C. Violence in 2012
4. Government response to the 2012 violence
(a) Curfews and prohibition of meetings of more than five people
680. One of the first responses of the Government to the violence in Maungdaw was the imposition by the Maungdaw Township Administrator on 8 June of a curfew and prohibition of public gatherings of more than five people.1471 Similar 2012 orders were imposed in Buthidaung, Kyaukpyu, Ramree, Sittwe and Thandwe townships.1472 According to the law, such orders should only remain in force for two months, unless the President directs
1461 CI-130, CI-136, DI-037, QI-105, QI-106, QI-108; KI-076.3, KI-076.4, KI-076.5.
1462 KI-076.3, KI-076.4.
1463 DI-037.
1464 CI-136, DI-037, QI-105, QI-106, QI-107, QI-108, RI-011; KI-076.2, KI-076.4, KI-076.5.
1465 QI-106.
1466 CI-136, DI-037, QI-107.
1467 CI-136.
1468 CI-082, CI-175, DI-037, QI-104, QI-107.
1469 CI-082, CI-136, QI-104, QI-107.
1470 DI-010, DI-037; K-076.4.
1471 Township General Administration Department, Curfew Order No. 1/2012 (8 June 2012), available at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf. See page 7. The power to impose such curfew orders appears to have been increasingly used by the General Administration Department, through township
administrators. It is viewed as an indirect way for the Tatmadaw to exercise control. See: M. Crouch,
“The Everyday Emergency: Between the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure”, in Constitutional Change and Legal Reform in Myanmar, A. Harding, Khin Khin Oo, eds. (Hart Publishing/Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 165.
1472 See presentation posted by the Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva on “Preventive measures and actions taken by the Government”, p. 2, available at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf
otherwise in “cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray”.1473
681. By September 2014, all curfew orders in Rakhine State were lifted, except in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships, where they have remained in force continuously since 2012.1474 According to credible reports, the orders are more strictly enforced in Maungdaw and Buthidaung towns than in surrounding rural areas.1475
682. According to the curfew orders, people were not allowed to be outside their homes between 6pm and 6am. These times were later shortened but, on 25 August 2017, the curfew hours in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships were again extended.1476 Although the curfew orders were drafted in general terms, in practice they have been enforced mainly against Muslims generally, and in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships against the Rohingya. Enforcement has been undertaken by village administrators, the NaSaKa, the BGP and the Tatmadaw.1477
683. Many Rohingya interviewees referred to the curfew as one of the serious restrictions they faced after the 2012 violence.1478 Given its prolonged and discriminatory application, it has had severe, adverse effects on the lives of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, including on access to livelihoods.1479 Interviewees also said that they were not allowed to keep lights or candles on during curfew hours.1480 In some isolated cases, security forces were more lenient and made exceptions, allowing Rohingya to be outside during curfew hours.1481 However, in the majority of cases, the curfew was strictly enforced, especially in 2012, and in the periods after the ARSA attacks in 2016 and 2017. In some cases, security forces went as far as killing Rohingya – including elderly people – who were outside during curfew hours.1482
684. The curfew orders also prohibited gatherings of more than five people on “roads, streets, the main road, lanes, garden (or) mosques and public schools”.1483 This has had a far- reaching adverse impact over the subsequent six years. The list of public places where gatherings of more than five people is not allowed reveals discriminatory intent, as it includes mosques but not monasteries or temples. Given the importance to Muslims of congregational prayers in mosques, this prohibition represents a serious obstacle to the right to freedom of religion, including religious worship, protected under international human rights law, including by article 18 of the UDHR and article 14 of the CRC. Credible reports indicate that some Rohingya have gathered secretly to pray in private houses, makeshift mosques or madrasas in remote areas.1484 This long-lasting prohibition of gatherings of more than five people is also a violation of the right to peaceful assembly, protected for example by article 20(1) of the UDHR and article 15 of the CRC.
1473 Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 144(6).
1474 V-047.
1475 V-047.
1476 See also chapter V, section D.3: An enduring catastrophe.
1477 CI-125, DI-073, V-047. See also A/HRC/32/18
1478 CI-062, CI-063, CI-064, CI-076, CI-079, CI-080, CI-082, CI-084, CI-089, CI-092, CI-094, CI-174, CI-175, CI-181, CI-183, CI-184, CI-185, CI-186, CI-187, CI-188, CI-189, CI-192, CI-194, CI-195, CI-196, CI-198, CI-199, DI-003, DI-004, DI-047, DI-050, DI-052, DI-053, DI-054, DI-073, DI-075, DI-076, RI-002, RI-003, RI-009, RI-010, RI-012, RI-015, RI-017.
1479 DI-053.
1480 CI-082, CI-094, DI-053.
1481 DI-075, DI-076.
1482 CI-076, CI-174, DI-050, DI-054, DI-073.
1483 Township General Administration Department, Curfew Order No. 1/2012 (8 June 2012), available at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf. See page 7.
1484 V-047.
(b) State of emergency
685. On 10 June 2012, President Thein Sein reinforced the curfew orders by declaring a state of emergency in Rakhine State under section 412(a) of the Constitution.1485 He stated that this was to “bring about security and peace and stability for the people immediately”. In his declaration, the President invoked section 413(a) of the Constitution, the power to “obtain the assistance of the Defence Services”. According to section 414(b), when declaring a state of emergency, the President may, if necessary, restrict or suspend one or more fundamental rights of the citizens residing in the areas where the state of emergency is in operation.
However, the ordinance adopted by the President did not invoke this power.
686. The state of emergency in Rakhine State remained in force for nearly four years.
According to international human rights law, a state of emergency can only be invoked in the presence of a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” 1486. The Myanmar Government itself did not see the situation in Rakhine State in those terms. On the contrary, in November 2015, at Myanmar’s second Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Permanent Representative of Myanmar stated that there had been no inter-communal violence in Rakhine State since 2012, and that “peace and stability in Rakhine State has been restored”. He highlighted that communities in Buthidaung and Maungdaw were now “engaging in inter-communal trade and business” with their children attending school together.1487
687. The Mission considers that the prevailing situation in Rakhine State was not
“threatening the life of the nation” and that the continuance of the state of emergency and curfew orders was unjustified. Instead, these measures were a means to restrict the lives of the Rohingya and the Kaman through their discriminatory application and to provide more powers to the Tatmadaw. President Thein Sein lifted the state of emergency on 28 March 2016, shortly before handing over power to the newly appointed NLD-led government.1488 (c) Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State
688. On 17 August 2012, the President established the Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State”.1489 While it was a positive step that the President set up the Commission, the composition of the Commission as well as the way it executed its mandate were fundamentally flawed. The Commission was initially composed of 27 members, including six Muslims, but did not include a single Rohingya. Two out of the six Muslim members were expelled from the Commission1490, reportedly because of their overly independent stand on some issues.1491 The Commission also included members who held strong public anti-Rohingya stands, such as Dr. Aye Maung, the Chair of the Rakhine Nationalities Democratic Party (RNDP), and U Ko Ko Gyi, one of the leaders of the 88
1485 Republic of the Union of Myanmar, President Office, Ordinance No. 1/2012 (10 June 2012), available at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf . See page 10
1486 United Nations Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 29: Derogations during a State of Emergency (31 August 2001), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11. The Human Rights Committee specified that, “not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”. The declaration of the state of emergency may also be viewed as unconstitutional since it did not specify its duration, as required by section 414(a) of the Constitution.
1487 Statement by Mr. Maung Wai, Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva, “Situation of Rakhine State and Cooperation with UNSG’s Special Advisor” (6 November 2015), available at:
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/upr/Sessions/23session/Myanmar/Statements/103.1_Closing%20Rema rka%20-%201%20-%20Situation%20of%20Rakhine%20State_UPR_Myanmar.pdf
1488 Announcement on the lifting of the state of emergency available at:
http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/29/03/2016/id-6792
1489 The New Light of Myanmar, “Investigation Commission formed” (18 August 2012).
1490 Haji U Nyunt Maung Shein and U Tin Maung Than.
1491 DI-077; K-240.
Generation Students Group.1492 The Chair of the Commission was Dr. Myo Myint, former Director-General at the Ministry of Religious Affairs; concerns were expressed to the Mission about his lack of independence.1493 The Commission published its report on 8 July 2013.1494 The Mission welcomes the fact that some parts of the report seek to reflect the perspectives of both communities on the violence. However, the report contains fundamental flaws that undermine its credibility.1495
(d) Displacement camps and sites
689. As of July 2013, about 140,000 people (Rohingya, Rakhine, Kaman and Maramagyi) were displaced in Rakhine State as a result of the 2012 violence. They initially lived in 76 displacement camps and sites.1496 Another 36,000 people were considered as “people in humanitarian need” having been adversely affected by the violence but without having been displaced. The displacement camps and sites were located across Rakhine State (see details in the map below).1497 About 95 per cent of those who were displaced in 2012-13 were Muslims, the great majority of them Rohingya, and the remaining five per cent were ethnic Rakhine and Maramagyi.1498