20. David A. Wolfe and Meric S. Gertler, ‘Clusters from the Inside and Out: Local Dynamics and Global Linkages,’ Urban Studies, Vol. 41. Nos. 5–6. May 2004, pp. 1071–93.
21. James Simmie, ‘Innovation and Clustering in the Globalised International Economy,’ Urban Studies, Vol. 41, Nos. 5–6, May 2004, pp. 1105–107.
22. See, for example, Börje Johansson and John M. Quigley, ‘Agglomeration and Networks in Spatial Economies,’ Papers in Regional Science, Vol. 83, 2004, p. 166.
23. Johansson and Quigley, p. 166.
24. Leon A.G. Oerlemans, Marius T.H. Meeus and Frans W. M. Boekema, ‘Firm Clustering and Innovation: Determinants and Effects,’ Papers in Regional Science, Vol. 80, 2001, p. 353.
25. Richard G. Smith, ‘World City Topologies,’ Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2003, pp. 561–82.
26. http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/index_en.htm
27. Angel de la Fuente, ‘On the Sources of Convergence: A Close Look at the Spanish Regions,’
European Economic Review, Vol. 46, 2002, pp. 569–99.
28. Mariassunta Giannetti, ‘The Effects of Integration on Regional Disparities: Convergence, Divergence or Both?,’ European Economic Review, Vol. 46, 2002, p. 560.
29. Fuente, p. 577.
30. Fuente, p. 595.
31. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, ‘Is R&D Investment in Lagging Areas of Europe Worthwhile:
Theory and Empirical Evidence,’ Papers in Regional Science, Vol. 80, 2001, p. 292.
32. Aadne Cappelen, Fulvio Castellacci, Jan Fagerberg and Bart Verspagen, ‘The Impact of EU Regional Support on Growth and Convergence in the European Union,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2003, pp. 621–44; Michele Boldrin and Favio Canova,
‘Inequality and Convergence in Europe’s Regions: Reconsidering European regional Policies,’ Economic Policy, Vol. 32, April, 2001, pp. 207–53.
33. Boldrin and Canova, p. 244.
34. Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg and Verspagen, p. 640.
35. R.W. Vickerman, ‘High Speed Rail in Europe – Experience and Issues for Future Development,’ Annals of Regional Science, Vol. 31, 1997, pp. 21–38.
36. Peter Karl Kresl and Balwant Singh, ‘The Competitiveness of Cities: the United States,’
Cities and the New Global Economy, Melbourne: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and The Australian Government, 1995; and Kresl and Singh,
‘Competitiveness and the Urban Economy: 24 Large U.S. Metropolitan Areas,’ Urban Studies, Vol. 36, Nos. 5–6, May 1999, pp. 1017–27.
37. Graeme Evans, ‘Measure for Measure: Evaluating the Evidence of Culture’s Contribution to Regeneration,’ Urban Studies, Vol. 42, Nos. 5–6, May 2005, pp. 959–83.
38. Hans Mommaas, ‘Cultural Clusters and the Post-industrial City: Towards the Remapping of Urban Cultural Policy,’ Urban Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, March, 2004, pp. 507–32.
39. Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, New York: Basic Books, 2002.
40. P.W Daniels and J.R. Bryson, ‘Manufacturing Services and Servicing Manufacturing:
Knowledge-based Cities and Changing Forms of Production,’ Urban Studies, Vol. 39, Nos.
5–6, 2002, pp. 977–91.
41. Jan G. Lambooy, ‘Knowledge and Urban Economic Development: An Evolutionary Perspective,’ Urban Studies, Vol. 39, Nos. 5–6, 2002, pp. 1019–35.
42. For a more extensive treatment of the impact of technological change on urban economies, see Peter Karl Kresl and Earl Fry, The Urban Response to Internationalization, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2005, Ch. 4.
43. Stephen Graham, ‘Information Technologies and Reconfigurations of Urban Space,’
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2001. pp. 405–26.
at the outset of the 1990s
In 1987, the context in which the ten European cities included in this study were situated was significantly restructured with the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA), also referred to as the process of ‘completion of the internal market.’ The popular conceptualization of this was that the member countries of the European Community (EC) would establish a set of markets for goods, services and factors that was as seamless and as tightly integrated as were those of the United States. Specifically, this entailed adoption of almost 300 individual measures that would lead to the realization of the ‘four freedoms’ – the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labor. So much has been written about the SEA and its consequences that it is not neces- sary to reiterate the details of this dramatic initiative, save to note that the expectation was that per capita incomes in the member countries would increase, over a period of five or six years, by between 4.5 and 6.0 per cent over what they would otherwise have been.1
Given the focus of this book, our interest in the SEA is the impact its imple- mentation had on the economic situation of cities in the member countries.
Realization of the four freedoms meant that what was being given up was the deep and pervasive structure of intervention in economic transactions on the part of national governments. While market economists would all argue that these interventions were inefficient and that they lowered incomes and increased unemployment for residents of member countries, their supporters would counter that the interventions provided stability, equity and shelter in a world of increasingly impersonal and uncontrollable shocks and economic restructuring. Critics of what was seen as the Anglo-Saxon model of le capi- talisme sauvage stated with passion that Europeans had different arguments and weights in their collective welfare functions than did Americans and Britons. These arguments may be considered to be accurately descriptive or just hyperbole, but they were offered often and loudly, by journalists, politi- cians and academics, all of whom could speak with some conviction and knowledge of the European situation.
What is important in this is that the process which was being undertaken removed to some degree the national government from the structure of support
54
that had been given to economic activities that had formed the basis of economic activity that sustained urban economies throughout the member countries of the EC. To a considerable degree the locus of decision-making about the economic and social matters that concern city dwellers had shifted upwards in the hierarchy to Brussels and the institutions of the EC.
Henceforth, the policies with regard to regional development, transportation infrastructure, city-center redevelopment, financial and other market regula- tion, social policy, education, culture, and so forth would be increasingly determined and funded by the European Commission and its Directorates General. Concomitantly, the responsibility for the strategy of development for an urban economy and the initiative for designing projects and formulation of proposals for funding, have shifted downward to the governments of the cities.
Therefore, the SEA opened a new avenue of communication between the indi- vidual cities and Brussels. Henceforth, cities would have to be more proactive in competing against each other for the attention of funding agencies in the EC.
Nonetheless two other features of the new situation of EC cities have devel- oped. One is the increased value in cities finding areas in which they can coop- erate, such as making joint proposals for, among other things, high-speed rail lines that would serve several of them, or general appeals for increased fund- ing of renovation of decaying central districts of cities in economic difficulty.2 The second is the fact that the national governments still have a powerful role to play, either through their unique role in the European Council or their role as an entity that can facilitate or hinder approval of any specific city initiative.
There is evidence that city initiatives that involve their national government as participants, or at least as co-proponents, are more successful than are those in which the city circumvents the national level and appeals directly to Brussels.
The ten cities that are included in this study differ in many ways. With the exception of Copenhagen, which was included because of its very interesting Oresund project with southern Sweden, none of the cities is a national capital.
Capitals have economies that are often artificially supported or at least directed because of their status; this status also limited the degrees of freedom they have to reconstitute themselves in response to new opportunities. Some of the cities, but not all, are important transportation centers, or facing the loss of major industries, or important service centers. Some are important cultural and recreational sites, while others can fulfill a point-of-access or a bridge city function.3Since much of the discussion in this book includes considerations of economic space and gives priority to concepts such as clustering and networking perhaps differentiating the cities by geography is the most appro- priate.
There is more than one way to conceptualize the geographic structure of the cities of the EU. One could imagine a vertical structure according to economic
weight or role in the global hierarchy or size, and so forth. Or one could consider a structure of differentiated specialization among many cities of roughly the same stature, however defined. Cities could be clustered or ranked according to some geophysical characteristic, such as northern or coastal cities, or some economic characteristic, such as industrial production or high technol- ogy importance. The possibilities are, while certainly not endless, at least numerous. Each is suited to the specific question(s) being asked. Given the issues that are expected to arise in this study the ten cities will be classified as either core or periphery, more or less along the lines of the well-known DATAR analysis which produced what became known as the ‘blue banana.’4Core cities have a dense structure of economic activities of a wide variety and they are generally in close proximity to other such cities so that networks are easily formed and significant interaction is a strong potential, albeit one that is not always realized. Peripheral cities are distant from the band of dense economic activity that runs from south-east England, down the Rhine River valley to Piedmont and Lombardy in northern Italy. They may be important regional centers of activity but they lack the easy contact with other similar cities.
Hence, the response of these two types of cities will, or should be expected to be, rather different. The veracity of this assertion will be tested as a conse- quence of the work that will be done on each of the cities. There is, it must be noted, no expectation that cities in the core will inevitably have a more positive and prosperous economic experience than will any individual city in the periph- ery. This is where the astuteness and willingness and ability to act on the part of local leaders comes in and is one of the primary foci of this entire study.
The core cities we will examine are: Amsterdam, Lyon, Milan and Turin;
those on the periphery are: Barcelona, Copenhagen, Dresden, Hamburg, Munich, and Seville. In this section we will detail the strategic plans that each of these cities adopted, or at least the dominant thinking in each city around 1990–1992. In the chapter which follows we will examine the extent to which these plans were actually realized.