when one wants to get rid of a troublesome actor, this actor is given a promotion and, what is more, is usually under no illusion as to the meaning of the reward that he has just received.
But there is more, and even more serious. The distinction between organization and structure has direct consequences on the strategy of change. In particular, it legitimizes the preference for a participative approach, which will be the case throughout this book. For, if an organ- ization was able to reduce itself to its corpus of rules and written standards, then changing it could be effected by injunction, based on an extensive use of consultants commissioned to redefine and redesign the new entity, after a rapid analysis. If, to the contrary, one understands that there is a great deal more to change and that one must look towards real behaviours – or strategies, as we will come to say – then one must rely far more on trust, on the development of capabilities, on the inventive- ness of all those involved.24
Paradoxically, this idea is relatively well accepted intellectually but little used in practice. A big company, a world leader in its market, came to see us with the following question: over the previous year, with help from a large and well known consulting firm, it had redefined a new structure that was better suited to the perception that it had of its market.
The past twelve months had been devoted to setting out the new prin- ciples in terms of management rules, accounting rules, reporting rules, human resource rules, and so on … Our contacts told us that this now involved putting in place the methods of functioning, that is, the actual way in which actors would use what had just been developed at huge expense. In brief, it was now finally necessary to look closely at the organization, and those responsible were well aware that this would not only be more difficult than the preceding phase and in quite different ways but, even more importantly, could not be conducted in the same manner. Already, the troops were grumbling against the ambient authoritarianism, and pressure was mounting more and more strongly for everybody to be called on to participate in the next phase – the only one that really counted in the eyes of all those concerned.
What has just been recounted through this example appears to be a matter of common sense, especially as, when told like this, in simple terms, it wins everybody’s support. And yet the consequences in terms of change are only rarely deduced, and companies continue to prefer approaches focusing on structures, once they have accepted the need to modify their organization. In so doing, they have control over neither the process that they have implemented, nor the results that they achieve, thus increasing the unwillingness of managers to take action, Change, Yes, but Change What? 91
as well as the phenomena of resistance from those who, rightly or wrongly, feel that their territory is under threat.
An outside observer is sure to be fascinated by the amount of time, energy and, of course, money expended in this way on laboriously defining the “new structures”, new processes, new rules – and all this for results that are inadequate if not diametrically opposed to those that were officially expected. Surprisingly, this can open up room for action:
a manager’s biggest worry, when he has just exhausted his political tal- ents in implementing an organization chart acceptable to everybody, is that he will be expected to rework it. In a confidential manner, his col- leagues let him know that they can take “anything, but not that”.
Which means that everything is possible! More, even – it also signifies greater freedom for working on the day-to-day reality provided the end results are acceptable. Sometimes directors themselves call for this work that they vaguely feel the need for.
This is what happened in a major North American company in the food processing sector. In order to cope with expansion and diversifica- tion, it needed to rapidly develop one of its factories, until then in single production, towards a capacity for rapid changeover of brands or products in line with market requirements. To this was added the necessity for a fast improvement in quality together with the eradication of delays in terms of product availability. That was a lot to ask. A new factory man- ager was appointed and the project for change was put in his hands.
Seconded to him were a number of young and ambitious managers, of good level, with whom he formed his executive committee. These young managers, looking on their stay in this factory as only a minor step in their career paths, represented the group’s functional manage- ment divisions on the site, such as the industrial division, all of which were big producers of regulations and procedures intended to harmonize the overall procedures for doing things in all of the group’s factories.
Nothing worked as planned. The executive committee never managed to reach an integrated vision, and each member took refuge in his own particular logic without worrying about the rest. As a result, procedures were seen as too complex, obscure and contradictory, piling up one on top of another. Payroll costs rose because of the need for new recruits to manage the increasingly complicated dealings with the rest of the group. At the end of day, the manager was given to understand that his true job consisted of bending the rules, and that it was his ability to adapt which would be evaluated in priority. It was from that moment on that he was able seriously to get to work and instigate the necessary changes.