personalities
,
parties
,
andvoters
SaifulMujaniandR.WilliamLiddle
SaifulMujani istheprincipalinvestigatorandafounderoftheIndone-sianSurveyInstitute(LSI)andassociateprofessorofpoliticalstudies attheUniversitasIslamNegeri,Jakarta.R.WilliamLiddle,professor ofpoliticalscienceatOhioStateUniversity,haspublishednumerous books and articles on Indonesian politics. This essay draws upon an earlierversionentitled“VotersandtheNewIndonesianDemocracy” bySaifulMujaniandR.WilliamLiddle,whichwillappearinProblems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society,
editedbyEdwardAspinallandMarcusMietzner(2010).Itispublished here with the kind permission of the publisher, Institute of Southeast AsianStudies,Singapore,http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg.
I
nelectionstothe560-seatPeople’sRepresentationCouncilon8April2009,IndonesianvotersgavetheDemocraticParty(PD)ofincumbent presidentSusiloBambangYudhoyonoaremarkablevictorywith21per-centofthevote,elevatingitfromasmallpartywithonly55seatsto the legislature’s leading party with 150 seats. Three months later, on July8,Yudhoyonowonreelectiontothepresidencywith61percentof the vote in the first round, easily avoiding a runoff. Former president MegawatiSukarnoputrioftheIndonesianDemocraticPartyofStruggle (PDI-P) finished second with 27 percent, and Golkar party candidate Muhammad Jusuf Kalla (Yudhoyono’s vice-president during his first term)trailedwith12percent.
The 2009 balloting marked the third legislative elections since the ousting of longtime strongman Suharto in 1998, but only the second presidentialcontestdeterminedbypopularvote.Priorto2004,thepresi-denthadbeenselectedbythePeople’sConsultativeAssembly,akind of super-parliament consisting, in the early post-Suharto years, of the membersofparliamentplusadditionalmembersappointedbythepresi-dent. Now, however, the people vote directly for a presidential ticket
thatincludescandidatesforbothpresidentandvice-president,whotypi-JournalofDemocracyVolume21,Number2April2010
callycomefromdifferentparties.1In2004,theretiredarmygeneraland former cabinet minister Yudhoyono teamed with Kalla, a member of Golkar,ashisvice-presidentialrunningmate.Theirjointticketdefeated incumbentpresidentMegawatiSukarnoputriandrunningmateHasyim Muzadi(thechairmanofIndonesia’slargestIslamicorganization,Nah-dlatulUlama)byavoteof61percentto39percentinthesecondround. In2009,YudhoyonochoseBoediono,theheadofthecentralbank,as hisrunningmateinthepresidentialelection.
UnderSuharto’sNewOrder,onlythreepartieshadbeenallowed to compete in parliamentary elections—Golkar (which had been the party of the Suharto government), the mildly leftist Indonesian DemocraticParty(PDI),andthemildlyIslamicUnitedDevelopment Party (PPP). During the decade since Indonesia’s transition to de-mocracy, the landscape of political parties has expanded consider-ably: In 1999, five parties were significant players—a number that grewtosevenin2004andninein2009.(Foralistanddescriptions ofthemajorparties,seetheBoxabove.)Thegrowthinthenumberof partiesrepresentedinthelegislaturemaybeduetoIndonesia’suse of an election system based on proportional representation in
mul-IndonesIa’sPolItIcalPartIes
(InOrderby2009Vote)
PD (DemocraticParty,148seats)—Secularnationalist,createdin2002asper-sonalelectoralvehicleofpresidentialhopefulSusiloBambangYudhoyono.
GOLKAR(Functional Group Party, 106 seats)—Secular nationalist, was statepartyduringSuharto’sauthoritarianNewOrder.
PDI-P (IndonesianDemocraticPartyofStruggle,94seats)—Secularnation-alist,ledbyMegawatiSukarnoputri,daughteroffoundingPresidentSukarno, herselfpresident,2001–2004.
PKS (Prosperous Justice Party, 57 seats)—Islamist, inspired by Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood,builtonIslamiststudentmovementin1980s–90s,first competedin1999electionastheJusticeParty(PK).
PAN(NationalMandateParty,46seats)—Secularnationalist,butbaselargely Muhammadiyah,Indonesia’sleadingmodernistMuslimorganization.
PPP(UnitedDevelopmentParty,38seats)—Islamist,beganinSuhartoeraas aforcedfusionofexistingMuslimparties.
PKB(NationalAwakeningParty,28seats)—Secularnationalist,foundedby NahdlatulUlama,Indonesia’slargesttraditionalistMuslimorganization.
GERINDRA (GreaterIndonesiaMovementParty,26seats)—Secularnation-alist, personal electoral vehicle in 2009 of Prabowo Subianto, retired army generalandformerson-in-lawofSuharto.
timemberdistrictsandwithoutaneffectiveparliamentarythreshold untilthe2009election.
ThePDI-Pwasthelargestpartyin1999,butithassteadilylostvoters sincethen,ashaveseveralotherparties.Meanwhile,thePD,foundedin 2002bythen–presidentialhopefulYudhoyono,hasgrownsteadily,taking 7.6percentoftheparliamentaryvoteinthe2004electionsbarelyayear afteritsfounding,and21percentinthe2009contests.DespiteIndonesia’s beinghometotheworld’slargestMuslimpopulation,Islamistparties(that is,thosethatfavorthecreationofanIslamicstate)haveneverhadsuf-ficientvotersupporttochallengethesecularstate.In2009,thecombined voteofthetwoIslamistpartiesthatpassedthenew2.5percentthreshold forgainingentryintoparliamentwasonly13percent.Foranoverviewof theelectionresultsin1999,2004,and2009,seeTables1aand1bbelow.
WhyhaveIndonesiansvotedastheyhavesince1999,andwhatare theimplicationsofthisbehaviorforthequalityandstabilityofIndone- sia’sdemocracy?Inaseriesofstudiesbasedonnationalpolitical-opin- ionsurveyscarriedoutundertheauspicesoftheIndonesianSurveyIn-stitute,wehavetriedtofindcomprehensiveanswerstothesequestions. Inanearlierstudybasedonfindingsfrom1999and2004,weargued that leadership (that is, candidate appeal) and self-identification with apoliticalparty(“partyID”inthevoting-behaviorliterature)werethe twomostimportantfactorsshapingelectoralchoicesinthoseyears.2We rejectedanalternativeinterpretationthathadbeenpopularsinceIndo-nesia’sfirstdemocraticelectionsin1955:namely,thatsociologicalor culturalfactors—notably,religion,butalsoethnicity,region,andsocial class—weretheprincipaldeterminantsofIndonesianvotingbehavior.3
The 2009 survey results reveal strong continuities, but also striking shifts,inthefactorsshapingvoterchoice.Thesenewfindingsarebased ontwonationalopinionpollsthatweconductedjustaftertheparliamenta-ryandpresidentialelectionsinAprilandJuly,respectively.Theappealof apartyleaderorpresidentialcandidateremainsthemostimportantfactor, butmediacampaigns—especiallyontelevision—forboththeparliamen-taryandpresidentialcontestshavebecomepowerfulforcesintheirown right.Meanwhile,theimportanceofpartyIDhasweakened,althoughit remainsinfluentialforsomeparties’andcandidates’supporters.
The most remarkable finding of our new research is the impact of voters’ perceptions of the national economic condition—a factor that wasnotsignificantin1999or2004.Likewise,voters’evaluationsofthe incumbentpresident’seconomicandotherpoliciesseemedtocorrelate forthefirsttimewithhowtheycasttheirballots.Asin1999and2004, however,wefoundlittleevidencethatvoterswereinfluencedbytheir religious,ethnic,regional,orsocial-classidentities.
onthosestandardsandgoals.Theirpreferenceforsecularnationalpar-tiesreducesthelikelihoodofethnicorreligiousconflict.Theabsenceof class-based parties reduces socioeconomic tensions, but unfortunately alsohindersthearticulationoflegitimateeconomicinterestsinthepo-liticalarena.Althoughthemediaprovidevaluableinformationtovoters, thisinformationisdistortedbythelackofbothbalanceandtransparen-cyinthefundingofadvertisingcampaigns.Finally,thedeclineinparty IDinoursurveysreflectsgrowingvoterdissatisfactionwiththeparties andhelpstoexplainthefragmentationandvolatilityofthepartysystem. To a certain extent, this is the flip side of a much better-functioning presidency,butitalsomeansthatthepartysystemisoneofIndonesia’s weakestdemocraticinstitutions.
Accordingtothefindingsofourearliersurveys,sociologicalfactors
1999 2004 2009
Party %ofVote Party %ofVote Party %ofVote
PDI-P 33.7 PDI-P 18.5 PDI-P 14.0
Golkar 22.4 Golkar 21.6 Golkar 14.5
PKB 12.6 PKB 10.6 PKB 4.9
PPP 10.7 PPP 8.2 PPP 5.3
PAN 7.1 PAN 6.4 PAN 6.0
PD 7.5 PD 20.9
PKS 7.3 PKS 7.9
Gerindra 4.5 Hanura 3.8
Other 13.5 19.9 18.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
table1a—ParlIamentaryelectIonresultsfor
1999,2004,and2009(byPercentofPoPularvote)
Sources: For 1999, International Foundation for Election Systems; for 2004 and 2009, IndonesianNationalElectionCommission.
Sources: Indonesian National Election Commission. The first-round total for 2004 ex-ceeds100percentduetorounding.
2004 2009
Party Candidate 1stRound 2ndRound Candidate 1stRound
PDI-P MegawatiSukarnoputri 26.6 39.4 Megawati 26.8
Golkar Wiranto 22.2 JusufKalla 12.4
PPP HamzahHaz 3.0
PAN AmienRais 14.7
PD SusiloBambangYudhoyono 33.6 60.6 Yudhoyono 60.8
Total 100.1 100.0 100.0
table1b—PresIdentIalelectIonresultsfor2004and2009
were not important determinants of voting behavior in either 1999 or 2004.Moststrikingly,neitheradherencetoaparticularworldreligion norbelongingtoacertainaliran (oneofthreeMuslim“streams”—nom-inal,reformist,andpious,eachofwhichwasrepresentedbyaspecific partyanditsaffiliatedorganizations,particularlyinthe1950s4)hada significant direct influence on voters. Moreover, regional differences, specifically the oft-mentioned gulf between the residents of Java and thoseofotherislands,didnotgreatlyinfluencevotingbehavior.These conclusionscontradictedpreviousscholarlyclaimsthataliran andlo-calitylargelydeterminehowIndonesianscasttheirballots.
Our2009electionsurveyconfirmed,indeeddeepened,thisfinding. Therewasnoconsistentorsolidevidenceofvoterpolarizationbasedon
aliran orMuslimreligiosityineitherthelegislativeorpresidentialelec- tions.Thelackofsignificanceofreligiousfactorswasparticularlyglar- inginthepresidentialcontest.TheGolkarticketconsistedofVice-Pres-identKallaforpresidentandformerarmed-forcescommanderWiranto forvice-president.Wiranto’scampaignteamtriedtopositionthepairas more religiously orthodox than Yudhoyono and Boediono. As rumors spread that Boediono practiced Javanese mysticism and that his wife wasCatholic,Wirantomadesuretopointoutinhiscampaignspeeches thathiswifeandKalla’sbothworetheIslamicheadscarf.Despitethe prominenceofthisthemeintheKalla-Wirantocampaign,wefoundno evidencethatithadanyimpactevenonorthodoxMuslimvoters.
Theimpactofregionalresidenceonvotingbehaviorhasalsodissi-pated.In1999and2004,therewasameasurableregionaleffectwhenwe comparedPDI-PandPKBvoters,ontheonehand,withGolkarvoters ontheother:MoreoftheformerlivedonJava,whilethelattertended tobespreadmorewidelyoutsideJavaandBali.Thiseffectweakenedin 2009duetomassiveregionalshiftsintheparliamentaryvote.Thenum-berofGolkarvotesintheouterislandsdroppedsharply,muchmoreso thaninJava.Asaresult,theregionalprofileofGolkarvotersnolonger differsmuchfromthatofotherparties,particularlythePD.
Second, the PD’s spectacular increase in votes in 2009—almost tripling its share from the previous election—was spread remarkably evenlyacrossthecountry.ManyoftheregionsoutsideJavathatGol-karhadcontrolledin2004,especiallyonSumatra,arenowdominated by the PD. In 2009, the PD matched Golkar’s votes in the electoral districtsofKalimantan,Sulawesi,NusaTenggara,Maluku,andPapua, allofwhichhadbeendominatedbySuharto’soldelectoralmachinein 2004. Yudhoyono’s party also grew significantly on Java, its base in 2004.ThusPDisnowthemostnationalofalltheIndonesianparties.
“Majapahit”candidates—referencestoearlyJavanesekingdoms.Kalla andWiranto,fromSulawesiandJava,respectively,wereamoretypical combination, with one candidate representing Java and the other, the outerislands.Voterswereobviouslyunmovedbythistactic,however; the PD ticket came in first in every province except South Sulawesi, Kalla’shome,andBali,oneofMegawati’sstrongholds.
Alongwithreligionandregionalism,classisoftenthoughttoplaya keyroleinshapingpartisanchoice.In1955inIndonesia’sonlydemo-craticelectionbefore1999,theCommunistPartyofIndonesia(PKI), which found its support among urban and plantation workers as well aslandlesspeasants,won16percentofthevote,makingitthecoun-try’s fourth-largest party. In 1965, however, the PKI was blamed for thekidnappingandexecutionofsixseniorarmygenerals.Itsleaders were killed or arrested, and the party’s ranks were decimated. It has beenbannedeversince,andclasspoliticshaveyettomakeacomeback inthecountry.Infact,intoday’sdemocracy,socialclass—atleastas definedbylevelofeducation,income,andtypeofemployment—isbe-comingless,notmore,importanttovoterchoice.Inthe1999and2004 parliamentary elections, voters for PAN, PKS, and the PD tended to comefromamoreeducated,higher-income,white-collarmiddleclass. Inthe2009election,bycontrast,therewasnosuchneatclassbreak-down among the voters for any party. The PD in particular, but also PAN and PKS, now reach out to lower-class as well as middle- and upper-classvoters.
Classlikewisehadlittlebearingonthepresidentialelection,despite theeffortsofcertaincandidates.Sinceitsformationinthelate1990s, the PDI-P has positioned itself as the party of the “little man.” It ap-propriately claims a connection to the Indonesian National Party es-tablishedinthe1920sbyIndonesia’sfoundingpresidentSukarno,the fatherofPDI-PleaderMegawati.Inthe2009campaign,Megawatiand herrunning-matePrabowoSubianto,headofthenewGreaterIndone-sia Movement Party (Gerindra), defended the interests of small farm-ers, fishermen, and petty traders. Prabowo, in particular, attacked the Yudhoyonogovernment’sallegedsupportforbigbusinessandforeign economicinterests.Thisissuemorethananyotherstokedthefearsof Yudhoyono supporters and fueled the hopes of the opposition. In the polling booth, however, voters of all social classes overwhelmingly choseYudhoyonooverMegawati.
Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns
thepartyleader.Inourstudyofthe1999and2004contests,likeability wasmeasuredbyaskingrespondentstochoosethepartyleaderwhom theylikedthemost.In2009,inordertogetamoreprecisepicture,re-spondentswereaskedtoratetheleaders’likeabilityonascaleof1to10. Amongthelistedleaders,themostlikedwasYudhoyono,whoplaced wellaheadofthesecond-placeMegawati.Thesefindingsshowthatthe PD’s electoral success and Yudhoyono’s reelection were clearly con-nectedtovoters’positiveevaluationsofthepresidentasaleader.
Indonesian political parties no longer appear to have deep psycho-logical roots in the electorate. As recently as August 2004, nearly 60 percentofIndonesianvotersstatedthattheyfeltclosetoacertainparty. ThisfiguredeclinedsteadilyuntilMarch2006andhassinceremainedat alowlevel,averagingjust22percentinourtwo2009surveys.In2009, voterswhoidentifiedwithapartywereadditionallyaskedwhetherthey felt“veryclose”(4),“close”(3),“somewhatclose”(2),or“notclose atall”(1)tothatparty.Theirresponsesregisteredameanscoreofbe-tween1.8forthePeople’sConscienceParty(Hanura)and2.3forPD, suggestingthateventhesmallportionofvoterswhoidentifytodaywith apartydosoonlyweakly.ThelowlevelofpartyIDinthesurveysis mirroredinalargebodyofcriticalcommentaryonpoliticalpartiesin theIndonesianmedia.
Despitethesefindingsandotherfactors—forexample,ahighinci-denceofswingvoting(votersshiftingtheirpartychoice)in2004and 2009—wenonethelessfindthat,statistically,partyIDremainsstrongly associated with partisan choice. Party ID can, of course, explain why some old parties such as Golkar, the PPP, and PDI-P, which were all activeduringtheSuhartoera,arestillinthegame.Itcannot,however, explain why between 2004 and 2009 one party (the PD) increased its votesharply,two(PKSandPAN)remainedrelativelystable,andsev-eral(PDI-P,Golkar,PKB,andPPP)declinedsignificantly.
In 2009, we asked voters a series of questions about their sources ofpoliticalinformation,includingdirectcontactwithpartyrepresenta-tivesortheirintermediariesandexposuretothemassmedia.Wethen connectedthesefindingstovoterchoice.Theresultsshowedthatvery fewvotershadeverbeencontacteddirectlybyparties,villageofficials, or religious leaders. Parties using traditional networks—local govern-ment bureaucracies, Islamic social organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (mass organizations informally connected to PKB and PAN, respectively), and other networks of Islamic schol-arsandteachers—areevidentlystrugglingtoreachvoters.Againstthis background,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatthevoteofbothIslamist partiesandpartiesaffiliatedwithIslamicorganizationshasbeenshrink-inginrecentelections.
voters said that they had watched political or governmental news on television during the election campaign, while 34.9 percent had read election-relatedarticlesinanewspaper,and30percenthadlistenedto reportsontheradio.Internetuseisstillverylimited,however.
Our survey asked respondents to name the parties and candidates whose campaign information and advertisements they had seen most oftenontelevision,readinthenewspaper,orheardontheradio.The PD’stelevisedadvertisementswerethemostviewed(34percent),fol-lowedbythoseofGerindra(25percent)andthenGolkar(11percent); nootherparty’sadswereviewedbymorethan6percentofthevoters. PDalsoheadedthemuchsmallerlistsofvoterswhohadreadnewspa-persandlistenedtotheradio.Inthepresidentialrace,voterspaidfar more attention to the Yudhoyono-Boediono ticket’s ads than to those ofanyoftheiropponents.Notsurprisingly,thefrequencywithwhich voterstooknoticeofadvertisementscloselycorrespondedtothelevel ofcampaignspendingofthevariousparties.BetweenJanuaryandlate March2009,thePDhadspentmorethananyotherpartyontelevision ads with US$5.1 million, followed by Golkar with $4.8 million, and Gerindrawith$4.4million.5Theseexpenditureswerenotinvain:We foundstrongassociationsbetweenvoters’exposuretocampaignadsand howthosevotersultimatelycasttheirballots.
The impact of media campaigns and advertisements is affected not only by frequency and intensity of exposure but also by the content and substance of the communications. Beginning in August 2008, the PD’s advertisements emphasized the achievements of the Yudhoyono government,particularlywithregardtoeconomicstabilityandthefight against corruption. Naturally, some opposition parties such as PDI-P and Gerindra attacked the PD’s boasts. In their view, the government hadinmanyrespectsfailedpoliticallyandeconomically—forexample, initsattemptstoincreasetheprosperityoffarmersandotherlower-class groups.Golkar’sposition,bycontrast,wasambivalent.Itcouldnotat-tackthegovernmentdirectlybecausetheparty’schair,JusufKalla,was theincumbentvice-president.Theparty’sadsnonethelessassertedthat thecountrywouldbebetteroffwithGolkarinpower.
The Incumbent’s Performance
andevenGolkar,theoldstateparty,hadrepositioneditselfasademo-cratic formation. In the 2004 election, the line separating opposition andincumbentforceswasagainblurred,asmostparties,includingGol- kar,wereinMegawati’sgovernment.In2009,however,PresidentYud-hoyono and, by extension, his party were the clear incumbents, while MegawatiandherPDI-Pweretheclearchallengers.
Inour2009surveys,weaskedrespondentstoevaluatetheeconomic conditionbothoftheirownhouseholdandofthenationaleconomyin 2009 as compared to the previous year, assessing whether it had be-come“muchbetter,”“better,”“worse,”“muchworse,”orhadremained “unchanged.” Significantly,inbothsurveysmorerespondentshadafa-vorable rather than an unfaSignificantly,inbothsurveysmorerespondentshadafa-vorable view of their household’s and the nation’seconomiccondition.InApril,42percentsaidthatthenational economywasgettingbetter,whileonly26percentsaidthatitwasget-tingworse.InJuly,thenumberswereevenmorefavorable—57percent sawimprovement,whileameager20percentsawdecline.
Theserelativelyhighlevelsofsatisfactionwitheconomicconditions seemparadoxical, given that 2009 was a year of global financial cri-sisthatsaweconomicgrowthinIndonesiacontracttoabout4percent fromabout6percentin2008.Therearetwoprobableanswerstothis puzzle. First, Indonesia was affected by the crisis much less than its Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly Thailand and Malaysia. Sec-ond,theeffectsofthecrisisweremorethanmitigatedbythemassive welfareprogramsthatthegovernmenthadimplementedandpromoted heavilyduringthepreviousfewyears.Budgetaryspendingonpoverty-alleviation measures, for example, increased by 283 percent between 2005and2008.6Votersknewaboutthewelfareprogramsandevaluated thempositively.Moreover,employmentfiguresrose,andthepercent-ageofIndonesianslivingbelowthepovertylinefell.Inflationwasalso verylowatthetimeoftheelections,downafterasharpincreaseinthe costoflivingthepreviousyear.Finally,fuelprices—alwaysapolitical minefield—alsodroppedin2009.
Evaluationsofbothhouseholdandnationaleconomicconditions— especially the latter—were closely correlated with partisan and presi-dential choice. This tallies with numerous political-economy studies thathavefoundevaluationsofnationaleconomicconditionstobemore importantindeterminingelectoralbehaviorthanevaluationsofhouse-holdeconomicconditions.7TheFigureonpage44showsasignificant divergence between perceptions of the state of the national economy entertainedbyPD,PDI-P,andGerindravoters,respectively.Themore favorable the evaluation, the more likely voters were to support PD; conversely, the less favorable the evaluation, the more likely voters weretovoteforPDI-PorGerindra.Therearenocomparablepatterns forotherparties.
PDI-PhadbeenYudhoyonoalliesinparliamentandgovernmentbetween 2004and2009.Amongtheremainingparties,onlyGerindraappeared tobeaforcethatcouldstrengthenthePDI-P–ledopposition.Again,this reflectedthedynamicsofGerindra’scampaign,whichopenlyopposed governmenteconomicpolicies;hence,thecorrelationbetweenanega-tiveassessmentoftheeconomyandavoteforGerindra—apatternthat continued through the presidential campaign. The more favorable the evaluation of the national economy, the stronger was the tendency to choosetheincumbentoverachallenger.Atthesametime,therewasno significantdistinctionbetweentheYudhoyono-Boedionoticketandthe Kalla-Wirantoticket.Asthesittingvice-presidentbutnotYudhoyono’s runningmate,Kallaprofitedsomewhatfrompositiveevaluationsofthe economy,butnotenoughtomakehimelectorallycompetitive.Thiswas inpartduetohisambiguouspositionasneitherincumbentnoropposi-tioncandidate.
On the basis of multivariate analysis, leadership appeal, campaign advertising,andpoliticaleconomyemergeasthefactorsthatbestex-plainthe2009parliamentaryvote.8PresidentYudhoyono’slikeability is most strongly associated with a vote for his PD rather than PDI-P, PAN,PPP,andHanura.Thesefindingsreflectrecentdevelopmentsin leadershipcompetition and party politics. For nearly five years, Yud-hoyono was under a bright spotlight. During most of this period, and especiallyaftermid-2008,heenjoyedrelativelyhighapprovalratings. Forthemostpart,theotherpartiesdidnotusethistimetocultivatenew
fIgure—assocIatIonbetweenvoters’evaluatIonofthenatIonal
economIccondItIonandvotIngforIncumbent(Pd)andoPPosItIon
(PdI-PandgerIndra)PartIes(%)
BetterEconomy SameEconomy WorseEconomy 29
25
22 20
11 19
14
10 20 30 40
4
2
PD PDI-P Gerindra
leadershipcadres;instead,mostkepttheiroldleaders,despitedefeatin 2004andpoorperformanceinopinionpollsbeforethe2009ballot.In thiscontext,Yudhoyono’slikeabilityhelpedtomovelargenumbersof votersfromoutsidethePDbasetowardvotingfortheparty.
Unlikeleaderappeal,thedirecteffectofmediacampaignsduringthe parliamentaryelectionslosesstatisticalsignificanceafterpoliticalecon-omyandleaderlikeabilityareincludedintheanalysis.Weinterpretthis findingtomeanthattheimpactofmediacampaignsiscloselyconnected with leader likeability and political economy. In fact, the PD’s cam- paignthemeswerebuiltaroundYudhoyono’spersonalityandthegov-ernment’ssocioeconomicpolicies,bothimplementedandpromised.
A different pattern emerges in the multivariate analysis of the ef-fectofmediacampaignsonthepresidentialelection.Here,theeffectis significantregardlessofleaderlikeability,partyID,orpoliticalecono-my.Presumably,thisisbecausethepresidentialelectioncampaignwas markedbystrongdisputesoverissuesandprograms,makingtheeffect oftheadvertisingitselfstillvisible.Initsstrategyandcommunications duringthepresidentialcampaign,Yudhoyono’smediateamfocusedon welfare programs, not the president’s personal qualities. By contrast, themediacampaignforthelegislativeelectionafewmonthsearlierhad mainlyidentifiedthepartywithitsleader.Itproclaimed,forexample, that“theDemocraticPartyisSBY’sparty,”usingthepresident’sfamil-iarinitialstotiehimtohisinstitutionallyunderdevelopedparty.
Interpreting the Data
Whatistherelevanceofourfindingsforthequalityofdemocracyin today’sIndonesia?Thesurveydatasuggestfivedirectimplications.On thepositiveside,perhapsmostimportantisthatIndonesianvotershave becomeincreasingly“rational.”Fromprevioussurveys,weknowthat they have identified a set of priority goals: economic growth, general prosperity,nationalunity,education,andtheruleoflaw.Theyturnto individualleadersratherthantopoliticalpartiestoachievethesegoals, andtheysetstandardsforthoseleaders—personalintegrity,socialem-pathy,professionalcompetence.9 In2004,theyelectedYudhoyonopres- identbecausetheythoughtthathewasthemostpromisingofthenomi-natedcandidates.Fiveyearslater,theygavehimasecondtermbecause theyperceivedhimtohaveperformedwellenoughtomeritreelection. In2014,weexpectmostvoterstoengageinsimilarcalculations,though ofcoursetheterm-limitedYudhoyonowillnotberunning.
claim that most Indonesians want the issues resolved as quickly and peacefullyaspossible.DuringthefirstYudhoyonogovernment,Vice- PresidentKallawasablesuccessfullytoquellhostilitiesonseveraloc-casions,especiallywhenmanagingthefragilepeaceinAceh,brokered inHelsinkibetweenJanuaryandMay2005.
Theimplicationsoftheirrelevanceofsocialclasstopartisanchoice arelessclear.Inmostmoderndemocracies,divisionsbasedoneconom-icinterest—ifnotclassinaMarxiansense—providethemostimportant basisforpartisanchoice.Insuchsocieties,partiesandtheirleaderstake politicalpowerinordertoimplementeconomicpoliciesandprograms rootedinbroaderconceptionsabouttherelativeweightthatshouldbe allotted to market freedoms versus state intervention in the economy. PerhapsthereluctanceofIndonesianstoformpartiesoftheLeftorthe Rightisdueinparttothehorrificmemoriesonbothsidesoftheviolent retaliation against the Communist Party in 1965–66. Alternatively, it maybethatIndonesianvotersinahigh-information,TV-driveneraare simply short-cutting the old ideological differences and making their owndirectassessmentsofelectedofficials’policiesandprograms.
The independent impact of television campaigns, especially on the presidentialvote,alsohasmixedimplicationsforthequalityofdemoc-racy.InIndonesia—asinmostothercountries—TVnews,talkshows, andpoliticalcommercialsgivecitizensaccesstovaluableinformation andcommentaryonpoliticsandgovernment.Indeed,moderndemocrat-iclifeinlarge,complexsocietiesisinconceivablewithoutthemedia, especiallytelevision.Atthesametime,themassmediaoftencannotbe relied on for unbiased information. In Indonesia, the media’s greatest failingmaylieintheabsenceofbalanceandtransparencyinthefund-ing of political commercials durfailingmaylieintheabsenceofbalanceandtransparencyinthefund-ing campaigns. A few candidates and partieshavehugebudgetsforTVads,whilemosthavenone.Moreover, votershavenowayoffindingoutwhofinancestheads.
Finally,theweakeningofvoters’identificationwithpoliticalparties is arguably the most important of the findings and has mainly nega-tive implications. We recognize that this circumstance goes hand in handwiththecountry’semphasisonindividualleaders,andthusisto someextentineluctable.Accordingtodemocratictheory,politicalpar-tiesshouldbebasedonlong-lastingeconomicandsocialintereststhat providerelativelypermanentlinksbetweengovernmentpolicymakers andvoters.InIndonesia,however,manyparties(including,ofcourse, Yudhoyono’sPD)arelittlemorethanextensionsofthepersonalityofa singleleader.Inthe2009elections,onlytwonewpartiespassedthe2.5 percentthresholdforparliamentaryseats.Notcoincidentally,bothare personal vehicles of wealthy, well-networked retired army officers— Prabowo Subianto in the case of Gerindra and Wiranto in the case of Hanura.
identification of parties with single leaders. PDI-P, for example, won anextraordinary34percentofparliamentaryseatsin1999becauseof itsleaderMegawatiSukarnoputri,thedaughterofIndonesia’sfounding presidentand,throughoutthe1990s,thestandard-beareroftheopposi- tiontoSuharto’sauthoritarianNewOrder.Whenthepeoplelostconfi-denceinMegawatiduringherpresidency,however,theparty’ssupport plummeted, and its vote share dropped by more than fifteen points in the2004elections.WhenMegawatileavespolitics,thepartywilllikely shrinkfurtherorevenbreakapart.Similarly,thePDwonanimpressive 7.6 percent of parliamentary seats in 2004 (less than two years after itsfounding),mainlyonthestrengthoftheleadershipimageprojected by SBY, a retired army general and onetime member of Megawati’s cabinet.WhileYudhoyono’sperceivedsuccessaspresidentexplainsthe PD’s2009jumpto21percentofthevote,thepartystilllacksastrong nationwideorganizationandisjokinglyreferredtoas“SBY’sfanclub.” Withtheterm-limitedYudhoyononolongerattheheadoftheticketin 2014,thepartymaywellseeadeclineinitsvotes.
Finally,Indonesianpoliticalpartieshaveareputationforexcessive controlfromthetop,meaningthatlocalpartybranchesandrank-and- filemembershavelittleinfluenceoninternalpartypoliciesorthese-lectionofpartyleadershiporelectoralcandidates.Evenworse,thereis notraditionorcultureofpartyaccountabilitytotheelectorate.Elected membersofbothlocalandnationallegislaturesoftenregardvotersand interestgroupsassupplicantsratherthancitizenswiththerighttode-mandresponsivenessandaccountability.10ThedeclineinpartyIDinour surveys may be reflective of growing voter dissatisfaction with these distantpartyleadersandorganizations.
The Impact on the Quality of Democracy
Theanswertothesecondquestionismorecomplex.Onthepositive side,thereappearstobeaclosealignmentbetweenvoterpreferences, electionoutcomes,andgovernmentalpolicyperformance,particularly with regard to presidential politics. Voters want to be governed by a president who can grow the economy, promote general prosperity, defend na-tional unity, fight corruption, and im-provethequalityofeducationandhealth care. Most voters perceived that Yud-hoyono had performed well enough in thoseareastomeritreelection.Inaddi- tiontovoters’increasedattentiontoper-formanceindicators,thelowprioritythat mostIndonesiansplacedonreligiousor ethnic factors is a positive sign of the electorate’sgrowingrationality.
Onthenegativeside,Indonesianvot- ershavehelpedtoperpetuateanineffec-tualpartysystemcharacterizedbyfragmentation(ninepartieseachwon morethan3percentofthevotein2009),volatility(fromthePDI-Pas thelargestpartywith34percentin1999toPDasthelargestwith21 percenttoday),littleinternalpartydemocracy,ahighdegreeofperson-alisticleadership,and—perhapsmostimportant—littleresponsiveness to the electorate. The presidency, meanwhile, functions much better. Whilethiscombinationofastrongpresidencyandafrailpartysystem iscertainlynotwithoutproblems,Indonesia’spolityislikelytoremain stable in the short term. The president has ample support from other parties in the parliament, much more than he had at the beginning of hisfirstterm.Furthermore,sinceYudhoyono’sinaugurationinOctober 2009,Golkarhasjoinedthecabinetaswell.
Such a grand governing coalition will have both advantages and drawbacks. Arguably, Yudhoyono will have the political resources to governmoreeffectivelythaninhisfirstterm.Therewill,however,bean absenceofthechecksonthepresident’spersonalpowerthatopposition partiesprovideinmanydemocraciesandthathavebeenconspicuously lackingindemocraticIndonesiasince1999.11Fightingcorruption,for example,mayturnouttobeagreaterchallengeoralessattractivegoal whenalargemajorityofthepoliticalpartiesrepresentedinparliament arealsoingovernment.
Theworstdisadvantagesmaynotappearuntil2014,however,atthe end of Yudhoyono’s second and final term. It will then become clear whether Indonesian democracy as a whole is too dependent on the va- gariesofpresidentialrecruitmentbecauseitlacksasolidbaseinawell- functioningpartysystem.Voterswereluckytogetacandidateasdesir-ableasYudhoyonoin2004,andluckyagainin2009tohaveapresident
whohasbeenbothresponsiveandresponsibleupforreelection.Ifthey donothavesimilarlygoodfortunein2014,however,theywillbeatthe mercyofapartysystemwithallthedeficienciesthatwehavedescribed.
NOTES
TheauthorswouldliketothankDjayadiHananforvaluableresearchassistance.
1. In the Indonesian multiparty system, the incentive is strong for a presidential candidatetobroadenhisorherelectoralbasebychoosingarunningmatefromanother party.
2.R.WilliamLiddleandSaifulMujani,“Leadership,Party,andReligion:Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia,”Comparative Political Studies 40 (July 2007): 832–57. The2009surveyswerecarriedoutbytheIndonesianSurveyInstitute(LembagaSurvei Indonesia,orLSI),andincluded1,800respondentsinApriland1,200inJuly.Detailsof theresearchmethodologyareavailablefromtheauthors.
3.Theclassicpolitical-sciencestudyofthe1955electionisHerbertFeith, TheIndo-nesianElectionsof1955(Ithaca:CornellModernIndonesiaProject,1957).Analysesof the1999and2004electionsemphasizingtheroleofreligionincludeDwightKing, Half-heartedReform:ElectoralInstitutionsandtheStruggleforDemocracyinIndonesia(New York:Praeger,2003)andAniesBaswedan,“IndonesianPoliticsin2007:ThePresidency, LocalElectionsandtheFutureofDemocracy,”BulletinofIndonesianEconomicStudies 43(December2007):323–40.
4.CliffordGeertz,TheReligionofJava(NewYork:FreePress,1960).
5.“MediaPanenIklanParpol”(Politicalpartyadsamediaharvest),BBCIndonesia, 31March2009.
6.MudrajadKuncoro,TriWidodo,andRossH.McLeod,“SurveyofRecentDevelop-ments,”BulletinofIndonesianEconomicStudies45(August2009):166.
7.D.RoderickKiewiet,MacroeconomicsandMicropolitics:TheElectoralEffectsof EconomicIssues(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1983).
8.Inourmultivariateanalysis,thedependentvariableisapairofparties(forexample PDvotersversusGolkarvoters),andtheindependentvariablesareourhypothesizedex-planatoryfactors—fromreligiousaffiliationtoperceivednationaleconomiccondition.
9. Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Voter Preferences for Presidential/Vice-PresidentialCandidates:PublicOpinionTrends,”LSI,Jakarta,25–30May2009.
10.HansAntlövandSvenCederroth,eds.,ElectionsinIndonesia:TheNewOrderand Beyond(London:RoutledgeCurzon,2004).
