The Restatement of New Testament Mythology by Helmut Thielicke
B. The Permanent Problem of the Mythological Form of Speech and the Attempt to Solve it
I. Mythology as a Form of Thought
We have approached the problem of demythologizing so far on the assumption that there is a real distinction between the form of the New Testament narratives, a form conditioned by the contemporary mythology, and the actual content which the form enshrines.
Our case against Bultmann is not that he makes this distinction, but the method and principles he uses to carry it out. For the criterion he uses to distinguish between myth and reality is the "self- understanding" of the men of the Bible. The unintended result is that the kerygma is
disintegrated into a philosophy. The historical reality of the truth is made relative, true only for a particular age. (If I understand it aright, the HBK memorandum criticizes Bultmann on similar grounds. Our identification with the death of Christ, it maintains, is not merely a present event, but a present event controlled by a real event of the past -- i.e. the dying of Christ: "Bultmann takes over from Heidegger the concept of existence, and uses it to describe the stripping away of illusions and the consequent entry into the authentic human existence. But as far as the historical Christ is concerned, it means no more than the readiness to be conformed with the death of Christ. But this would be meaningless if the significance of the death of Christ rested only on the interpretation placed upon it by the disciples and were not even in the life of Jesus related as an act to his resurrection")
Bultmann’s essay, and indeed the whole problem of demythologizing, must now be put to the test from a further angle. What we have to ask is whether the New Testament narratives are affected by mythology less in their objective aspect than in our subjective way of apprehending and describing religious truth. Or, to put it another way, is not mythology an essential element in human thought, and is it not therefore just as valid an approach to reality as, e.g. that of natural science?
It is the particular merit of the HBK memorandum that it has brought this aspect of the problem to the fore, and its very one-sidedness is all to the good. With a stroke of the pen
demythologizing has ceased to be an historical problem and has become one of epistemology. It is removed, so to speak, from the sphere of the object to that of the subject. The question is then not whether the New Testament can be emancipated from mythology, but whether human
thought can.
This is a veritable Copernican revolution. It is on a level with Kant’s discovery that space, time, and causation are not objective categories but a mode of subjective human apprehension.
Mythology would then be that form of human apprehension which is peculiarly fitted to deal with religious truth.
All this would mean that mythology could not be dissolved by scientific thinking or the scientific world view. The truth of mythology would still hold good despite all the changes in culture and philosophy, just as the human personality remains the same despite all the changes and chances of human life.
When we remember that Bultmann’s starting-point is the tension between mythology and science, it would seem here that we have an entirely new solution to the problem. Both
mythology and science are legitimate approaches to the truth. There is no question of the one becoming outmoded by the other in the process of historical development. The two approaches are complementary. "If this be true, mythology, while it would not be the sole approach to truth, would nevertheless be the sole approach to supra-sensual reality, the only way of describing the inner side of things" (HBK). This means that "mythology has a profounder dimension which is beyond the reach of science, since it is concerned with the underlying significance of things and events.’’ (On the relation between mythology, philosophy, and science, cf. J. J. Bachofen, Der Mythos von Orient und Okzident, Munich, 1926; Leopold Ziegler, Ueberlieferung, Leipzig, 1940; Georg Koepgen, Die Gnosis des Christentums, Leipzig, 1940.)
The best presentation of this idea that mythology is the only adequate expression of religious truth is to my mind that of Bachofen. He says: "The symbol [i.e. mythological symbolism]
awakens intuition where the language of abstraction can only offer rational explanation. The symbol addresses every side of the human spirit, whereas the language of abstraction is bound to confine itself to a single thought. The symbol strikes a chord in the very depths of the soul, whereas the language of abstraction touches only the surface of the mind like a passing breeze.
The one is directed inwards, the other outwards. Only the symbol can combine a wide variety of notions into a single total impression; the language of abstraction, on the other hand, arranges them in succession and presents them to the mind piecemeal, whereas they ought to be presented to the soul at a single glance. Words reduce the infinite to finitude, symbols lead the spirit
beyond the bounds of the finite into the infinite world of abiding truth. (Cf. also Alfred
Baeumler, "Bachofen, the mythologist of Romanticism", in the work of Bachofen quoted above:
"Those who are blind to the depths of mythology had better abandon it altogether.")
It seems to me that these words of Bachofen clarify the purport of the HBK memorandum.
Whenever mythology is translated into scientific and rational terms there is an inevitable loss of meaning and consequent superficiality, which shows the inadequacy of the scientific approach to this kind of truth. And if such is the case, then Bultmann’s demand that we should replace the mythical view of the world by a scientific one falls to the ground.
It will at once be asked whether the mythical description possesses any objective reality. What lies behind it -- an emotion, an existential experience, or an historical revelation? How is justice to be done to the theological concern which lifts the revelation behind the mythology out of the general history of religion? What, for instance, is the difference between the resurrection
narratives and the Dionysus myth? The very fact that mythology is only a form makes it even more imperative to establish the qualitative difference between revelation and religion.
This cardinal problem is ignored by the HBK memorandum. Perhaps this is because it limits itself to discussing the points raised by Bultmann, and because its author has not yet realized the immense amount of work which remains to be done even after Bultmann’s arguments have been disposed of. This further work concerns the relation between theology and myth in general, and the very different subject matter which myth describes.
The difference between the Biblical and non-Biblical conceptions of myth is indeed implicitly recognized by HBK, for it quotes Alfred Jeremias’s definition of Biblical myth: "Myth in the narrower sense . . . is one of the supreme creations of the human spirit. It is the narration of a heavenly process, presented in a definite logical series of motifs reflected symbolically in
objective events." Here is an explicit allusion to a "heavenly process" as the real foundation and background of the mythical narrative. This real foundation affects mythological thought rather in the way that Kant’s Ding an sich affects our capacity for apprehension with its categorical
determination. To put it epigrammatically, myth is not the objectivizing of a spook-like experience, but the subjectivizing -- the intellectual appropriation -- of an objective event of salvation. Here we have the exact equivalent of Jeremias’s heavenly process. Myth therefore employs subjective means derived from the human imagination to describe a reality which utterly transcends consciousness, and which possesses an objective validity in its own right, quite apart from its effects on the disciples and witnesses.
Bultmann’s conception of myth leaves no room for this transcendental element. This is just the criticism which the HBK memorandum levels against Bultmann, especially in connection with the resurrection narratives. These narratives, for all their mythological coloring, do postulate a real event between God and Christ in a sphere beyond all subjectivity and by no means limited to a more or less spiritual process between God and the disciples. "Bultmann assumes a process between God in Christ on the one hand, and the disciples on the other, but not a process between God and Christ. Yet the one really conditions the other. Hence there is a gap which is only
closed by the resurrection of Christ" (HBK).
The HBK memorandum has thus carried the discussion one important step further than
Bultmann. Yet it is to be noted that there can be no theological attitude to the problem of myth which does not take account of what Bultmann says on the subject. Hence we also think it right to advance beyond the criticisms raised by the HBK memorandum and raise a few positive questions for the further discussion of the problem. We shall also try to show the direction the answer may eventually take. But since this is a gigantic task which will demand the co-operation of many theologians, all we can do is to throw out a few suggestions. But those suggestions must be hazarded, if this discussion which has proved so promising hitherto is to be carried further.
II. Important New Tasks in Connection with the Problem of Myth
It can hardly be disputed that mythology is to be sought not only in its effects in history, but above all in the way men think. It therefore exists in its own right.
Moreover, since mythology is essential to the human mind, there must be a kernel of event behind the mythological facade, or at least there may be. Myth and history are not a priori antitheses.
Finally, this means that myth is not to be eliminated, but interpreted. Thus far we agree with Bultmann. But the question is, how is it to be interpreted? Does myth express a timeless philosophy of human life, or is it a real event of salvation history (e.g. the event of the
resurrection), an event to which faith knows itself to be related, and to which it bears witness in the language of mythology? We agree with HBK that the second alternative is the right one, for only that can prevent the kerygma from disintegrating into philosophy. All the same, the relation between myth and history requires further consideration.
(a) The Varieties of Myths
1. There are myths which contain transcendental truth, and which are therefore absolutely indispensable. Such, for instance, are the myths of the creation, the fall, etc. These are to be distinguished from legendary embroidery or mythological ballast derived from other religions outside the Bible.
2. There are myths which are pictorial explanations of certain facts in history. The Virgin birth is an example of this sort of myth. It is, as Schlatter has observed, the symbol of the historical fact that Jesus was the Son of God. These myths must be distinguished from straightforward
historical narratives, which, though they appear to be mythical, are to be taken as literal history.
Many of the miracles belong to this class, and so do the resurrection narratives (though the latter do not fall clearly into one class -- what about the empty tomb? To which class does it belong?).
When we come down to detail the classification is often uncertain, and there will never be unanimity about the point where the line is to be drawn. But that does not mean that we must give up the attempt trying to draw it.
(b) Translation into a Myth Compatible with the Modern World View?
So far during the discussion it has been generally assumed that mythological thought springs from a particular view of the world. Though mythology is in itself timeless, yet the actual imagery it employs is undoubtedly conditioned by the world view current at the time. The question is therefore whether it is not necessary to discover a new mythical expression for the Biblical truths, an expression which will take account of the change which has come about in our view of the universe. It seems to us imperative that we should hold our ground in face of this question. There would seem to be a great deal in favor of it: if there is to be no demythologizing, let us at least have remythologizing! All the more so since, pace Bultmann, whose view of the matter is all too academic, our age is not one of enlightenment. So far from accepting
enlightenment as an ideal, it is consciously, and still more unconsciously, searching for a new myth. Would not the modern myths of spirit, existence, or blood, enable us to present the event of Good Friday in an entirely new light?
(c) No Conclusive answer Possible
We cannot avoid raising this question, but the moment it is asked it is seen to be rhetorical. It is so formidable that it defies solution, as we shall see.
1. What man would be bold enough to attempt to produce an authoritative reinterpretation of the whole of the Bible ? (For nothing less would suffice.)
2. There are many myths in circulation in the modern world. Several new ones arise in every century, and they vary from country to country. But they have one thing in common. They all imply a monistic, immanentist conception of the universe. They leave no room for the element of transcendence. Their aim is rather to convey an understanding of the visible world around us.
Although Schleiermacher does not use the term, the classical expression of this aspect of myth is to be found in his Addresses on Religion. His immanentism is apparent even in his definitions.
Religion, e.g., is contemplation, feeling for the infinite, the universal, etc. His reinterpretation of revelation and miracle as a mode of contemplating the world as it is, is the logical outcome of his immanentism, and typical of the whole of secularized mythology. See especially the Second Address, On the Nature of Religion.)
This raises a further question. The form of modern mythology, as we have seen, has the merit of being compatible with the modern world view. But what about its actual content? Can the
content be detached from the form ? For that content represents immanence as the ultimate truth about the universe. Is it not therefore inherently unsuitable as a vehicle for the Biblical kerygma?
If we tried to use it as such a vehicle would not the Biblical material burst through the very form of the modern mythology? (Again, this can be illustrated by a comparison of Schleiermacher’s Addresses with his Christian faith. The Christian Faith is an attempt to find a rational basis for
the affirmations of Christianity, and it leads him progressively to abandon the mythological form of the Addresses. In the Christian Faith Schleiermacher’s original presuppositions are blown sky- high, and the resultant debris is extremely difficult to survey. Hence the classical controversy as to which is the real Schleiermacher, the Schleiermacher of the Addresses, or the Schleiermacher of the Christian Faith. This is a barren controversy. The Christian Faith is the self-destruction of Schleiermacher’s original mythological presuppositions. That is the immediate, unintended but inevitable result of his attempt to fit the Christian dogmas into his original mythological system. This is the clue to the understanding of the structure of Schleiermacher’s thought. It is not a matter of a change in Schleiermacher’s personal convictions. It is the inexorable
consequence of the material with which he is dealing.)
3. There is a third reason why the modern secular myth is a totally unsuitable vehicle for Biblical truth. That mythology is essentially the outcome of a revolt, the revolt of the "vital gods", or, to quote idealism, the revolt of "the wisdom of the world". Even the terminology of the modern myths must make an act of repentance if it is to become a suitable vehicle for the kerygma. Now, this is exactly what happened to the concept of the Logos, and this is what made that term
acceptable for the Fourth Gospel. But such an act of repentance is impossible for the secular myths. It would involve their self-destruction, as we have seen in the case of Schleiermacher.
This is particularly the case with a myth which, with all its other disadvantages is outspokenly pragmatist and propagandist in character, and which ignores the question of truth to such an extent that it no longer exists even in untruth, but in a chilly no-man’s-land between God and the devil. It is utterly inconceivable that Biblical imagery should be forced into such a straitjacket as this. Where this has happened e.g. in certain modern movements such as German Christianity -- the Christian content does not even burst the straitjacket, but becomes itself demonic.
Our first conclusion, then, is a negative one, and it must be kept in mind throughout the subsequent discussion.
1. It is impossible to translate the Biblical mythology and its associated world view into the language of contemporary myth. In other words, it is impossible to substitute one mythological framework for another.
2. It is impossible to remove the mythology, as Bultmann tries to. In other words, it is
impossible to substitute the world view of modern science for the Biblical mythology by what he calls "interpretation". This is because it involves the substitution of an abstract philosophy of existence for a kerygma rooted in history. We seem to be landed in what looks at first sight like an insoluble dilemma; some would call it a state of bankruptcy. There appears to be no way of modernizing Christianity or of making it relevant to the modern world: it is definitely out of date. This impasse is not to be evaded or made light of, so let us describe it as brutally as we can.
First, there can be no question of getting behind the mythological form of the kerygma by extracting a non-mythical kernel of truth.
Secondly, we must on the other hand not only take the mythology as it stands (that would be possible, since it is the expression of a permanent mode of thought); we must also take the temporal limitations of the mythology as they stand. We must in contrast to the HBK
memorandum assert this dilemma as frankly as we can. And this is where our difficulties really begin. The Church could not afford to ignore the problem of myth. But in facing it she appears to have stirred up a hornet’s nest. She believed that this controversy would set her hands free to use her weapons, but now it seems that she has been disarmed by myth itself.
We seek to advance further by asking two questions. First, what is the real meaning of this
indisputable dilemma? May there not be a theological reason for it? Secondly, what are the tasks which result from this dilemma?
(d) The Theological Meaning of this Difficulty and the Task it presents.
0n I: Of the Meaning of Dilemma.
(α ) The incarnation meant that Jesus entered into time and space, that he became our brother and comrade, (Phil. 2:7; Rom. 8:3) and in so doing exposed himself to the notitia (Notitia is a term used in dogmatics. It is to be distinguished from assensus, and expresses the fact that the earthly manifestation of the Lord is both revelation and concealment. Every manifestation of the Son of Man in time and space is presented to my notitia in such a way that he may nevertheless remain concealed: It is then impossible to make the assent of Thomas: "My Lord and my God"
(John 20:29). Despite the notitia he is not recognized for what he is.) of our capacity to apprehend him. This meant that he entered into the particular form in which our powers of apprehension express themselves -- i.e. by mythology.
We shall of course have to sketch a distinctively Biblical concept of myth, which is as far removed from a general religious experience of existence (Cf. e.g. Walter F. Otto, Die Götter Griechenlands, Frankfort, 1934.) as it is from the pragmatism of the secular myth. The
pragmatism which characterizes the latter often appears in perilous association with the
Christian kerygma, as for instance when it is maintained that for the great majority of mankind the myth must be upheld in its literal concrete form, whether it be true or not, or that the
tradition of the Church must be maintained at all costs. Here as always, only the truth will make us free. Any naive or artificial attempt to bolster up the Church is bound to reap its own reward.
It will leave the Church a prisoner, disarmed and discredited. (I am thinking here of such things as Hellbardt’s incredible exegesis.)
The task of theology is rather to work out an interpretation of any given myth which will express the history which lies behind it. Such an interpretation will be distinct from the timeless
abstraction of the bare symbol and from the cyclical view of time which characterizes pagan mythology. It may be asked whether myth thus interpreted could be described as myth in any