We need a revamped materialism that will allow us to see the virtual realities of the globe.
(Eisenstein 1998, 11)
In the preceding chapter I argued that prevailing accounts are analytically inadequate and politically problematic. A critical rewriting of global political economy therefore requires a critical rethinking of conventional theory. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify and substantiate these claims, primarily by reviewing the existing theoretical literature and assessing its strengths and limitations.
I first consider the disciplinary, epistemological, and ideological commitments of prevailing approaches to globalization. The next section reviews contemporary scholarship on the global political economy, feminist economics, postcolonial studies, and feminist social theory. By reference to these literatures, I identify both what is valuable and will be built upon and what is weak and must be improved upon to produce a critical rewriting of GPE. I then elaborate the analytical innovations of a relational “RPV framing” and “triad analytics.” To further clarify the orientation adopted in this book, I conclude by reviewing an interpretive (semiotic/poststructuralist) model of language.
The divided terrain of globalization studies
Disciplinary commitments
The fragmentation of knowledge due to disciplinary divisions and the analytical
“blinders” they impose has long been a target of critique, and rightly so. But the blurring of boundaries so prominent in globalization – and amplified by information technologies – exposes these blinders as especially debilitating.
Within the social sciences, the departmental separation of economics from politics (and from sociology, anthropology, communications, and psychology) works against understanding the overlapping, indeed mutually constituted, dimensions of these disciplines (e.g. Strange 1995). An added problem is that mainstream accounts of economics and international relations tend to marginalize consideration of race,
gender, and even class. A further problem is the disciplinary “divide” between social sciences and humanities. In the former, analyses of globalization are more likely to refer to material and structural processes. This is an effect of both substantive foci (goods, markets, states) and the epistemological commitments predominating in the social sciences. In the humanities, studies of globalization are more likely to emphasize culture, discourse, identities, and representational practices. This too is an effect of substantive foci (ideas, art, language, history) but is also due to the predominance of interpretive, historical, and postmodernist orientations in these disciplines.
In one sense, then, disciplinary blinders within the social sciences impede more adequate – and arguably, more relevant – analyses of global phenomena that are inextricably political andeconomic. In a second and related sense, disciplinary and epistemological divisions between the social sciences and the humanities obstruct analyses of globalization as inextricably economic andcultural.
Epistemological commitments
The salient point here is that disciplinary divisions regarding “what we study and make claims about” are linked to epistemological differences regarding “how we study and what we claim is real or true.” Knowledge production within the social sciences – especially the mainstreams of economics, politics, and international relations (IR) – remains wedded to positivist/empiricist commitments and their ontological assumptions.1The neoclassical paradigm and its atomistic model of
“rational economic man” prevail in economics. The dominant approach to inter- national or global political economy2– especially in the United States – is based on what Palan calls rationalist and methodological individualist approaches. These include “strategic interaction and game theoretic approaches” and the “neoinstitu- tionalist transaction cost economics theories of IPE” (Palan 2000a, 2, 6, 8–10).
Critics of “orthodox IPE” target especially the positivist and “rationalist”
commitments that align it with neoclassical economics. Here I focus on a specific point: that positivist/empiricist pursuit of a purported objectivity (presuming categorical separations of subject from object, and fact from value) has effectively disabled an adequate understanding of subjectivity, reflexivity, meaning, and value.
In particular, assuming a dichotomy of subject and object (rather than their inter- dependence) denies the “power” of subjective and cultural beliefs to construct the
“objective” world (Murphy and Tooze 1991a). From a postpositivist vantage point, this is a problematic claim in regard to any social phenomenon. But it is especially indefensible as an element of theorizing globalization, insofar as the latter depends on informationaltechnologies that are necessarily conceptual and cultural.
The problem is illuminated when we consider the virtual economy of global financial markets, where (subjective) information effectively determines the price (value) of financial assets (Hudson 2002). In Strange’s useful analogy: “it is the opinions [of participating bettors] not the objective prowess of the horse that moves the prices” (Strange 1997, 111, my emphasis). As recent accounts emphasize, the price/
value of financial assets is based on subjectiveunderstandings and expectations regarding projected future returns and has increasingly little to do with ostensibly
“objective” indicators associated with the “real” economy. The point here is that determinations of price/value – not just in financial markets – are both subjective and deeply embeddedin wider social relations. Positivist and “rationalist” orientations are unable to account adequately for these relationships.
In sum, and as current debates in social theory attest, disciplinary and epistemo- logical divisionsimpoverish our knowledge of social relations. What we know about material events and institutional structures is too rarely integrated with our understanding of representational practices and cultural productions. To produce more adequate analyses requires cross-disciplinary sensibilities that accommodate multiple dimensions and units/levels of analysis, and methodological orientations that integrate empirical and interpretive insights.
Ideological/political commitments
Prevailing disciplinary and epistemological investments not only impede more adequate analyses of globalization but tend to reproduce dominantinterests and interpretations. At issue here is the relationship between knowledge claims and their ideological and political effects. To develop this point I repeat the game analogy used in the preceding chapter to map the effects of neoliberalism.
In an important sense, orthodox accounts render structural hierarchies invisible, either by being depoliticized (as “the way things are” due to nature or ineluctable globalization) or marginalized (as perhaps regrettable but nonetheless subordinated to, or a distraction from, more pressing analytical concerns). The former claim reflects ahistorical and essentializing tendencies, where objects of inquiry are treated as “givens” rather than investigated as historically “made” constructions. The latter claim flows from a denial of power as embedded in and pervading knowledge- making practices. We might say that these players subscribe to a positivist view of power as external to – not an aspect or product of – their intellectual activities. To pursue the analogy, like enthusiasts for neoliberalism, enthusiasts for positivism acknowledge some adverse effects, but argue that the game and its rules are either inescapable or not themselves the problem. These conceptual premises however have material consequences, not least because they fuel inattention to and thus – inadvertently or otherwise – reproduce global inequalities.
In a second position, critiques of inequality are registered but within a positivist framing that constrains how power and hierarchies are understood. This occurs, for example, when inequalities are observed and investigated but explained by focusing on individual agents – as lacking motivation or skills – rather than by situating motivation and skills in context. The latter would entail a relationalapproach that viewed agents as embedded in (and reflexive producers of) power-laden social practices and structures. Another example is explaining inequalities by focusing on only one dimension of social relations rather than situating that dimension in relation to others. This denies, for example, the embeddedness of the economy in wider social relations, but also obscures the connectionsamong multiple hierarchies.
In short, players here are attending to, and critical of, inequalities, but positivist commitments encourage reductionist and monological explanations that provide
part but not enough of the structural picture. Empirical inequalities are noted and criticized but explained without challenging how we think about – how we analyze – power.
A third position encompasses those who are both critical of hierarchies and examine them from non-positivist vantage points. Players in this camp variously cross disciplinary boundaries, pursue multi-dimensional and multi-level analyses, embed agents and activities in wider social relations and their political effects, and interrogate knowledge production as power-laden and power-producing. Insofar as they view power as more diffuse and productive than positivists, these players are better equipped to analyze the diffusion of power that is associated with globalization.
This position has been especially productive in terms of critically deconstructing conventional accounts of hierarchy and exploring the intersections, contradictions, and tensions among hierarchies.
In sum, prevailing disciplinary, epistemological, and ideological commitments render a “divided terrain of globalization studies.” In various ways these commit- ments impair our understanding of globalization and must be rethought to address the analytical needs of the present study. What are those needs? In brief, and as suggested by my arguments so far, we require critical (reflexive), cross-disciplinary, multi-dimensional approaches and relational (interpretive) methods that illuminate embeddedness, expose linkages across “spheres” of activity, and integrate subjective, conceptual, and cultural dimensions in the study of “objective” phenomena.
To situate the analytical orientation deployed in this book, I next consider the strengths and weaknesses of existing accounts of IPE/GPE: mainstream and critical studies of IPE/GPE, feminist economics and women in development/gender and development (WID/GAD), and postcolonial critiques of globalization.
The theoretical terrain of IPE/GPE
I begin with the obvious: mainstream accounts of GPE that emerge from economics and IR and dominate both popular and academic understandings of “what is going on.” The literature here is extensive and because its claims are more familiar I do not detail them here. Moreover, my earlier discussion suggested the primary assumptions of neoliberalism and how both proponents and critics interpret the consequences of global restructuring. Insofar as orthodox accounts rely on neoclassical and narrow rationalist (positivist) models, they do not address the analytical needs of my project. Orthodox IPE remains, nonetheless, an important starting point. It is especially valuable as a source of empirical research that I draw on throughout the book.
As an area of inquiry shaped by different disciplines and addressed from numerous vantage points, not all of IPE’s theorists conform to the orthodoxy. Some mainstream economists increasingly criticize the adequacy of neoliberal models and viability of neoliberal restructuring as currently practiced. And in IR, “heterodox” approaches to IPE are increasingly visible.3 I briefly survey these variously overlapping approaches, focusing on the resources they provide for a critical rewriting of GPE and how I draw on these resources in the book.
The post-Fordist debate, which essentially asks structural questions about the future of capitalism, has generated three vantage points. The regulation approach4 draws on institutionalist traditions and articulates two key concepts: the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation. Neo-Smithians5 examine social innovations in the production process and how new technologies permit flexible, just-in-time production. Similarly, neo-Schumpeterians6 emphasize technical innovations but with particular attention to capitalist “long wave” cycles of inno- vation, generalization, and decline – until a new technology (most recently, microelectronics) reconstitutes the cycle.
Another approach, marxist global political economy7 attempts to develop
“a more holistic or structural explanation for the economic behavior of firms, institutions and markets” (Editors/RIPE 1994, 8). Marxism here is neither deterministic nor teleological. This approach takes institutions seriously and analyzes them in three ways: as forms of the institutionalization of (class) power; as
“over-determined by the central institution of capital”; and as the institution of the state, understood not simply as a tool of the ruling class but with a remedial role to play in alleviating class hierarchies (Palan 2000a, 11–12).
Transnational historical materialism8features the insights of Gramsci, especially as these illuminate hegemonic rule through ideological “consent” – exemplified in the transnational ideology of neoliberalism. This approach departs from orthodox IPE by moving away from state-centrism and rejecting positivist reductionism (Overbeek 2000, 168–169). Transnational class alliances may emerge to cement or legitimate “dominant economic projects” (Editors/RIPE 1994, 6).
Structuralist and marxist-oriented approaches offer critical vantage points and extensive research on changes in the organization of production, global divisions of labor, accumulation and regulation dynamics, and class and geopolitical hierarchies.
In this book, marxist perspectives inform my historical contextualizations and are especially valuable for rewriting the productive and reproductive economies. The particular advantage of Gramscian perspectives is their attention to cultural, ideological, and subjective elements. These are especially important for rewriting the virtual economy, which analyzes global finance, the informational economy, and the economy of signs.
A resurgent interest in institutionalism generates additional approaches. Closer to orthodox IPE is “new institutionalism,”9which shares the neoclassical assumption of methodological individualism but differs “on the nature of the rationality assumption, and on the premise that outcomes are efficient . . . [and on making]
institutions the centerpiece of its analysis” (Spruyt 2000, 131–132). “Evolutionary institutionalism”10features the work of John Commons and Thorstein Veblen, who noted the decisive effects of institutional decision-making for shifting the “terms” of capitalism, in particular by expanding the meaning of property from physical (material) objects for private use to (noncorporeal, immaterial) marketable assets (Nitzan and Bichler 2000, 78).
I note two specific contributions of institutionalist approaches. First, they focus attention on relationality and embeddedness: individual agency is embedded in institutional structures; institutions depend on actions taken by individuals and other
institutional actors; and the economy is embedded in social and political relations (Editors/RIPE 1994, 8–9). Second, they keep us mindful of history: institutions are
“made”; they reflect continuity but can themselves affect structural change; they are structured by formal rules and transformed by people taking action, predictably or unpredictably.
A final set of approaches goes by diverse labels.11“New IPE” features in an edited volume (Murphy and Tooze 1991b) and the journal Review of International Political Economy (Editors/RIPE 1994). “Constitutive” (constructivist) IPE features in a volume edited by Burch and Denemark (1997).12Palan (2000a, 7, 15–17) refers to a “post-rationalist” branch of GPE informed by Foucauldian insights and adopting
“an open-ended historical narrative in which outcomes are not predictable, but negotiated and contested” (2000a, 15).13Variously informed by non-positivist epistemologies, these approaches reconceptualize power, pay greater heed to subjectivity and culture, and advance our understanding of identities, agency, representation, and resistance.14
I draw especially on scholarship associated with the new IPE: it explicitly criticizes positivism and its constraining dichotomies. It insists on acknowledging the
“necessary subjectivity of the social sciences” (Murphy and Tooze 1991a, 6) and incorporating subjective, cultural, and identity issues. Similarly, it recognizes that knowledge production is inevitably political and encourages critical reflection on those politics. Obviously, reconceptualizing power and identity has implications for analyzing structural hierarchies, and especially the interconnections among these hierarchies in the GPE. In general, the cross-disciplinary work in critical and new IPE is a valuable “corrective” to mono-logical scholarship.15As a final point, new IPE offers the most “space” for analyses that transgress conventional boundaries in an attempt to see beyond present horizons.
Underdeveloped or omitted elements
This overview hardly does justice to the breadth and importance of contemporary IPE/GPE work, which I draw on extensively in the book. At the same time, this literature is deficient for my project in respect to the following weaknesses.
First and foremost, there is a “deafening silence” on gender. Even “critical IPE”
fails to engage the extensive feminist literature documenting not only how globalization affects gender (e.g. by feminizing labor-intensive employment) but also how gender shapes globalization (e.g. by assuming masculinist priorities).16 Second and related, the attention given to inequalities is generated by marxist interest in class stratification, but this is often at the expense of (rather than investigating linkages to) race and gender hierarchies. The work on race is especially limited.17
The third problem is a failure to specify how formal (waged) economic activity is relatedto non-waged work, economic family/household activities, and informal- ization.18This exacerbates the tendency to invoke public (government, politics) and private (business, economics) in ways that both erase the “other” private sphere – of the family/household – anddeny the dependence of government and business
on this sphere.19These points are inextricable from the fourth problem that is aggravated by empiricist/positivist commitments: a continued, even enhanced economism in accounts of globalization. Economism refers here to assuming both the primacy of economic activities (hence failing to embed the economy in wider social relations) and the “inevitability” of neoliberal globalization (hence taking it for granted rather than investigating it).20
To address these shortcomings I turn to additional literatures. Feminist scholar- ship has generated the most extensive and systematic research on gender and political economy. Equally important, this scholarship is informed by cross- disciplinary and critical commitments, plural methodologies, and ongoing struggles to take the intersection of structural hierarchies seriously. However, advancing the latter project requires much further engagement with critiques of racism, cast here as postcolonial scholarship. The remainder of the chapter clarifies and substantiates these claims through a discussion of knowledge-producing strategies and a review of the development of and differences among feminisms. In the process I identify the strengths and weaknesses of feminist postcolonial scholarship and indicate its relationship to the analytical orientation of the book.
The politics of epistemology
I begin with epistemology because it underlies and connects all dimensions of knowledge production. In spite of numerous challenges, positivism continues to dominate the disciplines of economics and IR that generate the most visible accounts of IPE. Necessarily over-simplifying, the key issue is how we understand the relationship between language (intersubjective meaning systems) and power.
Positivists make two interacting assumptions: first, that subjects (knowers) can be separated from objects (that which is known); and second, that facts – generated through the application of scientific method, which separates subject from object – can be separated from values, understood as the subjective taint of the knower’s interests, opinions, and desires. A corollary assumption posits that a “reality” of objects exists independent of the subject’s participation in it, so knowers – and the power relations within which they think and act – can also be separated from that which they study.
Critics are skeptical of these claims, and especially the dichotomized, either/or separations that are assumed. They argue instead that reality is more coherently understood as relational: knowers and known are in a relation to each other that is mediated by intersubjective systems of meaning, hence contextually determined.
More specifically, they argue that the objects – indeed the world – we study are socially constructed in the sense that humans/subjects “create” meaning and intelligibility through the mutual (intersubjective) constitution of symbols, language, identities, practices and social structures. This is not to argue that the physical world does not exist independent of subjects but that it has no social meaningindependent of that which is created and “imposed” by human thought and action. Knowers cannot stand “outside” of the reality they observe because their participation in that reality is a necessary condition for the object observed to have any social meaning.