INTRODUCTION
Delivering aid in an emergency situation is a com- plex process given the high levels of uncertainty, capacity and resources that characterize the needs.
Humanitarian agencies work hard to fulfill their
specific mandates and ensure that beneficiary needs are met in the quickest and most efficient way. Doing so requires in many circumstances joint efforts (partnerships) between different agencies to achieve the common goal. Partnerships between humanitarian agencies can take many forms rang- ing from informal agreements, to memorandum Rolando M. Tomasini
Hanken School of Economics, Finland
Humanitarian Partnerships ‒ Drivers, Facilitators,
and Components:
The Case of Non-Food Item Distribution in Sudan
ABSTRACT
Through the use of a case study, this chapter discusses the design of a partnership between humani- tarian organizations to understand what the drivers, facilitators, and components of the partnership are. This research has been designed using a topical literature review and a case study. The practical implications include a discussion and guidelines for designing partnerships under high uncertainty and limited resources.
17 Humanitarian Partnerships—Drivers, Facilitators, and Components
The literature on partnerships between corpora- tions is rather extensive. However, little has been written about partnerships in the supply chain among humanitarian organizations to respond to emergencies. Studies in commercial supply chains have explained the benefits of partnerships to miti- gate uncertainty or foster collaboration. However, these differ from the focus of this research in that the final recipient is not the only customer. In the humanitarian supply chain there are two custom- ers: donors and beneficiaries at opposite ends of the supply chain. They each bring high levels of uncertainty for the humanitarian organization at the onset of the operations. In other words, it can take days, if not weeks, until a good picture of how much will be donated from which donors for an inaccurate number of beneficiaries.
Researchers have begun to look into inter-orga- nizational collaboration in the humanitarian supply chain (Samii, 2009; and Schulz, 2009) though a lot of questions remain unaddressed regarding formalized multiparty partnership agreements among humanitarian agencies. Formal partnership agreements from humanitarian organizations have been more the subject of researchers looking at cross-sectoral partnerships (i.e., humanitarian- private, humanitarian-military, humanitarian- governments), still a greater understanding of why these partnerships emerge between humanitarian agencies in logistics remains to be discussed.
The focus of this chapter is on the initial phase of Darfur crisis in 2004 when the humanitarian organizations made the decision to partner for the delivery of aid and the steps and decisions taken to create this partnership. In the case presented here this phase corresponds to a ten-months (February-November 2004) period during which humanitarian agencies present in Sudan became aware of the rising needs of large numbers of people in the Darfur regions. Unable to access the region, yet aware of the logistical challenges they would encounter in responding to such a massive operation, managers from different humanitarian agencies worked together to plan and decide which
tasks would be addressed collectively and under what conditions. The result was a set of inter- agency initiatives meant to create cost savings and efficiency. This chapter focuses specifically on the partnership designed to deliver non-food items through a common pipeline.
The arguments are developed as follows:
Section 1 explains the context of humanitarian logistics and partnerships. Section 2, describes the methodology used to design and analyze the case study presented in section 3. Section 4 com- bines the literature to analyze the case and discuss the drivers, facilitators and components for the partnership between the different humanitarian agencies focusing on Darfur. Section 5 lists limita- tions and recommendations from this research. In closing, section 6 provides some recommendations for future research, and section 7 provides a set of concluding remarks about the application and relevance of this research to the evolving field of humanitarian logistics.
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Humanitarian logistics is a relatively new academ- ic field of study and emerging research (Kovacs and Spens 2007) with evolving definitions and concepts. The main difference with commercial supply logistics is that companies aim their “lo- gistics at increasing profits whereas humanitarian logistics aims to alleviate the suffering of vulner- able people” (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Unlike actors in a commercial supply chain, humanitarian actors are required to go beyond the profit logic (Ernst, 2003), as this logic is actually absent and replaced by the concepts of speed and cost (To- masini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Moreover, humanitarian actors are driven by efficiency given the limited resources as long as performance does not compromise their legitimacy or license to operate as neutral and impartial organizations.
Humanitarian Partnerships—Drivers, Facilitators, and Components
The second most salient difference would be the multiplicity of actors involved. Actors may come from different ideologies and motivations (i.e., United Nations agencies, non-profit organi- zations, community organizations, religious and faith based organizations, military, governments, media, volunteers, etc), but eventually need to find a way of contributing towards the common goal of meeting the assessed needs of the popula- tion. Mandates, organizational capacity, and local expertise combine together to build what Samii (2008) calls ‘virtual organizations’, where a set of agencies work together as one supply chain to coordinate the use of limited resources in a disaster relief operation.
The lack of a shared profit incentive, com- bined with the multiplicity of actors and their diverse mandates, capacity, and expertise leads to difficulties in alignment for the humanitarian supply chain. For example, some agencies may have mandates that extend beyond the emergency phase on to the recovery phase, while others may only have the capacity to stay in the emergency phase given their funding and limited staff. At the same time, another agency may only be able to provide specialized aid in the recovery phase that follows the initial emergency window. Deter- mining who will be present where, and for how
long at each phase is a challenge for each relief operation that affects the success and efficiency of the supply chain.
Following a longitudinal study of different partnerships, Lambert and Knemeyer (2004) states that most supply chain partnerships failed due to un-aligned expectations and undetermined levels of cooperation. Together they propose a model
“developed under the auspices of Ohio State University‘s Supply Chain Forum from lessons learned from best partnering experiences of that group’s 15 member companies”. The partnership model for supply chain proposes that there are a set of ‘drivers’ (compelling reasons to partner), that combined with set of ‘facilitators’ (supportive environmental factors that enhance partnership growth) lead to a decision to partner. The part- nership is then composed of ‘joint activities and processes that build and sustain the partnership’
to meet a level of performances that matches the expectations of the partners in the first place. See Figure 1.
The Lambert and Knemeyer model has inter- esting implications for this research given its focus on supply chain performance and the defi- nition of partnership. While the definition is not explicitly stated by the authors, they explain that rather than a supplier-selection tool, a partnership
Figure 1. The Partnering Process (based on Lambert and Knemeyer 2004)
19 Humanitarian Partnerships—Drivers, Facilitators, and Components
“is a way targeting high potential relationships and align expectations around them” (Lambert and Knemeyer, 2004). Such explanation fits well the intent of the humanitarian agencies in this research who intended this partnership to be yet another interaction point for them to implement their programs in Sudan. Their definition of part- nerships presented is not time bound. This is also in line with the humanitarian managers in the non-food items (NFI) pipeline for whom the duration of the partnership was a secondary issue.
Instead, the humanitarian managers focused on high-potential relations and alignment as described by the Lambert and Knemeyer model (2004).
METHODOLOGY
Research for this article has been conducted fol- lowing case study methodology suggested by McCutcheon et al. (2002), who adapt Yin (1989) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) case study methodology to the field of operations management. McCutcheon et al. (2002) also sustain that “case-based research represents the intersection of theory, structures and events” while allowing the researcher to
“explore concepts in the real world looking for patterns that are insightful, interesting, and offer the possibility of providing predictive, explanatory power or understanding”. Case-based methodol- ogy is deemed appropriate for this research as
“there is no control over the behavioral events, and the focus is on contemporary events” (Yin 1989). More specific to the context of operations management case-based methodology enables the researcher to observe in complex environments the different factors at play and assess their im- pact on the outcomes (McCutcheon et al. 2002) as it was done through the data collection and analysis. Given the type of research purpose and question, Handfield and Melnyk (1998) suggest that an in-depth case study be used to uncover and explore the topic and uncover areas for research and theory development. The case study here
serves to provide an understanding of a complex subject matter (Meredith 1998) for the analysis and recommendations.
The instrument chosen to gather the data (i.e., study protocol) was a questionnaire designed using the theoretical propositions of the Lambert, Em- melhanz, and Gardner (1996) partnership model.
Through open ended questions managers from humanitarian organizations and donor agencies operating in Sudan were interviewed onsite to understand “compelling reasons to partner, the supportive environmental factors that enhanced the partnership growth, the decision to partner, activities that sustained the partnership, and the extent to which performance met expectations”
(Lambert and Knemeyer, 2004).
Interviews were carried out in person for ap- proximately one hour each. The list of participants, totaling 40 humanitarians, was initially set to 20 and increased in sets of 10 twice until no new is- sues were identified in the responses. Participants can be divided into two groups: a focal group was made up of 5 organizations (World Food Program, UNICEF, UN Joint Logistics Center, Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, and Care International) involved in the design and delivery of the partnership; and an extended group included additional 7 organizations that joined the partnership after it was formed and contributed or benefited from its operations (USAID, DFID, ECHO, World Vision International, Save the Children, Medair, and ADRA). The latter could be considered “clients” or “users” rather than core members as those in the focal group.
Participants were provided with an overview of the research during a weekly meeting that assembled all the partners for updates, and they received a project brief through email prior to the interview meeting. Interviews were transcribed and shared again for corrections and additional comments from the interviewees. To ensure construct and internal validity, interviewees were prompted to provide additional data in the form of support material such as quantitative
Humanitarian Partnerships—Drivers, Facilitators, and Components
and qualitative internal reports, bulletins, and opportunities for observation in the field. These investigative observations proved to be useful in validating the focus of the research and the selec- tion of additional participants. Some examples of observations include attendance at coordination meetings, warehouse loading and offloading ac- tivities, field visits to the distribution sites, and donor coordination meetings.
Interview transcripts were then analyzed to draw out the drivers to partner from the different organizations and the facilitators to making the partnership work. Comments and quotes from the participants were categorized and coded to develop a list of recommendations for future partnerships of the same type.
Following a period of data analysis the compiled data was shared with the participat- ing organizations in a plenary meeting onsite in Sudan to validate assumptions before drawing final conclusions. Feedback was collected and integrated into the final analysis to describe the benefits of the partnership and critical success factors for its development.
Finally, the results were disseminated in a managerial report to all the agencies which served as an evaluation of the implementation phase of the partnership. Further analysis has been carried out through a more in-depth review of the literature for the purpose of this article.
CASE STUDY: NON-FOOD ITEM COMMON PIPELINE FOR DARFUR (SUDAN)
Early 2004, humanitarian agencies began to focus again on Sudan in anticipation of the signing of the peace treaty that would bring to an end to the long standing battle between South Sudan and the government of Khartoum (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2007). However, the eminent needs
approximately a million people, and rising, were suddenly made public. Rumors about violence in Darfur began to circulate in the spring. However, humanitarian presence in the area was too small to confirm the magnitude of the violence. Hu- manitarian agencies based in Khartoum required a travel permit from the government to travel to the region, which in some cases could take weeks if the purpose was not properly justified and agreed by the government. The bottlenecks and restrictions were eventually lessened as the rumors gained the attention of the international community and the UN Security Council began to pressure the government of Khartoum to collaborate. From one week to the next the number of victims escalated from an initial 200,000 victims to nearly 2 mil- lion people by the summer when the international community finally got the details of the fighting and crimes against humanity taking place.
Douglas Osmond, UNJLC Officer in Charge during the initial phases of the Darfur operation, pointed out during an in interview for this research in Sudan, that the mere magnitude of the crisis was beyond the operational capacity of the humanitar- ian agencies present to respond. He explained that
“internally displaced people (IDP) were scattered through a large area with very long distances to travel. These distances were unprecedented. Even in Goma/Bukavu, one of the largest IDP operations in the history of the African region, the people were closer to each other. At the end, resources were exhausted in movement alone.”
As most agencies in Sudan were staffed to conduct long term development programs they lacked the capacity to do emergency response as required in Darfur. “Development programs focus on capacity building, using the national staff, cost savings, low budgets and long time frames, where as emergency relief programs are the opposite in all respects” explained Osmond. Staffing highly skilled, qualified, and experienced personnel in short notice was a problem for most agencies
21 Humanitarian Partnerships—Drivers, Facilitators, and Components
The sudden emergence of this unanticipated crisis came to test the reactivity of all the hu- manitarian agencies. On one side, there were lots of bureaucratic bottlenecks by the Sudanese government that made getting information about the nature and magnitude of the crisis difficult. On the other side, humanitarian agencies lacked the readiness and preparedness to roll out such a large program overnight considering the unprecedented scale and intensity.
The combination of these issues created an unanticipated ‘‘preparation phase’ during which humanitarian agencies were unable to become operational and were forced to discuss a collabora- tive strategy. This phase raised the expectations of the donors who aware of the magnitude and complexity of the needs were also encouraging innovative solutions to target the needs in Darfur.
At least half of the interview participants explained the added value of the delays. For example, unlike most emergencies, under re- stricted operational capacity and limited access to resources, the humanitarian actors present had no other choice but to sit down, share information, and collectively plan. They felt the pressure of the donors and the international community who had been lobbying for the Sudanese authorities to give them access. To some extent humanitarians feared they were not ready for the day that access would be granted and felt the obligation to be as ready as possible for that day. In emergency situations, such planning is less frequent than desired due to the urgency of the task, the lack of anticipation, and funds. The preparedness phase ended with Sudanese authorities issuing travel permits to foreigners to access the Darfur region and ramp up their operations and assist violence victims grouped in the camps.
Through the joint planning discussion it be- came obvious that NFIs such as mattresses, plastic sheets, blankets, soap, jerry cans, etc. would be a common concern for all agencies given the lack of a leader for its sourcing and distribution. None of the humanitarian agencies or NGOs present in
Sudan had it in their mandate to provide NFIs to IDPs, let alone funding or the capacity to do it.
Even if one agency had the mandate, the magnitude of needs, volume of recipients, and the complex- ity of the environment revealed that no single agency could undertake the whole responsibility of sourcing, storing, transporting, distributing, and reporting.
In the interviews all donors expressed that by April 2004 they had funded rapid response agen- cies and had not seen any action or results1. Hav- ing exhausted the traditional operating channels innovative approaches seemed more promising.
Donors took the lead in recognizing that the best solution was interagency collaboration and pro- moted it by placing their resources in that direction.
Actors on the Non Food Items Common Pipeline
As the main coordination agency for the humani- tarian community, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the donors requested United Nations Joint Logistics Center2 (UNJLC) support to address the NFI concerns. At the time, this de facto partnership could be defined as a symbiotic relationship between OCHA’s man- date, funds, and administrative capacity with the UNJLC’s logistics field expertise and experience, access and presence in the field.
Reflecting on their initial conversations with UNJLC, donors and OCHA explained that NFIs demanded significant logistical planning and sup- port, which is UNJLC’s core function. UNJLC was staffed with seconded senior logistics staff from other agencies with ample experience in complex emergency and population movement in the region.
The first steps came after a series of nego- tiations and meetings between OCHA/UNJLC, the donors and the rest of the agencies to sign a few agreements that would set the blueprint for the common pipeline. Under these agreements, UNICEF assumed responsibility for the procure-
Humanitarian Partnerships—Drivers, Facilitators, and Components
ment of the goods for the common pipeline; WFP became the consignee for all in-kind donations;
CARE provided warehousing in the Darfur capitals and distribution to the implementing partners at the camps. The agreement meant that agencies in Darfur could request items that had been previ- ously identified as a priority at no cost and receive them from CARE on-site. See Figure 2.
UNJLC and OCHA assumed joint responsibil- ity to chair NFI working groups (NFIWG) in Khartoum and in the three capitals in Darfur (Nyala, Geneina, Obeid). The working groups were open forums for collective decisions at- tended by donors, UNICEF, and NGOs doing distribution in the camps (also known as imple- menting partners or IPs). See Figure 3.
In Darfur NFIWGs collected information about beneficiary figures from the field, estimated re- quests, pending needs, and analyzed the data to suggest priorities per camp to the NFIWG in Khartoum. Then the working group in Khartoum met weekly to identify priorities per state based on the field reports, the participants’ input and stock movement reports. Upon reaching consen-
sus on the priorities the working group in Khartoum communicated them to UNJLC/OCHA, who would adjust the quantity of the needs and set the priorities based on the pipeline status.
Having communicated the stated priorities to the rest of the humanitarian community, the IPs issued a request to UNJLC/OCHA to receive the items at a particular camp for distribution. The NFIWG in Khartoum reviewed the requests, sought clarification and assessed adjustments where necessary. Upon satisfactory completion of the review process, the NFIWG would issue an
“Action Request” to CARE to dispatch the items to the IPs. The action request was issued within a day. See Figure 2 for a detailed illustration of the material and information flow.
Participant Benefits
For the implementing agencies, having the com- mon pipeline in place allowed them to focus and invest their resources on their core activities. Basi- cally they did not have to worry about procuring their own goods (UNICEF), finding a consignee
Figure 2. Information and material flow