POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS 83 among the group members, thus affecting their behavior in both positive and neg- ative ways.
According to the rational choice approach, workers weigh the costs and benefits in material terms to maximize the gains accruing from their contribution. In this case, the workers adopt an effort level consistent with their belief that eventually the rewards will surpass their investment. Rational employees, in deciding whether to invest personal effort or avoid making it, will usually take into account such situational factors as the size of the group and whether the supervisor is able to discern the individuals’ efforts or contributions to the task. They will consider to what extent they are dependent on the other group members in fulfilling the task, how dependent they are on this employment, and what the current conditions are of the labor market. The investment of effort is then a function of some or all of these factors (cf. Knoke, 1990).
Unlike the economic approach, the normative approach maintains that indi- viduals act in accordance with the values and social norms of the team. That is, if the norms relating to investment of effort, fairness, and distributive justice are high among the members of the group, they are more willing to invest effort and make individual contributions toward the attainment of collective output. Another approach, which attempts to explain why individuals contribute to collective activ- ity in an organization, emphasizes the emotional ties developing among the team members. According to this approach, individuals’ motivation to invest effort stems from the emotional ties to the others in the team, and it increases as the group’s identity develops. We return to the antecedents related to social loafing in chapter 7.
POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS
harm. Nonetheless, many researchers suggest that whistle blowing is an act of good citizenship (cf. Dworkin & Near, 1997) and should be encouraged and even rewarded. Proponents of this approach maintain that whistle blowers should be pro- tected both by organizational sanctions and the law (Near & Miceli, 1995). Protec- tion, they argued, is necessary because often the organization considers the whistle blower as an outcast—an employee who broke the ranks and should be castigated.
Whistle blowing is often viewed as misbehavior: Employers consider this prac- tice as a subversive act and sometimes take vicious retaliatory steps against the perpetrators (Near & Miceli, 1986). Such employers may argue, for example, that even when instances of unethical behavior are discovered, they should be dealt with internally. Near and Miceli’s research indicates that whistle blowers reported that they were more likely to suffer retaliation if they did not have the support of their superiors, if the reported incident was a serious matter, and if they used external channels to report the wrongdoing. Of course retaliation by the organization is even harsher if it is not highly dependent on the whistle blower, if the charges are deemed frivolous, or if there are no alternatives to the activity in question. We can clearly see a pattern of escalation of OMB: An improper act is committed in or by the organi- zation, and a member decides to defy organizational norms of loyalty and discloses the wrongdoing to an external stakeholder. As a result, the organization commits further misbehavior by taking retaliatory actions against the whistle blower.
Organizational whistle blowing behavior is on the rise for the following reasons:
First, shifts in the economy are closely related to the increase of more educated, more skilled, and more socially aware employees in the workforce. Second, the economy has become information intensive and information driven. Third, access to information and ease of disseminating it leads to whistle blowing as an unantici- pated outcome of these shifts (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Furthermore, this type of disclosure by members represents a new and fast growing form of employee resistance that can become quite costly for organizations, such as in the widely publicized case of exposing unethical addiction-producing practices in the tobacco industry.
Because of its nature, it is difficult to determine the prevalence of whistle blowing. Rothschild and Miethe (1999) provided some interesting information.
Using a national sample of U.S. working adults, they found that 37% of those surveyed observed some type of misconduct at work and that, of those, 62% blew the whistle. However, only 16% of the whistle blowers reported the misconduct to external stakeholders, whereas the vast majority elected to disclose the information only to the internal authorities. Rothschild and Miethe justifiably concluded that, when faced with clear incidents of organizational misconduct, the vast majority of members remain silent observers—only about 25% of the whistle blowers do so to external agents. Thus, in any organization a sizable portion of employees are aware of, or at least have the potential of knowing about, substantial waste, fraud, and crime in the workplace.
Two of the most prominent researchers and writers on whistle blowing, Miceli and Near (1997) viewed it as antisocial OB. An early definition ofwhistle blowing
POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS 85 is the disclosure by present or past employees of practices under the control of their employing organizations that they believe to be illegal, immoral, or illegiti- mate to persons or organizations believed capable of effecting action relevant to the disclosure (Near & Miceli, 1985).Antisocial organizational behaviormeans an act intentionally performed by a member of an organization directed toward an individual, group, or organization with the intent to cause harm. For whistle blowing to qualify as antisocial behavior according to this definition, it must be pursued with the intent to inflict damage or harm others. This behavior then is consistent with OMB Type D (Vardi & Wiener, 1996), and it is also regarded as an act of retaliation or revenge (Miceli & Near, 1997). We may expect that it is this type of whistle blowing that would be mostly met by reprisals or punitive action on the part of the employing organization. Such whistle blowers are considered to be dissidents rather than reformers raising a voice of concern and motivated primarily by pure intentions to help the organization improve itself (Near, Baucus,
& Miceli, 1993).
The aptly titled volume, Whistle Blowing: Subversion or Corporate Citizen- ship?(Vinten, 1994) accurately reflects the debate among scholars regarding the nature and moral justification of whistle blowing. Vinten provided a working def- inition for the act: “The unauthorized disclosure of information that an employee reasonably believes is evidence of the contravention of any law, rule or regulation, code of practice, or professional statement, or that involves mismanagement, cor- ruption, abuse of authority, or danger to public or worker health and safety” (p. 5).
Undoubtedly there is a built-in asymmetry between the actor (the whistle blower) and the target (the organization). Thus, there is a greater need to protect the actor who, whether committing an act of citizenship or revenge, exposes wrongdoing, thereby contributing to the welfare of others often at great personal sacrifice. The organization, which is by far more powerful in every way, should accommodate this action, although at first it may be construed as misconduct or an act of disloyalty.
The dilemma facing the whistle blower was clear to De George (1986), who suggested three criteria for what he deemed morally justifiable whistle blowing: (a) The organization, left to its own devices, will inflict some damage on its employees or the public at large; (b) the wrongdoing should first be reported to an immediate superior, emphasizing the moral concern of the would-be whistle blower; and (c) if, after reporting the misconduct to superiors within the organization and exhausting internal procedures, the phenomenon persists and no action is taken, whistle blowing to external agents is regarded as good citizenship behavior.
A starker picture was portrayed by James (1984). He vividly and bleakly de- scribed the risks involved when employees choose to blow the whistle on their employers. His description supports the view that whistle blowing is considered an act of OMB by the organization. Whistle blowers almost always experience some form of retribution. In for-profit organizations, they are most likely fired. In addition, they are likely to be blacklisted and often leave their organization with damaging letters of recommendation. In not-for-profit organizations and public utilities, where management may not have the discretion to dismiss them, they are
likely to be transferred, demoted, or denied promotions and bound to have their pro- fessional reputation shattered in the process. Worse yet, because whistle blowers are perceived by employers as a threat, they are often attacked on a personal ba- sis, including threats to their families. Typically they are branded and treated as traitors, receive negative publicity, and are framed as troublemakers, disgruntled employees, or publicity seekers. In short we believe organizations do not go the distance against their own personnel unless they view their behavior as extremely damaging and a serious breach of acceptable behavior.
When faced with such high risks, two alternative propositions with regard to the motivational forces that affect an employee’s decision to engage in this type of misbehavior (as defined from the organizational perspective) should be evaluated.
Somers and Casal (1994) suggested examining this issue from the commitment- behavior perspective. This allows for alternative propositions with regard to the expected relationship between organizational commitment and the propensity to blow the whistle. One alternative is that individuals who are highly committed (loyal) to their organization are less inclined to blow the whistle and thereby damage it. The second alternative is that committed employees identify strongly with their organization and are willing to blow the whistle when they believe such an act benefits the organization. The results of the Somers and Casal study, drawn from about 600 management accountants, reveal an inverted-U relationship.
Namely, individuals with moderate levels of organizational commitment are the most prone to act as whistle blowers.
Is the intention to blow the whistle predictable? An interesting attempt to an- swer this question empirically was reported by Ellis and Arieli (1999). Because of the unique military setting, in lieu of the term whistle blowing,the authors referred to this behavior as reporting administrative and disciplinary infractions.
Conducted among male combat officers of the infantry of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the officers’ conduct as information transmitters was assessed. Specifically, the researchers examined the extent to which organizational norms of conduct and individual attitudes toward these norms influence (predict) officers’ decision to inform their superiors or remain silent and allow observed irregularities to go unchallenged. The military advocates reporting and promotes a culture that pro- mulgates the need to and virtues of complete honesty and accountability; it also provides personnel with a number of official channels through which any individual can transmit such information through appropriate channels. At the same time, the IDF also inculcates values of extreme loyalty to one’s unit. Such strong values of loyalty often influence the intention to pass any information that might endanger the unit’s reputation. Moreover, there are fairly strong social mechanisms in place that negatively sanction violation of such codes. Thus, any officer engaging in such con- duct faces a dilemma between extreme feelings of loyalty to the unit and the moral obligation to divulge any knowledge of irregularity to the military authorities.
Using hypothetical scenarios, Ellis and Arieli (1999) tested assertions derived from Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) reasoned action theory to predict officers’ choice
POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS 87 of conduct (see further discussion of the role of reasoned action in chap. 6). It was expected that the intention to report is predicted by the officer’s attitude toward the act of reporting (a rational attitude based on instrumental considerations) and a strongly internalized norm of expected behavior (beliefs by significant others).
Regression analyses indicate that the norms were stronger than the attitudes in accounting for whistle blowing. In simpler terms, this means that officers who intend to report irregularities do so because of strong identification with prevailing values.
In summary, social influence and organizational culture appear to be extremely important influences on whistle-blowing behavior. For this type of job-related conduct to move from being considered as OMB to a normative form of conduct, it must first be integrated into the organization’s cultural value system and then become an essential part of the socialization process—of learning the ropes.