Justin is the best-known and most influential of the Apologists. Born in Flavia Neapolis in the Samaritan part of Palestine, he grew up in an urban upper-class milieu. At the beginning of his Dialogue with Trypho he gives an account of his conversion to Christianity.15 First he tried out various philosophical teachers, settling for the school of the Platonists. But then the course of his life was changed as the result of a conversation he had with an old man by the sea. Where did this conversation and the subsequent conversion take place? Was it in Palestine, or had Justin already moved to one of the major centres of Asia Minor such as Ephesus?*h We do not know. Later Justin moves to Rome, where he sets up an informal school of Christian learning, until at some time between 162 and 168 he is accused, condemned and executed for his Christian beliefs.
Justin is an important early representative of the new Gentile Christian- ity. Though raised in Palestine, he does not approach the Gospel through the background of an inner involvement with Judaism, though, as his dia- logue with the Jew Trypho shows quite clearly, the question of the relation between the two religions is very important to him.17 On the other hand, the location of his activities falls outside the direct influence of developments in Alexandria. As we saw earlier, 18 the fate of Philo’s writings during this period is wholly obscure. Justin does not mention Philo or any other non- biblical Jewish author by name. The only evidence is indirect. If it is concluded that Numenius had knowledge of Philo, then copies of his writings must have been circulating in Syria in the 2nd century, and then contact on the part of Justin with these works is not impossible.19 There is also no hard evidence on the availability of Philo’s writings in Rome during
‘Christlich [i.e. not Stoic] ist der nlchste Satz von der Gottesfurcht und der Menschenliebe.’
The Jewish background is ignored, also in his comments on $14.
Is The account is certainly stylized, and has been the subject of copious discussion: cf.
detailed analysis by Van Winden (1971), briefer comments at Grant (1988) 50ff.
” The fact that Justin attended various philosophical schools does not preclude Palestine as the location of his conversion, as Skarsaune (1987) 246 rightly points out.
” Cf. Schreckenberg (1982) 182-183,200.
Ix See above $1.2-4.
I” On Numenius and Philo see above 0 1.2.
the period that Justin was active there. Lucchesi’s suggestion that he may have consulted copies of Philo’s works deposited in Roman libraries a century earlier is altogether speculative, and not backed up by any solid arguments20 Indeed another, equally speculative hypothesis, can be put forward, namely that Justin did not have access to Philo’s works in Rome, whereas he had read them and used them earlier when in Palestine. This might furnish an explanation for the fact the undoubted similarities that exist between the two authors are always rather imprecise. The exegetical themes are remembered, but never exactly; there are no precise verbal reminiscences, only the same or similar terms. But this hypothesis suffers too from a lack of any kind of solid evidence in its favour.
The question of Justin’s acquaintance with and relation to Philo and Philonic thought has in fact been a source of considerable scholarly dis- agreement. Through the research of earlier scholars such as Siegfried, Heinisch, and Goodenough an extensive dossier of parallel material be- tween Philo and Justin was compiled. 21 Wolfson, consistent with his chosen methodology, regards Justin as in continual dialogue with Philo’s intellectual heritage.22 Only a few years ago De Vogel asserted with com- plete confidence that Justin Martyr must have known Philo. But most recent commentators have reacted against the earlier view and shown a good deal more reticence in their verdicts. Chadwick concludes:24 ‘...al- though there are a number of correspondences between Philo and Justin in minor details the comparison is in the main a long catalogue of dissimi- larity... If Justin read Philo, he was not deeply influenced’. This view is implicitly supported by Osborn and most recently Skarsaune. Shotwell and Barnard express even graver reservations on a possible direct relation between the two thinkers.25 In our report of the various positions we shall first look at philosophical and theological themes, and then turn to the more specific area of biblical exegesis. But the reader is warned that, given the centrality of exegesis in both authors, the division is somewhat artificial.
A good starting-point for our survey is Goodenough’s monograph, The Theology of Justin Martyr.26 This was his first major publication, and it contains in germ many of the views and insights which he was later to work out in greater detail. Already he places a strong insistence on the division
*O Lucchesi (1977) 19. See further above $1.4 and below Q 14.3.
21 Siegfried (1875) 332-340; Heinisch (1908) 62-64, 125-291 passim; Goodenough (1923).
22 Wolfson (1956) e.g. 21, 192.
23 De Vogel (1985) 12.
24 Chadwick (1967) 164-l 65.
2s For references see the discussion below.
26 Goodenough (1923); it was in fact his Oxford Ph.D. thesis, published oddly enough in Jena. A summary in Eccles (1985) I I-14, but this intellectual biography is disappointingly brief in its treatment of Goodenough’s scholarly formation. Cf. also the useful summary of similarities between Philo and Justin given in Goodenough (1953-68) I .47-52.
between Judaism proper (as he calls it) and Hellenistic Judaism.27 Both strands find their way into Christianity and specifically into Justin’s thought, but it is Hellenistic Judaism which furnishes his theology with a theoretical basis. Fundamentally Philo’s views were typical of his Judaeo- Hellenistic background, even if he was more deeply a philosopher than most others, so it is above all with Philo that comparison will be fruitful.
Goodenough admits there are no extensive verbal parallels between Justin and Philo. But, he argues, to leave the matter at that in the face of the obviously profound influence which Philonic conceptions and methods had upon Justin’s theological manner and matter would be to beg the entire question.28 On the other hand?
. . . Justin’s aim was something quite different from Philo’s. Where Philo allegorized the Old Testament to justify his being a Greek metaphysician, Justin allegorized the same book to find continuity between Judaism and Christianity. We shall see that on the metaphysical side Justin’s Christianity is, like his exegesis, a weak Philonic reflection and adaptation. Justin was not primarily a metaphysician but a Christian propagandist... His traces of Philonic exegesis are thus naturally scattered. The astonishing fact is that in one so different in spirit and aim from Philo, so much that is recognizably Philonic is yet to be found.
Important examples of the influence of Philonism are found in Justin’s atti- tude to the Law (i.e. basically a reflection or imitation of an eternal moral principle) and his doctrine of God (especially the notion of transcen- dence).sa But it is especially the concept of the Logos in both a pre- incarnate and incarnate state that betray indebtedness to Hellenistic Judaism in general (including the Wisdom tradition) and Philo in particular.
Goodenough concentrates on the following aspects.sl
27 28 of
(a) The-argument from theophanies in the Old Testament. Justin uses material from Judaism and Philo, but pushes the argument further than Philo in order to show that the pre-existent Christ is a ‘second God’.
(b) The imagery used to describe the origin of the Logos in the Father (especially the concept of emanatior?) .
(c) The cosmic significance of the Logos as expressed especially in the celebrated theory of the Logos spermatikos, i.e. that all rational beings (including the philosophers) share in the universal Logos.33
Goodenough (1923) 33.
Ibid. 116; i.e. the method followed by Goodenough here is not so very different from that Wolfson (on which see above $3.2). The crucial difference between the two lies in their differing conceptions of Judaism and Philo’s place in it.
*!I Goodenough (1923) 116-l 17.
30 Ibid. 117-122 (Law), 123-138 (God).
jt Ibid. 139-175 passim.
32 This was gain a central place in Goodenough’s presentation of Logos theology in his brilliant but controversial By Light, Light (1935).
‘j With important consequences in the area of anthropology, 2 13ff.
I CN CHAPTER SIX
(d) The various titles given to the Logos: God (8~365); Lord (~6~~0s);
Power (%v,pts); Angel (&yyehoQ; Rising (&vazohfi, from Zech. 6: 12);
Rock (&pa); Beginning (&px$; Day (fipkpa, according to Goodenough probably equivalent to cp&< in Philo); Man (&vepo~os); Israel/Jacob;
First-born (n:po&o~o~); Many-named (~ohu~vu~o~).
Justin’s contribution is above all to emphasize the personality of the Logos and thus to develop a subordination to the Father which is quite different to what we find in Philo. But as a Logos doctrine it is still recognizably the logos of Philo which Justin in mind.34
Much of the argumentation on the figure of the Logos common to Phi10 and Justin is directly or ultimately derived from OT texts, and thus will involve us in the question of Justin’s exegesis. But first. a few ‘footnotes to Goodenough’ should be mentioned. On the concept of the h6yoq onep-
~CIZ~K~S Holte agrees that it is ‘most likely that the term... emanates from Philo’, but immediately adds that the content that the term is given is obviously Justin’s invention.35 Waszink investigates the same matter with more precision and concludes that three factors determined Justin’s selection: the fact that it was a well-known Stoic term (after all the Apology in which is occurs is addressed to the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius), the influence of the parable of the sower in Matt. 13, and the frequent occurrence of the image of sowing and planting in Philo. The implication is that Justin must have been acquainted with Philo’s writings.
Hegermann, in his investigation of the role of the Logos in creational and cosmological contexts agrees that there is a significant continuity between the Philonic tradition of Hellenistic Judaism and Justin.37 The subject of Justin’s conception of the pre-existence of Christ has been analysed in detail in a Harvard dissertation by the Greek scholar Trakatellis.38 The general approach and a good many of the conclusions are reminiscent of Goodenough. It is argued that both the terminology (~poi&cp~&tv, &apt<
hoytlcjl, ykvvqp.a etc.) and the conceptuality of pre-existence stand closer to Philonic than to Platonic and Middle Platonist evidence.39 With respect to the OT theophanies, and especially the exegesis of Gen. 18-19, Trakatellis concludes that it is unlikely that the similarities between Philo and Justin
34 Goodenough (1923) 174-175; similar view at Williams (1987) 127 on the antecedents of Arianism.
35 Holte (1958) 127-128 and passim; strangely he seems completely unaware of Good- enough’s monograph.
36 Waszink (1964b) 390.
37 Hegermann (196 I) 71-77. See also the very recent contribution of Hofrichter (1992) 187- 193, who in a discussion of Justin and Philo’s doctrine of the Logos argues strongly that Justin is dependent on Philo for his subordinationist theology.
j8 Trakatellis (1976).
3y Ibid. 1 I-52; note the conclusion on 4&47.
APOLOGISTS 101
are the result of coincidence .40 Christ’s pre-existence also plays a role in
the divulgence of logos to prophets and philosophers in pre-Christian times.
The concepts of orthos logos, law of nature (V&OS cpboeo~), and spermati- kos logos as introduced by Philo certainly played an important role in the formulation of Justin’s theory. 41 The strong emphasis that Justin places on Christ’s pre-existence means that the incarnation comes to be interpreted
in terms of humiliation followed by exaltation, a theological scheme that is, of course, very far removed from Philo’s doctrine of the Logos.42
A strong reaction against the positive perception of Philo’s influence on Justin is found in the monograph by Barnard published in 1967. ‘Far too much has been made of Philo’s influence on Early Christian theology’, the English scholar affirms rather apodictically.43 Taking the apologist’s ac- count of his conversion seriously, he argues that Justin passed directly from Middle Platonism to Christianity, and that in the case of his doctrine of God
‘it is quite unnecessary to bring in Philo’. It is the same with the Logos doctrine. Barnard examines all the Philonic titles that Goodenough had outlined, and firmly denies that these prove dependence. Both Philo and Justin have used the same source, namely the Old Testament.45 A similar negative assessment is found in Osborn’s study. The Leitmotiv of the monograph-the centrality of the notion of truth in Justin’s thought-leads
the Australian scholar to make the following suggestion?
Justin’s attitude to philosophy and to Judaism is governed by his sense of the autonomy of the truth which God gives. He is surprised that a Jew wants to speak to him as a philosopher. Philosophers can’t tell Jews anything which they would not learn better in their own scriptures... Justin talks philosophically to the Gentiles but not to the Jews. He uses the first part of his discussion [with Trypho] to dispose of the possible relevance of philosophy and then concentrates exclusively on the scriptures. If Justin knew anything of Philo, he does not show it. His use of the scriptures is different. Perhaps Justin delibe-
40
41 Trakatellis (1976) 53-92; note esp. 64,7 1.
Ibid. 93-135; see esp. 107, 122. He aligns himself with his teacher H. Koester, who argued-unconvincingly in my view-that Philo’s use of the concept of vbpoq cp6a~wq by Philo is strongly innovative; cf. Koester (1968) passim.
42 See the concluding remarks in Trakatellis (1976) 173-l 84.
43 Barnard (1967) 82.
44 Barnard (1967) 83 (cf. the similar views of Chadwick cited above at n. 24). On Justin’s debt to Middle Platonism see Andresen (1952-53); Lilla (1971) 4-6 and passim; specifi- cally on negative theology the fine article of Palmer (1983). Andresen’s article, arguing ‘da13 Justin nicht von dem originalen Platon, sondern von dem zeitgenassischen Platonismus beeinflul3t ist (165)‘, has been regarded as a decisive breakthrough in the study of Justin’s thought. But as far I can judge the name of Philo does not appear a single time in the course of the entire argument. This is surely an important oversight. I have not seen Henao Zapata (1971) on Justin’s debt to a Platonizing mystical metaphysics in part transmitted via Philo (summarized at R-R 205).
4s Barnard (1967) 92-96.
” Osbom (1973) 73.
rately ignored Philo, because he did not consider philosophy was the way to talk to Jews.
It is true that, when talking to Jews, Philo’s exegesis might be more useful than straight philosophy. But in fact the division cannot be maintained with any kind of rigour, since the key to Philo’s thought lies precisely in the convergence of philosophy and exegesis. And why should he not use mate- rial from a Jewish writer when addressing non-Jews if it proves useful?
102 CHAPTER SIX
<
The question of Philonic influence on Justin’s exegesis remains. Every scholar who touches on the relation between Philo and Justin has had to say something on this subject, but-since Siegfried and Heinisch two scholars have undertaken to give it more specific and detailed treatment. In a general study on Justin’s biblical exegesis Shotwell examines the canons of non-literal exegesis which Siegfried claimed Justin had taken over from Philo. He argues that it is more likely that Justin obtained these direct from the Palestinian Rabbinic tradition or from previous Christian interpreters, especially since he fails to give any actual examples of philosophical alle- gory.47 Later on in the monograph Shotwell devotes an entire section to the relation between Philo’s and Justin’s exegesis, but his analysis remains on a rather superficial level.4* Fourteen Pentateuchal texts common to both are analysed.49 Justin keeps closer to Rabbinic interpretations than Philo did.50 The conclusion we are given reads as follows.51
It is quite possible that the Judaism Justin knew was of the type that could furnish him with his knowledge of Palestinian Judaism, and, at the same time, with a knowledge of a Hellenized Judaism similar to that of Philo. If this is the case, there is no need to assume that Justin was dependent on Philo.
This is not very helpful, because we are given no idea of what kind of Judaism this might be.
Fortunately a far more comprehensive investigation into the traditions anterior to Justin’s exegesis has recently published by Skarsaune.52 The Norwegian scholar assumes-uncontroversially-that Justin as exegete had teachers from whom he learnt, just as he himself passed on material to disciples in his own school. The aim the study sets itself is to determine the extent of the traditional material Justin used, disentangle its prove- nance, and grasp its theological profile. More clearly than Shotwell Skarsaune recognizes that Jewish material could have been taken directly
47 Shotwell (1965) 38-47.
48 Ibid. 93-l 13.
49 Ibid. 94-99. The texts are G e n . l : l - 3 , 1:26-28, 2:7, 3:22, 9:3, 156, 18:1-3, 18:8, 32:35, 38:25, Ex. 3:2, 3: 14-I 5, Deut. 2 1:23, 32:7-9. The list is far from complete.
so Shotwell (1965) 99. Asserted in this unqualified way the statement is somewhat curious, because Philo in fact antedates the Rabbis entirely.
s1 Ibid. 103.
v S karsaune ( 1987).
APOLOGISTS 103
from Jews, or may have already been part of Christian exegetical traditions which he inherited. He points out that Siegfried’s canons of exegesis are not even specifically Rabbinic, since they correspond to usual ways of reasoning in the Hellenistic world.53 Shotwell is right, however, in conclu- ding that Justin’s type of allegory is much closer to the Rabbis than Philo.
The results reached by Skarsaune can be summarized along the following broad lines. 55 Justin used two main anterior Christian exegetical traditions: (a) the ‘kerygma’ source, a Judaeo-Christian tradition which has already passed through Gentile Christian hands before reaching Justin, in which Christ is above all the one who fulfils OT messianic prophecies (but without emphasis on his pre-existence); (b) the ‘recapitulation’ source, in which Christ is the second Adam and has power over Satan and the demons because he is God’s son, the first-born before every creature (here pre-existence is a central theme). Justin himself makes at least two signi- ficant additions: (i) Pauline testimonies, though these exist in tension with the ‘kerygma source’; (ii) the section on the theophanies.
Skarsaune concentrates-refreshingly-on the thematic content of the traditions he unravels, and in the case of the two main anterior traditions he sees little need to discuss possible Philonic provenance of exegetical material. This is very different in the case of the theme of the divine theo- phanies, which he subjects to a detailed examination.56 The arguments of Trakatellis are weighed and in many (but not all) cases found wanting:57
If there is any influence from Philo on Justin’s treatment of the theophanies, it is at best distant, and mainly operative in some general modes of argument rather than in concrete exegesis of texts. In the latter respect, Justin exhibits a marked independence of Philo, often directly contradicting or ignoring Philonic exegesis.
It would appear, therefore, that Skarsaune joins the majority position of the last 25 years in denying a strong relation between Philo and Justin.
But in the very last paragraphs of the book we are in for a surprise. We read that it is important to recognize the missionary context, i.e. that Jews and Christians were engaged in missionary competition addressed towards Gentile God-fearers. Hence the double phenomenon of close contact with Jewish exegesis and sharp polemic against Judaism. Hence also the exten- sive appropriation of themes from Jewish apologetics.58
5.7 Skarsaune (1987) 2-3, citing Daube (1949), (1953).
54 Skarsaune (1987) 250, and cf. n. 50 above (the formulation here is better).
Fs See the conclusions at 425-434; not all details and nunaces can be given in this summary.
5h Ibid. 409-424. The discussion is explicitly placed in the context of the ‘two gods’ testi- monies (cf. also 209). But insufficient account is taken of possible Rabbinic backgrounds here; the author seems unaware of the fundamental (though sometimes somewhat specula- tive) study of Segal (1977).
57 Skarsaune (1987) 423-424.
5x Ibid. 433434.