What Matters?
4.2 Compliance and Proposition 227
Education Reform Literature
What factors help explain the level of compliance to external reforms in school districts?
Most analyses of school reforms are framed quite generally, and specific models are often left unspecified (Hess 1999). However, the research can be broadly summarized as belong- ing to three types of explanations: political, demographic and institutional. The line of research that emphasizes micropolitics in the schools is concerned with conflict among dif- ferent interest groups in and around schools (Datnow 2000). According to this literature, any reform will be mediated by the interactions and interests of administrators, teachers and community activists (Brouillette 1996; Henig, Hula, Orr and Predescleaux 1999; Meier and Stewart 1991). The second line of research focuses on explanations of race and economics, or the demography of poverty, in urban school districts (Anyon 1997). The demographic
characteristics of the school district will shape the path of a reform since efforts, resources or preferences may not be in line with those required by the new standard. Moreover, racial tensions may further shape or constraint policies according to which racial group has rep- resentative power in the district (Meier and Stewart 1991). Finally, the last interpretation stresses institutional and organizational aspects of school districts that can influence (and hinder) school reform. Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that the large bureaucracies in public schools hinder autonomy and promote rigidity. Hess (1999) argues that, as organized, school districts promote a "policy churn" in which reforms are constantly proposed and hardly ever enacted, in an attempt to legitimize administrator, and agency performance.
Understanding how citizen educational initiatives get implemented is an area that has not been studied systematically but can obviously profit from insights from the literature on government-initiated school reforms. In the case of educational initiatives, the new standard becomes a new law which the district must implement, as in any other government-driven reform. However, citizen-developed initiatives are often highly politicized, publicized endeav- ors that may mobilize parents, local community activists and even school officials. These extra factors, one may conjecture, make it more difficult for the implementor to shirk.
Proposition 227
Proposition 227 was passed by California voters in June 1998 and was implemented since the school year of 1998-1999. The initiative's main mandate requires that: "All children in California public schools shall be taught English by being taught in English. In particular, this shall require that all children be placed in English language classrooms. Children who are English learners shall be educated through sheltered English immersion during a temporary transition period not normally to exceed one year" (California Education Code, Article 2, Section 305). The exception made to Proposition 227 is that parents can request waivers for children who: a) know already English, b) are ten or older, c) have special needs determined by school staff, and d) have been placed in an English classroom for at least 30 days. Waivers can be initiated both by parents or the school district (with the consent of the parents).
The final approval of waivers falls under the jurisdiction of the district's superintendent (California Education Code, Article 3, Section 311). The burden of proof if a waiver is denied falls on the district and not on the parents. Finally, Proposition 227 also allows for
parents to sue educators (including elected officials) who "willfully and repeatedly" do not comply with the law.
In short, Proposition 227's objective was to dismantle bilingual programs, however, some discretion was allowed: if 20 or more students at a given grade level receive waivers the school district must offer them a bilingual class or allow them to transfer. Given this discretion, we might conjecture that the level of bilingual program dismantlement varied by school district, depending both on the characteristics of the student body (i.e. the demand from parents for waivers) and the district officials preferences (i.e. the supply of granted waivers).
Two recent studies have looked at the case of California's implementation of Proposition 227 and are related to the present work. Rossell (2000) looks at state-level overall trends of enrollment in bilingual classes up to Proposition 227 and after, while also using data from interviews of 50 classrooms in several of California's large school districts. Rossell finds that although there are significant declines in bilingual enrollment in the schools observed, many former bilingual students are still being taught a portion of their instruction time (30 percent) in their native tongue. In terms of waivers, in the schools studied these were often prompted from the districts: "Visiting the school to sign a parental waiver is not an idea that typically originates with the parent (p.51)." Gandara et al. (2000), analyze 22 schools in 16 school districts conducting quantitative and interview analysis to address district compliance and impact on classroom instruction. They argue two important reasons for the level of compliance to Proposition 227: 1) the history of the bilingual program and the number of bilingual staff in the district, and 2) the leadership at the top of the district (superintendent) or principals.
Measures of Compliance and Hypotheses
The goal in this chapter is to test alternative explanations regarding compliance in edu- cational reforms. How do we measure compliance with Proposition 227? The ideal measure would be to analyze the waivers requested and waivers denied. That is, ideally we would estimate a model that separately predicts demand and supply given various district specific factors. Unfortunately, this measure is not publicly available and neither was it collected by the California Department of Education. The measure I will use instead is the change in the number of bilingual students before and after the reform, relative to the LEP popula-
tion. This measure has an apparent drawback, since we cannot estimate demand for reform separately from willingness to supply reform. However, Proposition 227's regulations place the burden of proof on districts if they deny a waiver. Also, the recent studies suggest that the demand for waivers was often shaped by the districts' prescriptions (or lack of). Parents were, 1Il many cases, willing to go along with the recommendations of teachers and school authorities.
Interpreting the literature on external school reforms and the recent studies on Proposi- tion 227 that emphasize the role of the districts leads me to posit the following hypotheses with regards to district compliance with Proposition 227.
School Micropolitics. Political/educational preferences of the school leadership and teachers shape the level of compliance with a reform. Given evidence on how race mattered in voting on Proposition 227 (Alvarez 1999), I conjecture districts with higher representation of Hispanic officials were less inclined to implement Proposition 227. Given the fact that Proposition 227 aimed to dismantle bilingual education in general, I conjecture districts with higher percentages of bilingual teachers were less inclined to implement Proposition 227.
Demographics. School district composition shapes reform through the representation of different groups at the school official level, via parental involvement and community activism, and by the varied response of the student population. Given theories of power conflict among groups (Giles and Evans 1986; Meier and Stewart 1991), I conjecture districts with more Hispanic students were less inclined to comply with Proposition 227, while districts with more blacks students were more likely to comply with the initiative. Further, I conjecture districts with higher levels of welfare recipients were less likely to comply due to fewer resources from the districts and the parents.
Institutional. Larger districts tend to have larger bureaucracies which can constrain reforms. Districts located in urban areas are subject to more visibility from state-level press and state-level interest groups including supporters of the measure, teacher unions, regulators and researchers. Badly performing districts have stronger incentives to attempt new reforms.
I conjecture then that large and urban districts were more likely to comply with Proposition 227. Similarly districts doing poorly were more likely to comply with the initiative.
Local Politics. Higher local voter support impacts school districts decisions through
community and parental activism and through local news. I hypothesize districts with higher percentages in favor of Proposition 227 were more likely to comply with the initiative.