One of the most promising trends in environmental ethics lies in the attention being paid to work in psychology, economics, and other social sciences. These fields can provide valuable tools in translating moral reflection into effective action and policy, while also informing and influencing this reflection. As we come to understand human character, its possibilities and limits, we may be better able to shape society and its norms in ways that encourage us to become more virtuous— or at least to act in better ways. Learning about the arguments and other factors that motivate the public and policymakers can help us in addressing collective action issues, while empirical studies of happiness and well- being can help us see new ways of flourishing. Such empirically grounded approaches to envi- ronmental ethics— going beyond ecology and biology— could well have a transformative impact on the field.
Notes
1. For a more general history of environmental ethics that delves back to the 19th century, see Nash (1989).
2. We should distinguish between anthropocentric ethics, and certain subjectivist, non- realist meta- ethical positions. For example, one could hold (meta- ethically) that values are grounded in or constituted by certain human attitudes. Species could have intrinsic value in such a view, in the sense that they are valued for their own sake, even if what this means, meta- ethically, is that certain humans under certain conditions would have some sort of
History of Environmental Ethics 23 positive response to species. In other words, even if values are constituted by human atti- tudes, this does not necessarily result in an anthropocentric ethics that only values entities insofar as they contribute to human interests and well- being. Thus, Hargrove’s position, while described by himself as a form of anthropocentrism, could instead be understood as a non- anthropocentric ethics with a subjectivist/ anthropocentric meta- ethics, where intrinsic aesthetic value is determined by human responses.
3. See Jamieson (1998) for an overview of individualistic responses; see Callicott (1989) for a more conciliatory response to individualistic approaches.
4. Beyond the foundational work of Naess, and Devall and Sessions, deep ecological thought has been revised and refined by a number of thinkers; see, for example Fox (1990), Devall
& Sessions (1985), Katz, Light, and Rothenberg (2000).
5. For further discussion of restoration, and responses to Elliot, see the papers in Throop (2000) and Hourdequin and Havlick (2013).
6. Ecofeminists have also made significant contributions to discussions of deep ecology, the moral status of animals, and other important issues; see, for example, Sallah (1984) and Plumwood (1993) on deep ecology, and Adams (1994), Gruen (1993), Kheel (1985), and Warren (2000) on the moral status of animals.
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Chapter 3
Environmental Science
Empirical Claims in Environmental Ethics Wendy S. Parker
Arguments in environmental ethics often depend on scientific information. Why should we establish habitat corridors? Because they will help maintain biodiversity, and biodiver- sity is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. Why should we reduce air pollution in our locale? Because current levels are causing cardiovascular problems and increased rates of cancer, and we should prevent such harms to human health when we can. Why should industrialized nations provide funding for climate change adaptation in developing nations?
Because it is required as a matter of justice: harmful future climate change, due to past green- house gas emissions from industrialized nations, is virtually unavoidable and will dispropor- tionately impact populations in developing countries. Arguments like these appeal not only to ethical principles and values, but also to information provided by environmental science.
Environmental science encompasses a wide range of investigative activities that aim to advance understanding of environmental systems and, in some cases, to identify and solve environmental problems. Many environmental systems are complex, incorporating a range of interacting physical, chemical, biological, and social processes. Consequently, doing envi- ronmental science often requires integrating knowledge and expertise from several disci- plines. For example, at the extreme, the study of earth’s climate system relies upon knowledge and expertise from physics, chemistry, meteorology, oceanography, geography, ecology, biology, statistics, and a number of other fields.
The complexity of environmental systems can make it challenging to understand their behavior and to predict how they will respond to interventions. These difficulties are exacer- bated by the fact that direct experimental tests of hypotheses in environmental science often are out of reach, whether for in- principle, practical, or ethical reasons. For example, since there is only one earth, we cannot directly test hypotheses about how earth’s climate would change over the next century under several different greenhouse gas emission scenarios. In many cases, evidence in environmental science instead comes in the form of limited obser- vational data collected in non- ideal circumstances, and conclusions are informed by results from scientific models, including computer models.
In part because environmental science has these features, its findings often are con- tested, especially when they bear directly on environmental policy decisions. Debates often center on whether scientific investigation has provided sufficient evidence that a serious
28 Wendy s. Parker
environmental problem exists, that its causes have been correctly identified, and so on. In the context of such debates, concerns about objectivity frequently are expressed, with each side accusing the other of biased assessment or even deliberate misrepresentation of the available evidence. These accusations sometimes are leveled not just at policymakers, but at environmental scientists as well.
Contemporary work in philosophy of science can shed light on the practice of environ- mental science as well as some of the challenges it faces. This chapter surveys some of this work. The first section discusses philosophical conceptions of scientific evidence and the closely related issues of uncertainty and consensus. The second section outlines a view of scientific models, argues that blanket dismissals of results from scientific models are unjus- tified, and explains why multiple models are sometimes used together when conducting research in environmental science. The third section examines different views on the roles of social and political values in science, especially science that bears on public policy. As will become apparent, the topics of the different sections are connected in a number of ways.