This chapter has posed some broad questions about governance arrangements and their impact on the poor. Table 1 summarized the governance dimensions against key dimensions of poverty. It is a crucial first step to assess the ways in which weak governance and corruption are hurting the poor; but it is quite another to move beyond assessment to build a strategy.
An initial assessment of the situation is critical both to understand the problems and to identify opposition and possible allies (more is said on this later). More detailed diagnostics can be built in as reforms progress. In most cases, reforms will start small
and build outward. It is likely that in the course of implementation the underlying problems will themselves be redefined.
Key points:
• Constituencies and political will are essential. Rarely will they be fully developed at the start, but the strategy should aim to build them along the way. To find an entry point and get the process started, there needs to be at least one source of commitment, whether from a civil society group, a legislative, judicial or government body, or a political party. The nature of the constituency will influence what can be done first. If there are only a few stakeholders, the initial work will be limited and it is all the more important to design it so as to appeal to broader interests.
• While champions are key to starting off, a broader constituency is a goal in itself -- no institutional reform program can hope to succeed on the weight of one individual.
• Concrete, if small activities should be carried out early to cement interest among the initial stakeholders and help attract allies--they can convince people of the value of change, reduce fear about its consequences among those who have less to lose than they think, and get potential reformers to start thinking about the underlying governance issues involved.
• While changing a law may do little by itself, in some cases fundamental legal changes (especially in access to information and procedural laws) may provide an organizing framework for concerns about accountability, implementation or service delivery, and thus initiate a wider process of institutional change.
• Certain kinds of institutional strengthening, especially those that provide an organization with information are critical to help its leadership understand and cope with problems. They also provide a means of combating corruption.
• Once the reforms needed have been clarified, it is important to bridge the gap between external stakeholders and the executive (or legislature or judiciary, depending on the locus of reform). Pressure from outside may be an essential ingredient to start the process, but progress will be limited unless the executive or other State entity is clear about what is needed, how to deliver, and has the capacity to do so. Alternatively, reforms may be led from within, in which case those on the inside should communicate their purposes and invite public debate and monitoring of results.
In building a strategy it may be helpful to reflect on some main factors and characteristics of the country’s institutional environment that will strongly shape the possibilities for effective institutional and policy reform and the sequencing of reforms.
Three important factors relate to political commitment, political feasibility, and sustainability. The benefits of reform must outweigh the costs. Meeting all three conditions does not guarantee that a reform will succeed, but it does indicate a higher probability of success. The following points are offered as a guide to teams that are seeking to review their proposed governance reform agenda against the tests of practicability and sustainability.39
Who gains and who loses from the proposed governance changes?
39 This passage draws on Haggarty, Luke, and Matsuda, Yasuhiko, “Assessing Clients’ Commitment to Sectoral Reforms: A Reform Readiness Analysis.” See also the Commitment to Reform Diagnostic at http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/toolkits.htm for further details. This toolkit assesses the political desirability of proposed reforms, the political feasibility—including opposition to this project or to broader reforms inside or outside of the government—and the sustainability of reform, including potential changes in key stakeholders. Also s ee (http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.htm).
To the extent that important elements of the government's support base are negatively affected, political leaders' commitment to reform is reduced. However, to the extent that key groups supporting the government are expected to benefit from the proposed reform, political commitment will be strengthened. Who gains, and who is likely to lose from the proposed reforms? Are any of these groups in the government’s current support base? Are any of the groups that stand to win or lose “swing groups”, i.e., groups that are critical to the government's ability to remain in power and that can credibly threaten to shift their support to the opposition? Within the past 30 years, has there been any attempt at reform in this sector by this government or by a government with substantially the same support base?
Are these changes politically feasible?
Even if the governance reforms are politically desirable, they may not be politically feasible. To bring about institutional change, government decisionmakers must be able to ensure the support and cooperation of other parts of government, which are critical to approving and implementing the reform project—for example, the legislature, bureaucracy, and judiciary. Assessing the strength of opposition to reform is important.
It entails identifying the critical “veto gates,” or institutional junctures, at which particular actors can block the government’s reform initiative. Who within the government needs to approve the proposed reform for its enactment? Who might be opposed to the reform project and why? What change in the design of the reform might win their support?
Which groups outside of government are known to be opposed to the reform?
And which organizations or groups—for example, tax officials, law enforcement agents, government regulators, and clerks—will have to perform tasks to implement the reform?
How are their interests and incentives being taken into account?
Are these changes sustainable?
The issue of sustainability is particularly important for institutional reforms. Reforms have longer gestation periods than policy changes, which can be achieved at the stroke of a pen. The sustainability of governance reform is dependent on whether the current government can expect to be in power, with a reform-friendly support base, long enough to ensure implementation. If a government comes to power that opposes reforms, the key question is whether the new government would wish to continue with them. If the reform benefits certain groups then these groups may be able to pressure the new government to continue the reforms. Alternatively attention may need to be paid to the extent to which powerful private interests can subvert policy.
Strengthening public oversight and other external accountability mechanisms makes an important contribution to sustainability. Which actors in-country are expected to monitor the reform project? And how will the central government be held accountable for results?
Strengthening the formal institutions of accountability (Parliament, Auditor-General, the judiciary and the courts) is critical here, as is ensuring freedom of information and the media. Key to the effectiveness of this approach is increased availability of information on performance of the government and other State bodies. Specifically, information should be disseminated on public spending and procurement, judicial decisions, regulatory activities, and data on public service delivery effectiveness. Surveys of citizens, private firms, and public officials are often helpful in obtaining information on what actually happens at the interface with the state, the extent to which corruption subverts the formal rules, and the areas in which public service delivery is weakest.