A Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts
by
B.A M.A B.A
H.J. Allen
(ordlnary) L927
by examínation L929 (Honours) 1933
The Department of PhilosoPhY
The University of Adelaíde September, L984.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Summary
Statement
Acknowledgements
INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND.
B. AN OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED ACCOUNT OF HUMAN FREEDOM
C. THE LINKS I^]ITH OTHER PHT.LOSOPHERS
PART ONE.
A. MITCHELL 'S CONCEPT OF MIND
(A) The dírect explanation of exPerience (B) The índirect explanation of experience
(C) The effects of expressíng the measurement of experience ln terms of a sommon denominator (D) Features of the structure of experience
ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE
(A) A cross sectíon of exPerience
1. The Attitudes of subjeet or self to an object (1) The fírst attitude of a self to an object (2) The concePt of lnterest
(3) The practical attitude of seeking (4) Summary of the three attltudes
(5) The "ínteraction" of body and mínd (n) r,ongitudinal section of experience 1. The courses of êxPerience
Page
iv vi vii I
1 3 6
B
11
I7
18
2L 25 27 31 34 35 36 38 49 49 55 55
I
2
The importance of the self dírecting course in a new course of experience The concept of AttentÍon
The concept of Se1-f ActivitY
56
59 63
6l
67 68 7L 75 76
79 80 81 B3
84 88 94
95 95
98 3
C. THE DIRECT EXPLANATION OF EXPERIENCE
(A) Minds and occasions
(B) An Account of the reacting sÈructure (C) An Account of the occasíon
(D) Summary of the causes of experience
l. Summary of Mitchellfs account of instincts reflex actions and intelligence
2. The concePt of a sensatíon
D. THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE
Survey of objects Sensory intelligence Perceptual lntelligence
(1) Implicít thought (2) Explicit thought
E. THE PROCESS TERMÐ ''TAKING FOR GRANTED''
1 Definítion and connectl-on wiEh implicit and explicít thought,
2. How it feels to take for granted
PART TI4I0.
THE ROAD TO RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM.
1. Summary of why the psychology is important.
2. Conceptual intelligence
(1) The following lengthy quotation
t
2 3
101 ro2 105 106
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Page
3 4
The freedom of thought
Mitchellts concept of character (1) Intellectual character (2) The emotíonal character (3) The practical character Mítchell and Hobart ComPared
(1) Impulses, resolves and temperament
(2) The self
(3) Hobart on character (4) Hobart on a person
(5) Hobart on !raíning and discipline (6) Mitchell on the traíning of our moral
character
(7) Grades of freedom and value.
The freedom of the wí11.
(1) The five meanings of freedom of the will (2) Summary of five meanings
(3) Degrees of responsibilitY The self or will as cause
(f) The features of a moral life
Campbell and Mitchell on the experíence of making an effort of will
Summary of Mitchellrs philosophy of human freedom
109 113
IL4
717 L20 L23 l-24
t25
L25 L26 L28 130
L37 140 T4T 153
rs4
]-63 L66 170
5
6
7
B
L78
BIBLIOGRAPHY 180
SU}IMARY
In thls thesis, I have attempted an exposltlon of sír I^lilliam Mitchellrs phílosophy of human freedom.
An exposition was d,eemed necessary, since Mitchetl's readers, lncludÍng hís reviewers had found both "The Structure and Growth of the Mind" and,'The Place of Mlnds ln the l¡Iorld'r obscure, an obscurity increased by Ëhe fact that neither book contained an index'
IhaveattemptedtoshowthaEMit'chelllsconceptofhuman
freedom has, as its essential basis, the psychology set out ln
"StrucËure and GrowEh of the Mind". The outline of the argument runs lÍke this:
(1) The concept of seeking leads to Èhe conclusíon that every creature that can seekr l-s free'
(2) Compared.with human freedom, this is a low grade
freedom.
(3)Tota]-kintermsofgradesoffreedomistointroduce
the concept of value, and value is only expllcable in terms of a direct account of exPerience.
The direct account of experience is analysed ln Part One'
Part Two.
(4) IE is only when \^7e pass beyond sensory inEelligence' and pereeptual intelllgence and reach the stage of conceptual
intelligencethatthepossibilítyofhumanfreedomemerges.
(5)Humanfreedomisshov¡ntobethefreedomofmorally responsible Persons.
(6)
rhisdeterminism exists.
freedom 1s only possible in a r'rorld where
(7) Thls determinism whlch exlsEs ln nature allows room for the freedom to be bound by reason'
This is the paradox to which this thesls leads'
STATn{ENT.
This thesls contaLns no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma aÈ any universltY.
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesls contalns no materlal prevíously publlshed or ¡¿rítten except ¡^rhere due reference l-s made in the text of the thesis.
The author consents to this thesis belng made available for phot.ocopying and loan'
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ACKNOI,üLEDGEMENTS .
I desire to express my appreciatíon of Professor Graham Nerlích's willingness to under- take the task of supervisíng my work on an almost
forgotten former Adelaíde Professor of Philosophy and Psychology.
Throughout Graham Nerlich has been courteous and patíent in pointing out my lapses, and he has
made suggestions which I gratefully acknowledge'
Dr. Chris Mortensen tenderly mauled a few of
my early misconceptions and Mr. Michael Bradley has assísted in this task.
Angiers advice and assistance in typing has
been very useful.
I owe a special debt to Dr. N' Nílsson of Flinders University whose knowledge of Mitchellrs work prompted htrn to spend hours in dlscussion,
íntroducing me t.o \rorks of contemporary phílosophers '
