The Qur’an assigns to humankind a special role within creation:27
And We have certainly honored (Arabic: karrama)28 the children of Adam and carried them on the land and sea and provided for them of the good things and preferred them over much of what We have created, with [definite] preference. [17:70]
Human beings were thus distinguished by God in a special way. This distinction (takʿīm) is made more concrete in a later passage when it is
24 See Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 88 ff.
25 Ibid., 89.
26 See also: Qur’an, 45:45, 14:45, etc.
27 It should be kept in mind that the commission of humanity refers only to our planet, the earth (cf. reference to the term vicegerent in connection with the statement “vicegerent on earth.” See Qur’an, 2:30, 24:55, 38:26).
28 The usual translation (also according to H. Wehr) for the word karrama here is
“excellent” or “honored.”
said that God appointed the human being as ḫalīfa (vicegerent) on earth.29 In order to determine how to understand the distinction between human beings and animals, we have to examine two basic concepts of the Qur’an:
the controversial term tasḫīr (often translated as serviceable) and taḏlīl (often translated as subjugation).30 These concepts show how extensive humanity’s power is over the rest of creation. Let us first consider the concept of tasḫīr:
Do you not see that Allah has made subject to you [Arabic: saḫḫara lakum] whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth and amply bestowed upon you His favors [Arabic: niʿam], [both] apparent and unapparent? […] [31:20]31
At this point we are talking about everything on earth that has been put at the service of humanity. Within the context of discussing the submissiveness of all things on earth, we also encounter the already mentioned term taḏlīl (subjugation). This is not infrequently mentioned in literature in connection with the idea of the authority of humanity and the servitude of animals since this is more frequently thought of as subjection or submission.
Do they not see that We have created for them from [ḫalaqna lahum] what Our hands have made, grazing livestock [al-anʿām], and [then] they are their owners [mālikūn]? And We have tamed them for them [or subdued; ḏallalnāhā lahum], so some of them they ride, and some of them they eat. And for them therein are [other]
benefits and drinks, so will they not be grateful? [36:71–73]
These verses are often used to legitimize the absolute supremacy of human beings over the animal world. From this perspective, humanity as a distinct creation should be able to subjugate animals and deal with them according to their own interests, without taking into account the interests of other creatures. This is justified by the fact that it is said that God has created for them [ḫalaqna lahum], i.e., for human beings, cattle that the human being owns [mālikūn] and gains many benefits from.
29 “It is He who has made you successors [ḫalīfa] upon the earth.” [35:39]. M.A. Rassoul says vicegerent instead of successor. On the problem of the term ḫalīfa as well as a discussion of the position of man within creation, see Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 222 ff.
30 Because of the overlaps in the meaning it is difficult to translate these terms clearly. But it can be said that the term taḏlīl is the one, which “[...] comes closest to the biblical idea of dominion in the Qur’an [...], because this term combined “[…] both elements of authority and servitude more discernible than they are in the idea of tasḫīr.“ (Tlili, op. cit. [note 3], 74 ff.).
31 This verse is not infrequently used to suggest the absolute supremacy of humanity over the environment and thus against animals; what is more, with reference to the term saḫḫara (make subject to, the verb of the noun tasḫīr.) it is often interpreted as meaning that humanity on earth possesses everything at their disposal and consequently also rules.
However, if we discuss the two concepts in a more differentiated way, we realize that these concepts cannot be interpreted simplistically. An analysis of the terms is also found in the works of Sarra Tlili. She evaluates the abovementioned verses, taking into account other, similar verses in her work, and examines the interpretation of four classical Qur’an exegetes.32 Regarding verse 36:71–73 mentioned above she remarks that we must consider three things:
first, we have to discuss the term al-anʿām, which is here translated as cattle.
Since the verses in this constellation refer only to anʿām (cattle), this should not be transferred to all animals as it has been described by the aforementioned exegetes.33 In other words, even if the abovementioned verse is interpreted in such a way as to affirm an “annexation” of the anʿām, this is nevertheless only related to a particular animal group and therefore only valid for it.
If we look at the concept of taḏlīl and its interpretation in more detail, we must consider that this concept was not understood as the absolute authority of humanity over this group of animals, but much more as God’s grace that made it possible for human beings to subdue a camel, which is physically superior. Because of these aspects, the concept of taḏlīl was frequently supplemented by the statement that one should meet the interests of the animal groups, since God demands that we show gratitude. It is precisely this gratitude which becomes clear when human beings do not cause any evil on earth and accordingly do not inflict harm on animals.34
According to Tlili, based on these aspects we cannot conclude that humanity is legitimized to understand itself as the ruler over the rest of creation, since God is always the ruler in the last instance. Therefore, at no time does humanity have an authority over the environment and thus the animal. The abovementioned verse also clarifies this statement. For the Qur’an uses the verb saḫḫara (make subject) also with regard to other things, such as solar systems,
32Aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 923), ar-Rāzī (d. 1209), al-Qurṭubī (d. 1273) and Ibn Kaṯīr (d. 1373).
33 See Tlili, op. cit. (note 3). 76 f; Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʿān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 2000), 15:38.
34 It is interesting to note that this aspect or the notion of not being allowed deliberately to harm animals was included in some state regulations. For example, the second caliph ʿUmar (d. 644) issued a law to regulate how much weight a load-bearing animal could bear. Non-compliance with this law led to punishment, which is actually transmitted to us in a case. (Tlili, op. cit. [note 3], 86. Quoted from al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʿān 10:49). From this Tlili derives that “[…] in addition to being morally wrong; mistreating animals of burden in violation of Islamic law is an act punishable in this world as well, and not only in the next” (Tlili, ibid., 86). The fact that the disregard of animals not only has consequences for the human being in the afterlife but can also be punished in this life leads to the addition of animals within a moral community as beings able to cope with suffering.
In this community they are regarded as moral objects (moral agents) and therefore have to be given moral consideration as well as rights by the moral subject, the human being.
seas, clouds, etc. This raises the question of how this term is to be understood in this context. Can humanity also have the sun and the moon at its disposal?35 It should also be borne in mind that the concept of tasḫīr is not a concept solely applied to humanity. In the Qur’an, certain elements are subjected to animals (for example the heaven to the birds [Qur’an, 16:79]). This sheds doubt onto the extent to which hierarchical structures can be derived from this concept.
In addition, it may be surprising why the concept of tasḫīr is interpreted so extremely positively and, in particular, as supremacy, while it is actually much less than that. If we consider the contexts in which the term tasḫīr appears, we find that this term is often followed by the phrase “that you might be grateful”
(laʿallakum taškurūn). This is what the Qur’an says in one place:
That you may settle yourselves upon their back and then remember the favor of your Lord when you have settled upon them and say. “Exalted is He who has subjected this to us, and we could not have [otherwise] subdued it. [43:13]
We can therefore state that human boundaries and weakness are clearly located within the cosmos. This also shows human beings’ dependence on the rest of creation, without which the human being “would not be able” to do certain things.36
We find similar interpretations of these Qur’anic verses by classical Qur’an exegetes such as Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī (d. 1272), Faḫr al-Dīn al-Razī (d. 1209) and Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar ibn Kathīr (d.
1373). They not only associate the concept of tasḫīr with a form of weakness of humanity since it often underlines the dependence on fellow creatures.
Rather, they emphasize the statement that the fact that God has made something subject to human beings (among others) is no proof that they can fully instrumentalize creation or animals and merely use them for their own benefit.37 It is God who has absolute authority over God’s own creation.
According to this, human beings cannot understand themselves as being intermediaries between God and animals. Rather, they must join the rest of creation as a special creation.38 Consequently, it would be oversimplified to say that God created everything solely for the benefit of the human being.
Rather, God has made available to every creature what it needs.39
35 “And He has subjected for you the night and day and the sun and mood, and the stars are subjected by His command (amr). Indeed, in that are signs for a people who reason.” [16:12]. See 14:32-33, 45:12-13, etc.
36 See Tlili, op. cit. (note 3), 99.
37 See ibid., 79 ff.
38 See Ibid., 92.
39 “And there is no creature on earth but that upon Allah is its provision, and He knows its place of dwelling and place of storage. […]” [11:6]. See Qur’an, 29:60.
In addition, as we approach the Qur’an we must bear in mind that the addressee is the human being and as such God highlights God’s graces towards this addressee. Therefore, due to their physical capacity, what distinguishes human beings is their task as ḫalīf on earth, which should be characterized by responsibility towards fellow creatures. However, we should never understand this distinction as freedom of action or as having absolute authority over the rest of creation.40