Professional
An examination over time in the
Irish context
Mary Canning
Accounting Group, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland, and
Brendan O'Dwyer
Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Keywords Discipline, Procedures, Accountancy profession, Ethics, Ireland
Abstract The primary aim of this study is to examine the descriptive power of the private
interest model of professional accounting ethics developed by Parker in 1994. This examination is undertaken over an extended time period in the Irish context. It develops prior research which concluded that the operation of the professional ethics machinery of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) facilitated private interest motives on the part of the ICAI. The paper draws on evidence regarding three critical events occurring outside the disciplinary process of the ICAI but impacting directly on its operation as well as on perceptions from within the process. The discourse surrounding the disciplinary process from 1994 to 2001 is examined using media coverage and ICAI pronouncements. This is augmented with in-depth interviews held with members of the ICAI disciplinary committees. The analysis provides evidence of pockets of support for the descriptive power of Parker's model but also illustrates how the rigid and static nature of the separate roles depicted within the model can often fail to capture the complexity of the various changes occurring over the period examined. The study presents evidence which challenges the proposed interrelationships between the various private interest roles depicted in the model and makes some suggestions for the modification of the model, particularly the interrelationships depicted therein.
Introduction
Professional ethics reveal a dual and complex role in that both the public and private interests are pursued. While the public interest is readily declared, the powerful private interest often remains submerged. Hence, according to Parker (1994, p. 508) ``the role of ethics in protecting the private interest represents a vital component of the accounting profession's ongoing commitment to
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ensuring its own survival''. Parker (1994, p. 508) developed a private interest model of professional accounting ethics which he envisaged would be subsequently refined and modified with respect to any unique aspects of particular national environments. This paper is responsive to this call given that prior research concluded that the operation of the professional ethics machinery of one professional body, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) facilitates private interest motives on the part of the ICAI (Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001). More specifically, the paper subjects elements of the model to critical scrutiny given unique aspects of the Irish national environment. This research comes at a time when the disciplinary arrangements of professional accounting bodies in Ireland and the UK have been the subject of governmental scrutiny and much adverse press comment due to research and publicity alleging audit failures (Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001; Mitchellet al., 1994; Sikka and Willmott, 1995). The paper also represents a direct response to Sikka's (2001a, p. 759) call for research to be undertaken which ``scrutinize[s] the rhetoric and public interest claims of accountancy bodies''.
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presents a reformulation of Parker's model as well as summarising and concluding the study.
Literature review
Since their inception, most accounting bodies, like all established professions have been self-regulatory (Lee, 1995). Functional perspectives on professions identify self regulation as one of the privileges professions seek in exchange for making their knowledge and skills available[2] (Willmott, 1986). As part of the self-regulatory process, some professions impose requirements on members as to their behaviour through the establishment of ethical codes. These requirements are enforced by way of disciplinary penalties.
If a profession, and in particular a self regulated one like the accounting profession, wishes to achieve public recognition, then ethical codes together with rigorous, accountable and transparent disciplinary processes which enforce them, are essential (Maurice, 1996). Such disciplinary processes are seen by Sikka (2001a, p. 755) as ``always political in that they enable accountancy bodies (and their members) to advance their social claims for colonization and control of jurisdictions, markets and niches''. Through readily declaring the public interest, these ethical codes have been accused of facilitating the profession's claims to act in the public interest (Parker, 1994) thereby maintaining confidence in the profession among the public and the state bodies (Cohen and Pant, 1991; Prestonet al., 1995). They are seen to act as a mechanism aimed at assuring the public and the state authorities that members are competent, have integrity and that the profession intends to maintain and enforce high standards (Wardet al., 1993). The credibility of the profession and its self-regulatory regime are therefore dependent on the enforcement of these codes being seen to be effective. By reporting selected misconduct by members, the profession is shielded from having public scrutiny of its ``broader professional values'' (Sikka, 2001a, p. 755). In other words, such enforcement will thereby ensure the respect of the community and the avoidance of the risk of losing the power and privilege of self regulation to the state.
Ethical codes and disciplinary processes: the conflict between public and private interest roles
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a public interest face to what is essentially a process driven by private (economic) interests (Lee, 1995).
Parker (1994) argues that ethical codes are often expressed in altruistic tones and that while encouraging a sense of social responsibility on the part of the professional member, they also assist in justifying professional self-interest. This, he argues, is contradictory in that while ethical codes apparently seek to fight inequality in society, at the same time they preserve inequality through their defence of the professional privileges of wealth, status and power (Parker, 1994). Therefore, although the codes themselves readily declare the public interest, the private interest remains submerged yet powerful, as the demonstration of an effective and accountable disciplinary process may reduce the chances of a profession losing its self-regulatory status. Their disciplinary processes can also be recognised as part of the territorial battles which enable professional bodies to ward off challengers and retain their ascendancy (Dezalay, 1992), or, in other words, to view them as ``a proven mechanism for diffusing criticisms, restoring the aura of independence and professionalism and, in this way, protecting the profession's jurisdiction'' (Sikka and Willmott, 1995, p. 561).
As already pointed out, disciplinary arrangements exist so as to promote adherence to ethical rules. Parker (1994) notes that while some have promoted them as a powerful stimulus towards adherence to ethical rules, others view distinct disciplinary processes and periodically observable disciplinary actions enforced as mere symbolic actions created to illustrate the profession's supposed ethical attitudes and assurances to outsiders. Parker (1994) describes this latter viewpoint as a form of disciplinary symbolism which, he argues, is aimed at projecting an image of the accounting professions' ethical attitudes, commitment and behaviour. Sikka (2001a, p. 756) suggests that ``it is as though the symbolism of disciplinary arrangements is considered to be sufficient to secure public confidence''. Parker (1994) claims that the disciplinary symbol lends support and reinforcement to the various dimensions of his private interest model of professional accounting ethics which we now proceed to discuss.
Parker's private interest model of professional accounting ethics
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of restrictions on disciplinary cases disclosure (Parker, 1994). By creating this ``professional mystique'', the profession is allowed to operate with minimum outside interference[4] (interference minimisation) and is granted the freedom to control its own activities and members (self-control). The relationship depicted in the model is one where professional insulation is seen to facilitate both interference minimisation and self-control and not vice versa (see Figure 1). Interference minimisation and self-control are, however, seen to be interrelated in that self-control can only exist where interference by outside parties in the profession's activities is minimised and interference minimisation will only be granted where the profession can demonstrate the adequate operation of self-control. The ethics code's facilitation of the roles of professional insulation, interference minimisation and self-control are deemed to be targeted towards the maintenance of professional authority, which Parker defined in terms of the profession's ability to obtain professional autonomy and exclusivity over its technical knowledge base, and public trust and approbation with respect to its claimed service ideals. The roles of professional insulation, interference minimisation and self-control are therefore seen to be subordinate and contributory to professional authority. There is therefore a presumption that professional authority cannot be attained without the ethics codes successfully fulfilling these three former roles. The underlying intent of professional authority is its ability to preserve the profession's socio-economic status ``in terms of social legitimacy and perceived social standing of the profession and the level of economic rewards achievable by members'' (Parker, 1994, p. 515). Equally, however, socio-economic status preservation is seen to reinforce the public's perception of the authority of the profession. These latter two roles are identified as mutually reinforcing and ``together serve as the focal private interest roles'' of the ethics code of professional accounting bodies (Parker, 1994, p. 515).
According to Parker (1994, p. 515), the model ``clearly sits within a wider social, political, institutional and economic context''. He claims that the complexity of this context is such that the model does not attempt to encapsulate it. While we accept this complexity, we examine how the model sits
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within a changing Irish context. Given the apparent static and absolute nature of the five roles depicted within the model we illustrate how these roles, as depicted, struggle to incorporate fully the impact of change in this context over time.
Research methods
The evidence in this study was collected using two methods. Firstly, a content analysis of media reporting and ICAI pronouncements regarding three events with public interest implications relating to the ICAI disciplinary process was undertaken. While these three events, which occurred between 1994 and 2001, happened ``outside'' the disciplinary process, they impacted directly on its operation. The analysis focuses on whether Parker's model adequately describes the operation of the ICAI disciplinary process over time in response to these external events. Secondly, semistructured in-depth personal interviews with eight individuals who had direct involvement with the ICAI disciplinary process were undertaken. The purpose of these interviews was to draw on perceptions from ``inside'' the process to inform the analysis of the descriptive power of Parker's model.
Content analysis
The content analysis (see Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1985) involved a comprehensive review of media and ICAI pronouncements surrounding the three events examined: the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Beef Processing Industry; the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry (Dunnes Payments); and the Parliamentary Inquiry into DIRT (Deposit Interest Retention Tax) by the Dail (Irish Parliament) Public Accounts Committee (PAC). A number of key words and categories were developed and agreed by the researchers in order to focus this analysis. Articles were identified using on-line search systems on newspaper, business magazine and academic journal web sites as well as general searches on library web sites[5]. Where on-line search facilities did not fully cover the period being examined, we examined individual newspapers' content in certain years (particularly, 1994, 1995and 1996) for evidence of articles relating to these three events using microfiche facilities. We also collected and examined information on the ICAI web site for press releases and pronouncements in relation to the three events. The articles were organised according to the event they related to and were examined in detail in order to obtain some understanding of the core issues involved while, at the same time, reflecting on the evolution of the issues and how the ICAI response to them impacted on the descriptive power of Parker's model.
Interview evidence
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of the various committees within the ICAI's disciplinary apparatus. The other five interviews were conducted with lay members[7] of the various committees. Our core focus in these interviews was to examine perceptions of the openness and transparency of the disciplinary process and its purported objective to act in the public interest. We initially wrote to the ICAI for contact details of these members as we wished to be open with the ICAI regarding the nature of our research. Before releasing any contact details, the ICAI insisted on liaising with these members in order to ascertain their willingness to be interviewed. We were also asked to provide a detailed outline of our research objectives in which we guaranteed the confidentiality of the interviewees given the apparent sensitivity of our research. We acceded to this. When interviewees agreed to be interviewed the ICAI provided us with contact details and we proceeded to organise the interviews.
Conducting the interviews
Before commencing each interview, the nature of the research was again outlined to each interviewee. It was stressed that it was perceptions we were examining and that we were not looking for definitive, wholly defensible answers to questions. We were extremely conscious not to lead interviewees in any way and attempted to formulate an informed conversation (Patton, 1990; Smith, 1972). It should be noted that while we made extensive attempts to establish a relaxed atmosphere and establish a rapport, on two occasions we got the impression that interviewees were somewhat concerned about elaborating in too much depth about the inner nature of the ICAI disciplinary process. However, all other interviewees were extremely forthcoming and elaborative in their responses to questions.
Evidence analysis
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both researchers after data collection had ceased. The first and second in-depth reading of each transcript was undertaken with the tape of the interview running in order to focus in on emphasis, mood, intonation and so on (Jones, 1985, p. 58). A number of key themes apparent in the evidence were then developed after much discussion and debate. Mind (cognitive) maps were prepared for each interview in order to support or, in some cases, challenge the themes identified. These also helped in the search for any apparent contradictions in the initial themes derived from the transcript evidence (Huberman and Miles, 1994; Jones, 1985; Patton, 1990).
The detailed field notes, mind maps, tape-recorded reflections, memos, interview summaries, and journals were then re-visited and analysed further. This led to the formulation of an initial ``thick description'' (Denzin, 1994, p. 505) of the interview findings using the interview guide questions as a loose framework (see King, 1999, 1998). This description was then examined using Parker's model as a lens in order to discover if the perceptions gained supported the model's descriptive power. This was a crucial part of our analysis and involved numerous sessions where we discussed and debated the themes identified with regard to Parker's model. Finally, a narrative was developed (Llewellyn, 2001) based on this analysis and this is primarily presented in the second section of the findings detailed below.
Interrogating the descriptive power of Parker's individual private interest roles
This section reports on the examination of the impact of three critical events of a public interest nature on the ICAI professional ethics machinery in the period from 1994 to 2001. These impacts are explored by analysing elements of the discourse surrounding these events using the content analysis of media coverage and ICAI pronouncements in conjunction with the interview evidence analysis. The examination focuses on whether Parker's model, particularly the individual roles depicted therein, adequately describes the operation of the ICAI disciplinary machinery over time in response to these three events. These events were chosen as they represent the three major events of a ``public interest'' nature which directly impacted on the ICAI's disciplinary apparatus from 1994 onwards. The decision to commence in 1994 is due to the seminal nature of the first event analysed which reached its conclusion in 1994 (Bougen
et al., 1999). This event represented the commencement of a strong societal push for greater accountability and transparency in Irish public life which has led to greater questioning of powerful, well established professions such as law, medicine and accountancy in this context.
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setting up of illegal tax avoidance schemes (O'Toole, 1995). A tribunal of this nature was an extremely rare occurrence in the Irish context at this time (Bougenet al., 1999) and the findings prompted private disciplinary inquiries by the ICAI given their public interest implications. Consequently, we commence our examination of the descriptive power of Parker's model as applied to the operation of the professional accounting ethics machinery of the ICAI in 1994 around the time of the aforementioned report.
Despite the public furore regarding the Beef Tribunal findings (Bougen
et al., 1999) and the questions raised about some of its members, the ICAI never reacted publicly to the report (Murdoch, 1997; 1998a,b). The absence of a public response combined with the private nature of the disciplinary hearings into possible breaches of its ethical code were representative of a body focused on insulating the process from public view (professional insulation) in order to minimise interference in its internal workings (interference minimisation). For example, despite disciplining one member, neither the name of that individual nor any indication of the outcome of the internal inquiry was published (Murdoch, 1997). This successfully created a sense of mystique around the process undertaken, further strengthening professional insulation. In fact, the profession was so focused on professional insulation in order to minimise interference in what it perceived as its internal affairs and was so resistant to any external threats to its professional authority that it actually stifled public debate on the issues involved. For instance, it was widely reported that a former president of the ICAI considered the issues raised to be so serious that he tried to raise the matter, and other related issues, in a letter to the ICAI members' journalAccountancy Irelandin 1996. The journal, however, refused to publish the letter lest it ``pre-judge the disciplinary process that was underway'' given ``the sensitivities of some of the issues'' (Murdoch, 1997; 1998a)[8]. This stance seems to have been aimed at maintaining a perception that the body exercised sufficient self-control over its members through procedures held behind closed doors. The ICAI was, in effect, asserting its self-perceived professional authority by ensuring that its ethics code (and the disciplinary process surrounding it) successfully fulfilled the roles of professional insulation, interference minimisation and self-control thereby operating in the ICAI's private interest. Its concern for the socio-economic status preservation of its members was illustrated by its refusal to publicly name the member disciplined or the outcome of the process (Murdoch, 1998a). A number of interviewees were highly critical of the ICAI's reluctance to publicly name the member disciplined:
I never agreed with the reluctance of the Institute (ICAI) to publish names of members ... It seemed there had been a customary practice not to do so unless somebody had done something absolutely gross. . .[There was] a misguided sense of justice and I disagreed with
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We d[id] take people to task, but [under the old system]. . .nobody knew about the end result
. . .(M2).
In summary, at this time, it was apparent that the ICAI did not consider its internal procedures to be the domain of the wider public despite the public interest implications of the Beef Tribunal findings. From the outside looking in, there was a sense that the ICAI considered itself to be immune from public scrutiny by virtue of the professional authority it felt it possessed. Therefore, the private operation of the ICAI disciplinary process combined with its lack of a public response to findings regarding its members' actions which had a public interest dimension suggests that Parker's model adequately describes the operation of the ICAI professional accounting ethics machinery in its own (private) interest at this time in this (Irish) context. The ICAI effectively depended on its professional authority supported by professional insulation, interference minimisation and perceptions of self-control in order to preserve the socio-economic status of its members. However, the ensuing years brought two further critical external threats to Parker's depiction of the individual roles and their interrelationships within his model. The following sections examine these threats and the ICAI response to them. In doing so, despite illustrating some further support for the model's descriptive power, they overwhelmingly indicate a number of threats to this power.
From privacy and secrecy to ostensible openness and transparency ± support for and challenges to the descriptive power of Parker's model
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also indicates the ICAI's desire to preserve professional insulation in order to sustain interference minimisation and self-control over its members. This was ultimately perceived as upholding its professional authority. Hence, the nature of this response further indicates how Parker's model adequately reflects the operation of the ICAI professional ethics machinery in its own (private) interest at this time.
The unravelling of professional insulation
Given the public interest nature of the McCracken tribunal findings, the defensive approach outlined above was widely criticised in the media for its lack of openness and transparency and continued concerns were expressed as to why the disciplinary hearings were not held in public (Murdoch, 1998a). The well established mystique (professional insulation) surrounding the ICAI disciplinary process was directly challenged as the ICAI's internal processes became subject to greater assessment from outside parties. Consequently, the strength of the foundation stone of Parker's model (professional insulation) came under threat.
The power of professional insulation, interference minimisation and hence, professional authority came under further direct external threat when the Tanaiste[11], Mary Harney, publicly called for the ICAI to act in a more open and transparent manner. She met with the ICAI and insisted that an observer be allowed to sit in on their disciplinary hearings. The ICAI initially refused categorically (Creaton, 1998), once more apparently fearing that this potential erosion of professional insulation would lead to increased outside interference in their internal affairs (reduced interference minimisation) and a consequent threat to professional authority (in line with the indicated role relationships in Parker's model). However, Harney persisted and issued a thinly veiled threat indicating she would reconsider the delegated self-regulatory status of the ICAI if they did not accede to her request. In a speech to a rival accountancy body, Harney highlighted the huge privileges accountants enjoyed in society and warned that, as a result of these, they must be prepared to give something back to society and punish any wrongdoings among their members (Suiter, 1997). This pressure eventually prevailed and the ICAI relented and allowed a government observer to attend the ICAI hearings. The ICAI also appointed a former Supreme Court judge, Mr Justice Blayney, to chair the inquiry and made a commitment to making public the inquiry's final report (ICAI, 1997)[12]. This represented further evidence of a shift in the operation of the ICAI disciplinary procedures from a focus on mystique and insulation to a form of acceptance (in public at least) of the need for more openness and transparency, thereby eroding entrenched professional insulation.
Reducing professional insulation in order to maintain interference minimisation
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process more open and transparent in May 1998[13]. Under the new proposals, certain inquiries would now be held in public, the procedures for dealing with complaints were to be speeded up, a greater representation of non-accountants (lay members) was allowed on the disciplinary committees and sanctions imposed by the process were to be publicised more extensively (ICAI, 1999a). Furthermore, the level of fines was to be increased (ICAI, 1999a). These changes represented an about-turn from the body who greeted the Beef Tribunal findings with silence and a degree of annoyance that any external body or person should question, or indeed intervene in, the private operation of their disciplinary proceedings. Pierce Kent, the newly elected president encapsulated this volte-face when stating ``we now recognise that open justice is far more convincing than private discipline. The changes approved by the Council will help reassure the public'' (O' Sullivan, 1998). A former president hailed the new procedures as reflecting a new ``open institution'' challenging perceptions of the body as a ``self protective organisation (given) the private nature of current disciplinary hearings'' (The Irish Times, 1998). The proposed changes were overwhelmingly supported by ICAI members[14].
The ICAI's gradual acceptance of an erosion in professional insulation suggests a perception of reduced professional insulation facilitating the maintenance of interference minimisation. For example, many interviewees argued that by making their disciplinary procedures more transparent and open in order to show that they were regulating themselves adequately (in effect, reducing professional insulation) the ICAI minimised the possibility of outside interference (maintaining interference minimisation). They perceived the nature of the relationship between professional insulation and interference minimisation as hindering rather than facilitating in nature. This tends to indicate, as depicted in Figure 2, some form of perceived tension or negative relationship (represented by (±)) between professional insulation and interference minimisation, a tension Parker's model does not consider. Instead, Parker's model suggests the opposite, that decreased professional insulation contributes to decreased interference minimisation, i.e. an absence of tension or a positive relationship.
Lee (1995, p. 64) has argued that one of the results of the accountancy profession's public response to criticism is the ``gradual exposure of the
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accounting body of knowledge'' and the removal of ``some of the mystique of accountancy'' which has ``made it easier for non-accountants to criticise practice'' (through reduced professional insulation). Our analysis suggests that some erosion of this mystique was embraced as it was ultimately perceived as ensuring that external criticism eventually abated and failed to evolve into interference in the ICAI's internal operation of its disciplinary process. It was perceived that the nature of the external pressures ensured that interference minimisation was not served by attempting to enhance the mystique surrounding the ICAI (increased professional insulation). In essence, professional insulation was traded off against interference minimisation.
In summary, our evidence suggests that at the commencement of its investigation into the McCracken Tribunal findings the ICAI had hoped to conduct its disciplinary procedures in a completely private manner, along similar lines to its actions around the time of the Beef Tribunal. However, severe external pressure for more open and transparent procedures was imposed on the ICAI and led to the setting up of the Blayney Inquiry. The ICAI response to these external pressures in conjunction with the interview evidence suggests a perception of reduced professional insulation facilitating the maintenance of interference minimisation. This tends to indicate some form of tension or negative relationship between professional insulation and interference minimisation in the Irish context, which Parker's model fails to identify. Instead, Parker's model suggests a positive relationship, i.e. that decreased (increased) professional insulation contributes to decreased (increased) interference minimisation. We therefore argue that this analysis challenges the descriptive power of elements of Parker's model in the Irish context at this time. We will now consider the third external threat to the ICAI professional accounting ethics machinery and its implications for the descriptive power of Parker's model.
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Supporting the descriptive power of Parker's model
On foot of a recommendation by the PAC, a review group on auditing (RGA) was formed to investigate,inter alia, the operation of delegated self-regulation within the accounting profession. A key recommendation included therein was the setting up of an independent statutory oversight board (IAASA)[16] to supervise the regulation of accountants by the various accountancy bodies (RGA, 2000). It was to be independent of both the profession and government with the power to impose sanctions where supervisory failures occurred, including a e127,000 fine. The most controversial element of the suggested amendments to the disciplinary process involved the right of the proposed oversight board to intervene in misconduct cases (thereby severely reducing interference minimisation). This potential role in ``operational'' issues was objected to by the ICAI as not being consistent with a supervisory function and they claimed that it would totally undermine the ability of the accountancy bodies to effectively regulate members (thereby threatening self-control). David Simpson, the then ICAI president, warned that the ICAI would not tolerate this board undermining its own disciplinary work and questioned whether ``this oversight board would have the expertise to effectively regulate the whole accountancy profession in Ireland?'' (Creaton, 2000).
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The static nature of the private interest rolesWhile the ICAI's initial negative reaction to the role of the IAASA in disciplinary affairs tends to reflect the interrelationships between the different private interest roles depicted in Parker's model, it also provides evidence questioning the apparent static nature of the roles depicted therein. Despite the ICAI's willingness to allow some erosion of professional insulation (by ostensibly making its disciplinary proceedings more open and transparent) with the aim of maintaining interference minimisation, the RGA report indicated that interference minimisation would be threatened regardless, especially given the proposed intervention role of the oversight board. Consequently, despite the ICAI reducing professional insulation, this failed to maintain interference minimisation. While, as outlined above, this conforms to the relationship proposed in the Parker model (reduced professional insulation leading to reduced interference minimisation), it may be that the RGA perceived the level of the reduction in professional insulation as being too small, and therefore interference minimisation was further threatened. For instance, while many interviewees agreed that the ICAI attempted to make its disciplinary process more transparent and open (thereby reducing professional insulation), they maintained that the extent of this reduction needed to increase substantially. Otherwise, the ICAI would fail to achieve what they perceived as its ultimate goal: the maintenance of delegated self-regulation, in essence, the avoidance of outside interference (the maintenance or enhancement of interference minimisation):
I actually think it [ICAI] needs to go further [reduce professional insulation further] because otherwise the internal review will be taken from the Institute [ICAI] and there will be another review system imposed by the state authorities [thereby reducing interference minimisation] (L1).
It is this notion, as depicted in Figure 3, of differing levels/degrees of professional insulation, interference minimisation, self control, professional authority and socio-economic status preservation that Parker's model does not explicitly consider. In fact, the ICAI eventually calmed its resistance to the RGA's proposals, thereby accepting some erosion of interference minimisation. Their President ultimately indicated that the profession was fully aware of the need to restore public confidence (by accepting a lower level of interference minimisation) in order to reaffirm its professional authority.
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To summarise, this section disputes the descriptive power of certain aspects of the Parker model by examining three key events with public interest implications within an eight-year time period in the Irish context. The model adequately describes the operation of the ICAI disciplinary procedures in its own private interest in 1994 (around the time of the Beef Tribunal findings). Our analysis of the consequences of two further critical events impacting on these procedures also indicates some support for the model. However, it also presents evidence indicating that there are occasions where the model is unable to encapsulate adequately the ICAI response to these events in its own private interest. First, the failure of the model to consider explicitly varying levels of professional insulation, interference minimisation etc. hinders its descriptive power. Second, aspects of the interrelationships between the various roles within the model (namely, professional insulation and interference minimisation) are queried. For example, the findings of the McCracken Tribunal and the DIRT Inquiry (DIRT, 2001) led to reduced professional insulation which was aimed at maintaining (or even increasing) interference minimisation. If we accept that interference minimisation contributes to professional authority, self-control and (indirectly) to socio-economic status preservation (as depicted in Parker's model), this reduction in professional insulation was also focused on maintaining or increasing these three other private interest roles. Our examination suggests, however, that there may on occasion be some tension between the foundation role of professional insulation and the various other roles in the model (in particular, interference minimisation). We explore this apparent tension further, as well as identifying an additional tension, in the forthcoming section which draws primarily on our analysis of the interview evidence. In doing so, we outline two more key threats to the descriptive power of Parker's model.
Perceptions of the ICAI professional accounting ethics machinery
Exploring further challenges to the descriptive power of Parker's model
The previous section focused primarily on viewing the model's descriptive power given events occurring outside the disciplinary process but impacting directly on its operation. This section draws on perceptions from within the process to further inform the analysis. Here, we subject the descriptive power of the model to additional scrutiny by examining the interrelationships between the various roles in greater depth using the evidence gained from the in-depth interviews with participants involved in the disciplinary process. However, while this section draws primarily on our interview evidence, our analysis is also informed by the contextual issues examined above.
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facilitate or contribute to one another but our forthcoming evidence suggests a potentially threatening (negative) relationship. Further, we also argue that the relationship between professional insulation and professional authority may sometimes be a reciprocal contributory relationship (i.e. both contribute to each other) whereas Parker's model indicates that it is professional insulation which contributes to professional authority and not vice versa.
The relationship between self-control and interference minimisation
In Parker's model, the relationship between self-control and interference minimisation is one of interdependency in that increased interference minimisation facilitates increased self-control and vice versa. Our examination of the ICAI response to external events in conjunction with the interview evidence suggests that self-control, particularly of larger, more powerful members, has come under threat. Furthermore, the evidence also indicates that in order to improve self-control, the ICAI must allow a reduction in interference minimisation, something it would appear, from our analysis above, reluctant to do. Consequently, contrary to the proposed existence of a reciprocal contributory relationship between self-control and interference minimisation, our analysis suggests that a tension exists in that an increase in self-control may require a reduction in interference minimisation. This evidence, as illustrated below, would therefore suggest that the relationship between these two roles is more complex than depicted within Parker's model.
A perceived absence of self-control
A number of interviewees drew a distinction between the control the ICAI exerted over its smaller and its larger ``well financed members'' (M1). They believed that the ICAI was unable to control the latter as they possessed the power and resources to forestall disciplinary proceedings:
. . .say we looked at the people who have had sanctions against them for a breach of the
disciplinary process, it was often members in a smaller firm where maybe the bigger fish were able to forestall the action or arising out of their allegations against them there may have been some other legal processes going on (M1).
What we are dealing with mainly is the small guys. . .I ask myself what's happening in the rest of the accountancy world. . .[and]. . .I want to get round to probing it to satisfy myself (L5).
. . .there might be a motivation behind some [Big 5] practices to delay the outcome about a
finding for as long as possible [against which the ICAI is helpless] so if a particular case against a person in a firm is found to be adverse and brought shame to the profession, they can say after 5to 6 years, this was outrageous, this was terrible, the person has now left the firm and we have nothing to do with them (M2).
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He claimed that ``if you are a member of the Institute (ICAI) willing to submit yourself to those powers that's fine, but if you're saying `look, to hell with you, your powers are limited and I'm not willing to do so' [then] it's very difficult for the Institute (ICAI) to withstand that'' (M1)[18].
Given that the larger firms were ``big contributors to the ICAI payroll'' (L5), another interviewee questioned whether ``the ICAI [was] the proper body to investigate serious, almost criminal actions'' by these firms. He felt strongly that ``this is an area where the ICAI might be conflicted'' (L5). This concern was shared by other interviewees:
. . .there is a perception among our members that the [small] guy would be beaten around a
room and blindfolded, [and that] the big boys control the Institute [ICAI] and won't have their reputations damaged. . .[However], I think we are going to see some changes very soon (M2).
We had the Beef Tribunal which produced serious questions about major accountancy firms
. . .you know there was fear and horror at the extent of this and when you consider one or two
of the firms that were involved, they were major accounting firms. . .then there was almost a balance of power in these type of things. . .with so few firms controlling so many chartered accountants the size of the firm might well exceed the resources of the ICAI and things like that. . .so I could see it as a problem and it was a problem for them (L3).
This provides evidence of an apparent absence of self-control in that the ICAI is perceived as being unable to control some of its larger members because such members are perceived as having the power and resources to resort to legalistic measures to obstruct disciplinary proceedings. Previous studies have also raised considerable doubts as to the ability of accounting bodies to effectively regulate major firms (Cousins et al., 2000; Mitchell et al., 1994; Sikka and Willmott, 1995).
Addressing the absence of self-control ± reducing interference minimisation
The interview evidence and ICAI pronouncements (ICAI, 2000a; ICAI, 2000b) suggest that in order to address the absence of perceived self-control, the ICAI may require some form of statutory backing for its disciplinary process (thereby reducing interference minimisation):
One of our biggest shortcomings was the inability or the lack of power to compel witnesses to attend and it was always easy for, say, one of the larger firms. . .to put up all kinds of legal
objections and stalling tactics which could go on for years (M1).
We didn't have the clout, or the authority, the powers of the Institute [ICAI] were much more limited (M2).
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order to protect the operation of its disciplinary process in the private interest of its members, it was contended that the ICAI had encouraged some state interference (some reduction in interference minimisation).
The analysis above suggests that focusing on maintaining or enhancing interference minimisation may actually work against self-control. In essence, there is a perceived lack of control over larger members which the ICAI has attempted to address by, on occasion, seeking reduced interference minimisation through increased state intervention in the form of statutory backing for its disciplinary process. Hence, it would seem that, on occasion, the ICAI is perceived as being open to its disciplinary process sustaining some loss in interference minimisation in order to improve self-control. This indicates, as shown in Figure 4, the existence of a tension or negative relationship between these two private interest roles (represented by (±)).
The implications for Parker's model are that the relationship between self-control and interference minimisation may sometimes be competitive as opposed to contributory. This apparent willingness to allow some reduction in interference minimisation (in order to enhance self-control) contrasts with evidence presented earlier suggesting a core focus on maintaining interference minimisation by the ICAI. We cannot ascertain how committed the ICAI actually are to any reduction in interference minimisation necessary to improve self-control, but what we can conclude is that there is a clear perception that a reduction in interference minimisation is required to improve self-control. Whether the ICAI is totally committed to this reduction is debatable given our earlier evidence suggesting a core focus on maintaining or enhancing interference minimisation.
Reciprocal contributory relationships (RCR)
In his model Parker identifies two relationships where reciprocal facilitation occurs (interference minimisation and self-control; professional authority and socio-economic status preservation). While the previous discussion questions the operation of a reciprocal contributory relationship between self-control and interference minimisation in the Irish context, evidence presented here would suggest one further reciprocal contributory relationship, between professional authority and professional insulation.
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While we accept that professional insulation facilitates professional authority given that professional authority may not exist without professional insulation, we contend that once some level of professional authority is established, this, in itself, can contribute to further or enhanced professional insulation. Hence, we suggest a reciprocal contributory relationship between professional authority and professional insulation. We illustrate this using perceptions of the complainants' role in the disciplinary process. These perceptions suggest that once professional authority is established, this, in itself, can further enhance mystique (and therefore professional insulation) thereby discouraging outside (or lay person) scrutiny of the disciplinary process. Consequently, while professional insulation may facilitate professional authority, once established, professional authority also facilitates professional insulation.
RCR: Professional authority and its facilitation of professional insulation
The role that the complainant plays in the disciplinary process could be seen as the profession's strategy of creating a ``mystique'' and thereby insulating itself further from outside scrutiny (professional insulation). For instance, many interviewees contended that making it difficult for complainants to initiate a complaint, discouraging them from making oral representations and not promoting the fact that there is a process in existence in the first place all serve to encourage a sense of ``professional mystique'':
You've got to write out a formal complaint . . . quoting all the Bylaws for a particular
situation. . .so for the average person that is difficult (L2).
It would not be a customer friendly room to bring someone into [disciplinary hearing room at ICAI headquarters]. A lot of people could become a bit over-awed by their presence there and I think they would tend to get a bit emotional and it would be difficult to extract fact from emotion (L1).
However, it could be argued that the more authority the profession commands (greater professional authority) (be it from professional insulation, interference minimisation, self-control or socio-economic status preservation) the more likely it is that outside scrutiny will be minimised by, for example, deterring potential complainants, thereby enhancing professional insulation. One interviewee clearly saw the current promotion of the disciplinary system and how it operates from the potential complainant's perspective as enhancing the sense of mystique surrounding the process. For example, the professional authority afforded to the profession is used to facilitate the operation of a system which, instead of encouraging complainants and facilitating them, acts to shroud the process. This creates a sense of mystique around the process which could not have been established unless professional authority already existed:
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The average person that deals with a firm of accountants would not know that there is a process available through the Institute [ICAI] for them to remedy some mistake that may be made against them (L1).
I think that the complainant should have somebody articulate the thing ... A lot of people would have complaints and they wouldn't be in a position to articulate them and they might get put off because they couldn't do that (L3).
There is much evidence here of a perception of a system that, while existing, by virtue of how it operates it tends to exclude potential complainants through a lack of information or an inability to deter perceptions of an austere self protective establishment body.
You've still got this image of trying to take on the establishment . . .and that there [are]
protection systems around them, that they control the systems and that trying to knock this down is like trying to shift the walls of Jericho, you're just not going to do this (L1).
One interviewee also spoke of a sense of ``tired resignation among the public regarding how professions (not just the ICAI) were regulated'' (L5) which he felt further deterred complainants. In summary, while professional insulation is deemed to facilitate professional authority in Parker's model (but not vice versa), when considering the role of the complainant in the disciplinary process, many interviewees viewed established professional authority as actually contributing to professional insulation thereby suggesting a reciprocal facilitation between professional insulation and professional authority.
Discussion and conclusions
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and publicity alleging audit failures (Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001; Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Mitchellet al., 1994).
Our analysis provides evidence of some support for the descriptive power of the Parker model in the Irish context. However, the investigation of subsequent changes in this context over the eight year period in conjunction with the interview evidence also serves to highlight a number of challenges to this descriptive power. These revolve primarily around the absence of any depiction of differing levels/degrees of professional insulation, interference minimisation, etc. within the model and the proposed interrelationships between the individual roles within the model. Therefore, we propose, in Figure 5, a reconceptualisation of the model, to take into account this evidence.
Around the time of the Beef Tribunal, the ICAI did not consider its internal procedures to be the domain of the wider public despite the public interest implications of the findings. The ICAI effectively depended on its established professional authority supported by professional insulation, interference minimisation and self-control in order to ensure the socio-economic status of its members thereby suggesting that Parker's model adequately reflected the operation of the ICAI professional ethics machinery at this point in time. In Figure 5below, we illustrate the initial positive/contributory relationship between the separate private interest roles, as initially depicted by Parker, using (+) beside the relevant arrow linking roles to one another.
However, two further critical events, which occurred in the ensuing years, challenged elements of the descriptive power of Parker's model. These events reflected the inability of his model to encapsulate changes in the Irish context over time which our model, as reflected in Figure 5, attempts to redress. Firstly, the evidence presented challenged the Parker model by illustrating the rigid and static nature of the separate roles depicted within the model. For instance, the discourse surrounding the McCracken Tribunal and DIRT Inquiry demonstrated that the Parker model appears to ignore the level/degree of interference (degrees of interference minimisation) that may need to be allowed in certain contexts as it fails to consider different levels of professional insulation and interference minimisation. Because all of the roles are considered in absolute terms, Parker's model appears overly static and therefore cannot encapsulate potential trade-offs between individual roles or any degree of latitude within each separate role. We have attempted to incorporate levels/
Figure 5.
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degrees of the various private interest roles in our model using multiple rather than single depictions of these roles.
A further challenge to Parker's model relates to the interrelationships between the various private interest roles depicted therein. Three such relationships (professional insulation and interference minimisation; interference minimisation and self-control; and professional insulation and professional authority) as depicted within Parker's model were challenged by our evidence. Firstly, Parker identifies the relationship between professional insulation and interference minimisation as being one of facilitation, whereas our evidence suggests an apparent tension in this relationship. For example, the ICAI response to the McCracken Tribunal and DIRT Inquiry in conjunction with the interview evidence suggest that reduced professional insulation is perceived as facilitating the maintenance of interference minimisation. Consequently, this suggests that increased professional insulation may not, in this specific context at least, contribute to interference minimisation. This tends to indicate the need for the recognition, as in Figure 5, of some form of tension (denoted (±)) between professional insulation and interference minimisation in Parker's model. Secondly, while Parker considers the relationship between interference minimisation and self-control as contributory, our evidence suggests that interference minimisation may actually work against self-control. In essence, there is a perceived lack of control over larger ICAI members which, according to the interviewees, the ICAI needs to address by allowing a reduction in interference minimisation through increased state intervention in the form of statutory backing for its disciplinary process. By focusing primarily on maintaining interference minimisation in its disciplinary process, the ICAI appears to have traded-off self-control over its members. Hence, it would seem that the ICAI may recognise the need to sustain some loss in interference minimisation in order to improve self-control and reduce the possibility of greater interference (further reduced interference minimisation). This suggests the need for Parker's model to recognise a tension (denoted (-)) between these two private interest roles as illustrated in Figure 5.
The third interrelationship challenged relates to professional insulation and professional authority. While we accept that professional insulation facilitates professional authority given that professional authority may not exist without professional insulation, our evidence suggests that once some level of professional authority is established, this in itself can contribute to further or enhanced professional insulation. Support for this emanates from an analysis of interviewee perspectives regarding the role of complainant's within the ICAI disciplinary process. Hence, using this evidence we suggest, as reflected by the additional arrow emanating from professional authority to professional insulation in Figure 5, a reciprocal contributory relationship between professional authority and professional insulation.
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However, our examination has shown that in one context over a certain time period, given prior evidence that the professional accounting ethics machinery studied works in the private interest (Canning and O' Dwyer, 2001), the model needs to evolve somewhat to encapsulate changing circumstances. Therefore, our suggested modifications to Parker's model may more accurately describe the operation of the ICAI's professional accounting ethics machinery in the private interest. We suggest that future research should consider the model's descriptive power in other contexts over time in order to provide some comparison with the evidence presented here.
Notes
1. As observed by one of the anonymous reviewers, we should point out that the analysis is only loosely over time: the 1994 to 2001 time period is, to quote the reviewer, merely ``a grain of sand in the continuum of time''.
2. This perspective views professions as ``integrated communities whose members undertake highly skilled tasks that are crucial for the integration and smooth operation of society'' (Willmott, 1986, p. 557). Within this perspective, distinguishing characteristics of a professional such as the custody of specific knowledge, independence, altruism and self discipline are highlighted but remain largely unquestioned (Willmott, 1986).
3. Parker (1994) notes that these third parties may encompass corporate shareholders (or intending shareholders), borrowers and lenders, regulators, government, social interest groups, or any other members of the public.
4. Interference primarily from the Government and its agencies.
5. As well as academic papers, the search covered newspapers and periodicals such as,The Irish Times, The Irish Independent, The Examiner, The Sunday Business Post, The Financial Times, Business and Finance, Accountancy IrelandandAccountancy Age. 6. The five broad areas that our questions spanned included perceptions as to: the
transparency of the disciplinary process and reporting mechanisms; the difficulties/ pressures imposed on the disciplinary procedures; the fairness and equity of the punishments meted; the accountability to complainants in the public interest; and the impact of recent amendments to the procedures.
7. Lay members are invited on to these committees in order to provide some non-accountant (quasi-independent) influence to the disciplinary proceedings.
8. This was despite the letter having been vetted by senior legal counsel.
9. M1 to M3 refers to interviewees directly involved in the internal administration of the ICAI disciplinary procedures and who also sat on various disciplinary committees. L1 to L5 refers to the five lay members of the various committees interviewed.
10. The ICAI members mentioned in the report included former Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Charles Haughey; Dunnes Stores (a major privately held retail chain) trustee, Noel Fox, and Dublin accountancy firms, Oliver Freaney and Co. and Deloitte and Touche as joint auditors of Dunnes Stores.
11. Tanaiste is a Gaelic term meaning ``deputy Prime Minister'' in the English language. 12. While the inquiry was set up in September 1997, it is still ongoing due to a combination of
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2000, it is currently (June 2002) being appealed and ICAI regulations as well as legal advice received by the ICAI prohibit publication of the report until the appeals have been determined or abandoned.
13. These changes were implemented in December 1999.
14. A postal ballot of members resulted in 91.24 per cent supporting the changes (ICAI, 1999b). 15. As part of its response to the PAC findings the ICAI appointed a special investigator, Professor Ian Percy to conduct internal inquiries. Such an inquiry is in keeping with the new procedures introduced in December 1999. According to the ICAI, this new approach allows complex complaints and cases involving the public interest to be investigated more efficiently and in a very focused manner. The ``Percy Report'' was issued in December 2001 and found no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of the auditing firms involved (Percy, 2001).
16. In April 2001, the Tanaiste established the body, entitled The Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA), on an interim basis pending new legislation. 17. While only three levels are reflected in Figure 3, we are trying to illustrate the notion of
levels here as opposed to being restricted to a particular number.
18. This is evidenced in the stalling process adopted by many of those members being investigated by the Blayney Inquiry, which, despite having commenced in September 1997, has still to issue its report publicly.
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Further reading
