3.5 Results Experiments 1-3
3.5.3 Increased Defense Spending in South America
It is possible, if not likely, that increasing funding to Europe for deterring Russia is already a politically primed issue . The public, and partisans within, may have already made up their mind on this issue. Another debate about where to use the military began following the Venezuelan elections in 2019. We may expect different results here because (a) the issue is less politically charged (i.e., partisans do not see this connected to their party’s success); (b) Democrats tend to support efforts to maintain democracy; and (c) it is not an area of the world where the United States is visibly involved militarily. Unlike in the Europe case, providing increased military spending in South America does not have the potential electoral implications that deterring Russia has. Additionally, the lack of U.S. military presence and traditional media attention makes the situation in Venezuela one in which Americans do not have a lot of prior opinions. This suggests thatâas compared to their responses to the Europe caseâAmericans may defer more to the expertise of the military (Page et al. (1987); Golby et al. (2018)) and information cues from their co-partisan leaders (e.g., Druckman et al. (2013); Achen and Bartels (2016)).
Table 3.6 displays the results of this experiment.
Table 3.6: Effect of party identification and elite cue on increased spending in support of Venezuela
(1) (2)
VARIABLES (Model 1) (Model 2)
Military Cue 0.025 0.060*
(0.020) (0.032) Republican Cue -0.015 0.013
(0.020) (0.032) Democratic Cue -0.007 0.037
(0.020) (0.033)
Rep ID 0.182***
(0.032)
Dem ID 0.101***
(0.032)
Dem ID*Mil Cue -0.107**
(0.047)
Rep ID*Mil Cue -0.006
(0.045)
Dem ID*Rep Cue -0.152***
(0.047)
Rep ID*Rep Cue 0.077*
(0.046)
Dem ID*Dem Cue 0.007
(0.046)
Rep ID*Dem Cue -0.157***
(0.049)
Constant 0.597*** 0.507***
(0.014) (0.022)
Observations 1,952 1,952
R-squared 0.002 0.085
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Several interesting results emerge from this analysis. First, the military elite cue has a positive effect on independents. This positive effect on support by independents (+0.06) is the only statistically significant result from the elite cues on independents, though the two partisan cues have a weak positive effect as well. Second, self-identifying as either a Republican or a Democrat has a positive effect on support for increasing military spending in South America (+0.18 and +0.10 respectively). Two possible explanations for this are that (1) this issue of increased defense spending in South America does not have a partisan prime or that (2) Republicans and Democrats are responding to two different components of the scenario. Republicans may be responding to the increase in defense spending, whereas Democrats may be responding to the effort to stabilize Venezuela.
Another interesting result is the partisan reaction to the military cue. The military elite cue has a negative effect on Democrats (-0.11) and a small positive, but statistically insignificant, positive effect on Republicans. The effect on Republicans is consistent with the previous two experiments. For Democrats, however, the military elite cue has a nearly opposite effect when compared to the Europe scenario. While identifying as a Democrat increases an individual’s likelihood of supporting the increase in funding, the inclusion of a military cue voids that effect. In this case, the military elite cue may signal how the stabilization to Venezuela will be brought about. Democratic respondents may want to bring stabilization, but they have concerns about a military intervention. In summary, military cues get caught up in complicated partisan politics about intervention in certain regions of the world.
Finally, the partisan elite cues only have the predicted effects on the out-group.
Democrats and Republicans receiving a cue from their own party do not change their level of support. A cue from the other party, however, has roughly the same negative effect for Republicans (-0.157) and Democrats (-0.152).
Figure 3.1: Predicted effects: Party identification, source cue and support for defense spending proposals
Mil Cue Republican Cue Democrat Cue Republican ID Domecrat ID Dem ID*Mil Cue Rep ID*Mil Cue Dem ID*Rep Cue Rep ID*Rep Cue Dem ID*Dem Cue Rep ID*Dem Cue
Effects with Respect to
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Effects on Linear Prediction Support for Increase in Overall Defense Spending
Mil Cue Republican Cue Democrat Cue Rep ID Dem ID Dem ID*Mil Cue Rep ID*Mil Cue Dem ID*Rep Cue Rep ID*Rep Cue Dem ID*Dem Cue Rep ID*Dem Cue
Effects with Respect to
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Effects on Linear Prediction Support for Increased Defense Spending in Europe
Mil Cue Republican Cue Democrat Cue Rep ID Dem ID Dem ID*Mil Cue Rep ID*Mil Cue Dem ID*Rep Cue Rep ID*Rep Cue Dem ID*Dem Cue Rep ID*Dem Cue
Effects with Respect to
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Effects on Linear Prediction Support for Increased Defense Spending in South America
Note: Figure 3.1 displays the variation in effects resulting from source cue and party identification.
These variations, and their contrast with the previous vignettes, demonstrate the challenges elites may have in predicting the effects of their public statements in support of defense spending initiatives. Through the first three experiments, the military elite cue has produced no significant positive effect on the aggregate support of initiatives; its effect on independents and partisans has varied based on the issue being proposed. The partisan elite cues have, in general, affected support as predicted, though these effects are stronger on the out-party than on co-partisans. Figure 3.1 provides a visual depiction of the results so far.