Whitehead by John B. Cobb, Jr
Chapter 3: Man as Responsible Being
3. Goodness as Moral Value
understood to mean that there is a certain element of harmony inherent in truth itself such that to some degree any experience has beauty when it has truth. Far more important, however, is the indirect contribution of truth to the attainment of all strength of beauty.
interest is metaphysically excluded! Every occasion’s self-actualization has a view to its impact upon future occasions and this sense of
relevance for the future is essential to its satisfaction.
The ethical importance of this metaphysical analysis is well worth elaboration. Many thinkers have held that all our decisions are made in terms of what will satisfy our own desires or what we believe to be in our own interest. If we make a decision that seems to be beneficial to others and to entail some sacrifice of ourselves, we are told that this is because of our desire to enjoy the admiration of others or to enhance our own self-approval. According to this view, our subjective aim is always at our own beauty.
Proponents of this position, however, generally fail to consider the question of the relation of the present self to the future self. Is this absolutely and self-identically the same self? Then do we always give equal weight to our distant future experiences and to our present ones in terms of this calculus of self-interest? It is fairly clear that we do not, since we seem, at times, to grasp an immediate opportunity for pleasure at the expense of recognized future disadvantages of considerable
seriousness. Is it, then, the momentary self that seeks its own
satisfaction without regard to consequences? But clearly, that is also false, since we frequently work for future gratification. The fact is that we sometimes seize opportunities for present gratification without counting the cost, and sometimes make great sacrifices for the future.
The self-interest theorist may agree that in fact we are not wholly consistent as to the degree to which we take our own future into account, but he will insist that we take no other future into account except as it may be instrumental to our own. My point here is that
although it may be impossible strictly to disprove this doctrine, it can be stripped of all its apparent plausibility. Is it in fact the case that I may sacrifice my present interest, genuinely sacrifice it, for the sake of a future ten or twenty years from now, and that it is impossible that I sacrifice my interest, just as genuinely, for the sake of my child’s
happiness a moment hence? This would be understandable if I had total imaginative identification with that future self and none at all with my child, but this is not my experience. And Whitehead shows that, despite the importance of personal identity through long spans of time, the relationship of my present occasion of experience to future occasions of my experience is not entirely unlike its relation to future occasions of other persons such as my child. The self-interest theory of ethics fits
neither the facts of experience nor the metaphysical view of Whitehead.
Whitehead stresses that every occasion aims at intensity of feeling not only for itself but for the relevant future. The whole question hinges on what is relevant. I have argued that to suppose all my own future
experiences relevant and no other future experiences relevant is to be guilty of a highly nonempirical dogmatism. The factual situation seems to be that we differ widely as to what future appears relevant to us. In some moments we may actualize ourselves with reference only to a very limited future, quite possibly limited to future occasions of our own experience. At other times, we may reckon with a very extensive future involving many persons besides ourselves.
Whitehead suggests that morality always has to do with taking into account the larger rather than the more limited future.(AI 346, 371, 375- 376.)The tendency of the moralist is always to insist upon the wider horizons where individuals tend to relapse into narrower ones. There is a real tension here, comparable in some respects to the tension between the achievement of a simple harmony immediately and the adventurous acceptance of disharmony now for stronger beauty later. However, we are now focusing attention upon the question of who shall enjoy the stronger beauty. Do we adventure only for our own sakes, for the sake of those closest to us, or can humanity as a whole enter into our vision?
A typical passage from Whitehead will show how he deals with these questions.
"Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook. The antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can be abolished only when the individual is such that its interest is the general good, thus exemplifying the loss of the minor intensities in order to find them again with finer composition in a wider sweep of interest." (PR 23.)
This quotation is typical because it shows us Whitehead pointing to that ideal which transcends tensions otherwise irresolvable. Just as in the discussion of beauty we say that the tension between the ideals of
perfect harmony and strength might war with one another except as they attain synthesis in the ideal, so here the aim at immediate intensity of feeling and the aim at intensity limitlessly beyond itself can attain synthesis only in an occasion with such concern for the general good that it finds its greatest beauty in its enjoyment of its contribution to that good. At every point short of this ideal, there will be some inevitable
tension between immediate enjoyment, a proximate future, and the vaster reaches of the future beyond our vivid imagination.
This tension, however, does not amount to a simple opposition. Only an occasion that enjoys considerable strength can make a valuable
contribution to the future. (AI 377.) Further, the sense of making a
contribution beyond itself belongs to the satisfaction of the occasion and adds to its strength of beauty.(AI 346.)The attempt to serve the future by negating the present is self-defeating, just as is the effort to ignore the future in order to achieve fuller beauty in the present.
The proper and necessary concern to encourage behavior in terms of the wider generality of outlook leads to the formulation of concrete
principles of behavior in codes. These codes have great social importance, but unfortunately they are typically treated as if they possess authority beyond that of their utility.(AI 374.)They are presented as if in their detailed formulations they place an ethical demand upon all persons in all situations. For this reason, progress and enlightenment inevitably discredit them.
There are many appropriate ideals of beauty at which cultures may strive; hence, concrete codes of behavior designed to facilitate the attainment of such beauty vary widely.(AI 374-377.) Each has its value in its season, but no particular moral principles at this level of
specificity can transcend the relativity of historical circumstance.
Hence, morals as generally conceived are irremediably relative.(MT 20.)
At a much more abstract level, it is possible to formulate universal principles. Whitehead proposes two. "These are the principles of the generality of harmony, and of the importance of the individual." (AI 376.) Once again, even here, we find a tension, for Whitehead sees that the first leads to the impersonal pursuit of order and the second to the love of individual persons. But again he has a solution in the ideal. "The antithesis is solved by rating types of order in relative importance
according to their success in magnifying the individual actualities, that is to say, in promoting strength of experience." (AI 376.)
Here we have Whitehead’s culminating suggestion for the evaluation of moral codes. That code is best which promotes that kind of order which promotes maximum attainment in the strength of beauty enjoyed by individuals. Presumably these individuals include subhuman individuals
as well, but the overwhelmingly important individuals are human persons. Each man finds ideal intensity of experience for himself as he makes his aim the attainment of just such an order. Meanwhile, at the finite and imperfect level at which life is lived, tensions remain.