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RANCEBalancing Between Constructive
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However the French workers’ movement has historically been driven by two ideo- logical tendencies that are found to a greater or lesser extent in the main national trade unions: an anarcho-syndicalist (or revolutionary syndicalist) tradition of Proudhonian inspiration and another one based on a Marxist grounding (Lojkine, 1996). Both of them have been divided for a century by the attitude adopted in relation to business management and more generally in relation to knowledge of management. In the 1900s, the debate was very strained: for some, the interest in economic issues and in the results of business made the protest movement’s justi- fications more credible and thus reinforced it; for others more in favour of direct action, trade unionism burdened itself with studies of business statistics that risk running into class collaboration. The break in the 1920s, as a result of the Russian Revolution, did not help to solve this dichotomy because the Leninist thesis of worker control paradoxically reinforced supporters of employees’ intervention in management and therefore requested knowledge in that field. The factories’ sit-in movement after the Liberation and in May 1968 can be interpreted in some ways as a development of this tradition.
Except for the years following World War II, dominated by reconstruction re- quirements, mistrust was predominant until quite recently, because CGT, linked with the French CP, had a large majority among the workers. But its weakening and its evolution towards a reformist trade unionism constitute a new deal which is more favourable to social dialogue. Nevertheless this dialogue is still difficult because industrial leaders, gathered in the MEDEF (ex. CNPF), mistrust and in many cases are even hostile to unions (Brizay, 1975). For instance the whole dis- cussion about strategic management has been considered as a dangerous intrusion in their prerogatives and in some ways like foreshadowing workers’ power. Many employers used the excuse of business confidentiality to restrict the release of economic information (Capron, 2001). This explains the weakness of collective bargaining in France in comparison with other European countries, although over the last decade efforts were made to develop negotiations instead of legal regula- tions, especially at company level.
The industrial terrain in France is characterised by large companies (transnationals since the 1960s) and a lot of SMEs. Since the second part of the 19th century and until the 1930s, paternalism has been pre-eminent in French firms, especially with important figures such as the “iron masters”: industrial leaders, who felt them- selves responsible for the life of workers and their families but did not share the smallest part of their power (Ballet & de Bry, 2001). From this time, it remains in French law that the firm has a “social interest” which is distinct from the share- holders’ interests and upon them, because it corresponds to the common good for all stakeholders (the going concern of the firm); so the shareholders are not the owners of a company, but the owners of shares of a company (Robé, 1999). It means particularly that the going concern of a firm does not depend only on shareholders, directors and workers, but also on public authorities. For example,
France – Balancing Between Constructive Harassment and Virtuous Intentions 99
when a firm meets difficulties and is in a risky situation, local authorities, creditor banks and social organisations will try to find solutions to save it or save the jobs involved. In return, civil society expects companies to create activities for devel- oping jobs and thus support the community. The French conception of the firm is an institutionalist conception and not a contractualist conception as in Anglo- Saxon law (Bazzoli, Kirat & Villeval, 1995). It is important to be familiar with this specific concept to understand in which context corporate social responsibility is embedded in French society.
From the 1930s paternalism has declined, because State interventionism and new social institutions (social insurance, pensions, unemployment insurance, etc.) have progressively taken over the role of firms. The social institutions are generally managed by social partners (representatives of employers and trade unions) at a national level, which is called “paritarisme” (equal representation) and from 1945 the social budgets in firms have been managed by the works councils created at that time. After the Liberation the State became a regulator of economic activities (nationalisations, plans, industrial politics…) and started to foster development and modernisation (Rioux, 1980). It is well known that the role of the State is tra- ditionally strong in France: in the second part of the 20th century, it has promoted important social legislation in many fields (wages, employment, hygiene and safety, etc.). But today this predominant role of the State in the society is increas- ingly questioned and simultaneously the extent of what business must be respon- sible for in society is also in debate, because a new paternalism which could man- age public affairs is feared (Salmon, 2002).
In fact, as regards welfare, people in France are expecting more from public au- thorities than from private firms. It seems that this feeling goes back a long way to the time of absolute and centralized power of the State. But as the role of the State, in particular regarding social funding, decreased, one can recently observe, at least in the discourses, that firms are regaining social importance in society, for exam- ple in the 1990s with the notion of “corporate citizenship”. Thanks to the success- ful growth of French firms in international markets, the image of business in soci- ety has improved in the last years, but simultaneously has been tarnished as a re- sult of restructuring and unemployment (Berthouin Anthal & Sobczak, 2004). This does not confer on large corporations a legitimacy in intervening alone in the con- struction of social well-being (Boyer, 2003).
We have focused this analysis on industrial relations and the role of the State be- cause they are the major factors for understanding CSR in France; however, there are other factors which are less important and more difficult to perceive. First of all, the role of the Catholic Church is discreet in economic activities and one can say that its influence is weak. But there is a mistrust towards business and money, the origin of which is probably religious. This attitude also explains the scepticism when good deeds are communicated to the public. “Discretion about good deeds,
100 François Beaujolin and Michel Capron
on the part of individuals or companies, is regarded as a proof of sincerity and disinterestedness” (Segal, 2003).
Concerning other actors, we can emphasise the role of banks which were until recently the most important source of funding for firms. The role of financial mar- kets has shaped only recently and popular shareholding remains limited and not very well organised. Pension funds do not yet exist but the situation is going to change thanks to a new legislation and the socially responsible investment repre- sents a very small part of savings. Moreover the consumers’ movement is not dy- namic, and NGOs play an important role to influence consumers’ socially respon- sible behaviour (Capron & Quairel-Lanoizelée, 2004). France has no tradition of consumer boycotting: for example, the call for a boycott of TotalFinaElf because of the Erika oil tanker spill failed.
Finally, France has a specific situation because there is a problem of translation concerning CSR3 for three reasons:
x “entreprise” (enterprise) is not equivalent to “corporation”: the term cov- ers all kinds of firms and notably independent SMEs or social economy firms,
x “social” has in French a more narrow meaning than in English: it usually refers to the labour relations inside a firm and is not focused on society is- sues,
x there is no distinction between the notion of responsibility and the legal concept of liability: the “traditional concept of responsibility presupposes an agent, a damage, and a causal link between agent and damage” (Noël, 2003),
it is obvious that these linguistic differences often lead to confusion and misunder- standing.