THE INADEQUACY OF AN ORDINARY ORGANISATION:
ORGANISATIONAL ADAPTATION TO CRISIS THROUGH PLANNED
AND SPONTANEOUS LINKS
Aida Alvinius Erna Danielsson
Gerry Larsson ABSTRACT
Emergency response organisations face the challenge of having a bureaucratic structure and meeting extreme situations where predefined directives cannot cover all possible emerging contingencies. The aim of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of the concept of links within the framework of emergency response agencies during severely demanding operations. The empirical data are based on fifty in-depth interviews from three crisis events. The results suggest that collaboration during crisis management is facilitated by two types of links—planned and spontaneous—and both can act vertically and horizontally. The results imply an elaboration of the organizational concept boundary spanners.
Keywords Planned link and spontaneous link, boundary spanners, disaster management, bureaucratic organisation, trust
INTRODUCTION
Emergency response organisations usually face the challenge of having a bureaucratic structure characterised by precision, discipline, reliability and predictability on the one hand (Andrzejewski 1954), and meeting extreme situations where predefined directives and routines simply cannot cover all possibly emerging contingencies on the other (Ben Ari 2005; Kapucu 2006). The greater the uncertainty, the more difficult it is to routinize activity by preplanning (Morgan 1986). However, this kind of organisation must still operate efficiently in demanding conditions where much is at stake.
Organisational theory appears to lack consensus on the adequacy of the bureaucratic organisational form in times of crisis. Critics claim that because of a rigid structure, organisations with a strict vertical hieararchy of authority do not function well in non-routine situations where creativity and flexibility are required (Kendra & Wachtendorf 2003). Some of the inadequacies tend to be intra-organisational. Performance may be confounded by a set of built-in conflicts that severely constrain policy-making, internal activities and actual operations. Typical clashes are based on irrational considerations such as internal Acknowledgment: This study is based on a project financed by the Swedish Emergency Management Authority (SEMA).
departmental competition, political rivalries, jealousies, and interests. These built-in conflicts in bureaucratic organisations hinder collaboration, coordination and optimal use of resources (Kirschenbaum 2004; Drabek & McEntire 2002).
Inadequacies in the bureaucratic structure of emergency response organisations also relate to environmental aspects. These include the lack of control and predictability when using volunteers during disaster management, the sheer number of actors, political influences, differences between organisations involved and the ‘Robinson Crusoe syndrome’ in which organisations believe that they are ‘the only ones on the island’, meaning they may not fully recognize other organisations or the need to find out how their agency fits into the overall response effort (Auf der Heide 1989 in Drabek & McEntire 2002).
In contrast, advocators of the bureaucratic organisational form point to recent empirical studies suggesting that lack of structure causes problems during disaster management. Mattox (2001) found, for instance, that federal agencies and response organisations functioned effectively, although independently, under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. At their best, bureaucracies have an ability to rapidly increase functional compactness and structured response (Abrahamsson & Andersen 2005; Lanzara 1983).
The bureaucratic structure appears to be ‘alive and well’ in most emergency response organisations throughout the world, including the military system. Thus, the issue of being for or against bureacracies may be a secondary concern; rather we should focus on identifying necessary conditions within this framework which allow for optimal adaptability in unpredictable and severe conditions.
According to most organisational theories (e.g. Cameron, Kim & Whetten 1987), top management tends to take a firmer grip in tough times. Decision-making responsibility is passed upwards, participation decreases, and control is emphasized. The military concept ‘mission command’ can basically be viewed as an attempt to counteract this tendency. However, it has been demonstrated that in order for mission command to work in stressful conditions, a trusting environment is important (Larsson et al. 2007; Vogelaar 1999). Within a basically bureacratic organisational structure, one aspect of a mission command concept relates to how situations are solved when the hierarchical chart is not clear as to who does what, when, how and where. Lanzara (1983) has pointed to the potential value of individuals with the required specific competencies who also have skills in collaboration and communication within and between organisations. Webb (1991) refers to individuals with these kinds of competencies as boundary spanners. By providing linkages which do not exist on organisational charts, boundary spanners facilitate the sharing and exchange of information and link their organization with the external environment (Aldrich & Herker 1977; Burt 1992; Grunig 1992; Willimas 2002).
Trist (1983) visualises boundary spanners facilitating communication over ‘social ground rather than between institutionalised figures’, (p. 280). Hosking and Morley (1991) claim that effective networking enables a boundary spanner to understand the social constructions of other actors, and how they ‘define the issue in relation to their own values and interests, know what “outcomes” and processes each would value, know who needs to be involved, know who could mobilize influence, and so on’ (Hoskins & Morley 1991, p. 228).
Most existing research on boundary spanners has been done in economic and industrial contexts. Reviewing the litterature, only two studies were found that focused on severely stressful situations. Summarising his study of the multi-organisational emergency operations following the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, Kapucu (2006) points to the need for bureaucratic organisations to have flexible modes of connectivity with co-actors under conditions of uncertainty. Boundary spanning appears to be a double-edged sword in times of crisis, however. In the second study found, Lakshmi et al. (2010) examined negative consequences of boundary spanning contacts in military contexts. Results from a study of Dutch peacekeepers showed that employees’ boundary spanning contacts with members of other organisations were associated with reports of negative relationships with external parties (e.g., work-specific problems, culture-specific problems). These negative relationships also had a spill-over effect such that they affected the attitudes of the boundary spanners towards their own job and organisation negatively.
The concept of boundary spanners thus seems to deserve further exploration when analysing emergency response organisations (Alvinius et al. 2010; Bacharach, Bamberger & McKinney 2000; Perrone, Zaheer & McEvily 2003). For this reason, we felt that a more generative approach was legitimate. The aim of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of formal and informal boundary spanners within the framework of bureaucratically-organised emergency response agencies during severely demanding operations.
METHOD
The study was conducted using qualitative interviews and a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967).
Selection of disasters, organisations and informants
This study is based on interview data from three crisis events (described below). The selection of events was made using two criteria: the first being magnitude (the handling of the crisis to have involved at least three or more organisations in several local communities and/or a region) and the second being variety. Consequently, in accordance with the guidelines of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967), we chose one natural disaster, one man-made accident and one event arising from antagonistic human actions.
The Boxing Day Tsunami. The Boxing Day Tsunami on 26 December 2004 resulted in momentous consequences for large parts of Southeast Asia, from personal tragedies to serious impact on the economies and populations of a number of countries. The disaster not only affected Southeast Asia, but also many countries far from its epicentre. A recent analysis by the United Nations lists almost 300,000 dead (http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/asia_tsunami/en/). Of all the European countries, Sweden suffered the greatest number of casualties in the tsunami, some 20,000 Swedes being on holiday in Thailand when it struck. According to an official Swedish Governmental Report in 2005 (SOU 2005:154), it was confirmed that 543 Swedes died and 18 were still missing.
the site for a couple of days as a preventive measure. The accident did not cause any significant harm to employees, public health or the environment
http://www.kemira.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Media/Reports/Environmental_Raports/Ke mira_Environmental_Report_2005_EN.pdf).
A hostage-taking. On September 23, 2004, a hostage drama occurred in Mariefred (a small Swedish town). Despite preparedness and incident exercises among the prison officer staff, two inmates with knives fled the prison after taking a warden hostage. The prisoners moved across several counties, which increased pressure on the police investigations. The hostage managed to escape, reducing situational stress, but the hunt continued. After four days of intense pursuit, the prisoners were finally arrested outside a small city far from the prison. The hostage drama was a unique event in that it was the first time in Sweden that hostage-takers had managed to take a hostage outside a prison area. The event received a lot of media attention, which was perceived as stressful for the organisations involved (http://www.kriminalvarden.se/templates/KVV_NewsArticle.aspx?id=2729).
Organisations and informants
The empirical data were based on 50 interviews. The organisations involved in this study were the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, a regional public prosecution office, an emergency treatment unit, a prison establishment, a local rescue service organisation and a regional police department (see Table 1).
TABLE 1: Overview of Informants
An emergency service function called Focal Point
Chief Fire Officer (CFO) on Duty
Overall Incident Commander
Chief of Emergency Treatment
Officer on Duty
Liaison Officer sent from Operative Unit (OPU) and located at the Swedish Rescue Services Agency
Two managers for the operational section on duty
The head of the logistics department
5. National Board
Chief of Security
(N) informants 50 9/41
Data collection
Data were collected from interviews, following a prepared interview guide. The prospective informants were contacted by e-mail and/or telephone and informed about the purpose and procedures of the study. Participants were asked to report on their experiences from involvement in rescue operations. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions and individually adapted follow-up questions covering the following themes:
Individual role and task during a specific rescue operation
Experience of individual actions during the rescue operation
Experience of organisational actions during the rescue operation
Experience of collaboration between the authorities and the organisation during the rescue operation
Stress and demanding conditions during the rescue operation
The interviews were conducted between January–November 2005 at the informants’ workplaces, on the premises of the Swedish National Defence College and in one informant’s residence. The interviews were recorded, and generally lasted about 60-90 minutes. All interviews were conducted and analysed by the authors.
Data analysis
The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed according to the constant comparative method of Glaser and Strauss (1967) and clustering, a process of moving to higher levels of abstraction. The first step was so-called ‘open coding’. Data were examined line by line in order to identify the informant’s descriptions of thought patterns, feelings and actions related to the interview themes. The codes derived were formulated in words resembling those used by the informants. For example, the statement, ‘I work as a police negotiator. Our task initially was to prepare us for interviews with offenders’, was coded as ‘a negotiator’. Codes were then compared to verify their descriptive content and to confirm that they were based on the data.
The second step involved sorting the codes into different categories. The above example, ‘a negotiator’, was sorted into the category ‘predefined position and task’ after constantly comparing interview transcriptions, codes and categories. Codes and categories were also analysed with respect to the selection criteria, meaning that comparisons were made between the different organisations and the different roles occupied by the informants. The third step consisted of clustering the categories into superior categories using the same procedure. The fourth and final step consisted of fitting the superior categories together using the constant comparative method. This resulted in a core variable called a link.
RESULTS
between various hierarchical levels within an organisation or between the management of the authorities and the political level. The horizontal communication process is described as acting between different organisations, or between individuals at the same level within the same organisation/agency. Table 2 illustrates major characteristics of Planned and Spontaneous Links.
Link
Planned Links Spontaneous Links
Predefined position and task
a) Liaison officer b) Representative role c) Coordinator
d) Negotiator
e) Information officer f) Observer
g) Translator (organisational differences)
Not predefined position and task
May belong to another organization
Appears on the site / field
Coordination
Collaboration
Support
Purposes
Getting the picture on the site
Sense-making
Estimating the allocation of resources on the site
Other competencies such as translation of another language
Aspects of trust
Network of contacts
Organisational acceptance, trust is related to a position not only to individuals
Aspects of trust
Swift trust
Willingness to work across organisational boundaries depends on organisational reputation
Negative aspect of Planned Links
Too many links mean too many different apprehensions
Negative aspect of Spontaneous Links
TABLE 2: Major Characteristics of Planned and Spontaneous Links
Planned Links
A Planned Link is related to an individual’s organisational role and is most often approved and accepted by superiors. Planned Links refer to individuals with collaboration tasks within their responsibility and mandate, such as liaison officers or negotiators. This linking function may have appeared successful in a previous event, which led to the establishment of this kind of link in the organisation. Planned Links can be decision-makers who are able to act outside the framework of the organisation because he or she possesses organisational acceptance and has a wide experience of managing disasters or unexpected events. Individuals with planned link functions in crisis situations belong to the ordinary chain of command during regular day work and may have a managerial position during ordinary working conditions.
Predefined position and task. According to the interview data, Planned Links are found in predefined positions such as a) liaison officer, b) representative role, c) coordinator, d) negotiator, e) information officer within or between organisations, or information officer between a response organisation, the media, the public and politicians, f) observer and g) translator.
a) Liaison officer. The Swedish Armed Forces have a built-in structure for this, as illustrated in the following quote from a centrally-placed manager of the Swedish Rescue Services during the tsunami disaster in South-East Asia:
Initially, the Swedish Armed Forces had placed a liaison officer with the Rescue Services staff who was familiar with military language and the military system.
b) Representative role. According to our informants, the first few days after the tsunami were critical in finding a structure for the mission. Improvisation and ad-hoc behaviour typified many decision-makers, in particular the Rescue Services staff. One informant had assumed a representative role to the Swedish Government in order to shorten the decision-making chain between the Government Offices in Stockholm and the Rescue Services in Karlstad, which is a smaller city in Southwest of Sweden. The quote below illustrates this:
Everything imaginable needed coordinating, but since we didn’t have any organisation in Stockholm and since I was on site, I assumed the role of being the Rescue Services on site in Stockholm.
In a crisis management situation you need to be able to appoint a person who will be of assistance during the mission. One of our informants could appoint competent staff and then receive his manager’s support for his decision:
I advise on who to appoint and then they have to think about it…and later I’ll get my boss’s support for my decision as to who should go off on this mission.
The international aid responses normally come direct to XX so I suppose it’s true that there is a special pathway in international aid responses that has been linked to operational departments, to the person XX. /.../ you need to think about the future and have more fixed structures that are pre-established and not as dependent on a single individual.
c) Coordinator. Some Planned Links have a coordinating role which means the individual functions as a ‘spider in the web’ at the disaster site:
The police incident officer is like the spider in the web, and it’s just like I described, the phone ringing, the radio screaming; everyone wants to be in touch because he’s the one who knows and lays down the guidelines and you want confirmation for this or that, or you want to say that this is what is happening now.
d) Negotiator. In the police force, there are pre-assigned roles for individuals with negotiation skills, which was necessary in the case of the hostage-taking.
My exact duty was to be negotiation coordinator. That is, to have overall responsibility for establishing a negotiation organisation, being able to conduct negotiations and simply being a link between the negotiators and the police chief’s staff – linking information into and out of what we called the negotiation cell.
The staff of the Rescue Services and the Armed Forces had a common entry point, and that was me.
e) Information officer. Information officers from the rescue services had a structure for managing internal information, as well as information dissemination to the public and the media.
There was also a group of staff who we called the media contacts.
In some cases, the municipal government had appointed a spokesperson who would collaborate with politicians during the crisis.
The municipal government’s crisis organisation – well I was actually the only representative.
As a Planned Link you can use your position to manage the task when it comes to creating contacts between the public and the Government Offices. One of our informants experienced this:
A man who phoned in had worked as a shipbroker and was now a doctor – a strange combination. And he felt the reaction he had from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other places he had contacted was that he was a complete idiot /.../ I said to him, tell me about your plan /…/ So, when I spoke to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I brought up this idea of the reefer ship.
At the accident site, a number of organisations such as medical, police and rescue services work together. During the sulphur spill, rescue staff from all the involved organisations were gathered, and many organisations appointed extra staff to manage the contacts between these organisations:
I appointed an informal police incident officer chief to directly manage the contacts [in the field].
On a national level, the observer is sent out to get a picture of the situation when something happens.
g) Translator, A translator bridges organisational differences by spreading revised information. It is not an easy task:
It’s never easy to get hold of the freshest information and present it in a way that people understand, and to get it up on the website.
Aspects of trust. To be an effective Link, you need a well-established network of contacts. Our informants described how they utilised formal and informal contacts during the mission. One of the rescue services managers, for instance, had encouraged the contact person in the Government Offices to contact the Thai Government about the tsunami. At the same time, they made use of other people’s informal contact networks during the mission:
I phoned the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and said to the senior person on duty: you deal with the government, the government has to get onto the Thai government /…/ And he had his network of colleagues of the same rank, and the whole thing started.
As another informant says, it is extremely important to have a broad network of contacts. Experience tells us that in all crisis management, if you aren’t sitting around the same table, you have to know the person you’re talking to on the phone, if you’re going to get any results.
In a crisis, the way the Link works is that you act first, and get support for your decision higher up in the chain later. Organisational acceptance permits digressions like this. For this to be possible you need to have complete trust in the person in question, so he or she can have free hands. A selected quote illustrates this:
Ensuring that you’re doing something at the same time as ensuring that you are constantly getting support, positioning yourself, keeping within the boundaries. /…/ we bring in people without actually having the money, but I feel secure in what I am doing.
Negative aspects of Planned Links. In a crisis, many different links can appear, both planned and spontaneous. In the sulphur spill accident, several rescue teams collaborated during the rescue operation, and numerous links had the role of conveying information, which was not always beneficial as the content changed from person to person, a bit like in a game of Chinese Whispers:
So when communication went from the first to the second link and then to the third, there were changes in the content of what was said.
As more people listened at each stage, there were small changes.
Spontaneous Links
No predefined position and task. Spontaneous Links act both vertically and horizontally when there is a need for their existence. They do not have to be a part of collaborating organisations, which is the case with Planned Links. Spontaneous Links happen to be the right individuals in the right place when an unexpected event occurs, which is often experienced by the informants as positive. Strenuous situations and demands can lead to Spontaneous Links emerging. Actors emerge when a need becomes visible, as was the case after the tsunami:
At the end of the day I got in touch with a guy XX who had contact with someone down there (Thailand); he suddenly appeared – this Swedish Air Force officer who was there celebrating his 50th birthday. So he turned up and asked if they needed help with anything.
The following comments of an operative leader (Planned Link) in the Swedish Rescue Services Agency illustrate how he gets the picture of the situation and how the spontaneous link estimates the need of resources during the rescue operation:
When I talked to the guy from SOS I wanted to know what kind of support they needed down there in Thailand. He said emergency support for search and rescue is a bit too late. Then we decided that what was needed was more medical personnel and psychologists.
Strenuous conditions can place demands on competent people when support is required in order to solve a task. The task, which is not predefined, involves coordination, collaboration and support but includes purposes connected to the extreme situation such as sizing up the situation, sense-making, estimating the allocation of resources and other competencies. In the case of the hostage-taking, it turned out that a church minister came to help when the hostage’s family needed support:
I picked someone from the support group and our prison pastor /.../ but we were so lucky because another minister from Mariefred lived on the top floor [in the building were the hostage lived]. He was their neighbour /.../ so those three travelled together – our support person, our prison pastor and the other minister went and met his [the hostage’s] wife and family to inform them.
Aspects of trust. In some favourable cases, Spontaneous Links function as interpreters between perpetrators and police. In other cases they function as filters, messengers or conversation partners. The following quote illustrates when the Spontaneous Link enjoys immediate trust from both the police and the criminal:
I [the Police negotiator] spoke mostly to the man in the apartment and not the suspect, but his friend, mediated with him, he was like a filter between the two of us, it worked very well because us policemen do have a special way of expressing ourselves sometimes. So he was able to take the initiative because I talked to him and he talked to his friend (the suspect, our remark).
On an organisational level, the main basis of trust appears to be a multifaceted view of organisational reputation, which means that willingness to work across organisational boundaries depends on an organisation’s reputation. A selected quote illustrates when a spontaneous link from a Danish SOS agency accepted a telephone call from an operative leader at the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and started to collaborate and exchange information during the tsunami catastrophe.
happened to be standing next to the ambassador. The ambassador handed the phone to this guy and said, ‘Please take this call, it’s the SRSA (the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, our remark) calling!’ He answered and we started to exchange information about the rescue operation. Since then, we’ve had several phone meetings.
Negative aspects of Spontaneous Links. In the case of the sulphur spill, the information centre wanted to quickly publish information about the disaster in five different languages on their website. However, one of the Spontaneous Links, a voluntary translator, could not be used. Despite having gained the trust of an information officer, he did not have organisational acceptance because he was not an authorised translator.
I had a guy who called in voluntarily and offered to help with translation from Swedish to Albanian. I let him translate and he did that quickly. And we were about to put that text on our website when the process stopped. Apparently we had an authorised translator and had to use certified text for publishing. But I wanted to use the text by the first translator because we didn’t have that much time. He’s doing it for free, he’s doing it right now. Why shouldn’t we use him? It can take several days to get a certified translation.
DISCUSSION
The major finding of the grounded theory study of emergency-response organisations is the identification of Planned and Spontaneous Links, and the different positions that these links can take. They contribute in diverse ways to effective operation by enabling exchange between individuals and groups. When functioning at their best, these links provide the rigid structure of bureaucratically organised emerging-response agencies, with the creativity and flexibility required. In short, the two kinds of links contribute to organisational adaptation to environmental conditions.
Theoretically, many of the observations of the two types of links fit in well with existing literature on so-called boundary spanners (Adams 1976; Thompson, 1967; Aldrich & Herker 1977, Tushman & Scanlan 1981; Williams 2002). Thus, they: (a) fill a need (Keller & Holland 1975), (b) enhance collaboration (Hoskins & Morley 1991), (c) perform different functions (Aldrich & Herker 1977), (d) are flexible and creative (Challis, Fuller & Henwood 1988; Leadbeater & Goss 1998), and (e) depend on trust (Webb 1991; Sydow 1998).
However, in the emergency-response context, some aspects not previously noted in the writings on boundary spanners were also found. In addition to the identification of Planned and Spontaneous Links, which will be further elaborated below, two differences were observed. One of these is probably related to time. Previous studies in non-emergency settings have noted that, because an individual’s needs change over time, the same boundary spanner will most likely attend to different parts of the environment at different times (Scott & Powers 1978). However, in an acute emergency situation actions are more focused and this was not observed.
Both Planned and Spontaneous Links bridge a gap in the bureaucratic organisation. Nevertheless, links do not take over the ordinary organisation. As can be seen in this study, as well as in earlier ones, the need for structure, coordination, rules and clear responsibility chains is huge. This is what bureaucratic organisations are good at accomplishing (Lanzara 1983; Mattox 2001; Abrahamsson & Andresen 2005). Links enhance the possibilities for the bureaucratic organisations to work even in strenuous situations, and it would be difficult for them to work without the bureaucratic structure, since their action is to bridge the formal structure into an emergent situation. Our theorising on Planned and Spontaneous Links appears to be in line with the conclusion drawn by Kapucu (2006) based on his study of the 9/11 disaster. Crisis situations may compromise the legitimacy of the involved response organisations and limit their access to essential informational and tangible resources. The two kinds of boundary spanners proposed here can be of crucial importance to hierarchic organisations in these conditions.
A major difference between Planned and Spontaneous Links lies in their position and task. Firstly, while Planned Links are already affiliated with an organisation but act outside the organisational framework during disaster management, Spontaneous Links are not affiliated with an organisation—they are ordinary people willing to volunteer their special competencies to help during a rescue operation. Planned Links manage coordination and collaboration between organisations, while Spontaneous Links get a picture of the initial phase of a disaster and estimate what is needed. Spontaneous Links have competencies that are different to that of Planned Links and their existence is temporary.
A second difference between Planned and Spontaneous Links lies in trust. Planned Links have a sort of underlying trust inherent to their role and built up within the bureaucratic structure of the organisation they work for. This study shows that Planned Links behaving outside the organisational framework act first and ask for support later, which means that they enjoy organisational acceptance and trust from their managers. This is an example of mission command as a managerial principle (Larsson et al. 2007; Vogelaar 1999). The results could also be related to the concept of ‘swift trust’, which is intended to explain the dynamics of temporary teams whose existence is formed around a special common task during a limited time span, such as an extraordinary event (see also Meyerson, Weick & Kramer 1996, Uzi Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer & Eyal Ben-Ari 2005). These results are in line with previous findings (see Kapucu 2006; Carley 1999; Comfort 1999; Hardin 1982; Granovetter 1973). According to these studies, reciprocity and mutual trust are important within dynamic networks, which allow members to more easily share information, risks, and opportunities.
Spontaneous Links run a greater risk of being rejected and are therefore more reliant on trust, or more concretely “swift trust.” The demands of the situation can be such that there is no time for further control or for seeking support. You have to trust the Spontaneous Link here and now. This normally occurs in the field, close to the impact area and can be of great importance to the solution of the mission, it can literally save lives.
points to the importance of organisational climate. Williams (2002) emphasizes that trust between individuals affects the organisation of the individuals representing it, which means that organisations can acquire a reputation for being more or less trustworthy. This evidences the difficulty of disentangling personnel from institutionalised forms of trust.
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that this investigation is a case study and, as such, does not permit generalisations. However, this was not the goal of this qualitative study. In the general terms of Glaser and Strauss, (1967), ‘Partial testing of theory, when necessary, is left to more rigorous approaches (sometimes qualitative but usually quantitative). These come later in the scientific enterprise’. It should be emphasized that the concepts derived from the data may be of a sensitizing, rather than a definitive, character to use Blumer’s (1954) words. It should also be noted that the study relies on self-reported data only. These may be inaccurate, and a broader range of data would have been desirable. Although the interview data is based on a limited number of informants, this form of information is important as it contributes to our understanding of the informants’ work duties and the relationship between problems that may arise with collaboration in stressful situations.
Continued research is important to gain more in-depth knowledge of the area, and to evaluate the generalizability of this study. In particular, further studies of individual and institutional aspects of trust and their importance to the emergence and functioning of Planned and Spontaneous Links are needed. The issue of intra- and inter-individual differences also deserves further attention. No two boundary spanners will give the same weight to elements that come to their attention, simply because they will each have their own criteria for deciding what is ‘important’ (Leifer & Delbecq 1978). Thus, there is a need for further studies of Boundary Spanners (in particular Planned and Spontaneous Links) in a variety of contexts to develop, formalize, and evaluate the utility of the present model.
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Websites:
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/asia_tsunami/en/
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