Yet if Freud's account of the individual and society IS, III

its basic terms, merely an item in an old tradition, his ac�ual inquiries led to a highly significant emphasis on rclatiOn­

ships. Indeed he introduced, in a wholly new way, a new mediating term, the family, and thus remarkably exten�ed the study ofaetual social growth. It was not that the f�mlly, as a first form of association, had not always been aVall,,:ble as a concept, but that Frcud's emphasis on the radIcal importance, in all human behaviour, of the p�tte�ns. of relationship established in infancy, transformed .IlS slgm�­

cance. Freud's dcscriptions are contained and limited by Ius theoretical separation of' the individual' and ' society', yet in diffcrent hands they have been diffcrently developed. In dogmatic Freudianism very linle .of interest

to

�he st�dy of social relationships has emerged, SiOce such reiallonshlps are always construed as of secondary importance. In othe: han?s, the possibility of linking our deeply personal relauonsilips witb the whole network of social relationships has been interestin gly cxplored. The work of Fromm seems particu·

lady IJseful, since he has developed one new mediating d.cs­

criplion, that of the ' social character'. This offers to descl"lbe the process by which social behaviour becomes part of an

Individuals a1ld SOOeHes ₉₇

individual personality: not by regular processes of restraint and .diversion, as in.Freud , but by a shaping process which can melude many km d s of relationship. The 'social charac­

ter'. is a selective response to experience, a learned system of feehn8. all� actil1g� in a maj?ri�yofthecorumunily into which

�hc chll� IS h<;'rn. �he fam�ly

IS

then the community'S agent

III

crcaung ti llS dCSlred sOC1al character in individuals. Ifil is successful, the individual's social activity will be at one with his personal desires, for the social character ' internalizes extcmal n�cessitil..'S an� thus harnesses human energy for the

�ask of a gl\'en economIC and social system'. The individual, m such a c.lse, comes to ' act according to what is necessary for. him .from a practical standpoint, and also to give him satisfaction for his activity psychologically'. Instead of a pcr�an��t human nature, which society rcstrains or modi­

fi�s, mdlvldual psychology is then a matter of' the particular klll� of relatedness of the individual towards the world'.

ThiS relatedness can correspond with the current social character,

01"

can diverge from it.

•

In this we can sec Freud playing the role of Hobbes, and I'rom.m .that of Locke: in both cases with a greatly refined

�es�r�ptlon of the .actual process of relationship between an IJldlv.ldual an � soc�ety. Fromm has advanced considerably in s�owlllg how society' can become truly embodied in indi­

Viduals, so that we need not think of them as separate and absolu�e but always in terms of relationships. The real prob­

lem aflses, however, when we ask what is the source of the individual character Ilmt can divergc from the social charac­

�er,.o�, more accurately, what kinds of rei at ions hip affect the 1Jl � lvI�ual charactc� �halarenot formsof�ocial l'c1alionship?

If . soc iUl character IS reserved to a particular construction w�lch mayor may not adequately interpret the real relation_

ships which the individual forms, then its function is dearer and. the possib�lity of variant individual response has a � obvl.ous lhcorellcal basis. Yet it is thcll a question whether 'socI.al character: is a finally useful term, sincc it seems only a parllal explanation of how relationships (society) create psychology (the individual).

T - o

I

98 TIle Long Revolution

The concept of' social character' is similar to the�nthrop'o­

logical concept ofa ' pattern of culture',

<?

om�arau�e studlcs of different societies have added to our hlstoneal eV',dencc to show how vadous arc the learned systems of behaviOur and attitudes which groups of human beings adopt, Each of these systcms, while it lasts, is the form of a society, a pattern of culture to which most of its individual members are success­

fully trained, Comparison of the systems has, dO.n: much to tral15form traditional arguments about the mdlVl�ual and society, for it has shown how variolls are the fecllngs aJ�d forms ofbehaviOul" that bring individual and commOl.l satis­

faction. Instead of asking the l"e1ationship betwecn an Idc�lly idcntified individual, with a standard cquipmcl

lt . of deslrcs and attitudes, and an ideally identified society, With stand�rd purposes, it has becn possible to look .at rcal and changmg relationships, with an amount of detatl that has bro

�

^{cn up}

the standard prescriptions. Yet, in extending the eVidence, it has made theorctical inquiry more difficult. P�rhaps the main result has been an enormous strengthclll.ng .o

�

^the

tradition which emphasizcd the extent to which mdlvldual personality is formed by social processes, even at ve�: d,;ep levels. This has becn wholly valuable, as a way of:ollectlOg the false emphasis on the abstract ' individual ', willcl� we �an now see to be a product of a particular social and historical situation ralher than a correct reading of the genera.i human condition. Yet this is not, rightly interpreted, a demai of the importance or individuals. As Benedict argues:

No cuI lure yet obsel"\'cd has been able 10 eradicate the di.Fft:renecs in the temperaments of the pcrson� who compose it. It IS a

�

^{",ays a}

give.and.take. The problem of the individual is �O{ :'?nfi ^{... -d by}

stressing the anlagonism between eul{U�^{e, a.n}d the lI�dl\"ldual, but by stressing (heir mutual ,·einforeemcnt. I Ins rapport ^IS so d�sc t1

1at . it is not possible to discuss patterns of culture without cOIl"dcnng specifically their n·lation to individual psychology.

A ' pattern of culture', like a ' social characle�', is a selec.tive response to experience, a learned system offccll�g and actin?, in a particular s()cicIY. Iknedict argues that tillS pattern Will

Illdividuals alld Societits

be 'congenial' to a m-uority of the members of the society, 99 and that thert;fore they can be trained to it, in such a way that by bec?�!Il� ,?embers of the society they will adequately express their mdlVlduality. But to others, the pattern will not be 'congenial ', and these will either not conform, or conform at a possibly heavy price to their individual desires. It is difficult to know what weight to PUt on 'congenial ' : the vari.

ations Benedict actually describes - different reaetiol15 to frustration and gl'ief -look vcry like what others would call 'learned responses', although the problem then arises that thesc are ' learned' and yet arc different from those the paniculUl' society teaches and approves. If they arc lIot learncd but innate, we arc back to 'human nature', to be

�Ilden;tood now not as a single thing, but as comprising all IIInate range of temperaments: the relation between the individua.l and society thus becomes a kind of loltery in which an individual of particular temperament dr�l\

:

^{s a}

winning or losing card ill the society in which he happens 10 be born . . V\Ic do not yet kno\',;neariy enough to prove or dis­

�rov? tillS .hyp�(hcsis, but it represents one attempted solu­

tlO� III 11 citrectlOll rather different from the genera! trcnd in socl1l1 psychology. Another anthropologist, Linton, finds it safe to conclude that illnatc, biologically determined factors cannot be used to account for personality configurations as wholes or for the various l·cs!.lOnsc paltcl"Os ineluded wilhin such configurations.

They 0pcl'ate sunpl)· as one among sc\"cl"ill sets ofr.'etol"ll responsible for the formation Oflhcsc.

Lint�n goes on to dcseribe, in the now familiar way, the creallon of mature individuals by learned culture patterns

and emphasizes '

thc fact that mOOt human b^chad^our ^si taught in thc form of

?1"8?1�i7.cd configura.lions I'athcr than simply developed bf the lndll'lciuai on the baSlsor expcri(."llcc.

Included in this tcaching, as parts of a whole pattern, arc some elements serving ' to meet individual needs' and others 'to satisfy social necessities'. Bul the carrier of these patterns

100 The Long Revolution

is simply acting as a ^• unit in the social organism', and he h.as other resources which constitute his individuality. The socml function of this individuality is that, in the changing world in which the society lives, the individual, by using his own resources, can help to change the pattern, in order to meet

new problems. . ^{. . .} . ;>

Yet what, precisely, is the proc(.oss of thIS mdlvlduatiOn . The ordinary emphases of social psychology show how far we have moved, at one level of our thinking, from the idea that the individual in some way Imudes his society - the

I

society being a secondary creation through restraint �r contract. Most social psychologists now stress the way ^III which awareness of oneself as ¹¹ separate individual has to be learned by the infant : ' the infant has no idea ofhimsclfas a separate individual'. As G. H. Mead has put it:

The self, ^{as t}hat whkh can be object to ^itself, is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social cxperience.

This definition implies differcnt levels of individuality. We can distinguish between the primary indi.vi

�

ual organis�

and the ' self' which is socially created. This IS useful, but It is only by using very difficult terms that \:e c

�

n clarify the distinction, since the word ' individual' ordmanly and natur·

ally includes these theoretically separable elements. Perhaps the most useful stress is that which describes the social process of making ' selves' in terms of indi\'id�at.ion: th; conscious differences between individuals arise ^In the sociUl process.

To begin with, individuals have "al)'ing innate potentialities, and thus receive social influence in varying ways. Further, even if there is a common 'social character' or ' culture pallern', each individual's so.cial history, his actual n.et,:",or�

of relationships, is in fact ullique. These are the basl�

I?�I.

vidualizing factors, but again, as the unique potentJahues and the unique history interact, the very fact of the growth of self_consciousness produces a dislinet organization, capable both ofse1f-scrutiny and self-direction. '

�

his 'au�ono.

mOlls' self grows within a social process which radically influences it, but the degree of gained autonomy makes

Individuals and Soeieties 101 possible the observed next stage, in which the individual can help. t� change

.01'

modify the social process that has influenced and IS tnfluencmg him.

To this vital description must be added another distinction greatly stressed in recent sociology. The abstraction impli ^... ·"

• • . , ^• . ^{... 1}

Ill. society c�n mak: It dIfficult for us to recognize theor­

eucall.y what In pl·actlce we see quite clearly: that even in a very SImple society it is hardly ever one single 'social char­

acter' or 'eult�r: p�uern ' that the individual encounters.

In complex sOCJetles hkeour own, the variations encountered arc so marked that we can speak of them as alternative systems will�in ^• a society'. This ^si obviously very important.

Ift.he analYSIS of' the individual' has rClurned an abstraction to Its actual processes ?f growth, so analysis of ' society' has rCIlII:ned .an abstraeuon to the actual complex of real rel�tlOnshlp.s. Instead of thinking of' socicty' as a single and lII�lform obJect', we look at actual groups and the relation.

shIps between the�. Since these relationships can be not only

�ho�e. of co.o�eratl?n but also of tension and conflict, the mdlvldual With Ius sense of particular directions find mat�l'jal in t1�e alternative directions of his society making

i!

pOSSible for hl� to express variant growth in social terms.

. The recogllllion of'groups' within a society is thus a con.

s,

�

erable step forward. But of course it is possible merely to shift the �round of the abstraction, making the group in its turn a

�1\Ir0rrr:'

^a

^�

olutc .. Even in tl�e simplest group, there arc, as ^III society , relattons of tensIOn and conflict as well as of e��pel·ati�n. This is as true of a face-Io-face group like a famlly.or a villag: as of a common-interest group like a t�ade, ull1�n or a SOCial class. Each of these will have its dis.

tinct socla

�

eh.aracter' or ' culture pattern', to which it will seek 10 _t�aUl Its .members. Yet enclosing this will be the constant lll.tcr�ctl�)Jl

�f

pal·tic�lar

!

ndividuals, and in such

�roups, as ^III socl.ety , new dlrectlOns will emerge. Again slllce

�

he group WlI.1

?

e in real .relations with other groups

:

th.e Pl0Cesses of tra11llllg and amendment within the group Will be 'par� oft

!l

e processes of training and amendment of the larger society . A group may be a convenient mark on the

102 The LOllg Revollltioll

scale, but it is only a mark, and the fact of cOlllinuilY, over the whole scale, is fundamental.

, n

We b<wt briefly traced. first the traditio�al d.iscll�sion of' the individual and society', second the mam dlrecllons o

�

^cer­

tain contemporary disciplines. \-Ve must now turn agam to experience, and to the f�ct �h�t we normally

fil!

^d _';)lll:sd^v_�,

in thinking aoout 'the mdlvlclual and soclcty ! h��ted ^1:1 practice to ^a vcry simple modd: that of Ih� m,dlvl

�

^{ual s}

conformity or noncouformity, and of the society s attitude to either of these courses. \-Ve havc a number of names for conformity which enable us to approve it as 'responsible' and 'Iaw-

�

biding', or to condemn it as ' timidly conven­

tional' or 'servile'. We have also a number of names for non­

conformity and some of thcse, such as 'independence' and 'the free spirit' arc approving, while othcrs, s�leh as 'lawless­

ness' and ' eccentricity' are damning. Some of us move to one side or other of these lines, and try to make a consistcnt posi­

tion. l'vlore commonly we make a virtue out of cither, as it secms to us at the moment. Such valuations may be rcal, but while they depend, ultimnleJy, on the s

�

mple model - conformity 01· nOllconformity -they are relatIvely .\'�ry weak.

I want to try to gct past this model, and by examl.llIng �o�e actual relationships bctween individuals and theIr societies extend our practical \'ocabulal·y for discussing this.issue.

\Ve can take first the description 1//tmbtr. In Its modern sense this is a useful way of describing an individual's positive identification with the society in which he lives. 'I'hc member ofa society feels himself to belong to it, in an essential way: its values arc his valllcs, its purposes his purposes, to slich a�

extent that he is proud to describe himsclfin its terms. He ^IS of course conscious of himself as a member - an individual within the society to which he belongs -but it is of the essence of membership that the individual, so fal· from feeling that thc society i� opposed to him, looks upon it as the natural means by which his own purposes will be forwarded. If change is necessary, he will contribute to its discussion and

1l/diuidua{s alld Societies 103 coming into effect, for he is confident of the values, attitudes and institutions of the society, accepts the ways in which its life is conducted, and sees even conflicts and tensions within the socicty as soluble by reference to thesc fundamental ways and values, in such a manner that the essential lInity of the society will be preserved.

This experience of membership is probably much more common than is nonoally allowed t1ll"oretically. I t is true that in mallY modern societies it has become mueh more difficult, and indeed it is when it significantly breaks down that the /Jroh/tm of ' the individual and society' is most apparent. Yet that membership can be real seems ccnain, and to omit its significance is to fahify tbe whole subsequent argumcnt.

But if we have identified the member, we must go on to identify other relationships which apparently resemble it and wllie-h Ilave, by displaccment, led to criticism of it

:

Existentialist thinkers h:tve made an important distinction between the 'autllcntic self' and the 'unautllelltic self', and their ordi ltary description of t he ' unauthentic self' has been of a mall wllo is 'the creature' of his heredity, II is envirOll_

ment and his society. Thus Kicrkegaard argues that society presses us to be 'objective' and ' typical', and that we must oreak through this to OUI" own existence. Jaspers sees modern society as offering the ' unauthentic self' as a whole version of man; we arc the crealllres of hercdity, environment and socielY until some basic expel-icnce (su/Tering, guilt, death) enables us to break through these offered versions to an authelltic realization of our true existence. Nietzsche, simi_

larly, sees the acceptance of social typification as Philistine and S,lI tre empha5izes the danger of such social concepts

�

'fullction' or 'dUly', which ("an only be valid to the 'un­

authentic' man. The central obsen·ation, in this whole tradition, is of great value, but tllC tendency to equate ' social man' wilh ' unauthentic man ' is highly mislc<lding. For what is being described as a social process is llOt the cxperience of the II/tmbtr, but of the slIbjut 01" the Sl'/"VOllf. Any socicty will pm pressure Oil the individuals who arc born into it to think

104 The Long Revolution

and behave in certain ways, but this need not be only the conversion of individuals to social purposes; it is also, in very many cases, an expression of the society's desire to sec thos.e individuals survive and grow, according to the best experI­

ence the society has.

\Ve must start by recognizing that individuals could not survive and grow except within a social process of some kind.

Given this, the real crisis of thc ' authentic' and thc 'un­

authentic ' is both an individual and a social process. The valuable element in the existentialist emphasis is the insist­

ence on choice and commitment. It is true that unless all individual, in the process of his growth, achieves a re.1l per­

sonal identity, he is incomplete and can be dismissed as

'unauthentic'. He must become deeply conscious of the

validity of his ways of thinking and acting, so that he is not merely ' a creature' of the society, but also an individual, a man in his own right. Yct this process, in actual individuals and in different societies, will bc exceptionally varied. It is only vcry rarely limited to conscious appraisal; its ordinary process, while including conscious appraisal in some cases, is a matter of the individual's whole organization: his ner�

vous system, his ^body, as well as the conscious activities ofhis brain. In actual growth, the whole complex of feeling and behaviour that constitutes his individuality will stand in a cer­

tain relation to the complex of feeling and behaviour that is his society. The stages in his growth which constitute his integration as a particular individual will inevitably be forms of relationship with the whole organization of his society.

But thcse forms of relationship can include what I have called the experience of membership. Particular individuals, in particular societics, can become ' authentic', can deeply commit themselves, in terms of their whole organization, to the living organization of the society to which they belong.

The 'social' is not necessarily the 'unauthentic'; it is capable of being the ' authentic' and the ' individual '. But it is then necessary to distinguish the kinds of relationship which give existcntialist arguments their substance. It is clearly possible lor an individual to acquiesce in a way of

IndiDiduals and S(1(;ietiu ¹⁰⁵

living which in fact fails to cOl'respond with or satisfy his own personal organization. He will obey authorities he docs not personally accept, carry out social functions that have no personal meaning to him, even feel and think in ways so foreign to his actual dcsires that damage will be done to his own bcing -often deep emotional disorders, oftcn physical damage to his own organic processes. The marks of this false conformity have been very evidcnt in our social experi�

ence, but il is wrong to interpret them in terms of the old ' individual ' and 'society' dichotomy. \oVe can best describe them as the roles of subject and servant, in contrast with member.

111e subject, at whatever violence to himself, has to accept the way of lire of his society, ancl his own indicated place in it, because there is no other way in which he can maintain himsclfat all; only by this kind of obedience can he eat, sleep, shelter, or escape being destroyed by others. It is not his way of life, in any sense that mailers, but he must conform to it to survive. In the case of the servant, the pressure is less severe, though still, to him, irresistible. The subject has no choice;

the servant is given the illusion of choice, and is invited to identify himself with the way of life in which his place is defined. It is an illusion of choice, because again, like the subject, he has no obvious way of maintaining his life if he refuses. Yet the illusion is important, for it allows him to pretend to an identification with the socidy, as if the choice had been real. The subject will have few illusions about the relationship which is determining him; he will know that the way of life is not his but must be obeyed. The servant, on the other hand, may come to identify himself with the way of life that is determining him; he may even, consciously, think of himself as a membcr (indeed the old sense of ' member' allows this, for if the individual is an organ of the organism that is society, particular individuals will be higher or lower organs yet still feci themselves as tnle parts). Yet at many levels of his life, and parlicularly in certain situations such as solitude and age, the discl'epancy betwecn the role the indi­

vidual is playing and his actual sense ofhimscJfwill become