Randall Curren
Well-being in education has become an important focus of multidisciplinary research and reform efforts in recent years. This has been stimulated by the dramatic growth of interdisciplinary research on well-being, and by growing awareness of the limitations of education for economic competi- tiveness and damaging effects of associated pressures on students and teachers. Philosophers, psy- chologists, and others have brought a variety of perspectives to bear on the ethical and educational significance of students’ and teachers’ well-being and on living well or flourishing as an aim of education. Arguments have been made for the inherent and instrumental value of enhancing stu- dents’ well-being, and an accumulating body of research suggests that schools that meet the needs crucial to student and teacher well-being are more likely to engender and sustain meaningful learning. Many educators have long accepted that unmet student needs can be an obstacle to learning and they have accepted some responsibility to address those needs. State education au- thorities have for their part begun to acknowledge the importance of student well-being, but they continue to resist the proposition that teacher well-being matters both inherently and as a foun- dation of student learning.
The ethical questions at stake cannot be adequately addressed without more specificity about the nature of the needs and aspects of well-being involved and how they should figure into an account of educational responsibilities or justice. What roles, if any, should well-being and needs play in a theory of justice, in defining a just system of education, or in conceptualizing a just school com- munity? There are also important questions to address concerning the status of living well or flourishing as an aim, or as the overarching aim, of education. What is the basis of claims about the aims of education? What is flourishing and what is its role in the scheme of educational aims? How can education promote flourishing? These are the questions addressed in the sections that follow.
Well-Being, Happiness, and Flourishing
Well-being pertains to the quality of lives and the ways in which the lives of individuals of various species can go well or badly for them and be made better and worse by things good and bad for them.1 Plants can exhibit well-being in this broad sense, as the conditions in which they live do, or do not, harm them and do, or do not, provide what is good for them. They can be said to thrive or flourish to the extent that they have what they need to sustain healthy growth and functioning characteristic of their species. Sentient creatures can similarly thrive or flourish, or not, but are distinctive in consciously experiencing some aspects of how well their lives are going. Pain is often a
sign of actual or prospective harm to an organism and its life prospects, both objective and sub- jective, for instance. Creatures that can think, form bonds and plans, and coordinate their actions in mutually agreeable ways can not only experience their lives as pleasant and painful, but also in such ways as more or less frustrating or satisfying, happy or unhappy, successful or unsuccessful, good or bad. Thought, language, and position in a social world add nuance and moral elements to the objective dimension of how well a life is going, nuance to its subjective dimension, and the pos- sibility of self-assessments of life satisfaction that are more or less aligned with or transcend these objective and subjective dimensions of well-being.
These objective, subjective, and self-assessment aspects of well-being are all present in the lives of human beings, and this has given rise to a variety of philosophical and psychological conceptions and measures of well-being – objective, subjective, and hybrid conceptions of well-being, including conceptions of happiness and flourishing (eudaimonia, living well), and measures of subjective, so- matic, mental health, and flourishing or eudaimonic well-being (Lee, Kubzansky & Vanderweele 2021; Vitterosø 2016a; David et al. 2013; Waterman 2013; Kahneman et al. 1999). Leading phi- losophical theories of happiness have regarded it in various ways – as a positive emotional state, as satisfaction with one’s life, or as pleasure (Haybron 2013) – and psychologists have often used a self- report questionnaire that combines assessments of life satisfaction and balance of positive and ne- gative affect (SWB or Subjective Well-Being; Diener 1984; Diener et al. 1985), or a related combination of scales, as a measure of happiness. This “state of mind” conception of happiness is often contrasted with a more comprehensive conception of happiness as a “life that goes well for the person leading it” (Vitterosø 2016b: 3; cf. Kraut 1979). The latter equates happiness with well-being in all its aspects, and in doing so deviates from ordinary usage. In wishing our friends health and happiness, for instance, we typically think of good health as foundational to happiness, not as part of it, though we would readily agree that these are two aspects of personal well-being. In the interest of clarity, I will speak of happiness exclusively in the ordinary “state of mind” sense, and use the term flourishing to signify a comprehensive, all-inclusive, or eudaimonic conception of well-being.2
The principal source of this second conception of happiness is the classical Greek term eu- daimonia, as used by Aristotle, and the fact that it has often, though not altogether convincingly, been translated as “happiness.” The announced topic of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is living well (eu zên) or – what is presented as synonymous – eudaimonia, the highest end to which all human beings aspire (Barnes 1984: 1730 [NE I.1–2 1095a15–20]). What do people aspire to? Do they “just want to be happy”? I am convinced that Aristotle accurately perceived that what human beings aspire to is living well or flourishing in a sense that implies a life both happy and admirable (kalon).
The kind of life that he identifies as what is in fact the best in this two-fold sense – the singularly happiest and most admirable life of which human beings are capable – is one that makes theoretical contemplation (theoria) in conformity with theoretical wisdom (sophia) its highest aim (Kraut 1989;
Reeve 2012; Curren 2019). This conception of the naturally best life for human beings is the basis of his claim that “there are branches of learning and education which we must study merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be valued for their own sake” (Barnes 1984: 2122 [Pol. VIII.3 1338a8–12]), though there is more to his theory of education than this implies (Curren 2000, 2013b). The narrowness and empirical implausibility of this specific con- ception of flourishing disqualifies it as a basis for contemporary social and educational policy and practice, but the underlying idea that fulfilling one’s potential well is the key to happiness and a good life has many adherents.
The broadly Aristotelian conception of human flourishing that has been immensely influential in the philosophy and psychology of well-being, and in philosophy of education, is typically taken to be a comprehensive conception of well-being encompassing healthy or optimal growth and func- tioning, implying fulfillment of potential (implicitly or explicitly ‘positive’ or optimal in its qualities) and happiness in a sense that includes both pleasure and satisfaction (Ryan et al. 2013).3 A central
aspect of this understanding of flourishing, and one that has been the focus of considerable research, is the “Aristotelian Hypothesis” that fulfilling our potential well – which is to say, in activities that exhibit goodness or virtues – is foundational to happiness. Suffice it to say, for now, that there is substantial empirical support for this hypothesis (Curren 2019, 2013a; Ryan & Deci 2017; Curren &
Metzger 2017: 80–84; Besser-Jones 2014). It does not follow that all activities that a person can engage in admirably are also pleasant and satisfying for her – there is no singularly best activity for all human beings. There is thus some tendency among researchers and educators to think of flourishing in terms of an individual’s potential, which roughly translates as the fulfillments of their human potentialities that would be best for them (in the two-fold sense or in light of a comprehensive conception of well-being).4 A recent definition of flourishing in philosophy of education that re- flects this broadly Aristotelian conception of human flourishing defines it as “optimal continuing development of human beings’ potentials,” notably in relationships and “activities that are mean- ingful, i.e. aligned with both their own values and humanistic values, in a way that is satisfying to them” (De Ruyter, Oades and Waghid, 2020).5
Research on flourishing has involved combinations of measurement instruments, including SWB and measures of stress (e.g., cortisol levels), mental health, and quality of task engagement (e.g., energy, persistence, and “flow” [Csikszentmihalyi 1990]), while various self-report instruments have been proposed as comprehensive measures of “optimal human functioning” (PWB or Psychological Well-Being; Ryff 2016: 95; Ryff & Keyes 1995) or flourishing (e.g., the PERMA-Profiler measure [Butler & Kern 2015]; see also Lee, Kubzansky & VanderWeele 2021). Kennon Sheldon has rightly observed that insofar as the latter are comprehensive measures of well-being or flourishing, they are not strictly measures of psychological well-being, and in doing well-being research what we often need is distinct measures of different aspects of well-being, so we can better understand how the latter are related to one another (Sheldon 2016, 2018). We want to understand such things as the impact of life goal orientations (e.g., image, wealth, and status-seeking versus personal growth, re- lationship, or service oriented) on happiness. Living well is largely a matter of the activities in which one engages, so measures of flourishing and attempts to promote it would properly focus on eu- daimonic activities – activities that fulfill our potential in ways that are at the same time both good and personally satisfying (Curren 2019, 2020b; Sheldon 2018; Charles 2015).
The Ethical Significance of Students’ Present Well-Being
With this understanding of well-being, happiness, and flourishing in mind, we can now address their significance in the sphere of education. Several aspects of students’ well-being matter ethically.
Perhaps most obviously, the unhappiness, stress, and loss of childhood pleasures that many students experience in high-stakes, poorly funded, and often punitive learning environments diminish their present happiness and often their physical and mental health. Health, happiness, and these pleasures or goods of childhood – such as carefree play – have ethical significance that should weigh heavily in decisions that affect the lives of children (Macleod 2018; Bagattini & Macleod 2015; Brennan 2014).
This ethical significance must be given due consideration in assessing the consequences of educa- tional decisions made from the highest levels of policy to the most granular ones made at countless points in the day of a classroom.
Such weighing of children’s well-being in assessing the likely consequences of educational de- cisions is not enough to fulfill educators’ responsibilities to their students, however. Even if we add that ongoing sacrifice of an individual child’s present well-being could only be justified on the grounds that it would advance that very child’s future well-being, there is more to consider than aggregate consequences.6 While the impact of acts and policies on increments of well-being always matter ethically, we must ask whether there are also specific duties or rights at stake, principles of justice regarding access to goods that are essential to well-being, or specific needs that must be met as
a matter of justice. A partial, legalistic answer is that, at least in common law jurisdictions such as the U.S., the state has responsibilities to safeguard and promote the well-being and developmental interests of all children, and these responsibilities are given effect in standards of custodial care for institutions. With regard to schools, these typically include provisions pertaining to safety, adequacy of instruction, and meals. Yet, from an ethical standpoint – the standpoint of justice – it is an open question how a government’s “duty of protection to consult the welfare, comfort and interests of [each] child in regulating its custody during the period of its minority” should be spelled out as specific requirements of justice (In re Gould, 174 Mich. 6663 (1913)).
Resolving this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, but there are at least three general approaches that could be considered. The first, developed by John Rawls (Rawls 1971), identifies a set of primary goods, conceptualized as “social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary” to pursuing a good life (Rawls 2001: 57). These are mostly conceived with adults in mind, and this limits their value for understanding what a society owes children with respect to their present well-being, as opposed to their future adult powers, rights, and opportunities. Rawls counts institutional bases of self-respect as a primary good (58), and this clearly imposes a duty on educational institutions to treat all children as equals, however different they may be with respect to race, ethnicity, or other differences.7 The significance of this for children’s happiness and overall well- being can hardly be exaggerated, but the direct significance of other primary goods, such as freedom of movement and choice of occupation, would be limited to preparatory or future-regarding aspects of schooling.
The Capabilities Approach (CA) as developed by Martha Nussbaum has wider direct significance for children’s well-being in educational contexts, because it identifies central capabilities to function in ways that are for the most part essential to being and living well across the lifespan, such as having good health, bodily integrity, pleasurable experiences, and using one’s imagination in “experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice” (Nussbaum 2011: 33; cf. 2003). Education would properly focus on nurturing internal capabilities – the developmental aspects of combined cap- abilities (or simply capabilities), the substantive freedoms to function in ways essential to living well in the social, political, and economic circumstances of one’s life (Nussbaum 2011: 20–21). Schools could scarcely succeed in this developmental task without allowing and encouraging children to actually function in these ways (23), so a CA perspective on educational justice with respect to children’s development would warrant an ongoing – not just future – empowerment of children that would be favorable to their present well-being. As institutions that are not just responsible for the development of internal capabilities but play a significant role in determining children’s combined capabilities or what they can actually be and do in the institutional circumstances of their lives, schools would also have duties of justice that are not subordinate to their preparatory function. Nussbaum presents her version of the CA as a human rights approach by making a case for regarding capabilities to function in ways sufficient for a minimally decent life of dignity as human rights. Affirming these as human rights across the lifespan would have the effect of specifying fundamental custodial duties with respect to foundational aspects of children’s present well-being, as well as their future well- being. One of those duties, undoubtedly beneficial to students’ well-being, would be to provide them with opportunities to use their imagination in “experiencing and producing works and events of [their] own choice” (Nussbaum 2011: 33).
A third approach would identify rights pertaining to the satisfaction of basic needs related to the fulfillment of human potentials important to living well. Variations on such a view might be little different from Nussbaum’s version of the CA, but (in Curren 2022) I have identified starting points for one that is distinctive in focusing on needs that play a central role in the psychological research that is arguably most helpful to addressing the relationships between children’s well-being and their academic progress. These psychological needs can arguably function as a comprehensive set of basic needs, much as physical health and autonomy are intended to do in the influential needs-based
approach of Len Doyal and Ian Gough (Doyal & Gough 1991). As in their approach and the one developed by Gillian Brock (Brock 2009), the needs in question are foundational to human agency, and thereby success in participating in society and pursuing goals. Addressing students’ needs has been a significant aspect of educators’ understanding of their responsibilities (as noted above), but the language of needs has played a remarkably small role in theories of justice (Brock & Miller 2019) and work in the ethics of education. We can begin to rectify this by recognizing that creating conditions in schools that are need-supportive or favorable to the satisfaction of the psychological needs in question might be conducive to students’ present well-being, conducive to students’ academic success, and ethically compulsory on a needs-focused theory of educational justice.
Well-Being, Needs, and Learning
Turning to the relationships between children’s well-being and their academic progress, there is a robust body of evidence establishing the causal significance of positive emotions for physical health and longevity (Conway et al. 2013; Fredrickson 2013). Institutional arrangements that induce a preponderance of negative emotions in students are likely to result in additional harm to their health and life outcomes. Furthermore, we have decades of widely replicated research: (1) indicating that student learning and conduct are strongly influenced by satisfactions and frustrations of basic psy- chological needs that are predictive of happiness and unhappiness: and (2) identifying specific ways in which learning environments and teacher behaviors can be more or less need-supportive or fa- vorable to the satisfaction of these needs (Ryan & Deci 2017: 351–381). This shows that student well-being and academic success are interrelated in ways that make a focus on what students need doubly important. It also identifies specific forms of need-support that make a difference to both well-being and learning.
To be specific, Basic Psychological Needs Theory (BPNT) posits the existence of three universal psychological needs defined as nutrients that are essential for growth, integrity, and well-being (Ryan &
Deci 2017: 10–12, 80–101). Frustration of these needs leads to observable and serious psychological and somatic harms related to impairment of growth, integrity, thriving, and fulfillment of potential.
From a philosophical perspective, these needs constitute “Aristotelian necessities” (Foot 2001: 15) for living well or flourishing, while felt aspects of need frustration and satisfaction constitute natural signs of things good and bad for human beings (Curren 2013a, 2019).8 The needs are for autonomy (self-directedness congruent with personal values and sense of self), relatedness (a supportive social climate and affirming relationships), and competence (experiencing oneself as capable); and the related potentialities can be broadly categorized as intellectual or agentive (the potential for rational self- determination), social, and productive (the potential to create and do things) (Ryan et al. 2013; Curren 2013a, 2022). A central, cross-culturally replicated finding is that the satisfaction of all three of these basic psychological needs through fulfillment of related potentials is essential to and predictive of well-being, measured in a variety of ways (Chirkov et al. 2011; Ryan et al. 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2001, 2017). Related research on the relationships between Nussbaum’s central capabilities and well-being, and between perceived access to Rawls’s primary goods and well-being, have shown that these relationships are mediated by satisfaction of the three basic psychological needs (DeHaan et al. 2016; Bradshaw et al. forthcoming).9
BPNT is a key explanatory component of Self-Determination Theory (SDT), which has grown from an influential series of studies on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation five decades ago to a systematic theory of motivation, development, and well-being, built on decades of widely replicated research (Ryan & Deci 2017). Important to understanding the relationships between student well- being and learning is the fact that basic psychological needs play key roles not only in well-being but in learning, through the regulation of motivation and uptake and integration of values and goals.
Satisfaction of children’s relational, competence, and autonomy needs grounds their acceptance of