Part Two
7.2 Focus on Accounting for Funds
7.2.2 The Offer and Acceptance of Delegations
The bulk of the issues raised about their accountability relationship with government arose from the delegation aspects of the relationship. Respondents felt that what they were expected to deliver was inappropriate. The offer (a contract, or funding
agreement) was perceived to make poor assumptions about client needs or to be poorly designed.
We recently had a request for proposals for another programme. We looked at it and immediately said it is unachievable. There is no way an organisation in our view could do this. It said for example that the outcome of the programme was that 80 percent of people referred to it had to be placed in full time work.
We know from our experience of dealing with unemployed people that it is unrealistic – it can’t be done and it can’t be done the way they wanted it to be done (1.4).
Contracts were defined narrowly in terms of outputs, which restricted the ability of voluntary organisations to focus on the total needs of the clients, or to take an outcomes approach.
Most clients have more than one problem to solve before we can even think about moving them onto something better. They have a drug problem, an alcohol problem, they are in financial trouble, they have been abused and its affecting their approach to life. You have to resolve the basic underlying personal issues with them before you can expect them to get a positive outcome.
To come along [the government department] and say we will put these people over to you, you run a motivational workshop, a needs assessment and help them find a job – its doesn’t always work (1.4).
The price offered for delivery of the contracts also generated much frustration. Price structures were seen not to differentiate by quality of the service provided. All organisations were paid a standard price for services, so there were few incentives to provide a quality service over and above what was specified. Services were part- funded, which the respondents believed signalled limited government commitment to the ongoing provision of the service. Government officials were believed to be most interested in getting the cheapest price.
We spent $10 000 setting up a social service centre that was designed to provide for those sort of referrals…What [government department] has done consistently over the years is to say okay we will buy counselling off you at x dollars. On that basis you hire staff and staff are the worst to move – buildings,
if you have to flog a building because you have to fold the thing up you cry a little but you do it, but where you are in a situation when you are locked into a contract and you don’t get a price adjustment … you constantly see your assets or endowments running at a loss. It puts you in an impossible position (4.7).
Until this year we were subject to a five-year price freeze. During the five years costs went up 15 percent. And yet we were expected to absorb all that and continue to pay our staff competitive rates of pay and continue to be audited for quality of care (1.4).
Respondents felt that officials entered into contract negotiations with a lack of understanding of their organisations, their clients and service provision, a lack of respect for their expertise in service delivery, arrogance in terms of knowing what should be delivered and to whom, and reluctance to listen to the respondents’ advice.
Get in some policy people that are a higher calibre and actually know what it is like to be a provider and actually have some business acumen. They have no idea what things cost, no idea (4.1).
The negotiation was from a position of arrogance from their end. Like we were the enemy – what are they protecting? (2.6).
[A government department] officials do not understand NGOs. It shows in the unrealistic demands about what we can and cannot deliver, about our level of resourcing (2.2).
The people in [a government department] need to recognise that our staff are at the sharp end and know what works and what doesn’t work for these people.
Whereas we tend to find that we are presented with a fait accompli (1.4).
In terms of acceptance of the contract, respondents felt they had little choice. Little negotiation occurred. Officials were perceived to operate on a ‘take it or leave it’
basis.
Shocking, dismal, one sided … They have the power because they have the money. We should be able to say we will do this work for you but in order to do it we need an increase on dollars of this amount and this is the justification.
Any contract I have been involved in should be able to have some negotiation in it. But with government you can’t. They just say sorry there is no more money and that is that (2.3).
It is not contracting in the true sense because they say this is what they are going to pay you (4.6).
Underlying all the comments was the perception that government officials did not, or could not, take the time to understand their business and to see their point of view.
Respondents perceived that officials were not interested in having an ongoing relationship with them. They consequently did not trust the officials they were engaged with. They questioned officials’ and the government’s integrity and long term commitment to the voluntary sector.
If you hook yourself into government policy – we have done it before – and we have ended up being burnt badly (4.1).
The government wants us to do more in the social services area but three quarters of the cost is borne by this organisation so why you think you are making a great contribution to the nation you are actually providing reverse charity to government (4.5).
We are very weary of being dictated to. We are happy to give full and frank accounts of our service but we want to provide a service the way we want to that is best for our clients (1.3).
Majumdar (2004) drew similar conclusions from research considering the experiences of Otago voluntary organisations contracted to the Community Funding Agency (CFA)22. He found that respondents were not so much dissatisfied by the contracting process as with the way CFA officials managed the process. In
22 The Community Funding Agency, the government agency tasked with contracting with voluntary organisations for the provision of social services, became part of the Children, Young Persons and their Families Service in 1999.
particular, respondents reported that they were rarely consulted about policy options and programme design, their suggestions for programme enhancements were ignored, and officials were reluctant to invest in the long term development of their organisations.
[the respondents from the voluntary organisations] were dissatisfied – not so much with the purchase of service contracting per se, as with the way the Community Funding Agency had been managing the contracting process. They were unhappy primarily out of the conviction that … they were rarely consulted by the Community Funding Agency or permitted by it to be involved in setting the policy agenda, determining options, making decisions, and monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes (Majumdar, 2004: 93).