SOUTH SUMATERA
D. Action and Situation Arena
Arena situations within the action arena, which are confined in institutional framework, affect information and transaction costs to participants. Thus, this might also impact policy choice situation, which often leads to Table 4. Access mechanism for community land use
Form of access Community origin Rules/norms
1. Hom-steading, shelter or stay
(home) Indigenous people
(Kubu people) Land for livelihood, hunting, home- steading
2. Para rimbo Musi people Rubber/mixed estates are in patron-
client relationship among Pesirah and indigenous people.
3. Shifting cultivation Musi/ Komering Tribe Shifting cultivation for crops/dryland farming arrangements (cycles) to maintain soil fertilization.
4. Community core plantation/
PIR or smallholder A spontaneous migrant from Musi people, Komering people, Rupit people, and Rawas people, and from Java people)
Oil palm plantation is obtained by trading with the figure/village head
5. Illegal transmigration area (village establishment without proper license from authority)
Often said: Jawa Lampung
Migrant from Lampung Managing open access land ex-IFP obtained by buy-selling from leader persons of villages
Source: Processed primary data (2016)
Diagnosing Performance in Governing Utilization ...(Ja Posman Napitu, Aceng Hidayat, Sambas Basuni and Sofyan Sjaf)
land utilization change and overlapping, as well as, conflicts.
1. Information and transaction costs
Information significantly determines how policymakers choose their decision, whether to grant or refuse, permit proposals. Applied consideration might vary, from the type of venture, produced goods, or extracted materials; which also includes potential impacts on environment and economic-related values.
Not only for the policymakers, information is also required by venture owners, including IFP, to understand current market condition, i.e.: product prices, production costs, as well as, global market updates. Further, from the available information participants could gain knowledge about decision making factors, such as: market perception and political transaction costs (Kartodihardjo 2008). Moreover, during the application process, negotiating ability might limit the needs of both sides, such as:
proposed area, location, and potential products.
Once a business thought to be feasible, the next possible decision is about how to increase production, which is going to involve, both biophysical and community characteristics, in the form of interaction among parties. Often, such interactions cause high transaction costs for corporations during decision-making process due to the existence of overlapping area (Kartodihardjo, Nurrochmat, & Justianto, 2015). The amount of the significant transaction costs would depend on key policymakers, whether beneficial or not for them, and often ignoring community interests. The above-
mentioned case was well explained by one of the informants, as follow:
"Indeed, sometimes we have to understand (the policymakers’ intentions) too if we do not understand and are not sensitive to such (intentions)...., we would never know when our permission will come out. The amount of the cost depends on his position. Indeed, in this society, it can be arranged" -
Maman LH (67) IFP Manager- The action arena could be more complicated if interests of local elites and their politics are involved. This is, since during local elections – as candidates eager to gain more fund to cover their campaign costs, such transactional activities are increasing. While at the same time concession holders sense the necessary to get closer to bureaucratic administration for the sake of their interests. This means, that structural power could affect corruption events (Baseowi et al. 2012), as described by the source:
"The company is obliged to ‘donate’, because ‘he’
is, the former head of the sub-district here. He knows companies here and the village head is his subordinate.
(Thus) if we do not ‘donate’, we cannot work in this area."
-Heri (54) IFP manager- There is a gap between management objectives and the implementation of forestry regulations, due to such kind of interactions between corporate individuals and policy- makers (Suwarno, 2014). Thus, any sanctions imposed to private forestry sector for their non-compliant activities against regulations
are also influenced by corruption practices (Hidayat, 2007). However, to do research about the aforementioned corruptive interaction is difficult, even for corporate HRD, due to its high sensitivity, as well as, possible cover ups.
Such transaction cost, which in the above context is bribery, in the action arena involve local officials and companies, whether legal or not, as well as other users (Nurtjahjawilasa.
Kartodihardjo, Nurrochmat, & Justianto, 2015).
Further, this also shows that the Meranti FMU is lacking optimal performance supports from all parties.
2. Overlap and take over areas
It is common for forestry officials, either from central ministry or local services, to perceive that land used by local people within the forest area is a law transgression. This is, since these
officials often ignore communities surrounding forest area as part of the environment from socio-cultural interactions and processes. Their livelihood activities within forest area are seen as to only having economic motive. Meanwhile, policymakers often grant concession licenses on community area, although it could potentially cause access overlapping and tenurial conflicts.
Such problems could occur because kinds of misguided activities, i.e.: a) permission granting to one or more new users on a currently utilized area; b) revocation of permission extension, which leads to open access area and gather free loaders, and c) permission granting on cropped customary area.
The existence of diverse biophysical conditions and dynamic user changes lead to complex interactions of exogenous factors within the action arena. Biophysical changes and Figure 4. Changing process of biophysical characteristics of forest areas
Diagnosing Performance in Governing Utilization ...(Ja Posman Napitu, Aceng Hidayat, Sambas Basuni and Sofyan Sjaf)
user interests in the action situation determine the outcomes, which are desirable for, both actors and participants, when the decision maker agrees upon their choice (See Figure 4 for the processes of the aforementioned biophysical attributes changes).
Further, such interactions might also lead to policy interventions, which could be caused by:
a) presence of new land users; b) biophysical changes of the area; c) user dynamics; d) addition to the community attributes, and e)
‘rule to use’ changes. In the Meranti FMU, the above case was observed from the land use change history, where the previous FPR area were altered to IFP due to policy shifts, while some of the latter area were eventually occupied by groups of people, and were conflicting.
Then, decision was remade for the occupied area, from the previously IFP to CPF, to muffle the conflicts. Initially, the establishment of the FMU in Indonesia was influenced by discourses of policy de-concentration among the policymakers (Ekawati, 2013). So, it is an ineffective policy decision if the implemented policy, in this case the FMU establishment, does not improve institutional performance (Kartodihardjo, 2008; Budiningsih, Ekawati,
Gamin, Sylviani, Suryandari, & Salaka, 2015).
Even, policy decision, in this case permit issuance, without community recognition, would lead to conflicts in forest area, which is so-called as ‘legal but not legitimate permission’
(Sinabutar, Nugroho, Kartodihardjo, &
Darusman, 2015). The changes of forest area was started since 1969. It referred to permits of Minister Decree and regional regulation (Table 5 and Table 6) as shown in Figure 5.