CHAPTER II DESCRIBING THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
4. Politics
The upsurge in rallies supporting the implementation of an Is- lamic caliphate and demanding implementation of shariah law in a particular time frame has attracted considerable attention from the mass media, particularly television. Despite this, only a few Muslims have seen such television programs. Thirty per cent of repondents had seen programs about an Islamic caliphate, and 27 per cent about implementing shariah law.
Several interim reasons can be proposed to explain this phe- nomenon. In the political arena itself ideas of establishing an Islamic State or codifying shariah law have been resisted in party political circles, especially those of nationalist and moderate inclinations. For
~ The Dynamism and Contestation example, the Golkar Party’s rejection of the necessity of an Islamic State, which was expressed by the East Kalimantan Golkar chair- man, Dahri Yasin. He did not agree that Islam should enter the public sphere in the form of Provincial Regulations, because the heterog- enous composition of the East Kalimantan population meant that it would not be of positive value to himself or his party. The party’s constituents might leave it.10
Another factor is the appearance of all kinds of Islamic sym- bols in the political arena, more stemming from political rather than religious motives. In the assessment of Dr. Faris Pari, a leader in Jakarta, the penetration of Islam in the political field is merely for political consumption, in the interests of a handful of people. There is no genuine movement supporting this.11 In fact Dr. Mohd. Sabri AR, a Muslim leader in Makassar, described the emergent symptoms of shariah-nuanced Provincial Regulations as an outburst that only “cre- ates turmoil” for the promotion of Islam, in a more genuine field of culture. He recognizes these symptoms as a sort of political binding agent that will only last as long as the political authority that supports it. He believes that the case in the Bulukumba Regency, for example, is the most recent example illustrating this phenomenon. Immediately after the term of office of Bulukumba Governor Patabai Pabokori – a central figure behind the region’s Provincial shariah regulations – the local population rapidly “returned” to the cultural “populist Islam”
model. 12
In Aceh the same view was offered by an intellectual leader in Biruen, Khairuddin Nur. For him the emergence of codified shariah law in a number of areas, especially Biruen and Aceh generally, is a movement or camouflage by the local political elite to divert public attention from economic and other social welfare woes. Thus the energies and attention of the public will be distracted from the fail- ures of the regional political elite in managing social issues, the economy and political matters, and even the corruption they engage in. Rather, they are directed towards historical romanticism and positive senti- ments towards the shariah of Islam.13 Tangerang City Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning prostitution, although capable of lowering the level of prostitution, was politically loaded. This regulation gave increased political weight of the Mayor, Wahidin Halim, so that in the Provincial
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Chapter III ~
elections the only contest was at the level of Deputy Mayor. 14 Nevertheless, the obvious presence of Islamic symbols in the political arena, although attracting little public support, gains the sym- pathy of Muslim clerics, leaders of Islamic mass organizations, and some political figures. Thus, although their numbers are small, their voices echo loudly. An East Java Muslim leader, Masdar Hilmy, rec- ognizes this, and sees the minority Islamic mass organizations, apart from NU and Muhammadiyah, as playing an important role in Islamic involvement in the field of politics.15 According to Ali Machsan Musa, an NU leader in East Java, these minority groups make much use of the print media to promote their ideas, such as by their continued production of weekly bulletins in mosques. 16
A Samarinda ulama (religious scholar), KH. Fahrudin Wahab, who supports the appearance of Islamic symbols in the political arena, said:
…every individual must proselytize Islam in whatever way… and non-Muslim groups living in larger Muslim communities are called protected non-Muslims (kafir dzimmi). They should not be offended by things like this.
In the event that shariah law is enforced, these kafir dzimmi must participate in implementing them. For example, speaking about Islamic criminal law (hudud), if kafir dzimmi offend against it they must be subject to such laws as well. 17
Muh. Ikbal Djalil, a PKS politician in Makassar, also seems to support implementation of Provincial Regulations governing liquor consumption in Bulukumba. He stated that this Regulation had a posi- tive effect on the people. If there was anyone who felt disturbed by it, this was because they felt they were incurring losses because of the Regulation.18 Support in the same vein was given by Prof. Dr. H.
Suparman (Deputy Chairman of MUI, in Serang).
“I agree that shariah law should be codified, as long as this is in line with national unity and within Indonesia’s legal framework. If we say that the Compilation of Islamic Law (KHI) is formal, then religious courts are formal.
Therefore if someone says that it shouldn’t be made formal,
~ The Dynamism and Contestation the substance is enough... so the reality is already there and they are not prohibited. Because, Muslims are required to implement shariah law. Only, its implementation should not conflict with the principles of the Unitary Indonesian State. If the government has given the impression of obstructing it, perhaps the government is backtracking, because the Dutch Government itself accommodated the forming of religious courts.” 19