AI (AII, CI, CII, GII)

GROUP DECISION MAKING

2: AI (AII, CI, CII, GII)

Figure 6.2 Vroom and Yetton’s normative model of participation in decision making (Vroom, 1974;

Vroom & Yetton, 1973)

the extent that the average difference between him and other ingroup members is smaller than the dif- ference between him and outgroup members. In this way, meta-contrast determines both the extent to which a given category becomes salient and the extent to which particular category members are representative of it (see Figures 2.9 and 3.2).

To revisit these ideas in terms of an example, we could think of three senior policymakers working on a project to promote the fortunes of an incum- bent conservative-leaning government. All are sym- pathetic to the government in power, but they also differ in the extent to which they support its goals and values. Let’s imagine that Alan (a) is very right wing, Beth (b) is moderately right wing and Clive (c) is slightly right wing, as in Figure 6.3.

Now, in a situation in which these three people are formulating policy on their own and with little reference to external events and forces, the meta- contrast principle suggests that they should be rel- atively unlikely to define themselves as members of a common social category in terms of a shared social identity (Case 1 in Figure 6.3). In this set- ting, then, because the differences between them should be relatively pronounced, the individuals are more likely to categorize themselves and each other in terms of distinct personal or lower-level social identities (perhaps as members of different party factions). To the extent that any member of the group represented what they had in common, this should also tend to be the person whose views

are most representative of a compromise between all three’s views (that is, Beth). At the same time, the other two individuals (Alan and Clive) should be equally and minimally representative of what the group has in common.

We can extend this example to think of situations in which this same group of people is acting in a context where events lead them to make compar- isons with other people who are (a) more left wing (Case 2 in Figure 6.3), (b) more right wing or (c) both more left and more right wing. Perhaps the group is entering an election campaign in which it faces opposition from a left-wing party, a more right- wing party or both. In all of these situations the meta-contrast principle suggests that the three poli- cymakers should be more likely to define themselves in terms of a shared social identity as ‘us conserva- tives’ different from ‘those ultra-conservatives’ or

‘those lefties’. In this situation, then, their personal differences should be transformed into group simi- larities and their ingroup as a whole should be seen as more homogeneous. Along lines suggested in Chapter 2, evidence from a large number of empir- ical studies supports precisely such predictions:

social identity salience and perceptions of ingroup homogeneity (that is, of similarity among members of the ingroup) are heightened dramatically as the context of individuals’ judgement changes from being intragroup to intergroup in nature (Doosje et al., 1998; Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1995;

Simon, Pantaleo & Mummendey, 1995).

Table 6.1 Prominent types of organizational decision making and employee involvement groups

Group type Features Primary purpose

Brainstorming Ideas are generated regardless of quality Generating new ideas Individuals elaborate and augment ideas

Evaluation occurs after all ideas have been generated

Committee Hold regular meetings of formally selected or eligible Exchanging information

individuals and views, evaluating

Group discusses formal agenda and keeps record of options discussion and any decisions

Delphi Individuals respond privately to questionnaires Generating and evaluating Responses are collated and returned to individuals options

along with a second questionnaire

Responses are collated again and an executive decision is made

Nominal Individuals generate ideas alone Generating and

Individuals present their ideas to the group evaluating options Group discusses ideas

Individuals vote privately on options

Quality circle Hold regular, frequent and voluntary meeting of Monitoring and small groups of employees working in similar area improving quality but with different personal characteristics and productivity Groups discuss problems affecting quality of work

Group has no power to implement ideas or decisions

However, in these intergroup settings, the meta- contrast principle predicts not only that Alan, Beth and Clive should be more likely to categorize themselves as members of a common social cate- gory, but also that the extent to which each is rep- resentative (that is, prototypical) of that category

will vary as a function of who they compare themselves with. If the group compares itself with ultra-conservatives, Clive (the least conservative of the three) should gain in prototypicality relative to Alan because he is more different to this particular outgroup and thus serves to maximize the interclass Case 1: Intragroup

Case 2: Intergroup

Underlying social comparative dimension

‘Objective’ positions

Case 3: Intergroup + threat

o o o

p1

p2

o o o

o o o

o o o

o o o

p1 p2 p3

(Threat) Threat

Defensive action

a

a a b

b b c c c

a a a b

b b c

c c

a b c

o o o

c c b b

a a Positions after ingroup

interaction

Ingroup’s representation of positions

‘Objective’ positions

Positions after ingroup interaction

Ingroup’s representation of positions

‘Objective’ positions

Positions after ingroup interaction

Ingroup’s representation of positions

Figure 6.3 Variation in intragroup homogeneity, consensus and the position of an ingroup prototype as a function of social comparative context

Note: a, b, c =ingroup members, o =outgroup member (as defined in Cases 2 and 3), pN =position of ingroup prototype. Boxes indicate salience of social category (ingroup and outgroup), with greater thickness indicating heightened salience. In Case 1, a, b and c are defined in terms of personal (or low-level social) identity and differentiated from each other, but, in Cases 2 and 3, they (and the os) are defined in terms of a shared category membership and represented as more interchangeable with each other. As the intergroup context becomes more salient (especially when associated with the perception of threat to the ingroup) the ingroup prototype becomes more polarized, perceived intragroup homogeneity is increased and is further enhanced by the consensualizing effects of social interaction. In these cases, social reality is defined in terms of a much more sharply differentiated sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. When the collective self is threatened (as in Case 3), this may also lead to social identity-maintaining defensive action.

component of meta-contrast. For the same reasons, Alan (the most conservative group member) should become more prototypical than Clive if the group compares itself with a left-wing outgroup (Case 2 in Figure 6.3). However, in the context of comparisons with both left- and right-wing out- groups, Beth should be more prototypical (as she was in the intragroup context), because she is maxi- mally different from these two outgroups, but also least different to the other two ingroup members.

In this way, and as we argued in relation to the emergence of group leaders in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.2; Turner, 1991), we can see that the posi- tion prototypical of the group as a whole will shift as a function of social comparative context. In par- ticular, this ingroup norm (or prototype) will become extremitized to the extent that an ingroup compares itself to an outgroup that advocates a dif- ferent position on an issue that is relevant to the ingroup members’ social self-categorization. When

‘us’ is opposed to ‘them’, what ‘us’ means will be less ‘them-like’ than it would if ‘you’ and ‘I’ are considered alone.

Support for these arguments has been provided by Hogg et al. (1990) in research that looked, among other things, at variation in participants’

perceptions of the position of an ingroup norm (that is, the prototypical ingroup position) as a function of changes to the comparative frame of reference. As predicted, when participants were presented with information about a more cautious outgroup, they perceived the prototypical ingroup position to be more risky; when presented with information about a more risky outgroup, they per- ceived the prototypical ingroup position to be more cautious; and when presented with informa- tion about both risky and cautious outgroups, they saw the prototype as lying close to the mean ingroup position. Along similar lines, computer simulations and empirical studies reported by McGarty et al. (1992) have found that, as an ingroup becomes more extreme within a given frame of reference, the relative prototypicality of extreme members is increased and, thus, the nor- mative position of the group as a whole becomes more polarized.

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The above analysis goes some way to explaining how the norms of a group can change in response to changes in the social environment, but how do the arguments bear on processes of social inter- action and the impact of such interaction on group decisions? Here again the answer lies in arguments introduced in Chapters 2 and 4 concerning the

manner in which social influence is structured by the self-categorization process (see Abrams &

Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1987b; Turner, 1991;

Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989).

At the heart of our earlier discussion was an assertion that the perceived importance of another person’s view of the world – and the motivation to ascertain and act on his or her view – depends on how that person is categorized relative to self.

When others are seen as sharing social self-category membership with a perceiver, they are perceived to be qualified to inform him or her about aspects of social reality relevant to the ingroup. As well as this, the perceiver expects them to hold similar views to him or herself and so he or she is moti- vated to appropriately resolve any differences of opinion (Turner, 1987a). This process therefore sets the scene for mutual social influence, whereby indi- viduals who categorize themselves in terms of a common social identity discuss and negotiate their differences with an expectation, and motivational pressure, to reach agreement. To help them do this, they exchange information relevant to their shared identity, clarify points of disagreement, identify and build on common ground (along lines discussed in Chapter 5; see Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty et al., 1998; Postmes & Spears, 1998). Moreover, the position that serves to guide such interaction, and towards which it should lead, is that of the ingroup prototype. This is because it is this position that defines what they have in common in this particu- lar setting (for example, as found by Stasser &

Titus, 1985, 1987).

Accordingly, under conditions of shared social identity salience, group discussion should generally lead to convergence on a prototypical ingroup position.

Moreover, in light of the foregoing discussion about the manner in which the ingroup prototype varies with context, we can see that these arguments lead to a prediction that, in particular social settings, group decisions should be both consensual and polarized. In particular, this outcome is predicted when an ingroup compares itself with a highly salient outgroup – for example, under conditions of social competition (Cases 2 and 3 in Figure 6.3).

On the other hand, convergence without polariza- tion is anticipated when a group compares itself with multiple outgroups that are both more and less extreme than itself, and divergence without polarization is predicted when decisions are made in an intragroup (or interpersonal) context (Case 1).

This latter prediction follows from the argument that, in intragroup contexts, individuals should be more inclined to categorize themselves in terms of personal or lower-level social identities and, in these circumstances – as members of different self- categories – they should not perceive one another to be qualified to inform, validate and correct their various views of the world (see Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990).

Applied to the example of our political decision- making group, we would therefore predict that Alan, Beth and Clive should be most likely to dis- agree about what form the project to promote the government should take in a situation where they are making their decisions alone and are very inwardly focused (for example, because they are competing with each other). Of course factors other than comparative context (such as a history of prior association as members of the group) might serve to increase their awareness of a shared social identity and these would make convergence on a common solution more likely. The same is true in a situation where the group defines itself in relation to multiple groups (or social positions) both more and less extreme. Here, a salient social identity should increase mutual influence and convergence on an ingroup norm, but, because that norm is unlikely to be polarized, no group polarization should ensue. In effect, this situation corresponds to situations like those confronted by participants in Sherif’s (1936) classic studies, where circumstances serve to make a shared identity meaningful but the group compares itself with no clear outgroup and no specific set of alternative positions (Turner, 1987a).

However, both polarization and convergence would be expected when our three decisionmakers explicitly compare themselves with a specific out- group (or the situation dictates that they consider alternative social positions of a particular type).

Based on the principle of meta-contrast, we would expect that they would converge on a position more aligned with Alan than with Clive if they were confronted by a left-wing group (Case 2 in Figure 6.3), but that they would converge on a position more aligned with Clive than with Alan if they were confronted by an ultra-right-wing group.

Support for predictions of this form was gener- ated in the research by Hogg et al. (1990) that we referred to above. Here, manipulations of compara- tive context led to the prototypical ingroup position being perceived as more polarized when the ingroup was compared with a single different outgroup and, under these (and only these) circumstances, group discussion also led to individual views converging on that polarized position. These conditions also corre- spond closely to those that are observed to lead to polarization elsewhere in the research literature (see, for example, Fraser et al., 1971; Moscovici &

Zavalloni, 1969; Stephenson & Brotherton, 1975;

Stoner, 1961; for reviews see Myers & Lamm, 1976;

Turner, 1987a; Wetherell, 1987).

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The above account proves an elegant, parsimo- nious and empirically powerful explanation of key

effects reported in the decision-making literature (a point confirmed in recent studies of organiza- tional decision making reported by Abrams, 1999).

How, though, does it lead to an explanation of full-blown groupthink of the type discussed by Janis (1971, 1982)? In fact, if we look closely at the picture that is emerging under conditions of inter- group comparison, we can see that this is already starting to resemble the one portrayed by Janis in his original work. The group is polarized, its views are consensually shared, its members are sharing information that is relevant to their shared identity (but not that which is of a more idiosyncratic nature and irrelevant to that identity), they are supporting ideas that are in line with the ingroup norm and rejecting (or not raising) those aligned with the outgroup. As well as this, they have a well- developed sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and social iden- tity theory’s esteem-related principles suggest that they should be motivated to develop a relatively positive view of their ingroup and a correspond- ingly negative view of the outgroup.

Moreover, while all these features of the group may be relatively unexceptional in standard condi- tions of intergroup comparison (of the form created in most empirical studies), they should become notably more pronounced under conditions of heightened social identification. This, in fact, is the basis of arguments developed by M. Turner and Pratkanis (1994, 1998a; Turner, Pratkanis & Samuels, 2003) in their social identity model of groupthink.

In particular, these authors highlight the role that perceived or actual threat from an outgroup can play in accentuating all of the above tendencies.

This, they argue, heightens pressure on the ingroup to maintain its positive self-image ‘at all costs’ and will be felt particularly keenly when the threat is associated with negative outcomes for individuals who are highly identified with, and ‘locked in’ to their membership of the particular group in ques- tion (the die-hards; see Branscombe & Wann, 1994).

So, to elaborate our example further, we could think of a situation in which Alan, Beth and Clive are devising a policy to help the government respond to a left-wing group that has been highly critical of the policy-making group and its activities (Case 3 in Figure 6.3). Here Turner and Pratkanis’

arguments would lead us to anticipate that the threat that such an attack was perceived to pose for the ingroup might precipitate a decision to retali- ate with which all members would agree. In the process of arriving at this decision we would also expect the group members to be highly motivated to protect a positive sense of shared social identity.

Accordingly, they are likely to express indignation at the affrontery of the attack while at the same time interpreting their own actions as morally and intellectually superior to those of the outgroup.

Here, of course, if we think of Alan, Beth and Clive not as members of a fictional group, but as

members of the Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon administrations, then we can see that these out- comes correspond closely to those observed in the acts of political decision making discussed by Janis (1982). Moreover, we see that, while we may very well judge such outcomes to be foolhardy, unjusti- fied or stupid, they are not themselves a manifestation of irrationality or mindlessness. On the contrary, they flow from processes that are, in important ways, normal, rational and unremarkable (Fuller &

Aldag, 1998; Hogg, 1992; Kramer, 1998; Whyte, 1989). Accordingly, where they exist, the problems of groupthink can be seen to lie not in the waythe group thinks but in whatit thinks.

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The analysis of group polarization presented above has been tested in several extensive programmes of empirical research (for detailed reviews see Turner, 1991; Wetherell, 1987, pp. 159–70). A central goal of this work has been to show how polarization, and factors that contribute to it, are shaped by features of social context. In particular, researchers have sought to show that polarization of any particular form is underpinned by an act of social identifica- tion on the part of group members and that it is this transformation of the self that is responsible for the distinctive features of group decisions.

In an early study of this form, Mackie and Cooper (1984) asked students to listen to a tape- recording of a discussion between members of a group that the students were led to believe they would either be joining or against which they thought their own group would have to compete.

The discussion either favoured the retention of standardized university tests or their abolition. As expected, exposure to the arguments on the tape had some general effect on participants, so that those who heard arguments for retention were more disposed to the tests than those who heard arguments for abolition. However, along lines dis- cussed in Chapter 5 (see, for example, McGarty et al., 1994; Mackie et al., 1990), this effect was com- pletely conditioned by the presumed source of the arguments. Only when the discussion supposedly emanated from an ingroup were the arguments it contained influential in shaping the participants’

own views.

In a second study that extended these findings, participants listened to a tape advocating or oppos- ing test abolition under conditions where they were either given no information about their

relationship to the group on the tape (the uncategorized condition) or told that they were going to join it (the categorized condition). Before stating their own position, participants had to esti- mate the position of the group on the tape. As pre- dicted, those in the categorized condition perceived this position to be much more extreme than did those in the uncategorized condition. When they expressed their own views, the judgements of categ- orized participants then showed conformity to this normative position in the manner anticipated by self-categorization theory. There was no extension beyond the norm as would be predicted on the basis of a desire for interpersonal differentiation of the form suggested by social comparison theorists (see, for example, Jellison & Arkin, 1977).

Support for self-categorization and social identity principles is also provided by a number of studies that explore the relationship between polarization and depersonalization (that is, change in the level of self-categorization from a personal to a social level; see Figure 2.7). In a study explic- itly designed to examine this relationship, Turner, Wetherell and Hogg (1989) looked at the behav- iour of individuals who were randomly identified as having either a risky or a cautious ‘decision- making style’. Half the participants were told that decision-making style was a factor specific to par- ticular individuals, while the other half were told it was characteristic of particular groups. Consistent with the social identity approach, the authors found that group polarization was only displayed by groups of individuals who thought that their decision-making style was a group-based norm.

When they thought riskiness or caution was a per- sonal attribute, groups of risky individuals moved to caution and groups of cautious individuals moved to risk.

Along similar lines, in an extension of her earlier work, Mackie (1986) found that in conditions of intergroup competition for a prize, individuals’

views were only extremitized after exposure to group discussion where participants focused on the performance of the group as a whole rather than their own performance as individuals. When the winning group was to be given a monetary prize, individuals conformed to an extremitized group norm, but when the best group member was to receive a prize, no such conformity occurred. As in Turner et al.’s (1989) study, polarization and mutual coordination were thus contingent on shared social identification, while the salience of personal identity was associated with a desire for interpersonal differentiation.

Similar effects to these were also obtained in a study reported by Spears, Lea and Lee (1990) that examined computer-mediated group decision making in relation to a number of social, economic and organizational issues (ranging from the selling off of nationalized industries to support for affirmative