The HRLS program, which operates in 61 districts of Bangladesh, aims to protect and promote the human rights and legal empowerment of poor and marginalized people. These were cases where the shebikas' initiative failed to prevent violence, also known as failure cases. The state of empowerment of the shebikas in the household can be assessed by looking at the nature of decision making and their role in implementing the decisions.
It is clear that the satisfaction of the shebiks with the HRLS program will have a positive relationship with the actions taken towards HRVs. For geographical representation and to capture variations, all divisions of Bangladesh were sampled within the study area. The data analysis was done according to the topics that correspond to the objective of the study.
FINDINGS
Statements representing the satisfaction of HRLS shebikas
Slightly more than half of the shebiks (56.5%) reported less satisfaction with HRLS, while one third (33.5%) were more satisfied (Figure 3). On the other hand, 87% of Shebiks were not satisfied with their salaries and a large number (98%) felt that they needed more training. What's more, more than half of šebeks (53%) believed that the social work of šebeks is not appreciated, while 97%
Similarly, the highest percentage (23%) of shebika families in Khulna and Rajshahi divisions rented out land to other people. On the other hand, less than a third of households (30.5%) have rented land from others. Three-quarters of households (75.4%) owned a duck/chicken and a mobile phone, and the vast majority (94%) of households had a chair/table.
Most Shebika household members reported having better health status, but 12.6% of households had members suffering from serious illness (Table 4). Seventy-one percent of the shebikas from Barisal division, the highest of the divisions, received training other than HRLE. Household income, household expenditure, credit market participation and household savings were considered financial capital of the shebika.
Shebika households reported having three main sources of income, of which service was the main source for the majority of the shebikas. On the other hand, less than half of the households (45%) reported having paddy/rice in stock from last year.
Indicators measuring social status of shebikas
In addition, this section also assessed the size of shebikas' social network and the presence of factors that determined their leadership. Half of the shebikas were considered upper class in terms of economic status, and 65% of neighbors reported that the shebikas had been called for their help (Appendix 5). But a small number of neighbors (5.8%) said elites attached importance to shebikas compared to ordinary villagers.
More than a fifth of the shebikas scored 1, while a quarter of them scored 2, and a similar number of shebikas scored 3 (Fig. 4). 75 percent of the shebikas scored 3 or less, meaning that the majority of them had a lower status. The social status of shebikas varied considerably between departments and the number of years they worked as shebikas (Appendix 6).
On the other hand, 10% of shebikas in Sylhet division scored higher and ≥ 70% scored lower in Rajshahi, Barisal and Dhaka divisions. An overwhelming number of shebikas (80%) working 1-5 years achieved a low score and more than one third working for ≥ 11 years achieved a higher score. A social network is a social structure consisting of individuals (or organizations) called "nodes", which are connected by one or more specific types of interdependence, such as friendship, kinship, financial exchange, dislike, sexual relations, religious relations, knowledge, and prestige.
For having each of these contacts, the shebikas received “1” versus “0” for not having the same. Four percent of shebikas had ties to political parties and just over a quarter of them (27%) participated in voluntary community work (Appendix 7).
Indicators used for measuring shebikas social network Participation in local community
The largest number of women in Dhaka division (27%) scored none, while the largest number of women (12%) in Khulna division scored 5 and above. There were no significant differences of the shebika's social network in terms of duration of engagement as a shebika. Twelve statements on leadership qualities were presented to the shebikas and their neighbors who knew the shebikas well to rate their leadership qualities (Matrix 5).
The scores from these two sources are averaged to represent the leadership status of shebikas.
Indicators for measuring leadership qualities of shebikas
The findings show that 85% of the shebikas scored ≤24, indicating that the vast majority of the shebikas had poor leadership qualities. The overwhelming number of women (71%) bought jewelry and more than half of them provided money to buy the same (Table 7). The cumulative scores from these two items measured the decision-making level of the shebiks within the family.
Finally, 31% of Shebiks had a high level of participation in decision-making on the above-mentioned points. Eighty-seven percent of Šebeks reported that they went to the nearest village, and 48.1% to the court (Table 8). Based on the predicted probabilities, the Šebeks decided whether to take action against the violation.
For less than half of the dowry, domestic violence and child marriages, the shebikas failed to protest, and in almost the same number of incidents, the shebikas took no action. On the other hand, the variation in the average number of successes, failures and no action taken by the shebikas in case of HRV varied considerably between the divisions. Of the cases, the shebika voluntarily protested over half of dowry, family and child marriage-related violence (Appendix 11).
Moreover, in less than half of the cases of domestic violence in Khulna, Chittagong, Barisal and Dhaka divisions, the shebikas took no action. Moreover, the shebikas have not taken any action in half of the child marriage in Chittagong division.
Issues relating constraints shebikas faced in their action against HRVs
Shebikas can also convince the parents of the bride and groom of the drawbacks of the dowry transaction (Fig. 8). Shebikas failed to prevent HRVs due to limitations at both the individual and societal levels. Again, in some other cases, the Shebikas did not receive help from the police when asked.
Moreover, the shebikas refrained from protesting because for a long time there were customs and practices of giving and taking dowry in the community. The Shebikas also failed to prevent child marriage for the same reasons as in the case of dowry. 64 percent of the shebikas mentioned that their and their family's safety were important reasons for not protesting the rape case.
Therefore, it became difficult for the shebikas to gain the villagers' trust in their knowledge of the fatwa. Therefore, the shebikas deliberately refrained from taking any initiative to stop dowry in these marriages. Some reasons in the case of dowry were also mentioned by 60% of the shebikas in the case of domestic violence and child marriage (Appendix 18).
These past experiences also discouraged the shebikas from taking action against the HRVs. In many rape cases, the shebikas took no action because they themselves were not convinced that the victim had been raped, as indicated.
CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The selection criteria of the Šebeks were important factors in whether they would take action against violations. In support of this assumption, the level of satisfaction of shebiks positively contributed to action against violations. The level of satisfaction of shebiks can be increased by addressing their problems and needs.
Similarly, social capitals such as social status, quality of leadership, proactivity, and a network of shebiks were also key in taking action against violations. These factors have increased the Shebiks' ability to act against violations and withstand the resistance they face to such actions. Women who were widowed, divorced or divorced were more likely to take action against violations.
In the training, the shebikas mentioned, but not with much emphasis, that action against the HRVs in their locality should be one of their responsibilities. It is suggested that an official procedure be developed to ensure the accountability of shebikas to HRLS in relation to their relationships with HRVs in the community. Thus, it is proposed that the shebikas should be paid a nominal fee by the program to conduct successful efforts against HRVs.
The structural constraints that the shebikas faced were actually inequalities that they faced in society. The contradiction with the power elite should be the last resort for action by the shebikas.
APPENDIX
About 75% of the Shebika reported that members of these households were victims of slanging, bloodshot eyes and, in some cases, verbal communication being cut off with them (Table 12). In addition, slightly more than half of the shebikas (51%) reported that the members of their households had to hear bad remarks when they were sick. Ninety-three percent of shebikas from all divisions reported experiencing psychological and action-related violence, and 15% reported being victims of deprivation (Table 13).
In most cases shebikas were the victim, but in few others they were the perpetrator. The difference in number of violence experienced by the shebikas from different sections was statistically significant. Verbal communication was stopped by about half of the shebikas (43.3%) and more than one third of them fell victim to slang, bloodshot eyes, confinement at home, forced out of the home, dowry, not allowed to rest and overburdened by household activities.
Forty-seven percent of the shebikas were beaten by their husbands or other family members, and 28% of them were sexually harassed. Verbal communication was stopped by 55.7% of the shebika in Dhaka division – the highest among the division. Thirty-nine percent of the shebikas had become perpetrators of at least one violence within the past 12 months from data collection.
Less than half of Šebeks (46%) reported that household members were not provided with food, and 36.1% of them made bad comments to family members during illness. In addition, around a fifth of Šebeks (22%) forced family members into marriage, insulted them with slang, showed bloodshot eyes and forced a member out of the home.
