T
he commodity-traders who feature in “The World for Sale” are not the kind who yell orders at each other in the ring of the London Metal Exchange. Javier Blas and Jack Farchy, journalists at Bloomberg News, are instead interested in the small band of mostly private companies that move bulk commodities from there to here. It is a fascinating and revealing story, largely because of where “there” is: usually a place where many people would prefer not to do business, run by characters they would prefer not to do it with. A handful of swashbucklers became billionaires by overcoming such qualms.The opportunities to make these riches came in three big waves. During the 1960s and 1970s commoditytraders were pivotal in breaking the established AngloAmeri
can oil cartel known as the “seven sisters”
and establishing a new one in opec. For
tunes were made in the wake of the free
forall that followed the collapse of the So
viet Union. And after 2001 these figures were instrumental in the integration of China into the global trading order, sup
plying vast quantities of raw materials from Africa and elsewhere. Along the way, as the authors describe, some traders helped apartheidera South Africa sidestep economic sanctions, sold oil for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and funnelled dollars to Vla
dimir Putin’s Russia. There are tales in the book of breathtaking trades, such as ship
ments of rebel oil from wartorn Libya or deals bartered amid the brutal “aluminium wars” in the Russia of the 1990s.
The wonder is that so few firms, owned by a tiny number of people, were able to grab such a hold on global commodity
trading with so little oversight. Vitol, a Dutch trading house, became the largest independent oildistributor under Ian Tay
lor, its British boss, in part by being venturesome in former Soviet republics.
Many of the industry’s branches sprang from a single tree—Philipp Brothers, a trading outfit based in America but with roots in Hamburg, at which a young Marc Rich made his name as a trader.
Rich saw more clearly than others how emerging Middle Eastern petrostates would reshape the oil market. He set up Marc Rich & Co in 1974, after a breach with The World for Sale. By Javier Blas and Jack Farchy. Oxford University Press;
416 pages; $29.95. Random House Business; £20
70 Books & arts The Economist February 27th 2021
I
f you frequentlyGoogle languagerelated questions, whether out of interest or need, you’ve probably seen an advertisement for Grammarly, an auto
mated grammarchecker. In ubiquitous YouTube spots Grammarly touts its ability not only to fix mistakes, but to improve style and polish too. Over more than a decade it has sprawled into many applications: it can check emails, phone messages or longer texts composed in Microsoft Word and Google Docs, among other formats.
Does it achieve what it purports to?
Sometimes. But sometimes Grammarly doesn’t do what it should, and some
times it even does what it shouldn’t.
These strengths and failings hint at the essence of language and the peculiarity of human intelligence, as opposed to the artificial sort as it stands today.
Begin with the strengths. In a rough piece of student writing, Johnson count
ed 14 errors. Grammarly flagged five. For example, it sensibly suggested inserting a hyphen in “post cold war [world]”. It spotted a missing “the” in the phrase
“with [the] European economy”. And it noticed an absent “about” in “wondering [about] the state of Europe”. By using Grammarly, the author of this essay could have avoided some red ink.
On the other hand, Grammarly has a problem with false positives, calling out mistakes that are not. The other two suggestions were not disastrous, but neither did they relate to “critical errors”
as Grammarly maintains. In the as
sertion that enlargement had “created a fatigue” within the European Union, Grammarly needlessly suggested delet
ing the “a”. In another errorridden sen
tence it recommended removing a com
ma, which fixed none of the problems.
This falsepositive tendency is not a
dealbreaker for reasonably skilled writers who just want a second pair of eyes; you can dismiss any suggestion you like. But truly struggling scribblers might not know when Grammarly’s ideas would make their prose worse rather than better.
Then there are the false negatives, or the mistakes Grammarly fails to notice.
Depending on the text, Grammarly can seem to miss more errors than it marks.
The company’s chief executive, Brad Hoover, describes it as a “coach, not a crutch”—which sets expectations more appropriately than some of the ads do.
Artificialintelligence systems like Grammarly are trained with data; for instance, translation software is fed sen
tences translated by humans. Grammarly’s training data involve a large number of standard errorfree sentences (so it knows what good English should look like) and humancorrected sentences (so the soft
ware can find the patterns of fixes that human editors might make). Developers also manually add certain rules to the patterns Grammarly has taught itself. The software then looks at a user’s prose: if a
string of words seems ungrammatical, it tries to spot how the putative mistake most closely resembles one from its training inputs.
All this shows how far artificial “in
telligence” is from the human kind (which Grammarly wants to correct to
“humankind”). Computers outpace humans at problems that can be cracked with pure maths, such as chess. Ad
vances in language technology have been impressive in, for example, speech rec
ognition, which involves another sort of statistical guess—whether or not a stretch of sound matches a certain string of words. One Grammarly feature that works fairly well is sentiment analysis. It can rate the tone of an email before you send it, after being trained on texts that have been assessed by humans, for ex
ample as “admiring” or “confident”.
But grammar is the real magic of language, binding words into structures, binding those structures into sentences, and doing so in a way that maps onto meaning. And at this crucial structure
meaning interface, machines are no match for humans. Computers can parse (grammatical) sentences fairly well, labelling things like nouns and verb phrases. But they struggle with sentences that are difficult to analyse, precisely because they are ungrammatical—in other words, written by the kind of per
son who needs Grammarly.
To correct such prose requires know
ing what the writer intended. But com
puters don’t work in meaning or in
tention; they work in formulae. Humans, by contrast, can usually understand even rather mangled syntax, because of the ability to guess the contents of other minds. Grammarchecking computers illustrate not how bad humans are with language, but just how good.
Grammar’s resistance to artificial intelligence illuminates the nature of language
Johnson The human touch
the Philipp Brothers’ brass over the profits from a bet on Iranian oil. He became the model for a new style of commoditytrad
er—a bold risktaker on personal terms with unsavoury leaders. His firm in turn spawned Trafigura and Glencore, a mining giant that listed in London in 2011.
“The World for Sale” has an elegiac air.
Rich died in 2013; Taylor in 2020. Ivan Gla
senberg, the hardcharging boss of Glen
core, will retire this year. Deeper factors are at work, too. The rapid growth in China’s economy in the first decade of this century, which spurred a commodity “supercycle”,
will not be repeated. And public disquiet over the ethics of dealing with shady re
gimes is growing. Rich spent two decades as a fugitive from American justice be
cause of his business with Iran; other com
moditytraders have since had expensive brushes with the law. America has used the dollar’s role as a global currency to enforce economic sanctions more effectively.
Meanwhile the suppliers and custom
ers of the traders have become more astute.
The superprofits of the middlemen were in part based on superior private knowl
edge. It is much harder to make so much
money from arbitrage now that informa
tion flows so freely.
Still, the instinct to buy low and sell high will endure. Peddling stuff dug up from the ground may always be a mucky business, but if it becomes too unrefined for Western tastes, others are bound to step in. As Messrs Blas and Farchy say, the lead
ing hawker of Iranian crude is now Zhuhai Zhenrong, a Chinese trading house. “The Chinese”, Taylor told the authors in 2019,
“probably are willing to take much more risk than we are.” The seeds of a sequel to this gripping book lie somewhere here. n
The Economist February 27th 2021
Economic & financial indicators
72
Economic data
Gross domestic product Consumer prices Unemployment Current-account Budget Interest rates Currency units
% change on year ago % change on year ago rate balance balance 10-yr gov't bonds change on per $ % change
latest quarter* 2020† latest 2020† % % of GDP, 2020† % of GDP, 2020† latest,% year ago, bp Feb 24th on year ago
United States -2.5 Q4 4.0 -3.5 1.4 Jan 1.3 6.3 Jan -2.5 -14.9 1.4 nil -
China 6.5 Q4 10.8 2.3 -0.3 Jan 2.5 5.2 Dec‡§ 1.7 -5.8 3.1 §§ 45.0 6.45 9.0
Japan -1.2 Q4 12.7 -5.3 -0.6 Jan nil 2.9 Dec 3.5 -12.2 nil -8.0 106 4.5
Britain -7.8 Q4 4.0 -9.9 0.7 Jan 1.0 5.1 Nov†† -2.8 -14.3 0.7 9.0 0.71 8.4
Canada -5.2 Q3 40.5 -5.3 1.0 Jan 0.8 9.4 Jan -2.1 -13.5 1.3 12.0 1.26 5.6
Euro area -5.0 Q4 -2.4 -7.6 0.9 Jan 0.3 8.3 Dec 2.6 -9.2 -0.3 18.0 0.82 12.2
Austria -4.0 Q3 54.6 -7.4 0.9 Jan 1.4 5.8 Dec 2.1 -8.6 -0.1 25.0 0.82 12.2
Belgium -4.7 Q4 0.8 -6.2 0.3 Jan 0.4 5.8 Dec -1.1 -9.4 -0.1 14.0 0.82 12.2
France -5.0 Q4 -5.3 -8.3 0.6 Jan 0.5 8.9 Dec -2.3 -10.9 -0.1 11.0 0.82 12.2
Germany -3.6 Q4 1.4 -5.3 1.0 Jan 0.4 4.6 Dec 6.8 -4.8 -0.3 18.0 0.82 12.2
Greece -9.6 Q3 9.5 -9.9 -2.0 Jan -1.3 16.2 Nov -6.6 -9.2 1.0 nil 0.82 12.2
Italy -6.6 Q4 -7.7 -8.9 0.4 Jan -0.1 9.0 Dec 3.2 -11.3 0.7 -29.0 0.82 12.2
Netherlands -2.9 Q4 -0.5 -4.4 1.6 Jan 1.1 3.6 Jan 8.4 -6.1 -0.3 4.0 0.82 12.2
Spain -9.1 Q4 1.6 -11.0 0.5 Jan -0.3 16.2 Dec 0.7 -12.3 0.3 9.0 0.82 12.2
Czech Republic -5.3 Q3 1.2 -5.7 2.2 Jan 3.2 3.2 Dec‡ 3.6 -6.5 1.6 18.0 21.4 8.6
Denmark -3.8 Q3 2.4 -4.0 0.6 Jan 0.4 4.4 Dec 8.5 -3.6 -0.2 30.0 6.13 12.2
Norway -0.6 Q4 2.6 -1.3 2.5 Jan 1.3 5.0 Nov‡‡ 1.3 -4.2 1.4 2.0 8.45 10.4
Poland -1.8 Q3 -2.8 -2.8 2.7 Jan 3.4 6.5 Jan§ 3.6 -7.9 1.4 -56.0 3.72 6.5
Russia -3.4 Q3 na -3.1 5.2 Jan 3.4 5.8 Jan§ 2.0 -3.8 7.0 87.0 73.8 -11.3
Sweden -2.6 Q4 2.0 -3.0 1.6 Jan 0.5 9.3 Jan§ 4.8 -3.5 0.4 47.0 8.31 17.1
Switzerland -1.6 Q3 31.9 -3.0 -0.5 Jan -0.7 3.5 Jan 9.1 -3.7 -0.3 50.0 0.91 7.7
Turkey 6.7 Q3 na 0.4 15.0 Jan 12.3 12.9 Nov§ -5.4 -3.4 12.8 64.0 7.21 -15.1
Australia -3.8 Q3 14.0 -2.9 0.9 Q4 0.9 6.4 Jan 1.2 -7.3 1.6 66.0 1.26 19.8
Hong Kong -3.0 Q4 0.7 -5.8 1.9 Jan 0.3 7.0 Jan‡‡ 6.2 -7.6 1.3 -1.0 7.75 0.7
India -7.5 Q3 125 -7.0 4.1 Jan 6.6 6.5 Jan 1.2 -9.3 6.2 -22.0 72.3 -0.5
Indonesia -2.2 Q4 na -2.2 1.6 Jan 2.0 7.1 Q3§ -1.6 -7.2 6.4 -6.0 14,085 -1.5
Malaysia -3.4 Q4 na -5.3 -0.2 Jan -1.1 4.8 Dec§ 4.8 -7.4 3.0 -2.0 4.04 4.7
Pakistan 0.5 2020** na -2.8 5.7 Jan 9.5 5.8 2018 0.1 -8.1 10.1 ††† -108 159 -2.9
Philippines -8.3 Q4 24.4 -9.4 4.2 Jan 2.6 8.7 Q4§ 3.4 -7.8 3.6 -69.0 48.6 4.8
Singapore -2.4 Q4 15.9 -5.8 0.2 Jan -0.2 3.2 Q4 18.2 -13.9 1.3 -32.0 1.32 6.1
South Korea -1.3 Q4 4.4 -1.0 0.6 Jan 0.5 5.7 Jan§ 3.8 -5.7 1.9 43.0 1,112 9.7
Taiwan 5.1 Q4 5.8 3.0 -0.2 Jan -0.2 3.8 Dec 13.8 -1.5 0.4 -15.0 27.9 9.4
Thailand -4.2 Q4 5.4 -6.1 -0.3 Jan -0.8 1.5 Dec§ 3.7 -6.4 1.6 70.0 30.0 5.5
Argentina -10.2 Q3 61.7 -9.7 38.5 Jan‡ 42.0 11.7 Q3§ 0.6 -8.6 na na 89.6 -31.1
Brazil -3.9 Q3 34.6 -4.4 4.6 Jan 3.2 14.1 Nov§‡‡ -0.7 -15.8 8.1 138 5.43 -19.3
Chile -9.1 Q3 22.6 -6.2 3.1 Jan 3.0 10.3 Dec§‡‡ 1.4 -7.9 2.9 -84.0 705 14.8
Colombia -3.5 Q4 26.5 -7.0 1.6 Jan 2.5 13.4 Dec§ -3.6 -8.8 5.2 -36.0 3,577 -4.6
Mexico -4.5 Q4 13.0 -8.3 3.5 Jan 3.4 4.4 Dec 2.6 -2.8 5.7 -80.0 20.5 -6.5
Peru -1.7 Q4 37.9 -12.0 2.7 Jan 1.8 13.1 Jan§ 1.0 -8.0 4.2 31.0 3.65 -6.6
Egypt 0.7 Q3 na 3.6 4.4 Jan 5.1 7.2 Q4§ -3.6 -8.5 na nil 15.7 -0.7
Israel -1.3 Q4 6.3 -3.6 -0.4 Jan -0.6 4.5 Jan 3.9 -11.8 1.1 49.0 3.26 4.9
Saudi Arabia -4.1 2020 na -4.2 5.7 Jan 3.4 8.5 Q3 -3.7 -10.6 na nil 3.75 nil
South Africa -6.0 Q3 66.1 -7.1 3.2 Jan 3.2 32.5 Q4§ 1.1 -14.5 8.8 -8.0 14.6 3.6
Source: Haver Analytics. *% change on previous quarter, annual rate. †The Economist Intelligence Unit estimate/forecast. §Not seasonally adjusted. ‡New series. **Year ending June. ††Latest 3 months. ‡‡3-month moving average. §§5-year yield. †††Dollar-denominated bonds.
Markets
% change on: % change on:
Index one Dec 31st index one Dec 31st
In local currency Feb 24th week 2019 Feb 24th week 2019
United States S&P 500 3,925.4 -0.2 21.5 United States NAScomp 13,598.0 -2.6 51.5 China Shanghai Comp 3,564.1 -2.5 16.9 China Shenzhen Comp 2,347.3 -4.6 36.2 Japan Nikkei 225 29,671.7 -2.0 25.4
Japan Topix 1,903.1 -3.0 10.6
Britain FTSE 100 6,659.0 -0.8 -11.7 Canada S&P TSX 18,484.5 0.6 8.3 Euro area EURO STOXX 50 3,706.0 0.2 -1.0 France CAC 40 5,798.0 0.6 -3.0
Germany DAX* 13,976.0 0.5 5.5
Italy FTSE/MIB 23,098.2 -0.3 -1.7
Netherlands AEX 664.5 -2.4 9.9
Spain IBEX 35 8,269.6 1.8 -13.4
Poland WIG 57,596.3 -2.4 -0.4
Russia RTS, $ terms 1,445.9 -1.1 -6.7 Switzerland SMI 10,727.7 -0.8 1.0
Turkey BIST 1,483.0 -3.7 29.6
Australia All Ord. 7,049.4 -1.5 3.6 Hong Kong Hang Seng 29,718.2 -4.4 5.4
India BSE 50,781.7 -1.8 23.1
Indonesia IDX 6,251.1 0.4 -0.8
Malaysia KLSE 1,557.6 -2.4 -2.0
Pakistan KSE 45,362.6 -3.0 11.4
Singapore STI 2,924.6 0.1 -9.3
South Korea KOSPI 2,995.0 -4.4 36.3 Taiwan TWI 16,212.5 -0.9 35.1
Thailand SET 1,491.1 -1.6 -5.6
Argentina MERV 49,606.7 -5.3 19.0
Brazil BVSP 115,667.8 -3.9 nil
Mexico IPC 45,151.4 0.2 3.7
Egypt EGX 30 11,435.4 0.2 -18.1
Israel TA-125 1,615.3 -3.0 -0.1
Saudi Arabia Tadawul 9,115.8 0.3 8.7 South Africa JSE AS 66,200.8 -1.4 16.0 World, dev'd MSCI 2,802.4 -0.5 18.8 Emerging markets MSCI 1,376.8 -4.7 23.5
US corporate bonds, spread over Treasuries
Dec 31st
Basis points latest 2019
Investment grade 127 141
High-yield 376 449
Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; Standard & Poor's Global Fixed Income Research. *Total return index.
Commodities
The Economist commodity-price index % change on 2015=100 Feb 16th Feb 23rd* month year
Dollar Index
All Items 163.6 193.8 22.4 76.0 Food 127.8 129.2 3.8 34.2 Industrials
All 197.1 254.1 33.7 106.6 Non-food agriculturals 144.6 363.8 175.6 266.2 Metals 212.6 221.6 6.9 70.4 Sterling Index
All items 179.3 209.7 19.2 62.4 Euro Index
All items 149.7 176.8 22.4 57.3 Gold
$ per oz 1,810.5 1,805.4 -2.6 9.1 Brent
$ per barrel 63.5 65.5 17.0 17.4 Sources: Bloomberg; CME Group; Cotlook; Refinitiv Datastream;
Fastmarkets; FT; ICCO; ICO; ISO; Live Rice Index; LME; NZ Wool Services; Thompson Lloyd & Ewart; Urner Barry; WSJ. *Provisional.
For more countries and additional data, visit Economist.com/indicators
The Economist February 27th 2021