Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:M:Mathematical Social Sciences:Vol41.Issue1.Jan2001:
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The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that the voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists.. Much of the
We can offer some intuition about why risk neutrality fails to emerge in this example. The key property is ambition, as it appears in Theorem 1: if there is a lottery with..
Four social choice correspondences for voting situations based exclusively on the simple majority relation, and called C1, correspond to four different solution concepts for the
Thus in such games where pure strategy sets do not differ much in size and payoffs conform with concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over ordinally ranked outcomes,
We show that if cheap talk is meaningful (in the sense that babbling equilibria are ruled out) and if there is room for cooperation (namely if there exists at least one
From the theory of microbial competition [32] it is known that two mi- crobial populations involved in pure and simple competition in a chemostat with time-invariant
Significant differences were observed in total plant dry weight by the different treatments in pure stands, 21 days after emergence with higher values under mixed cropping system
In all the treatments (high and low Italian rye- grass seed bank density, pure and mixed stands) barnyardgrass hedges reduced Italian ryegrass vegetative yield compared to the
