midst of those to whom eating such meat was an abomination. It, therefore, ceased to be binding whenever and wherever the grounds of the prohibition did not exist. It is analogous to Paul’s condemnation of women appearing in church without a veil. The decisions of that council, therefore, were no barrier to Paul’s discussing the question on its merits.
In this chapter the subject is viewed in two aspects; first, considered in itself; and secondly, in its bearing on the weaker or less enlightened class of Christians. Most of the questions which disturbed the early church had their origin in the conflicting prepossessions and prejudices of the Jewish and Gentile converts; or at least, of the more and less enlightened of the Christian converts. For it is probable that many of those who had been educated as heathen belonged to the class of weaker brethren. As a body, however, the Gentiles were disposed to latitudinarianism; and the Jews to superstitious scrupulousness. So far as general principles were concerned, Paul sided with the Gentile party. Their views about meats and drinks, and holy days, and ceremonies were derived from the apostle himself, and were therefore approved by him. But the spirit and practice of this party he severely condemns. Thus, in the present instance, he admits that an idol is nothing; that a sacrifice is nothing; that all enlightened Christians know this; that, consequently, eating of the heathen sacrifices was a matter of indifference, it made a man neither better nor worse; and yet eating of them might be, and in their case it was, sinful; because injurious to their weaker brethren. He begins the chapter with the admission, therefore, that all enlightened Christians have knowledge. He reminds them, however, that there is something higher than knowledge; that knowledge without love is, after all, only another form of ignorance. The main thing to be known is not apprehended, vs. 1-3. He admits, however, that Christians know that the gods of the heathen are vanities and lies, that there is but one only, the living and true God, v. 4. For although the heathen acknowledge a whole hierarchy of deities, celestial and terrestrial, Christians acknowledge but one God and one Mediator, v. 6. All this is admitted. It is, however, nevertheless true that many Christians, though they know that there is but one God, yet are not persuaded that the heathen deities are nothing, and therefore they stand in awe of them, and could not help believing that eating of sacrifices offered to idols was an act of worship, or in some way defiling, v. 7. The apostle also admits the second principle relied upon by the Gentile converts, viz., that meat does not commend us to God, that it can have no influence on our spiritual state, v. 8. It is not enough, however, that an act should be in its own nature indifferent to justify us in
performing it. If our doing what is in itself innocent be the occasion of leading others into sin, it is for that reason sinful for us, v. 9. If, therefore, a weak brother should be led, against the convictions of his own mind, to
join his stronger brethren in eating such sacrifices, he would bring himself into condemnation. It was, therefore, a breach of charity and a sin against Christ, to eat of the heathen sacrifices under circumstances which
emboldened others to sin, vs. 10-12. The apostle avows his own
determination never to eat meat at all, if by so doing he should cause his brethren to sin, v. 13.
1. Now as touching things offered unto idols, we know that we all have knowledge. Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth.
The idolatry of the Greeks and Romans pervaded their whole life. Their social intercourse, their feasts, the administration of justice, the public amusements, the offices and honors of the government, were all more or less connected with religious services. Christians, therefore, were constantly exposed to the danger of being involved in some idolatrous homage without even knowing it. This gave rise to numerous and
perplexing questions of conscience, which were often decided differently by different classes of Christians. One of the most perplexing of these questions related to the use of things offered to idols. Some had no scruples on this point; others thought it sinful to eat of such sacrifices under any circumstances. This was a question which it was necessary to have authoritatively settled, because it came up every day for decision.
The victims offered in sacrifices were usually divided into three parts. One was consumed on the altar, another was given to the priest, and a third was retained by the offerer. The portion given to the priest, if not needed for himself, was sent to the market. The portion retained by the offerer was either eaten at his own table, or within the precincts of the temple. The Christians, therefore, if they bought meat in the market, or if invited to the houses of their heathen friends, or to the festivals in the temples, were liable to have these sacrifices placed before them. The two grounds on which the more liberal of them defended the use of such meat, were, first, that the idols were nothing, they were not really gods; and secondly, that meat cannot commend us to God. Both these principles are true, and therefore the apostle concedes them, but at the same time corrects the practical inferences which the Gentile converts drew from them. There were really two distinct questions relating to this subject. The first was, whether eating such sacrifices was lawful? the other, whether it was lawful to eat them within the precincts of the temple? The apostle does not
distinguish these questions until the tenth chapter. Here he speaks of the subject only in its general aspects.
Now as touching things offered unto idols. Literally, But, concerning idol-sacrifices. The particle (de>,) but, serves to introduce a new topic. As the fourth verse begins, concerning therefore the eating things offered to idols, the intervening words are a logical parenthesis. This parenthesis may begin immediately after the word idols, or after the word knowledge, so that the first two clauses of the verse are connected. “But concerning idol-sacrifices, we know we all have knowledge.” This claim to knowledge, though a claim of the Corinthians, and the ground on which they defended the eating of those sacrifices, is not put forward as a point to be contested.
The apostle adopts it, or makes it his own, and then proceeds to qualify and limit it, precisely as he did with the aphorism, “All things are lawful,”
in <460612>
6:12; see also <461023>
10:23. The subject of the two verbs know and have in this verse are not necessarily the same. The sense may be: ‘I know we all have knowledge.’ The knowledge intended is determined by the context.
It is the knowledge concerning idols. In this verse Paul says, “We all have knowledge;” but in v. 7, he says, “This knowledge is not in all.” This apparent contradiction may be explained by supposing, what is perfectly natural, that the apostle has reference to different classes of persons in the two passages. In v. 1 he may intend himself and his followers. We all, that is, all the stronger or more enlightened class of believers. Whereas, in v. 7, he may refer to Christians generally, including the strong and weak. ‘This knowledge is not in all, for the weak have it not.’ Or the distinction may be between theoretical and practical knowledge. All Christians admit, as a matter of theory, that an idol is nothing, but this knowledge is not in all believers practical and controlling. This also is natural and satisfactory. It is analogous to the statements of this same apostle in reference to the heathen. In <450123>
Romans 1:23, he says, ‘They know God,’ but in <460121>
1 Corinthians 1:21, he says, they ‘know not God.’ These statements are perfectly consistent, because the word know has different senses. There is a sense in which all men know God; they all, from the constitution of their nature, and from the works of God, know that there is a being on whom they are dependent, and to whom they are responsible. But this is not the knowledge of God which is said to be “eternal life.” It is therefore
perfectly consistent to attribute the former knowledge to the heathen,
though he denies to them the latter. So here it is consistent to say that all Christians have a theoretical knowledge of the truth that there is but one God, and that idols are nothing, and yet say that this knowledge is not practical and controlling in all. It is one of the great beauties of the Scriptures, that the sacred writers in the calm consciousness of truth, in the use of popular, as distinguished from philosophical language, affirm and deny the same verbal proposition, assured that the consistency and intent of their statements will make their way to the heart and conscience.
That the apostle is here speaking of theoretical, as distinguished from true, practical knowledge, is plain from what he says of it. It puffeth up. The Greek word here used (fusio>w,) is, in the New Testament, employed in the sense of the word (fusa>w,) which means to blow, to fill with wind, to inflate, and then, to render vain and conceited. Mere theoretical or
speculative knowledge, that is, knowledge divorced from love, tends to inflate the mind, i.e. renders it vain and conceited. It is a great mistake, therefore, to suppose that there knowledge, without religion, elevates and refines men, or can purify society. It is essential, but it is insufficient.
Charity edifieth. Charity is an inadequate and unhappy translation of the Greek word (ajga>ph), because, agreeably to its Latin derivation, it properly means the feeling which arises from the perception of the wants and sufferings of others, and the consequent desire to relieve them. Love (ajga>ph, a word peculiar to Hellenistic Greek,) is much more
comprehensive than this, not only because it may have God for its object, but also because, when exercised towards men it includes complacency and delight as well as benevolence. It is of this comprehensive virtue the
apostle treats at length in the thirteenth chapter of this epistle, and of which he here says, it edifies. It does not terminate on itself, as knowledge does, but goes out of itself, and seeks it happiness in another, and lives and acts for others. It is, therefore, something incomparably higher than
knowledge, when the two are separated and distinguished.
2. And if any man think that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing yet