A continuing challenge for researchers in community psychology is conceptualizing commu- nity phenomena at a collective level with appropriate theoretical constructs (Heller, 1989).
However, the pervasiveness of an individualistic ideology in psychology makes it difficult to conceptualize psychological phenomena in terms of a collectivistic perspective. Individual- ism, and its conceptual counterpart, collectivism, are basic assumptive world views that vary within and across cultures. While both individualism and collectivism influence the nature and expression of psychological phenomena, psychological theory and practice generally assume an individualistic perspective. Awareness of the hidden bias of individualism is particularly important for those who wish to be sensitive to cultural diversity (Vega, 1992). In developing constructs that reflect a collectivistic perspective, the individualism embedded within our discipline must be identified and challenged.
In the following, I describe individualism and collectivism, and highlight the prominence of individualism in psychological research. I illustrate some ways to identify individualistic assumptions through a critical analysis of psychological conceptualizations of power and control. I discuss the implications of this critique for developing a more collectivistic perspec- tive that highlights the shared and relational aspects of power and control. I then present some additional examples of community psychology research that provide collectivistic perspec- tives on psychological phenomena. Finally, I conclude by summarizing themes from these examples that may be useful to those interested in adding such perspectives to their own research.
COLLIN VAN UCHELEN • Cross Cultural Psychiatry Program, Department of Psychiatry, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T 2Al, Canada.
Handbook of Community Psychology, edited by Julian Rappaport and Edward Seidman. Kluwer Academic I Plenum Publishers, New York, 2000.
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Individualism and Collectivism
Individualism and collectivism represent contrasting sets of values, norms, assumptions, and ideologies that vary across cultures and are expressed in social behavior (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Triandis, 1989a, 1989b; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Individualism is associated with independence, autonomy, agency, emotional detachment from others, and competition (Triandis, 1989a). Collectivism involves cooperation, emotional attachment to others, concern with others' opinions, and attention to family and relatives (Triandis, 1989a). Cultures as a whole can be characterized in terms of their individualism and collectivism (e.g., the United States is highly individualistic, while the People's Republic of China is more collectivistic).
Triandis (1989a) characterizes individualism and collectivism as follows:
In individualist cultures most people's social behavior is largely determined by personal goals that overlap only slightly with the goals of collectives, such as the family, the work group, the tribe, political allies, coreligionists, fellow countrymen [sic], and the state. When a conflict arises between personal and group goals, it is considered acceptable for the individual to place personal goals ahead of collective goals. By contrast, in collectivist cultures social behavior is determined largely by goals shared with some collective, and if there is a conflict between personal and group goals, it is considered socially desirable to place collective goals ahead of personal goals (p. 42).
Individuals in a given culture vary in the extent to which they are individualistic or collectivis- tic with respect to given social settings. The more a person identifies with the collective, the more congruence between individual and collective aims. In highly collectivistic settings, the discrepancy between individual and collective aims may diminish entirely (Triandis, 1989a).
Individualism in Psychological Research
The differences between individualism and collectivism are readily apparent when comparing social phenomena in diverse cultures, and are well described in the field of cross- cultural psychology (see Triandis, 1995). An overview of the nature and correlates of individu- alism and collectivism may be of interest to community psychologists; however, here I address what I see as one of the primary implications of this research for our field. Essentially, that is the general tendency to represent psychological phenomena in terms of an individualistic perspective. To a large extent, this tendency reflects the individualistic cultural context within which psychology originated and operates (Pepitone, 1981). Consequently, many of the conceptual and methodological tools of our trade encode and reproduce the prevailing ideol- ogy of individualism of Western society (Fox, 1985; Hogan, 1975; Prilleltensky, 1989). This critique has been made about psychological research on achievement motivation (Spence, 1985), the self (Heelas & Lock, 1981; Lykes, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sampson, 1985), control (Furby, 1979; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984), self-efficacy and learned help- lessness (Stam, 1987), empowerment (Riger, 1993; Surrey, 1991; van Uchelen, 1989), power (Miller, 1976, 1987), psychotherapy (Wallach & Wallach, 1983), development (Gilligan, 1982), and the notion of mental health (Sampson, 1977).
The ideology of individualism is embedded in basic assumptions about the nature of individual and social reality (Watt, 1989). For example, Sampson (1977,1985,1988) observes that, in much of psychology, the person is conceived of as a self-contained and autonomous individual. This view is prevalent in individualistic societies wherein the person is constructed in terms of rigid self/nonself boundaries that clearly delineate the individual from the sur-
rounding social field (Heel as & Lock, 1981; Sampson, 1985, 1988). This is an independent view of the person (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), emphasizing individuation and autonomy. In this view, the boundaries of the individual are at the skin.
The independent view of the person, however, is not universal. Conceptions of the person vary both across and within cultures and settings (Geertz, 1975; Heelas & Lock, 1981; Lykes, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sampson, 1988; Shweder & Bourne, 1982; Zeigler, 1990). In contrast to the independent self, an interdependent view of the person is based on relatedness, social embeddedness, and interdependence. In this view, the boundaries of the self are permeable and fluid. One's identity is inextricably linked to, and constituted in terms of, one's relationships with others (e.g., family or collective), geographic settings (e.g., home or land), or transpersonal realms (spiritual force or ancestry). The interdependent conception of the person is applicable in collectivistic cultures in which the collective is seen as part of the self, and the self as part of the collective (Triandis, 1989a, 1989b). Within collective contexts, the self is often experienced in terms of the overlap between the individual and surrounding social context! (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989b; see also Miller, 1984).
Consequences of Individualistic Assumptions
Individualistic assumptions embedded in theory and methods have several consequences of importance to our discipline. The misapplication of individualistic concepts or measures to collectivistic phenomena can misrepresent or bias the way collective processes are under- stood, resulting in incomplete, inaccurate, and insensitive representations of the phenomena of interest. When phenomena operate in accord with individualism, we will be able to account for their variance with individualistic models (Spence, 1985). However, when the phenomena of interest are primarily collectivistic, individualistic theoretical models will be inadequate (Spence, 1985; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984).
For example, one way that individualism is incorporated in theory occurs in cost-benefit models that assume behavior or decision-making occurs in order to maximize benefit to the individual. As an alternative, some theorists are recognizing that people also behave in ways that prioritize the gain to the collective. Using dilemma games, Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1990) have shown that when individuals identify with a collective entity, they behave in ways that maximize gain to the entire collective. Similarly, Fiske (1992) describes a collectivistic model of communal sharing to understand behavior that maximizes the collec- tive good. Utilizing theoretical models that incorporate collectivistic values will improve the fit of our theory to collectivistic community phenomena.
To the extent that our discipline is influenced by individualism, it hampers our ability to conceptualize phenomena in ways that articulate collectivistic perspectives. Given that com- munity psychologists are often interested in phenomena that occur on a collective or commu- nity level, it is especially important to become aware of how individualistic assumptions are
1 A third alternative is suggested by Lykes (1985), who introduces the notion of social individuality. She contends that the individualistic (independent) and collectivistic notions of self represent only two models of how the self is experienced. Social individuality refers to a synthesis of these two models, representing the self as an ensemble of social relations. Although Lykes (1985) draws a distinction between collectivist and social-individuality views of the self, both these views hold much in common when contrasted with the independent view of the self. For the purpose of this chapter, then, I will refer to both the collectivist and social-individuality concept of the self as an "interdepen- dent" view of the self. This is consistent with the terminology used by Markus and Kitayama (1991), and simplifies the presentation at hand.
incorporated into theoretical models of collective phenomena. Such phenomena include responses to community threat (O'Sullivan, Waugh, & Espeland, 1984), participation in neighborhood organizations (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990), and involvement in self-help groups (Levine, 1988) ..
Another consequence of individualistic assumptions in our theory and methods is that it can lead to culturally insensitive research. As a discipline, community psychology values cultural diversity (Rappaport, 1977; Vega, 1992). One way in which cultural differences are manifested is through individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1989a). These terms define a primary dimension of cultural variation occurring both between and within cultures. Many collectivistic subcultures exist in the context of more individualistic dominant cultures (e.g., Asian, Latino, and Native American communities exist within the United States). Although community psychology emerged within the context of the highly individualistic culture of the United States, its values represent a challenge to be accepting of, and sensitive to, the diversity within society. Yet, given that many community researchers and activists are embedded within an individualistic society, it is likely that the ideology of individualism is incorporated into our work. The individualistic influence becomes problematic when measures or constructs mis- represent the nature of phenomena that occur in collectivistic settings, subcultures, or groups.
Psychologists who work with such settings should pay particular attention to the consequences of their research with the collectivistic aspects of the phenomena of interest.
CHALLENGING INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
Recognizing the ways in which individualistic assumptions operate in our own discipline is quite difficult. As a cultural ideology, individualism is both elusive and influential (Watt, 1989). Examining its influence in our discipline is like asking those who know only one language to reveal the ways in which it constrains and shapes the nature of their experiences and their ability to communicate about them. To know this, it is useful to have the perspective afforded by knowing another language. In the same vein, community psychologists can learn the conceptual language of collectivism as a step toward recognizing and challenging individ- ualism embedded in our own theory and methodology.
An illustration of evaluating the individualistic bias in psychological constructs is pre- sented below. This example highlights a few of the individualistic assumptions contained in psychological concepts of power and control. In particular, I focus on how the discourse on control assumes an independent conception of the person, defines power and control in terms of dominance, and incorporates an individualistic view of control in the notion of mental health. This reveals the subtle ways that individualism enters into psychological theory, and lays the groundwork for a more collectivistic view of power and control.
Example 1: Individualism in Concepts of Power and Control
The relationship between powerlessness and human distress is a major concern of community psychology (Joffe & Albee, 1981). Similarly, the concept of empowerment has provided a focus for theory and research in the field (Kieffer, 1984; Lord & Hutchinson, 1993;
Maton & Rappaport, 1984; Pretsby, Wandersman, Florin, Rich, & Chavis, 1990; Rappaport, 1981,1984,1987; Riger, 1993; Zimmerman, 1990; Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988). Although
empowerment is a multilevel phenomenon that spans the individual, group, and community levels of analysis, the construct still reflects individualistic ideology to the extent that it incorporates individualistic views of power and control (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Riger, 1993; van Uchelen, 1989).
Psychological conceptualizations of control may misrepresent the collective aspects of power because of individualism inherent in theory and methods. On the level of theory, individualism is reflected in independent definitions of the person (Sampson, 1988), the centrality of individual dominance in constructs of power and control (Eisler, 1987; Fine, 1989;
Furby, 1979; Gergen, 1989; Miller, 1976), and individual agency as an ideal of psychological health (Gergen, 1989; Sampson, 1977, 1988; van Uchelen, 1989). On the level of methodology, power is operationalized in terms of individualistic measures of personal control over desired outcome (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Furby, 1979; Gurin, Gurin, & Morrison, 1978;
Seeman, 1972, 1983; Stam, 1987). A critical examination of how power and control are conceptualized and measured must be undertaken if community psychologists are to under- stand a more collectivistic perspective of this topic.
Control and Conceptions of the Person
Within the Euro-American cultural context, the individual is seen as the unit from which action or agency emanates (de Charms, 1968). Internal control implies a locus of control internal to the person. In contrast, if the locus of control is believed to be external to the individual, control then presumably rests within a realm outside of (or external to) the person.
The conception of the person is thus a key aspect in the meaning of control.
The underlying assumption of locus of control is that the individual is taken as the fundamental unit of reference or agent to which locus of control beliefs pertain (Sampson, 1988). To the extent that a person holds an independent view of self, the assumption of the self as an autonomous agent and source of control is not problematic. Given the prevalence of the independent view of self within individualistic cultures, it makes sense to conceptualize locus of control, in its most basic form, as either internal or external to the autonomous individual.
However, when the self is seen in interdependent terms, it is no longer accurate to view the autonomous individual as the unit to which the experience of power and control pertain. If the self is viewed (and experienced) as inextricably linked to, and constituted by, a network of relations embedded in the collective context, then conceptualizations of control may need to be revised to accommodate a more encompassing view of the person. The meaning of internal control would need to refer to something that both includes and goes beyond the individual as the point of reference. A collectivistic conceptualization of control would allow us to use an interdependent view of a person who experiences and realizes power in the context of relationships within the collective. The concept of locus of control (Rotter, 1966), as it is commonly used, is unable to accommodate this conceptual shift because it presumes an independent notion of the person.
A Feminist Critique of Power as Domination
Feminist theorists have revealed another individualistic assumption embedded in our concepts of power and control. Writing on the topic of power, Miller (1976, 1987) has noted that the traditional meaning of power and control assumes dominance as a defining feature.
She distinguishes between having power for oneself and exercising power over others. Miller suggests that the dominant conception of power is one that emphasizes "the ability to advance oneself, and, simultaneously, to control, limit, and if possible destroy the power of others"
(1976, p. 116). This view combines a notion of self-power ("the capacity to implement") with that of dominion or dominance over others. Miller challenges the necessity of linking these two components. She opposes the understanding of power that assumes dominance as an essential characteristic-an understanding that she suggests reflects a patriarchal emphasis on interpersonal domination and subordination.
As an alternative, Miller (1976) calls for an understanding of power that gives primacy to self-power without dominance. She suggests that women often experience a sense of power in the context of relationships that enable one to develop one's own resources and capacities (see also Eisler, 1987; Fine, 1989; McClelland, 1975; Starhawk, 1987; Surrey, 1991). In this view, an individual's power is developed in the context of relationships that enhance the power of the self and of others.
A similar critique of power as dominance is advanced by hooks (1984), who maintains that a reconceptualization of power in terms of life-affirming and creative action to end domination provides an alternative definition of power based on the experiences of working- class women of color. She notes that this type of power occurs in feminist groups in the form of task rotation, consensus decision-making, and internal democracy. This alternative view of power is expressed through women's resistance to definitions of their reality advanced by those in traditional positions of authority. The critiques offered by Miller (1976, 1987) and hooks (1984) name patriarchy as an overarching condition that enlists individualism and domination as essential components of traditional definitions of power (see also Fine, 1989;
Gergen, 1989; Janeway, 1980).
Control and the Western Ideal
Another individualistic assumption embedded in the discourse on psychological concepts of control is the ideal of internal control as a desirable characteristic for psychological health (Waterman, 1984). Sampson (1977, 1985, 1988) and Gergen (1989) critique Western psychol- ogy's image of the ideal person: An autonomous, self-contained individual with a high level of internal personal control. This ideal is reflected in the individualistic goals and approaches of contemporary clinical psychotherapy (Wallach & Wallach, 1983), and in the policy objectives of community mental health (Sampson, 1977).
In his 1977 paper, Sampson illustrates how the ideal of the self-contained individual is a defining feature of mental health. For example, a common measure of success in the treatment of those who are labelled as mentally ill is autonomous functioning and independent living.
After discharge from psychiatric hospitalization, ex-patients often live collectively in residen- tial halfway houses. The goal is to graduate from these group homes into independent living arrangements. This reflects an understanding of interdependent living as merely a transitional phase on the road to independent living as the final goal. However, the reality of independent living for these citizens is often experienced as a lonely, isolated, and alienated existence in single-room occupancy accommodations. Failure to maintain independence is viewed as a deterioration in functioning. The failure is located within the individual and in his or her inability to live independently, while the individualistic criterion of independence as a hall- mark of mental health is rarely called into question.
As an alternative, Sampson (1988) and Gergen (1989) suggest an ideal of interdependence and social embeddedness. This alternative ideal is based on an ethic of caring (Gilligan, 1982;
Noddings, 1984) and communion (Bakan, 1966; Wiggins, 1991), rather than domination and individualism. Gergen (1989) advocates relinquishing the ideal of autonomous individualism and individualistic conceptions of control, and proposes that theoreticians explore a new concept of control based on the ideal of interdependence.
Individualism in Measures of Control
The individualistic bias of measures of control (e.g., Rotter, 1966; Seeman, 1972) is manifested in the relationship between externality and collectivism. In collectivistic settings, identity is commonly experienced in terms of the interdependent view of the self. In these circumstances, the locus of control is in the collective or context of which the person is a part.
However, the individual may not experience him or herself as powerless because control comes about through identifying with the collective. In this case, control is located both in the individual and the collective, although it is not framed in this way. With individualistic measures, the outcome is one in which collectivism correlates with external locus of control.
This can lead to the erroneous conclusion that collectivists are more powerless than individual- ists. This conclusion pivots on an individualistic conception of control and power. The challenge is to rethink the conceptualization and measurement of power and control in a way that does not make collectivists appear powerless.
Incorporating Collectivistic Perspectives in Community Psychology Conceptualizing Control in the Collective Field
I have argued that individualistic concepts of power and control may not be congruent with the ways control is experienced when the self is constituted in relational terms. This points to the importance of tailoring theoretical constructs to the contexts for which they are used. I use the term "field control" (Sampson, 1988) to refer to a collectivist conceptualization of control. Field control refers to a conception of control that is based on an interdependent view of the person. The term calls attention to the context or field as an important element in one's experience of having control. Field refers to the locus or sphere of control that encom- passes both the individual and the collectivity of which he or she is a part; control refers to actual and experienced competence, efficacy, capacity, and ability that exists within the collecti ve field.
The defining feature of field control is sharing control and power within the collective.
It is not control over other members of the collective, nor does it suggest that the individual is personally controlled by the collective. Rather, field control occurs when one has a voice in the collective without domination based on hierarchical authority. The concept of field control suggests a shift from an individualistic understanding of control based on an independent view of the self, to a collectivist view of control that is based on an interdependent view of the person embedded in the collective.
Researchers who study empowering processes and contexts can benefit from an examina- tion of the theoretical and experiential dynamics of a more collectivistic view of power and control. To the extent that individualistic concepts and measures of control are used as