HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLINGUISTICS
2nd EDITION
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLINGUISTICS
2nd EDITION
EDITED BY
MATTHEW J. TRAXLER Department of Psychology, University of California at Davis,
Davis, USA
MORTON A. GERNSBACHER University of Wisconsin,
Madison, USA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface vii
List of Contributors ix
1. Observations on the Past and Future of Psycholinguistics 1 Alan Garnham, Simon Garrod, and Anthony Sanford
Section 1: Language Production 19
2. Properties of Spoken Language Production 21
Zenzi M. Griffin and Victor S. Ferreira
3. Syntax and Production 61
Fernanda Ferreira and Paul E. Engelhardt
4. Speech Disorders 93
Gary Weismer
5. Functional Neuroimaging of Speech Production 125
Thomas A. Zeffiro and Jennifer L. Frymiare
Section 2: Language Comprehension 151
6. Speech Perception within a Biologically Realistic Information-Theoretic
Framework 153 Keith R. Kluender and Michael Kiefte
7. The Perception of Speech 201
Jennifer S. Pardo and Robert E. Remez
8. Spoken Word Recognition 249
Delphine Dahan and James S. Magnuson
9. Visual Word Recognition: The Journey from Features to Meaning
(A Travel Update) 285
David A. Balota, Melvin J. Yap, and Michael J. Cortese
10. Lexical Processing and Sentence Context Effects 377 Robin K. Morris
11. Semantic Memory 403
Beth A. Ober and Gregory K. Shenaut
12. Syntactic Parsing 455
Martin J. Pickering and Roger P. G. van Gompel
13. Prosody 505
Shari Speer and Allison Blodgett
14. The Syntax–Semantic Interface: On-Line Composition of
Sentence Meaning 539
Liina Pylkkänen and Brian McElree
15. Constraint Satisfaction Accounts of Lexical and Sentence Comprehension 581 Maryellen C. MacDonald and Mark S. Seidenberg
16. Eye-Movement Control in Reading 613
Keith Rayner and Alexander Pollatsek
17. Psycholinguistics Electrified II (1994–2005) 659
Marta Kutas, Cyma K. Van Petten, and Robert Kluender
18. Discourse Comprehension 725
Rolf A. Zwaan and David N. Rapp
19. Neuroimaging Contributions to the Understanding of Discourse Processes 765 Robert A. Mason and Marcel Adam Just
20. Comprehension Ability in Mature Readers 801
Debra L. Long, Clinton L. Johns, and Phillip E. Morris
21. Figurative Language 835
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Herbert L. Colston
22. Eye Movements and Spoken Language Comprehension 863
Michael K. Tanenhaus and John C. Trueswell
23. Perspective Taking and the Coordination of Meaning in Language use 901 Dale J. Barr and Boaz Keysar
24. Comprehension Disorders in Aphasia: The Case of Sentences that
Require Syntactic Analysis 939
David Caplan and Gloria Waters
25. Language Processing in Bilingual Speakers 967
Ana I. Schwartz and Judith F. Kroll
26. Psycholinguistics and Neurolinguistic Perspectives of Sign Languages 1001 David P. Corina and Heather P. Knapp
Section 3: Language Development 1025
27. Language Learning in Infancy 1027
Anne Fernald and Virginia A. Marchman
28. Acquisition of Syntax and Semantics 1073
Stephen Crain and Rosalind Thornton
29. Learning to Read 1111
Richard K. Wagner, Shayne B. Piasta, and Joseph K. Torgesen 30. Cognitive and Linguistic Issues in the Study of Children with
Specific Language Impairment 1143
Laurence B. Leonard and Patricia Deevy
Index 1173
PREFACE
It has been a lucky 13 years since the publication of the first edition of this Handbook.
Cognitive psychology in general, and psycholinguistics in particular, have experienced tremendous growth and change during this time (an overview sketch appears in Chapter 1 by Garnham, Garrod, & Sanford). One of our goals in amassing the second edition was to document and survey the most important of these theoretical and empirical develop- ments. To this end we recruited approximately 50 of the very best researchers and theoreticians in the field. We hope you will agree that these scholars have done a superb job, not merely describing their own research enterprises, but reviewing and explaining activity across their sub-disciplines.
Another of our main goals in creating this second edition was to sample as broadly across the field of psycholinguistics as possible. One small flaw in the first edition was an over-representation of chapters on higher level processing. Because higher level language processing is still a fascinating and critically important facet of the study of human language understanding, and because there have been tremendous advances in this sub-discipline since the previous edition, we have tried to ensure that higher-level processes are still adequately represented (e.g., chapters by Zwaan & Rapp, Mason &
Just, and Gibbs). However, we hope that the second edition strikes a better balance between different areas of research.
We hope that the reader will, therefore, obtain a broad and general overview of the field, as well as an introduction to the most important recent experimental findings.1Of course, there is a great deal of important work in psycholinguistics that we have not been able to include due to space limitations.2This a regrettable but inevitable consequence of the economics of publishing.
We have organized this edition into three sections plus Garnham, Garrod, and Sanford’s historical review and future directions chapter. The first section comprises four chapters on language production. The chapter by Griffin and V. Ferreira focuses on the production of words, while F. Ferreira and Englehardt’s chapter focuses primarily on production of phrases and sentences. Weismer admirably reviews speech disorders. Zeffiro and Frymiare complete the section with an explanation of how to exploit fMRI techniques to study language production, an area that we are likely to see more of in the next decade.
The second and largest section reviews issues in language comprehension. Without listing each chapter individually, we note that this section is organized in a roughly
1Readers will also learn the meaning of the Swedish word “ko-tätaste.”
2For example, I have already been comprehensively hazed for not dedicating a chapter specifically to reference assignment. It goes without saying that the next edition will have a chapter on reference assignment.
bottom-up way, starting with the lower-level processes involved in speech processing (e.g., Kluender & Kiefte), leading to comprehension of individual words (e.g., Balota, Yap, &
Cortese), proceeding to phrase- and sentence-level issues (e.g., Speer & Blodgett), and moving upward to discourse processing and interaction in dialogue (e.g., Barr & Keysar).
Along the way, these authors review a number of methodological issues. This section culminates with a trio of chapters that review language comprehension in specific popu- lations (i.e., aphasic patients, Caplan, & Waters; bilingual speakers, Schwartz & Kroll; and deaf signers, Corina).
The final section reviews language development, beginning with a chapter on language development in infancy by Fernald and Marchman, followed by Crain and Thornton’s review of syntactic development in early childhood.3Wagner, Piasta, and Torgesen then provide concrete advice on how to teach children to read in their chapter.4We conclude with a chapter by Leonard and Deevy on specific language impairment.
A volume of this scope would not be possible without the support and cooperation of many people. We, as editors, express our strongest gratitude to each of the authors for producing such high-quality work. Sarah Oates at Elsevier has also been instrumental in bringing this volume to fruition.
Psycholinguistics has been enriched by the addition of many young and talented sci- entists in the past 13 years. It has also been diminished by the loss of some of our best and liveliest individuals, including Peter Jusczyk, Ino Flores d’Arcais, Elizabeth Bates, and Marica de Vincenzi. Our sadness at their passing is tempered by the fact that their contribution to our understanding of psycholinguistics endures.
Matthew J. Traxler Morton Ann Gernsbacher
3The reader who moves immediately from Fernald & Marchman to Crain & Thornton may experience episte- mological whiplash, but that is one of the risks you take when reading about an active and exciting field like psycholinguistics.
4I have it on unimpeachable authority that Joe Torgesen was to meet with President Bush to discuss reading in- terventions on September 11, 2001.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
David A. Balota Department of Psychology, Washington University, St.
Louis, MO, USA
Dale J. Barr University of California, Riverside, CA, USA Allison Blodgett Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
David Caplan Neuropsychology Laboratory, Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, USA Herbert L. Colston University of Wisconsin, Kenosha, WI, USA David P. Corina Center for Mind and Brain, University of California,
Davis, CA, USA
Michael J. Cortese University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA Stephen Crain Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Delphine Dahan Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Patricia Deevy Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA Paul E. Engelhardt Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science
Program, Michigan State University, MI, USA Anne Fernald Department of Psychology, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA, USA
Fernanda Ferreira Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, UK Victor S. Ferreira Department of Psychology, University of California, San
Diego, CA, USA
Jennifer L. Frymiare Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Alan Garnham Department of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
Simon Garrod Department of Psychology, University of Glasgow, UK Raymond W. Gibbs University of California, Santa Cruz, CA, USA Zenzi M. Griffin School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, GA, USA
Clinton L. Johns Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA
Marcel Adam Just Center for Cognitive Brain Imaging, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Boaz Keysar University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Michael Kiefte School of Human Communication Disorders, Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, Canada
Keith R. Kluender Department of Psychology, Madison, WI, USA
Robert Kluender Department of Linguistics, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA
Heather P. Knapp Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, DC, USA
Judith F. Kroll Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, PA, USA
Marta Kutas Departments of Cognitive Science and Neurosciences, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA Laurence B. Leonard Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA Debra L. Long Department of Psychology, University of California,
Davis, CA, USA
Maryellen C. MacDonald Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
James S. Magnuson Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA; and Haskins Laboratories, New Haven, CT, USA
Virginia A. Marchman Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Robert A. Mason Center for Cognitive Brain Imaging, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Brian McElree Department of Psychology, New York University, NY, USA
Phillip E. Morris Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA
Robin K. Morris University of South Carolina, SC, USA
Beth A. Ober Department of Human and Community Development, University of California, Davis, CA, USA; VANCHCS, Mather, CA, USA
Jennifer S. Pardo Department of Psychology, Barnard College, New York, NY, USA
Shayne B. Piasta Florida Center for Reading Research, Florida State University, FL, USA
Martin J. Pickering Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, UK Alexander Pollatsek Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, MA, USA
Liina Pylkkänen Department of Linguistics & Department of Psychology, New York University, NY, USA
David N. Rapp University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA Keith Rayner Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, MA, USA
Robert E. Remez Department of Psychology, Barnard College, New York, NY, USA
Anthony Sanford Department of Psychology, University of Glasgow, UK Ana I. Schwartz The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX, USA Mark S. Seidenberg Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, WI, USA
Gregory K. Shenaut Department of Human and Community Development, University of California, Davis, CA, USA; VANCHCS, Mather, CA, USA
Shari Speer Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Michael K. Tanenhaus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, USA
Rosalind Thornton Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Joseph K. Torgesen Florida Center for Reading Research, Florida State University, FL, USA
John C. Trueswell Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Roger P. G. van Gompel Department of Psychology, University of Dundee, UK Cyma K. Van Petten Department of Psychology, University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ, USA
Richard K. Wagner Department of Psychology, Florida State University, FL, USA
Gloria Waters Communication Sciences and Disorders, Sargent College, Boston University, MA, USA
Gary Weismer University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA Melvin J. Yap Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA Thomas A. Zeffiro Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General
Hospital, Boston, MA, USA
Rolf A. Zwaan Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
Chapter 1
Observations on the Past and Future of Psycholinguistics Alan Garnham, Simon Garrod, and Anthony Sanford
“Do you mean am I a structuralist or a Leavisite or a psycho-linguistician or a for- malist or a Christian existentialist or a phenomenologist?”…“Well, I’m none of them”… “I’m a nineteenth-century liberal” (Malcolm Bradbury, The History Man, p. 106).
1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLINGUISTICS
1.1. Philosophical Beginnings
How and when can we distinguish “psycho-linguisticians” from other people who might be interested in language or, more generally, from “nineteenth-century liberals”?
Interest in language is a long-standing one, though when it became a psycholinguistic one, is a harder question. North Americans tend to date the history of psycholinguistics from the 1950s. Being European, our natural instinct is to trace intellectual origins to Ancient Greece: to Plato, in fact, since Socrates did not write anything, and the pre- Socratics are too fragmentary and difficult to interpret. Plato had a theory of concepts. In fact he had the same theory as Jerry Fodor (1987). Plus ça change. Except that Plato tried to say something about where the “innate” concepts came from – from our (mysterious) contact with the world of ideal forms. Fodor remained silent about this matter. Perhaps he was heeding Wittgenstein’s (1921/1961) advice to keep quiet when it is patently obvious that nothing sensible can be said (or however one wants to translate proposition 7 of the Tractatus). We mention Plato’s theory of concepts because Plato was clearly con- cerned with the mental. Indeed his theory of concepts is more like Fodor’s than much of the so-called psycholinguistic research of the 1950s is like today’s work on sentence pro- cessing, for example.
Plato aside, or rather theories of “ideas” aside, much of the interest in language before the late nineteenth century was not psychologically oriented. To a modern psycholinguist, particularly one influenced by Chomsky’s view of linguistics, that may seem strange.
Nevertheless, even though language use is clearly (primarily and almost entirely) a
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human activity, and a mental activity at that, most people throughout most of the his- tory of the study of language have treated language as, in Jerry Katz’s (1981) phrase, an “abstract object”. Ironically, perhaps, this view is called Platonist. So, there is a long history of interest in languages per se, going back, according to recent scholarship, over 2500 years. There were flourishing traditions in Mesopotamia, China, the Arabic- speaking world, ancient Greece, and, perhaps most notably, India, in the study of gram- mar, broadly construed. In some of these traditions, but not all, the link between the study of language and the study of logic was strong. This strand of work on language led, eventually, to the development, in the work of Boole, Frege, and others, of formal logical systems that bore certain resemblances to natural languages. And eventually, formal tools were applied to something roughly approximating to natural languages, with the first serious attempt to capture some of the complexity of real languages in the work of Richard Montague (Thomason, 1974).
Other traditions focused more closely on the details and intricacies of natural lan- guages, leading eventually to the comparative method of William Jones and others in the nineteenth century, and then to Saussure, structuralism and modern linguistics proper.
Another strand of this work, one interwoven with more general issues that can be traced back to Plato, sowed the seeds of the Chomskian revolution, or at least is retrospectively seen as doing so.
These developments began with some of Aristotle’s many disputes with Plato.
Aristotle did not like Plato’s theory of concepts, and who can blame him? Since Aristotle we have had over two millennia of rationalism versus empiricism. The debate centered primarily on ideas (concepts) on the one hand and knowledge on the other. It became heated in so-called modern (post-Renaissance) philosophy and in particular in the works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and other continental rationalists, and Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and other British empiricists. In this philosophical tra- dition, other aspects of language received little attention, or so one might conclude from the standard histories of philosophy. However, Chomsky famously picked up on Descartes remarks about the creative nature of language, and discovered precursors of his own ideas in the work of “lesser” Cartesian philosophers, such as Cordemoy, and in the (rationalist influenced) Port Royal grammar (Arnauld & Lancelot, 1660), which is now seen as proposing the notion of a universal grammar.
1.2. Psychological Beginnings
Psychology did not exist as a discipline in the first half of the nineteenth century. By the end of the century it clearly did. It is traditional to identify the foundation of Wundt’s lab in Leipzig as the beginning of psychology as an independent discipline. And it is certainly true that the division of faculties into departments in rich nineteenth century German uni- versities both freed psychologists from some of their philosophical shackles, and allowed them to begin or expand programs of empirical research. Development in the early part of the nineteenth century are also pertinent to the discipline of psycholinguistics, Medicine saw spectacular changes and spectacular growth, with detailed case studies appearing of
psychological deficits of various kinds. Of particular importance to psycholinguistics were the original descriptions of Broca’s (1861) and Wernicke’s (1874) aphasias.
The foundation of Wundt’s lab, and its notional date of 1879, is well known. Less well known that there was a thriving tradition of experimental work on the psychology of lan- guage, particularly in Wundt’s own lab. Wundt himself published a book on “die Sprache” in 1900, which appeared in an enlarged two-volume edition in 1912–1913.
Wundt’s early psycholinguistic work, and that of other German-speaking or German- influenced psychologists in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries has been documented in detail by Arthur Blumenthal (1970). In a later piece, Blumenthal (1987) suggested a symmetry between the breakdown of the early period of Sprachpsychologie, as he called it, and the prematurely announced (Reber, 1987) demise of modern psy- cholinguistics. According to Blumenthal, some linguists were initially greatly attracted to the empirical and philosophical work being carried out on language in Wundt’s Leipzig laboratory. Regular attendees at Wundt’s lectures included Bloomfield, Mead, Saussure, and Boas. Also attracted were the so-called Junggrammatiker, many of whom were also based in Leipzig. These “young grammarians” (the common translation “neogrammari- ans” is misleading) were reacting against the stuffiness of Germanic university traditions in the humanities. As is well known, the different approaches and philosophies of the var- ious German labs appeared to produce irreconcilable problems within psychology itself.
And according to Blumenthal this led some linguists, notably Delbrück (1901), to argue that linguists should seek to work independently of psychologists. Reber (1987) similarly argued that one of the reasons for the demise of modern (Chomskian) psycholinguistics was that linguists could not agree among themselves, and that psychologists therefore thought they would be better working on their own.
As is well known, the First World War and its aftermath had a profoundly negative effect on psychological science in continental Europe. In North America, too, Wundt’s in- fluence waned dramatically with the advent of behaviorism. In Europe, Wundt became involved in the kind of arguments that led directly to behaviorism in the USA – about the use of introspective techniques, for example. Wundt, himself, favored strict experimenta- tion, but the Würzburg group favored the use of introspective techniques. It was from this group that the next great European psycholinguistic, Karl Bühler, emerged. Bühler was a functionalist and, although he publicly opposed them, his ideas had much in common with the Gestalt psychologists, who also emerged from the Würzburg school. Bühler was forced to flee from the Nazi regime to the USA, but never established himself in an academic post there.
Ironically, behaviorism affected the study of language both within psychology and within linguistics, but without producing a continuing rapport between them.
Bloomfield’s Introduction to the study of language (1914) was decidedly Wundtian in orientation. But by the time it had metamorphosed into Language (1933), the behavior- ism for which Bloomfield is renowned had come to the fore, though in the preface he states that “since that time (1914 – AG)…we have learned…that we can pursue the study
of language without reference to any one psychological doctrine”. In psychology, although behaviorists were anxious to analyze thought as subvocal speech, they had com- paratively little to say about speech itself, or any other aspect of language. Eventually, in the late 1950s, Skinner published his little read but much cited (as routed by Chomsky) Verbal behavior (1957). Behaviorists still maintain that Skinner’s purpose was entirely different from what Chomsky construed it to be, and that it is a functional analysis, in a broader sense of that term than is common in linguistics (see, e.g., Catania, 1998, 2005).
Bloomfieldian linguistics made little contact with psychology, behaviorist or other- wise. But one strand of early- to mid-twentieth century North American linguistics did make an impact on the emerging cognitive psychology of the 1950s: The Sapir – Whorf hypothesis. Sapir was an academic linguist. Whorf was not. His passion and the fact that he was self-taught give his work a certain appeal. And this appeal was only compounded by stories, apocryphal or otherwise, such as the one about the “empty” gasoline cans that exploded when spent matches were discarded in them, because they were full of gasoline vapor. The question of how language and thought are related is an old and difficult one.
Students like the topic and they like the Sapir – Whorf hypothesis. However, regardless of its truth or falsity, at least one of the authors of this article (AG) has always been embarrassed in presenting some of Whorf’s arguments for this position.
Wundt’s work was wide-ranging, and influential in its time. Yet it was rapidly forgot- ten. However, it should be remembered that there are other antecedents of modern psycholinguistics in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century “psychological” schol- arship. In The psychopathology of everyday life Freud (1975) introduced the idea that has come to be known as the Freudian slip, one type of which is the slip of the tongue. Freud had particular ideas about the genesis of speech errors, and little concern for the form they took. However, those he reported largely conform to modern notions of what speech errors should sound like (Ellis, 1980). There is, of course, no contradiction between the idea that speech errors have certain linguistic properties and the idea that they are gener- ated as expressions of unconscious intentions. Indeed, the latter might be considered a description of the causes of speech errors as “verbal behavior”, though perhaps not one that behaviorists would relish. Slightly earlier than Freud, Meringer and Meyer (1895) published what would now be seen as a more orthodox analysis of a large collection of speech errors, noted down from everyday speech. This technique was revived in the 1960s and some of its limitations noted (see, e.g., Cutler, 1982).
Corpus techniques were also being applied, at a similar time, to questions about language acquisition, again foreshadowing work that started in the 1960s in North America. As Arthur Blumenthal (1970) points out in the introduction to Chapter 3 of his Language and psychology: Historical aspects of psycholinguistics, diary studies of child development are often traced back to Rousseau’s 1762 book Émile, and to a more formal report published by an academic, Dietrich Tiedemann, in 1787. With the emergence of psychological laboratories in Germany in the late 19th century, more sophisticated accounts began to be kept, including one by Wundt. The most systematic of these was that of Wilhelm Preyer (1881). More important than these works, however, is the diary
study (and its analysis) of Clara and Wilhelm Stern (Stern & Stern, 1907), which was considerably more linguistically sophisticated.
A not entirely separate set of precedents for another line of research can be traced back to a similar period: on eye-movements in reading. Émile Javal, in Paris, first observed that the eyes do not move smoothly in reading, but in a series of jerky movements (sac- cades) interspersed with pauses in which the eye are effectively still (fixations). J. M.
Cattell (1886), working with Wundt in Leipzig, used a new instrument, the tachistoscope, to show that words can be recognized in a single glance in which the eye does not have time to move across the word. Various attempts were then made to record eye movements in reading, culminating in the work of Edmund Huey (1908). Huey had met Javal in France, and carried out much of his work in the laboratory founded by G. Stanley Hall at Clark University in Massachusetts. Hall had also travelled in Europe and studied with Wundt in Leipzig. In addition to Huey, Erdmann and Dodge, in Halle, made detailed ob- servation of eye movements in reading, observing those movements via mirrors. Dodge also showed that little information is taken in while the eye is moving. Even in the be- haviorist period, there were important studies of eye movements by Buswell and Tinker.
Buswell (1922) devised a much less intrusive method (than Huey’s Plaster of Paris cup on the cornea) for making a physical record of eye movements. Tinker (1936) attempted to establish that eye movements in ordinary reading were similar to those obtained with the rather intrusive laboratory techniques then in use.
1.3. The Modern Era
Just as psychology as a science is traditionally traced to the founding of Wundt’s lab- oratory in Leipzig, modern (largely Anglo-Saxon) psycholinguistics has its quasi-mythical founding moment. Actually, there are three related moments. Two seminars sponsored by the Social Science Research Council (US) and the subsequent publication of the original version of Osgood and Sebeok’s (1965) Psycholinguistics: A survey of theory and research problems. A leading figure in the instigation and organization of these seminars was John B. Carroll, editor of the collected papers of Benjamin Lee Whorf (Carroll, 1956), and a psychologist who is associated with attempts to establish the Sapir – Whorf hypothesis using psychological techniques. The leading idea was “reuniting linguistics and psychology” (Osgood & Sebeok, 1965, p.v), thus recognizing that they had previ- ously been much closer than they were in 1950. John W. Gardner, another psychologist who played a leading role in setting up the seminars, hoped that the reunion would have profound implications for problems in education.
In retrospect, the seminars and Osgood and Sebeok’s survey have an almost surreal feel to them. There is little, if any, hint of the impending impact of Chomsky’s work on either linguistics itself or psycholinguistics. Of the three “approaches to language behav- ior” identified, one is the linguistic approach and the other two are the learning theory approach (behaviorism) and the information theory approach. Both information theory and learning theory were very quickly dismissed, in the period following the seminars, as too narrow to encompass language behavior.
While learning theory approaches never recovered from withering attacks by Chomsky (1959), Fodor (1965) and others, information theory has been important for cognitive psychology more generally. It influenced work on attention, short-term memory and, to some extent work on language – one thinks of Miller and Selfridge’s (1950) use of texts with different orders of approximation to English, and Yngve’s (1962) work on transition probabilities. One might even argue that it is (however tenuously!) linked to the notion of information processing, which was hugely important in the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s.
Miller, information theory’s most important psychological proponent, was soon lured away from that approach by the idea that a theory like that outlined in Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957) could form the basis of a processing theory (see, e.g., Miller
& Chomsky, 1963). This 1963 paper is the origin of a set of ideas that later came to be dubbed as the Derivational Theory of Complexity:
The psychological plausibility of a transformational model of the language user would be strengthened, of course, if it could be shown that our performance on tasks requiring an appreciation of the structure of transformed sentences is some function of the nature, number and complexity of the grammatical transformations involved. (Miller & Chomsky, 1963, p. 481).
Unfortunately the Derivational Theory was never formulated in a testable way, and it is unclear how it could be (Garnham, 1983).
The 1965 reprint of Osgood and Sebeok’s survey contains a follow-up Survey of Psycholinguistic Research, 1954–1964 by A. Richard Diebold Jr. (1965) Its bibliography, which runs to nearly 16 pages, is informative. There are references to work on language and thought, language acquisition, verbal learning, and information theory as represented at the original meetings. There are a good many references to work by linguists, includ- ing Chomsky, and there is mention of the early experimental work inspired by Chomsky’s linguistic theory. What is noticeable, however, is how few of these references would appear in a modern text on psycholinguistics. Psycholinguistics as we know it re- ally got started in the mid-to late 1960s.
As we have already mentioned, the first major wave of work looked at the psycholog- ical reality of transformations and led to the Derivational Theory of Complexity.
Chomsky’s ideas were also influential in empirical work on language acquisition (e.g., Roger Brown’s First Language project, see Brown, 1973, and the notion of the Logical Problem of Language Acquisition, see Baker & McCarthy, 1981), and on the biological foundations of language (e.g., Lenneberg, 1967). Chomsky, notoriously, soon backed away from the idea that experimental work in psychology might have implications for linguistic theory. And, indeed, other linguists, including contemporary cognitive lin- guists, who claim that cognitive considerations are important for language, have proved similarly reluctant to engage with psychological methods (as opposed to psychological considerations). Reber’s (1987) claim of a “(surprisingly rapid) fall of psycholinguistics”
is misleading in that all it is really saying is that the particularly strong link between Chomskyan theory and psychological research on language, which existed briefly in the 1960s, was broken and it was not replaced by a similar link to another framework. So, for example, neither Generative Semantics, nor any of the Phrase Structure Grammars of the 1970s and 1980s, both of which have an obvious psychological appeal, have inspired much in the way of psycholinguistic research. And neither, as we have already said, has cognitive linguistics. Reber’s comments do, however, open a debate about the link between linguistics and psychology and the extent to which the psychology of language should be psycholinguistics. Can language use be explained partly or wholly in terms of general cognitive principles, or do we have special language processing devices? And if the latter, what linguistic concepts are needed to describe them? We do not have answers to these questions. We believe that proper descriptions of languages are important for the psychology of language, but the relation between linguistic descriptions and descriptions of processing mechanisms is likely to be a complex one. Nevertheless, even without definitive answers, work on sentence processing has continued apace in the 1980s and 1990s and through into the 21st century.
Another major influence on psycholinguistic research from the 1960s was work in artificial intelligence, and in particular research from Minsky’s (1968) semantic infor- mation processing framework, which culminated, as far as language processing was concerned, with Terry Winograd’s (1972) SHRDLU. The other major influence from the semantic information processing literature on psycholinguistics research was Ross Quillian’s (1968) notion of a semantic network for representing meaning. Perhaps more generally influential, first in setting unreasonable expectations for AI, and then for the backlash against it, was Joseph Weizenbaum’s (1966) ELIZA program, in its various manifestations. DOCTOR, the Rogerian therapist version of ELIZA, engaged in con- vincing conversations with people, and led to claims (not by Weizenbaum) that the prob- lem of understanding language had been solved. ELIZA is widely claimed to have inspired the creation of HAL, the computer in 2001: A Space Odyssey. Weizenbaum (1976) later made strong representations against the claims made for ELIZA.
Since the 1980s, however, the GOFAI (“good old-fashioned AI”) that inspired psy- chological research has dried up with the advent of what has been called the “AI winter”.
Perhaps foolishly in retrospect, one of us published an AI textbook for psychologists at that time (Garnham, 1988). To some extent the place of GOFAI in psychology has been taken by neural network (“connectionist”) modelling. Within psycholinguistics, the major impact of neural network modelling has been in the domain of word recognition.
Connectionism has also sparked renewed debate about modularity.
A refreshing development in psycholinguistics since the 1960s has been a greater sophistication in dealing with questions about meaning. Although semantic networks capture some interesting facts about word meaning, the “theory” theory (Murphy &
Medin, 1985) is more subtle. And more recently there has been a renewed interest in questions of polysemy, metonomy and the like. However, we remain unconvinced that most psycholinguists appreciate the enormous complexities of questions about the
meanings of words and how they relate to representations of information in individual minds (an issue touched on in Hilary Putnam’s, 1975, famous discussion of natural kind terms such as “larch” and the linguistic division of labor). The use of Wittgenstein’s ideas in psychology (e.g., Garnham, 1980), or at least psychologists interpretations of those ideas, is another interesting development. However, Wittgenstein’s (1953) own ideas are notoriously opaquely presented, and it is almost certain that he would not have endorsed the various uses of his ideas, given his dismissive view that “in psychology there are empirical methods and conceptual confusion” (Part II, Section xiv). Much ear- lier in his career, Wittgenstein had experience of psychological research. Another set of ideas that continue to intrigue psycholinguists are those of pragmaticists, and in partic- ular the work of Grice (see, in particular, 1975). Nevertheless, there is a great deal more work to be done in determining how the pragmatic aspects of meaning are produced and understood.
The mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983) has revolutionised thinking about text meaning. For example, it gives a much clearer idea of what is meant by the integration of information in comprehension than the “bizarre” Bransford and Franks (1971) exper- iment. Nevertheless, reading a novel is surely more about engaging with the characters than about constructing an internal model of the situation(s) described in the text. There is a great deal more to be learned about the understanding of extended texts.
There is much more that could be said about the modern era in psycholinguistics.
Much of it is said in this Handbook. There is no doubt that – psycholinguistics is alive and kicking. We all have our favored questions and techniques, but there is plenty to keep us all, and more, busy for the foreseeable future. We should learn whatever we can how- ever and from whomever.
2. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The original handbook chapter on Future Directions opened with the statement that there is nothing more foolish than trying to predict the future. And that is still as true today as it was then (although it is a fair bet that we shall see much more from the labo- ratories of cognitive neuroscientists). Instead of trying to predict the future we pick some issues in psycholinguistics that we feel call out for future study. The issues are not in any way intended to be exclusive. They are just issues that we feel are important, unresolved and relate directly to the primary goal of psycholinguistics in elucidating psychological mechanisms of language use.
The first issue concerns the range of language use addressed by the subject. The mod- ern era of psycholinguistics has concentrated almost exclusively on one kind of language use: namely, that associated with monologue settings. Yet, the most natural and basic form of language use is dialogue: Every language user, including young children and illiterate adults, can hold a conversation, yet reading, writing, preparing speeches and even listening to speeches are far from universal skills. Therefore, we feel that a central
goal of psycholinguistics of the future should be to provide an account of the basic pro- cessing mechanisms that are employed during natural dialogue.
The second issue we consider also concerns scope, but in this case in relation to the more conventional topic of reading comprehension, and the extent to which standard psy- cholinguistic approaches do justice to the complexity of texts that people read in every- day life. In both cases the issue is about taking seriously how language processing in the psycholinguistic sense relates to the wide range of uses to which language may be put.
2.1. Language Processing and Dialogue
There are many reasons why psycholinguists have avoided dialogue in the past, both the- oretical and practical. The theoretical reason relates to something which we have already alluded to in covering the history of the subject and its grounding in linguistics. Theoretical linguistics, at least in the generative tradition, has developed theories about the structure of isolated, decontextualized sentences that are used in texts or speeches – in other words, in monologue. In contrast, dialogue is inherently interactive and contextualized: Each inter- locutor both speaks and comprehends during the course of the interaction; each interrupts both others and himself; on occasion two or more speakers collaborate in producing the same sentence (Coates, 1990). So it is not surprising that generative linguists commonly view dialogue as being of marginal grammaticality, contaminated by theoretically uninter- esting complexities. Dialogue sits ill with the competence/performance distinction assumed by most generative linguistics (Chomsky, 1965), because it is hard to determine whether a particular utterance is “well-formed” or not (or even whether that notion is relevant to dialogue). Thus, linguistics has tended to concentrate on developing generative grammars and related theories for isolated sentences; and psycholinguistics has tended to develop processing theories that draw upon the rules and representations assumed by generative linguistics. However, the situation in linguistics is changing and linguists are beginning to explicitly take dialogue into account (see e.g., Ginzburg & Sag, 2001; Keysar, this volume).
So there is less theoretical excuse for psycholinguists to ignore dialogue.
The practical reason is that dialogue is generally assumed to be too hard or impossible to study, given the degree of experimental control necessary. Until quite recently it was also assumed that imposing a sufficient level of control in many language production studies was impossible. Thus, Bock (1996) points to the problem of “exuberant respond- ing” – how can the experimenter stop subjects saying whatever they want? However, it is now regarded as perfectly possible to control presentation so that people produce the appropriate responses on a high proportion of trials, even in sentence production (e.g., Bock, 1986; Levelt & Maassen, 1981)
Contrary to many people’s intuitions, the same is true of dialogue. For instance, Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland (2000) showed effects of the priming of syntactic structure during language production in dialogue that were exactly comparable to the priming shown in isolated sentence production (Bock, 1986) or sentence recall (Potter &
Lombardi, 1998). Similar control is exercised in studies by Clark and colleagues (e.g.,
Brennan & Clark, 1996; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; also Brennan & Schober, 2001;
Horton & Keysar, 1996). Well-controlled studies of language processing in dialogue may require some ingenuity, but such experimental ingenuity has always been a strength of psycholinguistics.
Also, there has been a steady development in techniques that make it much easier to study language processing ‘in the wild’ that could contribute to a mechanistic psycholinguistics of dialogue. First, there is the development of more extensive dia- logue corpora available in electronic form. Some corpora have been elicited in semi- controlled conditions, such as the HCRC map task corpus (Anderson et al., 1991), and have been extensively coded and time-stamped. Such rich sources of naturalistic data open up new ways of testing processing hypotheses. There is also the development of more sophisticated behavioral measures of on-line processing during dialogue, such as the head-mounted or remote eye-tracking systems now available. In fact, such equip- ment has already been used to investigate referential processing in a constrained dialogue setting (see Brown-Schmidt, Campana, & Tanenhaus, 2004; Tanenhaus &
Trueswell, this volume).
Therefore from both the theoretical and the practical point of view there is every rea- son to hope for a more focused study of language processing during dialogue in future years. But how might this contribute to a better understanding of basic language processing mechanisms? The key difference between a dialogical and a monological approach to language processing is in how they define the system under investigation. In a monological approach there are two basic systems one for language production the other for language comprehension. The only relation between the two is that the output of one system is taken as the input to the other. In other respects the two systems are to all intents and purposes independent. However, the dialogical approach treats the system as minimally bounded by two interlocutors engaged in both production and comprehen- sion of the language being used. Communication and language processing is taken to be a joint activity between both interlocutors (Clark, 1996). Hence, how one interlocutor formulates her message is inevitably influenced by how the other interlocutor has for- mulated his. More generally, Pickering and Garrod (2004; see also Garrod, 1999) have argued that the basis of successful communication is somewhat different in monologue and dialogue settings. In monologue readers and listeners attempt to establish a coherent interpretation or situational model of what the texts are about. However, successful dia- logue depends on interlocutors aligning their respective models or representations.
Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue that one of the consequences of this alignment process is that comprehension and production become coupled. This is not a new idea, at least in some areas of psycholinguistics. For instance, it has long been argued that there is a close relationship between perception and articulation of speech (Liberman &
Whalen, 2000). Although the claim about speech is still controversial, the debate has recently been rejuvenated in neuroscience as a result of evidence for activation of artic- ulators during speech perception (Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, & Rizzolati, 2002).
2.2. An Enriched Approach to Reading Comprehension
Just as dialogue poses a challenge for future psycholinguistics, we think that even con- tinued research into monologue and reading settings has its own challenges that require considerable attention. A prevalent perception of psycholinguistics by many academics outside of the discipline, but interested in language use, is that the materials used in most experiments are short, typically dull, de-contextualised, and generally unrelated to any- thing in real life. As psycholinguists, we would of course defend the subject against any negative construal of these facts, pointing out that adequate control over sentence struc- ture and content is essential if we are to understand the basic mechanisms of compre- hension. It is of central interest, for instance, to determine the syntactic and semantic interpretations given particular sentence structures.
However, we also think that it is important for psycholinguistics to take a broader view of interpretation. While the determination of the processes and principles underlying how single, controlled sentences are understood, along with analyses of the time course of processing, is grist to the mill of psycholinguistics, it can harbour dangers for progress.
For instance, there has been a small but steady amount of work on the interpretation of doubly quantified sentences, almost all of which (to our knowledge) relies on principles that operate at sentence level only, so that the sentences of interest occur in vacuo.
Although some sentence-level grammatical constraints undoubtedly apply in these situations, we think it likely that most examples of double quantification occur in specific contexts, where pragmatics will constrain ultimate interpretations, and will probably con- strain intermediate possibilities, and semantic interpretations, as well. Studies of in situ processing may well provide a different and more useful picture of how interpretation occurs from studies of sentences in vacuo. Let us immediately say that we are not advo- cating lack of experimental control: rather, we are advocating the study of processing within situations where sentences are treated as utterances within a setting. While hope- fully there will be many instances in which processing is identical whether the sentence in question is in vacuo or in situ, it is a question that needs an answer for any specific proposed processing mechanism.
Another aspect of greater realism in materials concerns claims of richness in interpreting these materials. The kind of inferential activity that goes along with reading has been a topic of interest in the psychology of language for many years, and has had a checkered history. Inferences made in the service of coherence (causal chaining, discourse anaphora, etc.) probably form the biggest group that have been investigated, although there has been a steady interest in elaborative inference as well. Work on causal chaining and on elaborative inferences has tended to be the domain of discourse psychologists, who are somewhat on the edge of what is currently mainstream psy- cholinguistics. McKoon and Ratcliff’s (1991) paper on minimal inference-making while reading occurred at a time when (since the mid-1970s) psychologists along with colleagues in AI were hypothesizing very large scale inferential activity in the service of comprehending. McKoon and Ratcliff showed how careful one has to be in claiming that
this or that inference is made. Beyond that, they claimed that in many laboratory reading studies, many types of inference simply are not made.
This minimalist position holds little appeal for the growing number of psychologists interested in what we might term the richness of experience when immersed in a story- world. For instance, adopting what on the face of it is a quite different viewpoint, Zwaan (1999) suggested:
When reading a story, we may “experience” cold wind blowing in our face, the smell of stale beer, a kiss on our lips… (Zwaan, 1999, p. 83).
Certainly, if readers experienced no excitement, no prediction of what might happen next, and no ego and emotional involvement, then there would be no sales of novels, detective fiction, and popular magazines. Expanding the notion of interpretation to in- clude these possibilities takes one well beyond the limits of what is typical in mainstream psycholinguistics. It is of interest to note evidence that descriptions do indeed have very direct influences on people, and these go beyond the purely cognitive. For instance, lis- tening to accounts of after dinner smoking elicits cognitive and physiological responses consistent with smoking urges in smokers (e.g., Drobes & Tiffany, 1997). Writing is just as often emotive and dramatic as it is meant to be instructional.
We suggest that a better understanding of how written communication works is possi- ble only by exploring a fuller range of written material, let us call it realistic written ma- terial. Once again, we should emphasize that we are not advocating a lack of controlled experimental materials, but rather, an expansion of the types of questions that are being asked. One growing area that should rather obviously benefit from a broader perspective is what might be termed the grounding program.
In the past two or three decades there has been an upsurge of interest in the problem of how meaning is grounded in the world of perception and action (e.g., Searle, 1980;
Harnad, 1990; Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Ziemke & Sharkey, 2001). Consideration of the symbol grounding problem is of course having an impact on questions about language comprehension and is a likely area for a major upsurge of future research. Most of the existing work is on the periphery of mainstream psycholinguistics at present, and only the most basic of demonstration work has so far been carried out. First, pioneering efforts by Glenberg and his colleagues, and the later work of others, have demonstrated that when actions are carried out that are incompatible with the direction of movement implied by a description, then interference occurs. For instance, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) had people judge whether utterances like You handed Courtney the notebook was a sentence or not. If the judgement was made by moving the hand to a button away from the body, then it was initiated more rapidly than if the judgement was made by moving toward the body. The opposite holds for Courtney handed you the notebook. More recently, Zwaan and his colleagues (Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & Aveyrard, 2004; Kaschack et al., 2005) have demonstrated similar interference/facilitation patterns for perceptual displays changing in ways that represent motion away from or toward the observer.
Secondly, studies in neuroscience have also been recruited as evidence of embodied cognition. There is now good evidence that areas of the brain near the appropriate motor cortex areas are activated when words denoting certain bodily actions are presented in a variety of tasks. For instance, the verb walk activates areas near those associated with movements of the lower limbs, while talk activates areas associated with control of ver- bal articulation (Pulvermuller, Harle, & Hummel, 2001). This work is seen as supporting the belief that understanding is somehow rooted in experience (action and perception).
While this angle constitutes an interesting way of approaching at least some of the fun- damental problems of meaningful, grounded interpretation, it also appears to provide a basis for linking reading to the kinds of phenomenological experiences described by Zwaan. We think that a broader construal of the notion of interpretation to include bod- ily correlates is a likely area of expansion. However, demonstrations of the role of action and perceptual systems in interpretation is certainly in its infancy, and, like mainstream psycholinguistics, uses single sentences in most experiments. Whether comprehending long sequences that describe complex actions requires close coupling to action and per- ceptual systems throughout the narrative still requires demonstration.
Once one begins to address the possibility of dealing with naturalistic materials like real stories and literary materials, many other questions arise. One is simply whether processing is uniformly full (“complete”, if you have a theory of what constitutes a complete interpretation). There is a growing literature within more conventional psycholinguistics showing that semantic processing is often rather shallow (see Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Sanford & Sturt, 2002, for reviews). When one considers reading long pieces of work, selective processing is likely to be much more important than in the typical single sentence/short paragraph work of traditional psycholinguistics, although this is an open question, of course. However, much more study of what it is that controls how thoroughly processes of reference resolution, causal chaining, and representation of discourse takes place, seems to be due. Writers typically have the problem of causing their readers to think about A and not about B – that is, they have a problem of controlling the processing patterns of their readers, if they are to effectively put over an impression or a message. Selectivity in processing must underlie success in the face of this problem.
2.3. Scope and Interest
We see a major problem for a proper psychology of language as being one of lack of interaction between different sub-disciplines. For instance, the lack of overlap of atten- dance at the major conferences on sentence processing (e.g., the CUNY series of confer- ences) and those on discourse (e.g., the series on Text and Discourse) is very noticeable to those of us interested in both perspectives. While sentence processing and text pro- cessing and dialogue fail to fall under integrating umbrellas, there will never be a Language Science comparable to the recently emerged Vision Science. What we cannot tell about the future is whether there ever will be a Language Science (or even an inte- grated Psychology of Language). But it makes a fine goal.
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