The role of NGOs in public and private land development:

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The role of NGOs in public and private land development:

The case of Dhaka city

Md. Manjur Morshed

^a,^⇑

, Yasushi Asami

^b

aDepartment of Urban and Regional Planning, Room: IEM-204, Khulna University of Engineering and Technology (KUET), Khulna 9203, Bangladesh

bDepartment of Urban Engineering, University of Tokyo, Room 901, Building No. 14, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656, Japan

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 3 April 2013

Received in revised form 24 December 2014

Keywords:

Urban planning Land Housing NGOs Dhaka Bangladesh

a b s t r a c t

Through a series of case studies, this paper discusses the three stakeholders in land development for housing in Dhaka city: the public and private sectors, and NGOs. In a scenario in which urban planning merely serves to the fulfil formal requirements and benefit certain groups, in which the public sector is an accomplice to the private sector, and where NGOs have their own private interests; urban planning in the public interest is interlocked with private interests. NGOs are important tertiary stakeholders in planning and service provision. While they vary in their types and objectives, environment NGOs in particular often find themselves in an antagonistic position concerning public and private land development.

However, the interventions to the public and private sectors placed by the NGOs can provide a platform for future negotiation and participation in policy formulation.

Introduction

This paper concerns the role of NGOs in public and private land development for housing in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Access to buildable land is the precondition of well-ordered and incremental housing supply. The failure of the market, and of the government, to provide for basic needs, makes NGOs an important secondary agent of social development in Bangladesh (Ahsan et al., 2009; Momin, 2013). With particular focus on residential subdivision and slums, this paper investigates whether and how NGOs are inﬂuencing public and private land developments.

Since the mid-1970s and the establishment of neo-liberalism as the orthodoxy underpinning the policies of the IMF, the World Bank, and more recently the WTO, debates have tended to focus upon governance, rather than government per se (Lee and McBrdige, 2007). Dissatisfaction with the ability of the existing political system to respond to the views and needs of all social groups, and scepticism towards for-proﬁt private sectors, demands some form of accountability (Stroker, 1998, 38). With the ascent of neo-liberalism in the 1990s, the topic of governance and accountability gained new relevance. First, the ‘roll back of the state’, which has sub-contracted delivery of public services to complex partnership for the quality, effectiveness and efﬁciency of delivery (Leat, 2004; Jepson, 2005, 516). This often refers to the expansion

of market mechanisms into previously relatively non-marketised domains, e.g., land and housing (Walker et al., 2008, 528). Sec- ondly, relationships between the state and ‘civil society’ to create a public realm (Swilling, 1997) that leads to a collective beneﬁt, which cannot be achieved by either acting separately (Rakodi, 2003, 524). Civil society is considered a third sector outside the private sector and the state. In the liberal tradition that views con- servative governments and organised business interests in unison (Oommen, 2003, 128), civil society can become the primary locus for the expansion of democratic and civil rights.

The ‘Civil Society Empowerment’ initiatives in most developing countries have been focused almost entirely on the NGOs. This is due to the fact that in places where grassroots democracy has yet to take hold and where the private sector is still at the ‘rob- ber-baron’ phase of maturation, there is so much corruption and nepotism that external donors do not trust the integrity or capacity of organisations normally associated with ‘civil society.’ NGOs, by virtue of their relatively independent and non-proﬁt status, and their links to poor communities that they have generally served well, are treated as an entry point to the burgeoning civil society that donors will help shape (Stiles, 2002, 835–836). The World Bank estimates that more than 15% of total overseas development aid is channelled through NGOs (Lehman, 2007, 646).

Bangladesh is a pioneer in NGO activism. There have been several studies on NGOs focusing on various issues, such as, resources and governance (Gauri and Galef, 2005; Kabeer et al., 2012), corporate social disclosure (Jamil, 1998; Ahsan et al., 2009; Momin, 2013), social-economic and political consequences

⇑Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses:[email protected](Md. Manjur Morshed),asami@csis.

u-tokyo.ac.jp(Y. Asami).

Contents lists available atScienceDirect

Geoforum

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / g e o f o r u m

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(Stiles, 2002; Naher, 2010), and housing the urban poor (Rahman, 2002). However, land development for housing in Dhaka has not yet been studied. The paper is organised as follows. The second section is the literature review that provides a background of the role of public, private sector and NGOs in land transformation.

Methodology is in the third section and the land development process is in the fourth section. The paper concludes with the discussion and conclusions in the ﬁfth and sixth sections.

Literature review

Government and land development

Rakodi states that ‘‘. . .the state-led approach to development implied that public sector organisations could plan and manage urban development and the debate focused on an appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities between central and local government and between the administrative departments of government and semi-autonomous public sector agencies’’ (2003, 524). Translated into housing delivery and physical planning, government approaches have intended to provide decent housing directly and to plan cities by demarcating land uses.

First, public housing programmes could never make a significant dent in the housing deficit due to the combination of rapid urban growth, limited governmental capacity and resources, and the sheer number of people living in poverty. The whole system lacked a sound economic base due to the level of subsidies involved to reach the targeted groups (Choguill, 1988; Sengupta, 2006, p. 450;Choguill, 2009; Gilbert, 2009). Nor did public housing achieve its social equity objectives. Government provisions have been used to camouflage inequality rather than to redistribute income, land and wealth (Gilbert, 1981, 657; Shidlo, 1990;

Fekade, 2000). Eventually, the majority of the urban residents are left to fend for themselves in grossly inadequate and usually illegal solutions (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986).

Secondly, from the physical planning perspective, zoning to demarcate and to contain desired land use and master planning to ensure guided land development are typical examples of public intervention. For the most part, urban planning intends to control the private development driven by a sense of altruism leading to the greater good for the greater number, efﬁcient service provision and justice to unprivileged groups. Among many planning tools used, one of the most prominent examples is the ‘greenbelt’. In modern times, greenbelt policy was pioneered in the United King- dom. The revision of Planning Policy Guidance Note 2 in the UK in 1995 suggested that greenbelts had a positive role in fulﬁlling several objectives. These include: (i) to achieve a compact urban form and to contain urban sprawl; (ii) to provide open countryside for outdoor sports and recreations; (iii) to retain attractive landscapes and to improve damaged and derelict land around towns; and (iv) to secure nature conservation interests, e.g., agricultural, forestry and related uses (Steeley and Gibson, 1998; Kim and Choe, 2011, 48).

Following the British example, greenbelts of different objectives were used as a planning tool in several Asian cities, e.g., Seoul, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Hanoi. The greenbelt of Seoul was successfully enforced because of the dictatorial regime backed by the military plan for the city. However, the greenbelt resulted in a bipolar urban density, high density inside and outside the greenbelt (Tankel, 1963; Kim and Choe, 2011, 47). The greenbelt for Tokyo failed because of strong opposition from the residents and landowners. The greenbelt policy is rarely an effective planning tool to curb land conversion and to protect environmentally vulnerable areas in Asian cities, which are char- acterised by population growth, demand for buildable land, speculation and corruption.

In addition to the failure to guide land development, the emer- gence of informal land and housing sub-markets (e.g., slums, squatters, informal subdivisions) is the result of planning regulations that practice unduly high standards in view of the ﬁnancial capacity of low-income households (Fekade, 2000; Gilbert, 1981;

Mehta et al., 1989;Sivam, 2002, p. 528). Between 70% and 95% of the all new houses that were being built in cities of the developing countries in the informal subdivisions (McAuslan, 1994;Kombe, 2000), were the response to the restrictive and high-standard planning regulations. The general dissatisfaction towards the tradi- tional role of urban government is due to the lack of success in the use of limited resources, responsiveness to the needs of urban growth, sensitivity to the needs of the urban poor and concern for environmental protection. This has in many places given rise to advocacy of a managerial role of the state. The major deviation from the previous state-led urban approach was the inﬂuence of neo-liberal economic thinking that is expressed in the macro- economic policies and associated with structural adjustment from a desire to reduce the role of government in land and housing delivery (Devas and Rakodi, 1993; Rakodi, 2003, 525).

‘Roll Back of State’ and private land development

The World Bank (WB) is the ﬂagship of neo-liberal policy pro- motion in urban management in developing countries. The Bank’s policy paper New Urban Management Program (NUMP) states ‘‘a shift in the role of central governments from directs providers of urban services and infrastructure to enablers’’ (WB, 1991; RAJUK, 2006, 20). The components of the enabling policy are: (i) simple regulation so that the private sector can respond to market demand; (ii) the delivery of land and housing through the privately raised capital; and (iii) cost recovery of government investments and by formalising illegal land and housing so that taxes can be charged (Jones and Ward, 1994, p. 33; Zanetta, 2001). This is because the private sector is assumed to be more efﬁcient than the public sector in providing land and housing (Cheung, 1978, 50).

There are several noted consequences of the enabling policy concerning the land and housing supply in cities of developing countries. First, housing became less of a priority for the government ‘‘...as its social allocation and cutbacks are justified as housing reforms which has taken many forms and manifesta- tions’’ (Sengupta, 2010, 323). For example, public housing programmes disproportionately favours the middle and upper income groups in the name of cost recovery, but these bypasses low-income shelter needs. Secondly, the for-profit market is not interested in low-income housing.Firman (2009, 332)notes that peripheral land conversion by the local government and private sector in Jakarta is caused by political interests and pressure by placing what are perceived to be profitable economic activities.

Thirdly, in all developing countries, with rare exceptions, imple- mentations of planning regulations are so weak that landuse plans are ineffective in controlling the physical development (Firman, 2009; Sivam, 2002, p. 529). With the consolidation of neo-liberalism,Roy (2009)refers the peripheral land subdivisions in developing countries as ‘privatization of informality.’ These subdivisions are no more legal than squatter settlements and shanty towns, but they are expressions of class power and can thus command infrastructures, services, and legitimacy (82–83).

Even though reliance on the enabling policy modiﬁes the tradi- tional role of the government, it also, paradoxically, broadens this role. In operational terms, enablement will often take the form of partnership arrangements that joins government policy makers, government agencies, community based organisations, NGOs, private builders and/or households (UNCHS, 1992; WB, 1993; Pugh, 1994, 358;Sengupta, 2010). Public–Private Partnership (PPP) for urban housing delivery (e.g., India), a tool to combine righteous

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position of the public sector and efﬁciency of the private sector, has emerged out of the emerging paradigms of 2000s. Similarly, Choguill (2009)andRahman (2002)recommend a wide range of NGO involvement (including partnerships) for low-income housing delivery in Bangladesh. NGOs are not only the source of sound policy and highly-trained experts to provide government with ideas and staffs, but also serves a crucial watchdog function by holding government accountable to the people (Stiles, 2002, 835), and can become producer of indirect social and environmental services (Cohen and Arato, 1992). Thus in multi-stakeholder arrangements of governance (Pierre, 1998; Baud et al., 2001), NGOs can become the power-breaker between government and private sectors to create a middle ground for public interest.

NGOs

NGOs are composed of non-government and non-proﬁt organisations which are comprised of volunteers and concerned with distinct policy objectives (Young, 2000; Lane and Morrison, 2006, 233), and ‘‘. . .typical NGOs would include charities, interest groups with a particular political agenda and objectives (e.g., industry associations), social movements, neighbourhood organisations and other civil associations’’ (Carson, 2002; Lane and Morrison, 2006, 233).

Literatures on NGOs suggest a range of problematic with regards to their participation in public and private decision-making. Organisations participating in multi-stakeholder arrangements have both common and conﬂicting views and interests (Baud and Dhanalakshmi, 2007, 136), where the most powerful groups can promote their own interests. Secondly, NGOs are often ideological in their positions.Lane and Morrison (2006, 232)expressed their concern regarding the conﬂict between public interest and environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in Australia, and stressed that ‘‘. . .more nuanced and critical appraisal of the role of NGOs in environmental policy so that political space might be reserved for the public interest and to ensure that the democratic effects of civil society are not diminished’’. Public interest is procedural rather than a substantive concept and is accounted for by ensuring the articulation of diverse values and interest in public policy.

Thirdly,Chatterjee (2004, 40), distinguishes ‘political society’ or

‘popular politics’ from ‘civil society’ or ‘the politics of right-bearing enfranchised bourgeois citizens’. For Chatterjee (2004), political society involves claims to habitation and livelihood by ‘‘groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation involve violation of the law’’ (Roy, 2011, 227). One extension of this political society is urban slum, whichRoy (2009) refers as ‘subaltern urbanism.’

Similarly, informal subdivisions by the powerful developers are another form of subaltern urbanism from the top. Finally, given the diversity of NGO objectives and agendas, recent literatures demand for accountability of NGO activities (Abbey, 2008;

Jepson, 2005; Stiles, 2002).Ackerman (2004)suggest that participatory processes are strengthened when there is a clear legal framework within which they can work, and which prevents participation from being at the whim of the government, or the private sector and NGOs. The World Bank emphasises ﬁve points in accountability while managing services: delegation of tasks, ﬁnance, performance, information about performance, and enforceability (WB, 2003, 47). Such formal approach to NGO participation is subject to reasonable doubt in developing countries like Bangladesh where informality is omnipresent and is the primary mode of the production of metropolitan space – informal sectors contribute more than 85% of the total housing stock in Dhaka (Islam, 2004).

NGOs in Bangladesh are registered under the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Ordinance, 1978 (GOB, 1978).

There is a lack of accurate information on the current number of

NGOs operating in Bangladesh (WB, 2006). However, along with the international NGOs, only a few social NGOs – e.g., Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Grameen Bank,Proshika, Gonosastho Kendra,and ENGOs – Bangladesh Environmental Law- yers Association (BELA),Bangladesh Poribesh Anodolon(BAPA) and Poribesh Bachao Andolon(POBA) have become especially inﬂuential because of their sheer size, agendas and grassroots involvement (Gauri and Galef, 2005; Momin, 2013). Considering the inherent ties between the interests of political parties, private sectors and administration,Momin (2013)suggests that NGOs in a developing country like Bangladesh are unable to challenge the private sector or to formulate public policy in any essential sense (see alsoTilt, 2004).Rahman (2002, 433)suggests that the government in Ban- gladesh does not espouse NGO participation in public policy formulation. Deegan and Islam (2009) investigated the process of NGO involvement in Bangladesh and they found that the NGOs and journalists set agendas, which ultimately put pressure on the government and private sectors.

In conclusion, while informality of land and housing in developing countries can be attributed to the regulatory and finan- cial incapacity of the government, the enabling policy has merely institutionalised the informality. Informality itself is resistant to formal participatory arrangements. Therefore, the success of NGOs participation in urban land and housing delivery mostly depends on their informal practice. NGOs need to be flexible enough to negotiate with the informal process, rather than trying to ensure accountability from an idealistic position. Secondly, the land and housing supply in developing countries is passing through a transitional period (Kombe, 2000),¹ from government supply system to a function market system. Therefore, current realm of land and housing development has to be understood as an outcome of the co-existence of three influential sub-sectors: government, private (market) and NGOs.

Methodology

Information about the land developers is a commercial secret.

The developers are not cooperative, even hostile, to individual researchers due to their ‘illegal’ status. Government agencies do not entertain individual researchers in Bangladesh. The past educa- tion and work experience of the ﬁrst author was an incentive con- ducting this research. Chains of connections and groupings of friend-like relations of the ﬁrst author were used to collect and to facilitate the primary and secondary data collection (for expla- nation of professional connection in the data collection process, seeBunnell et al., 2011, 493).

Field surveys in August, 2011 and in September, 2012, one month each, were conducted on the land developers, Capital City Development Authority of Dhaka (Rajdhani Unnayan Katripakha – RAJUK) and subdivision planners and Real Estate and Housing Association of Bangladesh (REHAB). There were 1082 land and housing developers in Dhaka city registered with REHAB by the last field survey date. The actual number of developers could be as many as twice the number of listed members. A total of 29 land developers and five land use planners from the land developers were contacted. These interviewees provided detailed facts regarding the land development process. Site visits offered by the land developers was an incentive to the comprehensive understanding about the present condition and location. The first author inter- viewed three planners from RAJUK. Faculties of the department

1Kombe (2000)deﬁnes the ‘transitional period’ as the time required to change from bureaucratic land allocation to a well-functioning market-led supply system.

This is the time needed for the formal institutions entrusted with the management of urban land, in particular the supply of housing land, to develop the capacity to supply sufﬁcient planned and surveyed land for housing.

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of Urban and Regional Planning (URP), Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), who were also representa- tives of the Bangladesh Institute of Planners (BIP) and some of the ENGOs, complemented the understanding about the role of NGOs in the current land development process.

The proposed GIS map of the metropolitan area was collected from RAJUK. To gain a comprehensive overview of the government policy, Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan (DMDP), 1995–2015 was consulted. The National Housing Policy and the planning guidelines were helpful understanding the ofﬁcial requirements for land conversion by the public and private sectors. The website of RAJUK was useful for understanding the subsequent changes in the planning and government interventions in the land and housing market. Previous research on land and housing development in Dhaka was collected from the department of URP, BUET. These sources provided a comprehensive base for understanding the physical growth and the land transition process in Dhaka. Addi- tionally, newspaper reports, blogs and commentaries on land and housing situation in Dhaka have been helpful for understanding the non-governmental perspectives.

Land development in Dhaka city Urban planning

Dhaka became a megacity in 2001. Population migration to Dhaka reached its peak in the 1980s with an annual growth rate of 10.97% (BBS, 1991). Swamps and other wetlands started to disappear as new residential, administrative, business and commercial importance developed (Roy, 2006, 26). A significant portion of the city has been converted from low-land and lakes to built-up – area names like Chankhar-pool, Hatir-pool and Moti-jheel (present CBD) still represent the previous state of these areas. Frequent urban flood in the city is a consequence of filling in the water body and low-lying areas. To control the unplanned land conversion, the metropolitan area was extended from 829 km²in 1959 to 1528 km²in 1987 under the jurisdiction of RAJUK, mean- ing, any land conversion has to take permission from RAJUK. This addition of about 700 km² covers most of the four surrounding administrative regions: Savar, Joydevpur, Keraniganj and Narayan- gonj. The population was estimated to be more than 15 million in 2010 (BBS, 2008).

From the planning perspective, the systems in Dhaka followed the trail of British Planning; the shift from Dhaka Master Plan, 1959 to Dhaka Metropolitan Area Integrated Urban Development Plan (DMAIUDP), 1981 is an example. The latest in the planning is the Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan (DMDP), 1995–

2015. The DMDP is a comprehensive planning system that works at three levels: (i) Structure Plan, 1995–2015 provides a long-term strategy for the sub-regional, urban and sub-urban areas without specific land use for a target population of 15.5 million; (ii) Urban Area Plan, 1995–2005 identifies the order, magnitude and direction of the anticipated urban growth, and define a broad set of policies;

and (iii) Detailed Area Plans provide planning proposals for speciﬁc sub-areas compliant with the Structure Plan and the Urban Area Plans. The Detailed Area Plans for the 1528 km²metropolitan area was completed in 2010 (Fig. 1). The DMDP has a target population of 15.5 million by 2015, which is, ironically, equal to the estimated population of 2010.

DMDP and the greenbelt

Between the extension of the metropolitan area to comprise 1528 km² in 1987 and the initiation of the DMDP in 1995, land developers saw an opportunity for subdivisions in the metropolitan

area. At that time, and at the primary stage of the DMDP, land conversions in the extended metropolitan areas barely came under scrutiny of RAJUK. The Detailed Area Plans in 2010 demarcated the already converted areas as urban residential zones. Legalisation of the land conversions was based on the political and monetary influence of the developers. Private land developments were marked as non-residential zones in the Detailed Area Plans if the developers had failed to bribe the RAJUK planners or the consulting firms responsible for preparation of the Detailed Area Plans. RAJUK acknowledges that there are many flaws in the Detailed Area Plans and revisions are to be made subsequently.

According to the Structure Plan, the land use in the Detailed Area Plans in the extended metropolitan (except the government projects) area is virtually a ‘greenbelt’ (Fig. 1). Excluding the core city area of about 100 km², of 1428.88 km², about 73.3% is demarcated as non-residential areas (agricultural zone, flood flow zone, rural settlement zone, water body and others). Excluding the government land projects and declared residential zone (already built-up new urban areas), almost 100% area is unavailable for subdivision. Due to the chronic shortage of buildable land and housing, and speculation, residential subdivisions in the peripheral area are the most profitable and the most common form of land conversion.

Controlling and guiding the land conversion has been the biggest challenge for the DMDP. The Structure Plan promotes dense urbanisation in the newly developed urban areas and partially enables or discourages peripheral land conversions (RAJUK, 2006, 48). Since the core city area is already built-up and passing through a re-den- sification process, and due to the skyrocketing land price,²future land and housing developments have to be in the peripheral low and flood-flow zones (Roy, 2006). Therefore, implementation of the greenbelt type landuse faces strong resistance from the private sector and local stakeholders.

Public land development and NGOs

The National Housing Policy of Bangladesh in 1993 (revised in 2004 and 2008) subsequently adopted the recommendations of the World Bank. The Structure Plan proposes that the government should only intervene in the land market, in an enabling capacity, to remove existing impediments in the supply, transfer, and regulations of land for shelter (RAJUK, 2006, 29). Additionally, the Structure Plan mentions that the government’s main role is to promote and to facilitate the provisions of shelter by indirect mea- sures. The direct provision of housing is and must be the responsi- bility of the individual (RAJUK, 2006, 30). However, government intervention persists in direct violation of the housing policy and the planning system. The ‘formal’ status attached to the government land and housing projects, which guarantee utility and services, cause immediate price hike. Given the dedicated quotas for the government employees and the privileged groups, government projects are self-beneﬁting.³

Case Study 1: RAJUK has several land projects (Table 1), including a new town (Purbachal) in the eastern fringe of the

2Land prices in Dhaka never experienced depression post 1970s, and are higher than major cities of the United States (Table 2). Bangladesh Institute of Planners (BIP) estimates land price in prime locations of Dhaka city: Dhanmondi residential area is the most expensive, average roughly Tk 3500 or around 60$ per ft², Gulshan about 3194 BDT and Baridhara about 3000 BDT (WB, 2007, 38). In comparison, the mean imputed land costs (extensive margin) in some cities of the United States are as follows ($/ft²): Boston 13.1; Chicago 14.5; New York 32.3; San Diego 26; San Francisco 64 (Glaeser and Gyorko, 2003).

3Government projects are self-benefiting. According to the guidelines, the quotas are as follows: government job holders 40%, employees and officials of semi- government bodies 15, war veterans 2, journalists 1.5, artists and sportsmen 1, businessmen and industrialists 10.5, private job holders 12, wage earners 10 and other categories for employees and officials of the RAJUK including the ministry concerned 2.5 (The Daily Star, 2009).

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metropolitan area (Fig. 1). The new town is the biggest planned township in the country with an area of 24.88 km². With estimated 26,000 residential plots of different sizes and 62,000 apartments, the new town will be equipped with infrastructure and urban facil- ities. Eight lane roads will connect with major highways leading to

different parts of the country. The new town is a direct intervention in the land market and is against the suggestion of the Structure Plan (RAJUK, 2006, 37). The Detailed Area Plans marks RAJUK’s new town as a residential area, which is a violation of the virtual greenbelt. The land uses near the new town are marked as Fig. 1.Land-use proposal of the detailed area plans and the government projects.Source:RAJUK GIS map, 2010

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ﬂood-ﬂow and agricultural zones in the greenbelt, which makes the private land developments in the area illegal.

The Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act, 2010 suggests that any alteration or land filling in the designated water body and flood-flow zones is a criminal offence. Against this act, several ENGOs– Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA)andPoribesh Bachao Andolon (POBA),Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK)and Institute of Architects Bangla- desh (IAB) filed a writ petition in the high court. The court ordered all unauthorised land developers (total 56) to stop their operation in the metropolitan area. Additionally, the Bangladesh Institute of Planners (BIP) and other civil associations, such as,Sushasoner Jon- no Nagorik(SUJON), were in favour of the implementation of the greenbelt. However, RAJUK’s new town project has government permission, thus high court rule is not applicable to it (Kaler Kontho, 2011).

From the case study, the government plays a provider role in the land and housing supply while violating the housing policy and the greenbelt. The ENGOs have failed to hold the public land and housing development accountable. The government has a monopoly over the formal claim to its own projects. On the contrary, the greenbelt is effectively an obstacle for the private developers. NGOs in Bangladesh play safe and they are less enthusiastic to challenge the government (Stiles, 2002, 843). According to Mon- jil Morshed, advocate, Human Rights and Peace for Bangladesh (HRPB), the ENGOs are playing a dual policy. While ENGOs are quite vocal against the land developers, they have consented to the government misdoings (Kaler Kontho, 2011). Such a dual policy questions the credibility of the ENGOs trying to enforce the greenbelt. In addition, numerous misdoings of politically afﬁliated NGOs have been reported in the newspapers.⁴In a seminar by Bangladesh Network for Environmental Governance, noted economist and envi- ronmentalist, professor, K. Kallekuzzam pointed out that an NGO is building a private university by ﬁlling in lowland (ETCNEWSBD,

2011). Therefore, NGOs cannot be generalised as non-proﬁt organisations, and their neutrality in the environmental concerns of land development is compromised.

Private land development and NGOs

The DMDP advocates that the private land developments should adhere to the basic principles of the Structure Plan. At the same time, the Structure Plan acknowledges that new land conversions will continue to occur, particularly in locations adjacent to pres- ently developed and developing areas, in spite of high ﬂood risk and a paucity of infrastructure, social and community services (RAJUK, 2006, 37). Based on the boundary of the metropolitan area, there are two types of land developers: those inside and those outside. Given the proposed greenbelt, land conversion for subdivisions is simply not possible in the metropolitan area. The presence of a large number of land developers outside the metropolitan area is posing a threat to the preservation of environmentally sensitive areas.

Case Study 2: RAJUK and NGOs have been passive to challenge the powerful groups. For example, an army housing scheme (Jolsh- iri) in collaboration with a land developer of about 1000 acres in the metropolitan area was permitted by the prime minister (Fig. 1). A for-proﬁt land developer is responsible for the operation, development and maintenance of the housing scheme while the army’s presence behind the scene plays a vital role in the land acquisition process. The housing scheme was a violation of the greenbelt, but RAJUK and the ENGOs took no initiative to stop it.

The housing scheme had several consequences. First, it curtailed the land business of developers in the vicinity. Secondly, local political leaders and intermediaries lost their cut from the land transaction. Thirdly, the presence of the military is a potential threat that obliges people to sell their land, apparently cheaply, to a particular developer. Thereafter, the local political leaders, land developers and intermediaries encouraged [through ﬁnancial assistance and wrong information] the local residents to protest against the army housing scheme. This turned into a violent clash between the military and the local residents (Prothom Alo, 2010).

As a result, the housing scheme had to reduce the proposed area. In response to a journalist’s question regarding the legality of the army housing scheme, former army chief, Major General K.M. Saf- iullah said:

‘‘The housing scheme has the Prime Minister’s permission. Also, if the private land developers can violate the Detailed Area Plans (greenbelt), why cannot the military develop a land project in the metropolitan area?’’ (Pakhik Chinta, 2010).

Seven NGOs – Action Aid, Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD),Ain o Salish Kendra,BELA, Bangladesh Legal Air and Services (BLAST), Manusher Jonno Foundationand Nijera Kori, along with Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), pub- lished a written statement highlighting the violation of the greenbelt and the fundamental human rights. These NGOs held several press conferences and pointed out that the army housing scheme had bypassed all the planning regulations by taking permission Table 1

Present and future government land project.Source:RAJUK, 2010.

Name Area km² Serviced plot (apartments) Population accommodation

Present projects (inside the metropolitan area) Purbachal (New Town) 25 28,000 (62,000) 3 million Nikunja (Residential Housing Estate) 0.3 500 (Unknown) 5000

Uttara 3^rdPhase 21.3 7500 (22,000) 1,56,000

Jhilmil Project 1.5 1800 (9500) Unknown

Future project (outside the metropolitan area) Unknown Unknown

Table 2

Land price change in major locations in Dhaka city.Source:Seraj (2009).

Locations Land price (000 BDT./Katha^*)

Year 1975 1990 2000 2007

Baridhara 25 600 2500 9000

Mohakhali 25 600 1800 8000

Dhanmondi 25 600 2200 9500

Shamoli 17.5 300 1000 3000

Uttara 20 300 1000 3500

Bashabo 2 300 800 2000

Mirpur 10 200 700 2000

Badda 4 200 600 2000

Motijheel 50 1200 3500 11,000

* 1 Katha = 720 ft²= 66.9 m²; 1 USD = 78 BDT (approx.).

4 Often citied is the donation of high value government land to politically afﬁliated NGOs. That land is often used for slum formation, which eventually becomes a vote- bank during the national election, and is often a place with a high social crime rate (e.g. drug-related crimes). Also, politically afﬁliated NGOs act as propaganda machines for different political parties.

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directly from the Prime Minister (Pakhik Chinta, 2010). These NGOs asked for a judicial inquiry, but they did not legally challenge the army housing scheme. Therefore, NGOs are not willing to challenge powerful groups, but they are able to create public pressure by exposing their misdoings.

Case Study 3: A land developer (Metro Makers Limited) filled in 2.23 km² of demarcated wetland of the greenbelt. Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Housing and Public Works and RAJUK for not taking any steps against the land development. Thereafter, the land developer and the plot purchasers’ association filed three lawsuits against RAJUK and BELA for creating obstacles for the housing project. After a long legal battle, the Supreme Court declared the housing project illegal. Additionally, the court ordered the land developer to revive the wetland. The court also directed the land developer to protect the interests of around 3500 plot purchasers and to return as much as twice the money taken. Such a verdict against the land developers is the first of its kind. According to the court and BELA, this will act as a warning for most of the land developers in Dhaka. However, the developer, in collaboration with the land purchasers, has plans to continue the legal battle (The Daily Star, 2013). In Bangladesh context, revival of the wetland by removing the already built-up housings is rarely a possibility.

From the case study, it is unclear whether a powerful NGO such as BELA can legally challenge private land development though public interest litigation. Considering the insecurity of land tenure and the long harassment of the land purchasers, the ENGOs ﬁnd themselves in an antagonistic position in matters of private interests. The ENGOs have very little local, political and administrative support. In many cases, the land developers ﬁnance the elections of the local politicians. If elected, the politicians are to return the favours by making the land acquisition and transaction in favour of the developers. According to Professor, Dr. Sarwar Jahan, president of Bangladesh Institute of Planners,

‘‘Most of the local political leaders are developers or own land in the DMDP area. They are involved in land development and transactions, which they cannot do if the Detailed Area Plans is implemented. Therefore, the local leaders are strictly against the implementation of the Detailed Area Plans and are provok- ing the local people to go against it’’.

In response to the ﬁrst author’s question regarding the illegality of the land developers, and the opposition from RAJUK and the NGOs, one representative of a land developer responded:

‘‘It is true that our operation is illegal. Nevertheless, if the government can violate the Detailed Area Plans, why cannot we? Moreover, it really does not matter because we control the land developments here, not RAJUK or the ENGOs’’.

To the same question, a RAJUK planner said:

‘‘Publicly we condemn the operations of the land developers, but I have two land development companies and I work as con- sultants for another two, so do most of the RAJUK planners. In reality, I am pessimistic about the implementation of the greenbelt’’.

These scenarios point to the convergence of the interests of the public administration, private developers and local stakeholders (e.g., local politicians and landowners) into purely private (economic) interests.⁵ Therefore, similar to the ﬁndings of Lane and

Morrison (2006), protecting the greenbelt can be viewed as a private interest ENGOs, rather than their effort to ensure public interests.

ENGOs are unable to account for the interests of all the stakeholders and ﬁnd a middle ground. They are trying to hold the private sectors accountable by exposing their misdoing. However, their effectiveness is selective and limited to private land developers.

NGO involvement in slum development

Apart from the environmental ones, most NGOs in Dhaka are involved in service provision and slum developments, act as ﬁnan- cial intermediaries for vulnerable groups and cater for special groups such as street children, destitute women, garment workers (Rahman, 2002, 435).

Case Study 4: The squatter population of Dhaka city mush- roomed to about 14% of the total urban population in 1974.

Because of pressure on the government from the press and from the more fortunate members of the society, an operation began in 1975 to clear 172,589 squatters from the streets and vacant lands of Dhaka. The squatter people were dumped in three peripheral resettlement camps where virtually no preparations had been made for them (Choguill, 1993). A UN Mission in 1975 remarked:

‘‘. . .before any action is taken to resettle or remove squatters. . .steps be taken with a view to developing a short-term strategy for dealing with the squatter problem’’ (Ullah, 1994;

Rahman, 2001, 58).

A vivid yet incomplete record of ‘systematic’ slum eviction can be found inRahman (2001) where evictions took place for city beautiﬁcation, due to the pressure from the social elites, and often forcefully by musclemen or by arson attacks.

The Korail slum in Dhaka sits on over 0.69 km²of government land. It is the largest slum in the city, with over 40,000 residents bordering wealthy neighbourhoods such as Banani and Gulshan.

In January 2012, the High Court ordered to clear the land, and in April 2012, the Dhaka district administration demolished almost 2000 homes in Korail without advance notice, leaving 4500 people homeless (Searchlight, 2012; The Guardian, 2012). Due to the immediate protest from the residents, NGOs and citizen associations backed by the mainstream media, the government had to withdraw from the total eviction plan. However, previously,Ain o Salish Kendra– a local organisation offering legal aid to slum dwellers – petitioned to the High Court to pass an order to make sure

‘‘. . .the rehabilitation of the Korail slum dwellers before any eviction drive’’. The High Court passed an order to this effect. But in what seems like a case of gross government negligence, ofﬁcials involved in eviction efforts were clueless about the earlier order (Searchlight, 2012). In reaction to the slum eviction, Asif Saleh, the Director of Communication at BRAC commented:

‘‘We have created a structure where there is no place but slums for low-income people to live. They are the engine of the informal economy, and yet, the state likes to pretend that they do not exist and this [eviction] is the result of that indifference’’

(BRAC, 2012).

The case study shows that the legal rule can be ignored when it conﬂicts with the government and/or private interests. Without the active participation of the major NGOs and civil associations, it would be impossible to stop the eviction drive. There is a shift of the media from a weapon of the better off to a representative of the lower-bottom classes. NGOs and civil associations are the biggest contributor to this shift of the media. NGOs, activist, support groups and civil associations are developing a consensus without the government (or imposing conditions on the government) while making positive contributions to the life and

5 There has been continuous pressure from the civil society for Public–Private Partnership (PPP) in Bangladesh. PPP is considered to be a non-proﬁt expenditure for the government; however, the government has failed to formulate a legal framework for PPP. In the 2013–14 ﬁnancial year, 3.29% of the total budget expenditure is allocated for PPP, but none for land and housing projects.

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livelihood of the unprivileged groups. There are cases where NGOs (e.g.Dustha Shasthya Kendra) are successful in negotiating access to utility and service formally for informal slum communities, and are successful in recovering the capital cost. Another example of success by NGOs in land and housing for the slum dwellers isSeva Nari O Shisu Kalyan Kendra. This NGO was successful in formally mort- gaging the private land on behalf of the slum dwellers, and guaran- teed ﬁve years of secured residency (Rahman, 2002, 440). While these are examples of successful NGO involvement, these are short-term solution without having a long-term strategy in sight.

Apart from the criticism of political afﬁliation and self-serving, there are frequent allegations against the NGOs in Bangladesh.

First, it is the divided opinion and fear that these organisations are creating a parallel government, ﬁnanced by foreigners and accountable to nobody (The Economist, 1998). Recently, the Ban- gladesh Awami League government – backed by political vendetta – tried to make Grammen Bank accountable to the government, but it faced ﬁerce resistance from the national and international community. Secondly, NGOs have been unable to maintain a socio-political mobilisation strategy even though many NGO leaders, as most social scientists in Bangladesh, consider themselves Marxist. Pressured by donors, NGOs have set aside their radical messages for social change and have become hierarchical in nature (Stiles, 2002, 843).

Discussion

This paper has presented a case study of Dhaka city focusing on the role of NGOs in public and private land development process.

Government intervention in the land market through direct provision violates the planning code and national housing policy. This beneﬁts the already better-off groups and does not provide housing solutions to the majority.Varley (2013, 17)suggests that governments have often permitted middle-class housing, indus- trial zones and government ofﬁces by violating their own laws.

Roy (2009, p. 84)suggests that such ‘extra-legality’ exists at the very heart of the state and is an integral part of the territorial practice of state power. The land use proposal (greenbelt) of the metropolitan area is a reﬂection of the ENGO inﬂuence. This, however, is due to the overwhelming pressure from the donor agencies to engage NGOs in public policy making (for example, UNDP provided about 90% of the total budget for DMDP preparation) (RAJUK, 2006). The government has a monopoly on legitimacy claim and NGOs are not up to the task to challenge by means of public interest litigation.

The greenbelt surrounding the city contradicts the market-led land supply. Such planning, as suggested byMattingly (1996), controlling. Private residential subdivisions present a complex market in the absence of a formal recognition. However, subdivisions present a homogenous trend all over the world that they can bypass the legal requirements. Legalisation, recognition and densiﬁcation of these subdivisions are time-consuming and costly processes.

Private land development by powerful groups such as the army housing scheme can bypass all the legal requirements by taking permission directly from the top. Moreover, the local stakeholders (e.g., political leaders, landowners and developers) are the deciding factors of the local land transition. Public administrations are fully aware of the land development and are often intricately involved with the process.

The experience of the planning of the Dhaka metropolitan area has interesting parallels with the case of Seoul and Tokyo (Kim and Choe, 2011) and Indonesia (Firman, 2004). First, large-scale land developers are outside the metropolitan area due to the low land availability inside, as in Seoul. Secondly, local politicians and landowners are against the implementation of the greenbelt inside the

metropolitan area, as in Tokyo. Thirdly, considering the current land price, developers are creating new town type of exclusive residential areas for the middle and high-income groups, as in Jakarta.

Therefore, the greenbelt will have very little impact on the land transformation in Dhaka.Firman (2009, 328)notes the importance of a grounded examination of urbanisation, that is, the understanding of the local context, the broader socioeconomic and political situation, as well as the physical condition of the places and societies in which the region exists. The extent of the private land development is mostly dependent on the interests of the local stakeholders and on the local geography, and is merely a consequence of the planning system and public policy.

The opposition from the ENGOs towards the government and private land developments stems from an environmental concern.

NGOs, while trying to ensure public interests, find themselves competing with the private interests of land developers, land buyers, landowners, local politicians and RAJUK planners. There- fore, similar to the findings of Lane and Morrison (2006), NGOs have private interests that are not always congruent with public interests.Tilt (2004)suggests that NGOs influence the private sector indirectly by exposing poor company practices in the media to encourage future regulation (see also Momin, 2013). NGOs in Bangladesh are aware of their inability to influence the public and private sectors directly and prefer externally verifiable criteria (Momin, 2013). ENGOs and other civil associations such as Bangla- desh Institute of Planners (BIP) are emphasising on the implementation of the greenbelt, effectively is an externally imposed or verifiable land use plan.

NGOs are not interested in challenging the state and state-associated power-groups, e.g., RAJUK, the army, the Ministry of Hous- ing and Public Works. On the contrary, they are effectively an obstacle for the private land developers. Because of the long public litigation process, private land delivery is substantially delayed incurring huge costs. Therefore, NGOs are unable to ensure participation with and accountability of public and private land development for housing in Dhaka. NGOs are successful in selected cases, e.g., negotiating with the public authorities for service provision and with private sectors for land tenure for slums. However, NGOs are successful in inﬂuencing public and private land development indirectly by creating public pressure.

Conclusion

Physical planning to guide land development in developing countries like Bangladesh is not necessary because of their ineffec- tiveness, but mostly an outcome to the local dynamics. The case of Dhaka suggests that both the public and private land developments are informal from the perspective of the planning system.

While Neo-liberal land development should ensure a continuous negotiation among the three stakeholders: public and private sectors and NGOs, which ultimately leads to the adoption of politically palatable options (Jones and Ward, 1994, 46), it is quite the contrary in case of Dhaka. Rather, these three stakeholders are acting separately except when their interests meet. Especially, the NGOs ﬁnd themselves at the periphery of the public and private decision-making because of their apolitical positions. Unless NGOs can ensure a political space for the public and private sector, their effort to ensure accountability hardly brings any positive outcome.

The success of social NGOs in Bangladesh is due to their grassroots involvement. Currently NGOs assume an accountability position that is very much devoid of the acceptance of the public and private sectors. Their legal approach by enforcing the planning regulations is an obstacle to the efﬁcient private land supply.

Additionally, accountability of NGO activities is a prerequisite for successful participation with public and private sector. Therefore,

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while the government should set standards based on understanding of modiﬁcations from formal system (Abbey, 2008), NGOs need to develop an accountability regime that is aligned to its historic roots and success (Jepson, 2005, 523).

Finally, NGOs do not treat public and private land developments equally. Nor do they cater for the aspirations of local stakeholders like the politicians, landowners and land buyers. Therefore, NGOs ﬁnd themselves in an antagonistic position in public and private land developments. However, this can be an initial platform for NGOs to be ﬂexible, fair and improve their actions for greater acceptability in public and private land developments.

Acknowledgments

The study period was supported by the Japanese Government (Monbukagakusho) Scholarship program. Many thanks to Kate Harris, for her assistance in English proof reading. Finally, we would like to extend our gratitude to the four anonymous review- ers, to Dr. Harvey Neo, the Editor, Geoforum, and to Professor P.

Carmody, the Editor in Chief, Geoforum for their comments on the earlier draft of this paper.

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