Description and evaluation : an examination of Julius Kovesi's philosophy of language : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at Massey University

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Dl�SCRIPTION AND EVALUATION

An Examination of Julius Kovesirs Philosophy of Language

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the reQuirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in philosophy at Massey University

John Patterson

197 5

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M3STRACT

ii

Kovesi maintains

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th&� �he key to und erstanding a term is t o be found not in ê^mp�rical similarities among observable things and events but in the human ⁿêêd^s ând interests incorporated in nhâ^t he calls the formal

elements of our notions^,

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that these formal elements also provide, wtere appropriate1 standards for evaluation,

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that this is true of moral and non-moral notions alike, t he differences between mGral and other notions, between moral and other judgements and between practical and t heoretical re^asoning ^being differences in ingredient s or subject mat ter rat her than in logic,

and (4)

t hat t he distinction between descr1ption and evaluation has,

t raditionally, be en incorrectly dravm.

In this essay I c:x:n.r:1in2 these tht3ses .""nd the argument s used to supoort thmn, an d ^conclude that, if

extended more widely than Kovesi envisages and interpreted wit h care, they aTe inhe:':'ently plausible and are more

at t ractive than some obvious riv^als.

The first c�apter is devoted mainly to e�1cidating the technica l t el'ms 1 form r and 1 matter 1 , comparing them 1Ni th the more fami^liar 1 ^necessary¹ ^and ¹^contⁱⁿg^ent^{1 ,}

w

it h Aristot le's 1form' and 1matter1 and with Plato's 1form1•

Chapter two concentrates on Ko·�esi1s

theses (l)

and

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_articular emphasis on the requirement that language be public an d on t he notion of fol lowing a rule, finding that (l) applies not onl;y to t^erms but also to a variety of speech act s. In (>hapters ""Ghree and four I examine t hesis

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finding it adeQuately supDorted, but dis

agreeing with t'wo consen.:uences Kovest draws from his view of moral notions.

I

also consider whether he is commit t ed to the view that we create the world t hrough th e notions

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iii

we form, arguing that despite anrwarances he is not committed to such a viev;, and that the question vvhether we do so create the world lacks sense. Chapter five is concerned primarily with thes8s

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and

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with partic

ular attention to t11 e q_ue st ion whether we must all have the same notions in order to underst.smd each other, and to jnst hovr the differences in ingredients or subject matter mentioned in

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are to be specified. I conclude that a public lan�J.age is possible vvi thout our all having, in the appropriate sense, exactly the same notions, and suggest that the difference between moral and other notions lies not in some single moral ooint of view but in what is regarded as central to the notion of a person.

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1

2

3

4

5

CONTETTTS

FOPN

1.1 1 .2 1.3 1.4 1 .5

AHD HATTER Introducti:-m

'Form' 8.:nd ':m::-1ttor'

Pclations bct":cen fnrm and matter 'Good' and

'ye l low'

'Form'

and

'matter' in Aristotle and Plato

W·TPIRICAL SP·TILARITIES

2.1

Recognitors

2 .2

SE:nsati0ns

2 . 3

_Form and em�irical simil�ritios

2 .4

Speech acts

2 . 5

Argnment A 2.6 Ru l es

HORAL AND

OTHER NOTIONS 3 . 1

Moral notions

3.2 norn.l notions

and

objectivity

3. 3

�·1oral n0tians

and

rul es

3. 4

Moral notions and

exi stence 3.5

LanguGgo nnd

exist ence

PRACTICAL RSASOPIPG

4.1

Deduction

4.2

Complete tsrms

4 . 3

Imp8ratives

4.4

Principles

4.5

Decisions

4.6

Facts nnd reas�ns

DESCRI�ING THE WORLD OF EVALTJATION

5 .1

Description and

evaluat ion 5.2 Complet e t erms and

evaluation 5.3 Evaluation and ^valuing

5.4

The moral point of view 'NORKS CITED

l l

3 22 31 36

45 45 5 3 61 70 76 87

99 99

101 106

lll

115

127 127 14-0 131 149 1 5 9 173

178

l7g

189

19S

208

216