Application of Micro- and Macro- structure: The Case of Glasgow
5.4 Adaptability of the Structure to the Conurbation of Glasgow It is now possible to abstract the proposed macro- and micro-structure for the
5–20. Diagram of the structure of the conurbation of Glasgow over the figure-ground (based on OS Pathfinder maps)
5.4 Adaptability of the Structure to the Conurbation of Glasgow
existing population of districts or towns within the conurbation. Therefore expansion is relatively easy to manage. If, however, the population shrinks the question is whether, and if so which, built-up areas of the city could contract, and then existing communities will be directly affected.
One needs to remind oneself at this stage that the micro-structure will work efficiently only if all the centres are supported by the appropriate size of population, and this is currently not the case in all areas of the existing conurbation of Glasgow. Unfortunately data for the conurbation as a whole are not available; therefore this discussion concentrates on the city of Glasgow including Rutherglen (1975 boundaries). If 40% of the city area is allocated to open land (see section 3.3) and only 60% of the total area is built upon then the gross population density of Greater Glasgow is around 55.7 persons per hectare (pph) and therefore only a little short of
5–21. Diagram of the structure of the conurbation of Glasgow with the figure-ground eliminated
the 60 pph benchmark which is believed to be necessary to support local services and facilities and public transport. Glasgow’s population is accordingly on average only a little too small, but it is rather unevenly distributed over the city area (Fig. 4.32). Those districts with a population below the city average (with the 1975 boundary about 33.4 pph over the total area equivalent to a population of 55.7 pph over 60% of the area) represent 53.5% of the total city area but accommodate only 32% of the city’s population (Fig. 5.22). It is these
5–22. Areas in the city of Glasgow below the required average population density (based on Glasgow City Council, 1995)
districts that do not achieve a sufficient population to support local services and facilities. Many of them are located at the edge of the city and incorporate a considerable amount of open land over and above the 40% set as threshold value, but a number of them are located in the central development zone on either side of the River Clyde.
There is the additional problem of outmigration. The city population (excluding Rutherglen) fell from 1,055,000 in 1960 (Glasgow City Council, 1996, pp. 15–18) to 622, 333 (Glasgow City Council, 1995) with only insignificant changes to the city boundary and area. This amounts to a population loss of 41% in that period. The decline was dramatic during the 1960s and 1970s, but during the 1980s and 1990s there was a steady decline in the rate of outmigration (between 1980 and 1993 around 3,000 persons or 0.5%
a year with a falling tendency). Not to cope with the situation of uneven distribution and continued loss of the population would mean that the micro- structure would not work optimally in over half of the developed areas of the city. There are three ways of dealing with the mismatch between population and built-up area.
• Strategy one: increase the population in those areas with a population density below the city average (around 55.7 pph over 60% of the total area of Greater Glasgow). This strategy is based on the assumption that people could be attracted to move from the countryside or from the conurbation but outside the city into underpopulateo areas of the city. With the proposed micro- structure the city population of Glasgow (including Rutherglen) would have to increase by 21.4% (145, 226 people).
• Strategy two: increase the population in those areas below the threshold average by redistribution of population from areas with densities above average. This would require that 21.4% of the total city population living in districts with average and higher than average density would have to move into the 53.5% of the city’s districts with densities below average.
• Strategy three: decrease the size of the built-up area of the city in those districts below the population average. This strategy is based on the
assumption that the population in the higher-density area will or should not be reduced and that the population in the lower-density areas needs to be
concentrated into a considerably smaller area to achieve the required gross density. This approach would involve demolition of existing fabric in and the dislocation of people out of 21.4% of the city area (4,348 ha).
Strategy One
The first strategy needs little further discussion as its advantages, but also its difficulties, are obvious. There is competition between urban districts and towns;
some of those outside the city boundary of Glasgow offer better conditions for industry, services and other facilities to locate, and this causes outmigration. If competition could be changed into co-operation—clearly, the sustainability of individual places can be seen only in conjunction with the entire urban region—
and if Glasgow could be made more attractive in terms of workplaces and general living conditions, then it might be possible to attract people into the city and achieve a more balanced population and workplace distribution in the conurbation and city region. This surely is the aim of many local agencies and departments but requires strategic plans for the regeneration of the entire region rather than individual areas in it.
Strategy Two
The second strategy considers that there may not be any need for an increase in the city’s population or a decrease in the city’s area if a more even distribution of population could be achieved in the individual built-up areas of the city. The problem with this strategy is that the weak areas of the city would be strengthened by weakening the strong areas, and this seems to be a problematic option. The densely populated neighbourhoods and districts are all historical areas of good spatial structure and form, and part of their quality is the high concentration of people which in turn supports good services and facilities. Quite apart from the fact that decanting population from the higher-density areas may reduce their quality and perhaps even viability, this strategy is likely to involve a considerable amount of restructuring of urban areas and dislocation of people and might therefore be economically and socially unacceptable.
Strategy Three
The third strategy has been widely, and often, discussed in Glasgow, causing considerable commotion at times. There have been suggestions that the city should get rid of the most deprived areas and relocate people from these areas into more advantaged districts. Others have suggested that areas at the very periphery of the city should be phased out and returned to farmland, regardless of their level of deprivation or otherwise, because they are furthest away from central services and facilities. It so happens that some of the most deprived areas are at the very edge of the city. Many of those who in recent decades have spent considerable sums of money and have made huge efforts to improve deprived areas—specifically the local housing associations and co-oper-
5–23. City of Glasgow: the most deprived areas (based on Glasgow City Council, 1995)
atives—have reacted strongly to such suggestions. They point out that there are communities and people in these areas who want to stay and further improve these districts. They also believe that demolition of housing stock and dislocation of people would only repeat the disasters of the comprehensive development of many urban areas immediately after the Second World War.
An examination of the location of the most deprived areas reveals that they are not only located at the very periphery of the city but also immediately north, east and south of the well-structured central belt (Fig. 5.23). Therefore the level of deprivation on its own cannot be the basis for a decision to eliminate an urban area—if such a decision were ever to be made—because demolition frequently means shifting part of the problem elsewhere; the location of areas has to be considered as well.
It would make sense to start consolidation of the city in the more central areas because this would achieve more continuity of development with the appropriate structure and density right next to, and in good connection with, the already densely developed and well-structured city centre and the northern inner south- east/north-west development belt west of it. This would result in the priority regeneration of areas directly east, south and north of the city centre, and indeed one such project is already under way with the regeneration of the Crown Street area in the Gorbals, presently Glasgow’s most coherent approach to the regeneration of a deprived area just south of the city centre, intended to bring people back into this inner-city zone. However, the regeneration of all urban areas in the city to the same levels of quality and density as pursued in the Crown Street Regeneration Project might not be feasible unless the regeneration would entice more people and businesses to locate in the city. This reinforces the conviction that one strategy alone cannot solve all problems, and a combination of them may have to be applied.
Combination of Strategies
In reality all three strategies may well form part of a regeneration programme for the city and conurbation. All areas other than those that are already rather dense and well structured may undergo some form of compaction; some people and businesses may be attracted into the city because of added bonuses resulting from ongoing regeneration programmes; and some areas may be so derelict and so badly located that their regeneration into sustainable entities may prove too costly and thus they may actually be given up in favour of the regeneration of other, more promising areas.
A decision as to the right strategy needs to be based (a) on a thorough understanding of the qualities and deficiencies of all areas on the basis of the sustainability criteria already used earlier, and (b) on an assessment of the amount of restructuring required in each neighbourhood and district and the long-term costs and benefits of their restructuring. Regeneration of a district is in the end viable only if it can achieve within reasonable economic and social costs the required population density as well as affordable services and facilities and public transport, because only then will a district become a well-functioning and attractive part of a sustainable conurbation or city region. This in turn means that a decision to regenerate an individual district will have to be based (a) on the long-term costs and benefits of regeneration based on each of the three strategies, and (b) on the impact of the regeneration of a district on the entire conurbation and urban region.