution on one or two i ssues in the philosophy of science; however fail ing that the bibliography and page-siecific references may still prove useful.
Ferhaps the most prominent of those i ssues, both within this thesis and at large, i s the scientific status of behaviourism. Thus the short title 'In defence of behaviourism', while not reflecting the structure or conclusion, does indicate a major theme of some wider interest.
Certain key terms may conveniently be elaborat ed at this point.
' Behaviourism' , and hence 'behaviouri st•, refer here to the science of behaviour developed by
V
vi B.F. Skinner and outlined in Chapter 3. This usage differs from that of Skinner (1974), who used the term
'behaviourism' to refer to the philosophy of that
science. In this thesis the philosophy of behaviourism is considered to be -part of the philosophy of science in general.
'Science' refers to the tradition identified with Galileo, Newton, ~endel, Darwin and many others. It is a complex behavioural phenomenon, in some aspects
comparable with and merging into myths (Feyerabend 1961;
1975) and common idiom (cf Toulmin 1953:39 on certain metaphors as the ghosts of dead theories). While it
would be difficult to gain assent to any strict definition of science, particula.r works identified with particular persons (eg. Newtonian mechanics) may generally be
accepted as exempl8.rs of science from which an ideal form of science may be abstracted. A theory may be said to be ' scient ific' t o the extent that it conforms to such an ideal. Science may be analysed into products and
processes. In Chanter 2 there are identified the
products ' primary knowledge' and ' secondary knowl edee', and the processes 'revolutionary science', 'normal
science', 'technology' a.nd 'justification o:f theories'.
Likewise the term 'technoloJy' is not restricted to the applications of physical sciences t o the design of hardware; the term is used to refer to t he application of any scientific theory to any practical probl em. For instance, a.n ap~lica.tion of behaviourism to the solution of instructional problems in schools, regqrdless of
v;hether or not 2.ny gadgetry or even numerical measurement are involved, counts as technology in this sense.
A 'theory' is a coherent body of (justified or hypothesised) primary knowledge, together with its associated secondary knowledge (if a.ny exists). One exemplar of a theory is Newtonian mechanics.
vii The conventional dichotomy between 'science' and 'social (or behavioural) science' is not observed, in kee-pine; with the view that behaviourism is not in principle different from physical sciences such as Newtonain mechanics. That the dichotomy is usually founded on a lack of familiarity with physical sciences was indicated by Popper (1966:292n44(2)) :
"And it turns out that those who believe that intuitive understanding is a method peculiar to sciences of 'human behaviour' hold such
views mainly bec8.use they cannot imagine that a mathematician or a physicist could become so well acqtiainted wi th his object t hat he could
'get the feel of it', in the way in which a
socioloeist ' gets the feel' of human behaviour".
The positions labelled 'Aristotelian' and
'Galilean' may not conform in all respects t o the views of Aristotle and Galileo respectively. The term
'Aristotelian' is used follwing Revusky (1 974:693);
t he term '1alilean' is used (in place of Revusky' s 'Platonic') following Cardwell (1972:36).
In view of the diverse t o~ics t reated and the volume of the relevant literatur e, a comprehensive
literature review would be unwieldy. As each topic is r8.ised some of t he literature relevant t o t hat t opic i s reviewed and other relevant items are noted without comment.
I wish t o t ha.nk my supervisor Mr Eric Archer for his guidance and encouragement, Mrs 0. Healey for doing most of the typing, and my wife Jan for her support .
